F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH August 19, 2005
PATRICK FISHER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
GINA L. MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 03-2276
AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF NEW
MEXICO, INC., doing business as
AAA New Mexico,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-01-1372 WFD/ACT)
Whitney Warner (Repps D. Stanford, with her on the briefs), of Moody & Warner,
P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
Charlotte A. Lamont (Sarah K. Downey, with her on the brief), of Bannerman &
Williams, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, McKAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Gina L. Miller filed suit against AAA New Mexico, alleging disparate
treatment on the basis of gender and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ADEA), and
retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, and New Mexico state law. She also
asserted a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (EPA), along with
state law claims for breach of an implied employment contract and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed Ms. Miller’s
discrimination, retaliation, and EPA claims on summary judgment. 1 Her implied
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims
proceeded to trial, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The court declared
a mistrial, and subsequently entered judgment as a matter of law on behalf of
AAA New Mexico. Ms. Miller appeals the district court’s rulings. We affirm.
I
Ms. Miller’s two basic contentions on appeal are that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law to AAA
New Mexico on her various claims. Our standards of review of these two
1
During proceedings before the district court, Ms. Miller stipulated to the
dismissal of her age discrimination and associated retaliation claims. Hence, we
will not discuss them further.
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judgments are highly similar and require that we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Coldesina v. Estate of Simper, 407 F.3d
1126, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing grant of summary judgment de novo,
and construing facts in light most favorable to non-moving party); Tyler v.
Re/Max Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing
judgment as matter of law de novo, and viewing evidence and inferences drawn
therefrom in favor of non-moving party). Under these required standards, the
record reflects the following.
Ms. Miller began working for AAA New Mexico 2 in August 1996 as a part-
time traffic reporter. Her position was officially classified as “senior clerk” and
she was paid on an hourly basis. 3 Ms. Miller reported directly to Brenda Yager,
manager of the Public and Government Affairs (PGA) department. At the start of
her employment, Ms. Miller received a copy of the AAA New Mexico Handbook
which detailed that her employment was at-will. The handbook also contained a
2
AAA New Mexico is the wholly owned subsidiary of AAA Club Services,
Inc. AAA Club Services, Inc., in turn, is the wholly owned subsidiary of the
Automobile Club of Southern California. The Automobile Club of Southern
California oversees the work of AAA organizations in New Mexico, Hawaii,
Texas, and California.
AAA New Mexico has both hourly and salaried employees. Salaried
3
employees are deemed to hold “regular” positions and can be full-time or part-
time. However, only regular employees receive benefits. When Ms. Miller began
her employment with AAA New Mexico, she understood that as an hourly
employee she was not entitled benefits.
-3-
disclaimer stating in part: “This at-will employment relationship may not be
modified by any oral or implied agreement. No provision of this employee
handbook, including the Involuntary Termination section . . . or of any Club
policies shall create any contractual obligations inconsistent with the at-will
nature of the employment relationship.” App., vol. VII at 1369-70.
About three months after Ms. Miller began working for AAA New Mexico,
Ms. Yager asked if she would be interested in working extra hours performing
public relations duties at her current rate of pay. Ms. Miller agreed.
Acknowledging the extra duties Ms. Miller had assumed, Ms. Yager gave her
permission to call herself a “Public and Government Relations Specialist.” Ms.
Yager also had Ms. Miller distribute a memorandum to the rest of the AAA New
Mexico staff indicating she had taken on additional duties, in conjunction with
her traffic reporting duties, in the department. 4
Sometime during the early part of 1997, Ms. Miller asked Ms. Yager
whether she was working outside the scope of her official job description as a
4
At some point during her employment with AAA New Mexico, Ms. Miller
also began to refer to herself as “lead traffic reporter.” Ms. Yager did not object
to Ms. Miller using this title. While Ms. Miller was not in charge of the other
traffic reporters, she did take on the responsibility of scheduling and training the
other reporters, as well as maintaining a resource notebook for the department.
She also had “direct contact with affiliates . . . [and] she was actually responsible
for working with them to put together their contracts.” App., vol. II at 274. This
included filling in forms from AAA New Mexico’s legal department, and then
having any final negotiations approved by Ms. Yager.
-4-
part-time traffic reporter/senior clerk, and whether she was being paid
appropriately. As Ms. Miller eventually testified at trial, Ms. Yager agreed that
she was “working outside [her] job description at the time, and . . . agreed that the
position should be graded higher, classified at a higher rate of pay.” Id., vol. III
at 640. In response to Ms. Miller’s query as to how or whether this could be
rectified, Ms. Miller testified Ms. Yager told her
not to worry, because the company was going through some changes
and they were actually getting ready to evaluate positions throughout
the company and that there was a good chance that the position was
going to be reclassified, in fact, would be reclassified at that time
and graded at a higher . . . rate.
Id. at 642.
In April 1997, Ms. Yager had Ms. Miller fill out two different job
questionnaires for a job study. One questionnaire was for her position as part-
time traffic reporter, and the other was to detail her public affairs duties. Ms.
Yager stated that the questionnaires were to be used by human resources in the
California main office to evaluate and reclassify positions. 5 She expected the
5
All of AAA New Mexico’s human resources functions were housed in and
provided for by the Automobile Club of Southern California. The parent
organization set “all of the human resource policies, benefits, compensation,
salary grades, [and] titles,” id., vol. IV at 855, 1032, for its subsidiary companies.
In order for Ms. Yager to create a regular salaried position within her department,
she was required to seek permission from her direct supervisor to request human
resources perform a job evaluation study. She could not unilaterally decide to
reclassify a position or create a regular benefitted post. Rather, if the business
(continued...)
-5-
review and reclassification process would take “a few weeks . . . maybe two to
three months at the most.” Id. at 643. Ms. Miller anticipated that when the job
study reclassification process was complete, she would receive increased
compensation for her work.
The job study was completed in September 1997, but to both Ms. Miller’s
and Ms. Yager’s dissatisfaction, the study did not “actually take the information
that Ms. Miller provided and determine whether or not her title was correct or she
was being paid correctly.” Id., vol. IV at 868. Rather, the study used the job
questionnaires to perform a comparison between the different state AAA offices
under the auspices of the Automobile Club of Southern California to ensure the
current positions in the state offices were similarly ranked. 6 It was not the type of
“true job study” Ms. Yager had expected or what she “was originally told . . . was
going to happen.” Id. at 867. Ms. Yager was unhappy with the results of the
study, and continued to affirm to Ms. Miller that she thought Ms. Miller was
performing duties outside of her job classification, and should be better
5
(...continued)
needs of the department warranted reclassifying a position or creating a new one,
a request could made for such, but any final job creation or classification decision
had to be ultimately approved at “the executive level.” Id. at 1037, 1064; id., vol.
VI at 1325-26.
6
As a result of this company wide job study, Ms. Miller’s official
classification was changed from “senior clerk” to “clerk, intermediate.” This
change did not affect Ms. Miller’s hourly pay rate.
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compensated. Ms. Yager promised Ms. Miller she was going to follow up with
human resources and look into the problem.
On January 9, 1998, Ms. Yager sent a letter to her then direct supervisor,
Steve Lenzi, urging the review of the staffing needs in her department, especially
Ms. Miller’s position. Referring to the work Ms. Miller was performing as both a
public relations assistant and a traffic reporter, she wrote that “[t]wo positions
exist in the public and government affairs department . . . that need to [be]
evaluated for correct title and salary grade.” Id. at 874; id., vol. VI at 1279. She
informed Mr. Lenzi she believed the current titles and grades were inappropriate
and asked that the positions be upgraded. She also noted that an upgrade of the
two positions would impact Ms. Miller, who was then working about thirty-five
hours a week. Mr. Lenzi gave Ms. Yager permission to contact human resources
to request they perform an evaluation of her department’s needs as well as the
positions for possible upgrading.
Ms. Miller further testified that during the winter of 1998, Ms. Yager
assured her she was continuing her conversations with human resources and that
Ms. Miller “would receive an upgrade and be reclassified based on the
information that [Ms. Yager] had received from her management.” Id., vol. III at
657-58. Ms. Miller testified she believed an “upgrade” meant “a new job title,
the correct job description,” id. at 658, and a “regular” position with full benefits,
-7-
in which she worked thirty-five hours a week. Id. at 657-58. She further testified
that Ms. Yager stated the upgrade would happen “soon, within a few weeks or a
few months.” Id. at 659. However, Ms. Miller was unable to testify as to the
exact date of the upgrade, or the exact salary she would receive upon that date.
Id.
In the meantime, Ms. Yager’s supervisors indicated to her that it would be
easier to provide wage increases to her employees than to go through the process
of creating regular posts. Ms. Yager testified she was informed that in order to
create regular posts in her department “a job study would have to be done, and
that it was a very lengthy process, and if I was looking at providing increased
compensation immediately, [a pay raise] was the way to do it.” Id., vol. II at 282.
Ms. Yager would rather have gone through the process of obtaining regular
positions, but she nonetheless increased Ms. Miller’s wage to $10.00 an hour.
Upon determining that one of the employees who also received a raise had just
joined the company and had been trained by Ms. Miller, Ms. Yager increased Ms.
Miller’s hourly rate to $10.50, retroactive to the date of the $10.00 wage
increase. 7
When Ms. Miller began her employment with AAA New Mexico in August
7
1996, she earned $7.50 an hour. In February 1997, her wage was increased to
$7.90 an hour. Then, in March 1998, her wage was raised to $10.00. She
subsequently received the additional raise to $10.50 an hour, retroactive to
(continued...)
-8-
All of Ms. Miller’s male colleagues in the PGA department were also
classified as “clerk, intermediate” and worked in hourly part-time positions.
There only appears to be one instance, during a three month period in 1997, when
a male co-worker earned eight cents an hour more than Ms. Miller. 8 Between
1998 and the spring of 2000, however, no male in Ms. Miller’s department
received an hourly wage that surpassed hers.
In November or December 1998, Leigh Matthewson, Ms. Miller’s mother,
began working in the PGA department as a contract employee doing public affairs
work. Ms. Yager eventually hired her in May 1999 in a hourly position with the
official classification of “clerk, intermediate.” At the time she was hired, Ms.
Matthewson said she was interested in a position with benefits but Ms. Yager
informed her she did not have a regular benefitted position to offer her. At trial,
Ms. Matthewson testified she agreed to work for AAA New Mexico because of
her understanding that the position she would be filling was in the process of
being upgraded to a regular post. She was unable to identify a specific date upon
7
(...continued)
February 5 of that year. On February 28, 1999, her hourly rate was further
increased to $10.68.
8
In her response to AAA New Mexico’s motion for summary judgment, as
well as on appeal, Ms. Miller makes no reference to this apparent disparity, and
instead asserts that her Title VII discrimination and EPA claims are based, in part,
on the disparity in wages between her hourly rate and that of the men in her
department from 1998 to 2000.
-9-
which the position would in fact be upgraded, or a date on which she would start
receiving benefits.
In February 1999, Ms. Yager informed Ms. Miller she was still working on
obtaining the upgrade. Ms. Miller testified Ms. Yager “had promised that the
upgrade process was ongoing and that [the upgrade] would happen.” Id., vol. III
at 675. Ms. Yager, Ms. Miller, and Ms. Matthewson participated in a number of
brainstorming sessions during which they discussed how they hoped the
department might be reorganized in light of the potential upgrades. Throughout
this process, Ms. Yager testified she told the two women
“you know, I don’t know how much input, how much say I’m going
to have. But certainly, let’s talk about some things that might be
workable. And if I have input, then that’s good. Then I’m armed
with better information and with how we think things might work
best [for our department].”
Id., vol. IV at 946.
In May of that year, Ms. Yager included two regular positions in her 2000
budget proposal. In submitting her budget request to her general manager, she
noted that “[i]n the 2000 budget, I’ve upgraded [Ms. Miller’s] and [Ms.
Matthewson’s] positions to regular employees rather than hourly. They already
are working the hours (35 and 40 respectively) but they are not currently getting
benefits. This is the one item that I would like to protect above others.” Id. at
891; id., vol. VI at 1285. Ms. Yager testified that her manager agreed to honor
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her request. 9
On July 1, 1999, Ms. Yager again met with Ms. Miller and Ms. Matthewson
to discuss the status of the 2000 proposed budget which included the two regular
positions. Ms. Miller’s trial testimony indicated Ms. Yager informed the women
“[t]he upgrades were imminent. They were going to come through any time . . . .”
Id., vol. III at 678-79; id., vol. IV at 892. Ms. Yager testified that “I didn’t say
that was the final word. But yes, I said it was looking good, that at least at this
juncture, we had a long ways to go in the budget, but at least as of this juncture,
they were in the budget.” Id., vol. IV at 891-92. She also testified that “human
resources temporarily approved for the use of [the titles of Public Affair
Specialists] on business cards. And I actually said to them that they may not be
the job titles that we end up with, but for right now, they’re fine.” Id. at 892; id.,
vol. III at 678-79. Ms. Miller and her mother were “absolutely elated because
[Ms. Yager] said the positions were approved or going to be approved, just within
a short period of time . . . .” Id., vol. IV at 991.
Around this time, Ms. Miller raised the question of whether she would
receive retroactive pay for the public affairs work she had already performed for
the PGA department. She testified Ms. Yager was not clear on the answer to this
Ms. Yager testified that in the last two budgetary years she had requested
9
the addition of a regular benefitted position in her department, but that her request
was denied on both occasions.
-11-
question, but would look into it for her. Ms. Miller said Ms. Yager “believed I
should receive retroactive compensation for the time that I have worked outside
of my job description; that I had clearly been working out[side] of my job
description for years . . . and that she believed I should receive retroactive
compensation.” Id., vol. III at 681, 772. However, at trial Ms. Miller also made
clear she had “never testified that anyone told me I was going to receive
retroactive compensation.” Id. at 773. Ms. Yager also testified that upon being
asked by Ms. Miller whether she would receive retroactive pay, Ms. Yager
responded it “was highly unlikely that the company would consider that, but [she]
wasn’t going to discount anything . . . .” Id., vol. IV at 950.
Despite Ms. Miller’s and Ms. Matthewson’s belief that the position
upgrades would occur soon after their July meeting with Ms. Yager, nothing
happened. Later that month, Ms. Miller contacted a member of the human
resources department in California and inquired as to the status of the job review
process. She was informed the process had not yet begun, but that “[a]ll positions
in New Mexico (as well as Texas and Hawaii) are going to be evaluated hopefully
this year.” Id., vol. VI at 1287; id., vol. III at 683. Ms. Miller was “shocked and
dismayed” at this response because it was her understanding that the upgrades
“were just around the corner.” Id., vol. III at 683. Ms. Miller testified that in
asking Ms. Yager about the delay, Ms. Yager assured her that “there was no
-12-
problem at all with the upgrade. The upgrade was going to take place. It was
simply a matter of the timing . . . .” Id. at 684.
Ms. Yager met with Ms. Miller and her mother again in late September
1999. She said she was sorry the process was taking so long, but “[s]he was not
clear about a time line . . . because she couldn’t get a time line from human
resources.” Id. at 687. In an effort to garner more information about the job
evaluation process, Ms. Matthewson contacted human resources in October. The
response from the human resources staff member indicated that
[a]s far as I know, those positions are being looked at and it is
expected that they will be upgraded to reflect more of your current
duties. Those positions will not be even looked at until next month
sometime, and should be completed prior to January. When the study
is done it is expected that they will include the items you mentioned
including job description, status and compensation. . . . Since they
have not even been started yet, it is hard for me to give you much
more info. Our compensation department will be working on them
along with your local management and Public Affairs management
here in California. Hope this helps – currently I don’t have more
definitive answers.
Id., vol. VI at 1289; id., vol. III at 689. Ms. Miller and her mother were “shocked
[and] upset,” id., vol. III at 689, by the response, and could not understand why
the process was taking so long “especially when [Ms. Yager] had adamantly said
that she had submitted all the paperwork necessary and that the job upgrade was
just around the corner . . . .” Id. at 690.
Ms. Yager was equally “devastated” to learn the upgrade review process
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was so delayed. Id., vol. IV at 894. She testified it was her “understanding, at
least in the fall of 1999, that [human resources] was, in fact, working on [the]
positions,” id. at 893, and it was her belief that completion of the process “was
imminent.” Id. at 894. Her perception from speaking with staff in the human
resources department was that “everything was on track for the job study to be
completed by the end of the year.” Id. at 947. Hence, she was “upset” to learn
that the process “had not even been started yet.” Id. at 894. It was very
important to her that the regular positions be created because she had “been
telling Ms. Matthewson and Ms. Miller that the process was happening and it
would be soon” and “that the job study would be completed by the end of the
year.” Id.
Ms. Yager had another meeting with Ms. Miller and her mother during the
first week of November to further discuss the upgrade process. Ms. Yager
confirmed that at the meeting Ms. Miller stated she “thought the company was not
treating her equitably . . . it wasn’t fair . . . [and] was discriminatory.” Id., vol. II
at 289. In an affidavit, Ms. Miller also stated she
knew that the traffic reporters were paid nearly the same that [she
was], but the traffic reporters did not perform any “lead” traffic
reporting duties and did not perform public affairs specialist duties.
It seemed very unfair and [she] could not find any other explanation
for these differences except [her] sex . . . . [She] complained to [Ms.
Yager] that [she] thought what the company was doing was
discriminatory, that it was not right, and that it was unfair.
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Id. at 340; see also id. at 289-90 (Ms. Miller stated her “pay was unfair compared
to the men in the department”). Ms. Yager informed the Human Resources
department that Ms. Miller “thought she was being treated unfairly, that she was
being discriminated against, and that she thought she was being treated differently
than male employees.” Id. at 290.
On November 17, Ms. Yager met with Alice Bisno, her then direct
supervisor, and two other members of the human resources department, to discuss
her request to create two new regular positions in her department. While Ms.
Yager had previously discussed the upgrade requests with Ms. Bisno, the meeting
“was the first time [they] actually talked about possible ways to reorganize” the
department. Id., vol. IV at 896. Ms. Yager testified that her understanding of the
purpose of the meetings, as well as her request for upgrades, was to move the jobs
from “hourly position[s] to . . . regular position[s].” Id. at 897. She did not recall
ever directly engaging in a conversation about eliminating Ms. Miller and Ms.
Matthewson’s hourly positions, nor was a “conscious decision” ever made in this
regard. Id., vol. I at 156. Rather, she and her colleagues “looked at what the
business needs of the operation were and we decided that those two part-time
positions were not serving the needs of the department and that we needed two
full-time positions. And it was my understanding that that’s what the two
employees were requesting as well.” Id.; see also id., vol. II at 298-300; id., vol.
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IV at 898-99. 10
On December 15, 1999, Ms. Miller and her mother again met with Ms.
Yager to inquire as to the status of the review process, and whether they would be
classified as regular employees by Christmas so that they could take paid vacation
over the holidays. Ms. Yager “told [them] there was no news . . . that the upgrade
process had still not been completed, and it would be maybe sometime in January
before . . . she could give [them] a final [report] on the upgrade completion.” Id.,
vol. III at 694. Ms. Yager apologized to the women for length of time it was
taking to complete the process. Ms. Miller testified that “she said, ‘I believe what
the company is doing is morally wrong, and I don’t agree with it, and I’m really
sorry. And if you can just hang on a little bit longer, it’s going to come through.
I promise you.’” Id. at 696.
After the holidays, Ms. Miller testified that Ms. Yager was unable to
provide the two women with any further information about the job evaluation
process. Ms. Miller stated that upon asking Ms. Yager “when [she and her
mother] could expect the upgrade . . . her response . . . was ‘I have no idea. I
have no idea.’” Id. at 702. On January 31, 2000, Ms. Miller again met with Ms.
Yager. At that meeting, Ms. Yager indicated that
10
Ms. Yager also affirmed that she was not in charge of how the upgrade
process would proceed, and that “every step of the way, [she called] human
resources and follow[ed] their direction.” Id., vol. VI at 907.
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she didn’t have any further answers for me at that time. She told me,
encouraged me to talk to human resources about all of my concerns,
because she didn’t feel like she could answer those questions. She
still told me that the upgrade was a certainty. That wasn’t the issue.
The issue was when it was going to be completed. . . . And then . . .
we talked about the retroactive compensation . . . . [a]nd she said that
she thought that I should receive the retroactive compensation.
Id. at 706.
Soon after that meeting, Ms. Miller and her mother learned they would be
meeting with Ms. Yager and Ms. Bisno to address their employment concerns. In
preparation for the meeting, Ms. Miller sent a memorandum to Ms. Bisno stating
she hoped Ms. Bisno could “provide a detailed status report on our forthcoming
job upgrades.” Id., vol. II at 379. She noted that while she understood the new
job title for the upgraded position would be “Public Affairs Specialist II,” she still
had “no idea of the job responsibilities and parameters” of the position. Id. She
further inquired as to what the “‘grade’ classification and salary band” was for the
proposed new post. Id. She also stated “[i]n that it is illegal to do so, how am I
to continue performing daily job duties outside of my classification, as I’ve done
for over three years, without any promise of good faith or compensation on the
part of the company?” Id. at 380.
Ms. Bisno, along with Ms. Yager, met with Ms. Miller and her mother in
New Mexico on February 10, 2000. Ms. Bisno informed the women that as a
result of the job study, their current part-time hourly positions were being
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eliminated, and replaced by two new full-time regular positions. At that time,
neither Ms. Bisno nor Ms. Yager knew “what the compensation for the position[s]
would be.” Id., vol. III at 714.
Pursuant to AAA New Mexico policy, the new positions had to be posted
and Ms. Miller and her mother would have to apply for them. 11 They were
encouraged to apply for the new positions, but were also told there were no
absolute guarantees they would be selected. The women were informed they
would not receive any retroactive pay for the public relations duties they had
performed under their “clerk, intermediate” titles. Id. at 717. Nonetheless, Ms.
Miller stated that Ms. Bisno “said she would promise to investigate our concerns
and our complaints about discrimination.” Id., vol. II at 347. 12
11
Ms. Yager testified she asked Clarence Sandy, a human resources staff
member for the Automobile Club of Southern California who was assigned to
human resources for AAA New Mexico, about the posting process for the new
positions. He informed her Ms. Miller and her mother would have to apply for
them. She indicated Ms. Miller and Ms. Matthewson would probably be unhappy
to learn about the posting requirement, but he responded “[t]hat it was company
policy that any new position in the company needed to be posted.” Id., vol. II at
299; see also id. at 302.
There existed only two exceptions to AAA New Mexico’s new job posting
requirement. First, if an individual’s position was “being phased out through the
Staff Reduction Program,” id. at 389, “they have to be given first consideration,
[and second,] . . . if someone is returning from a medical leave, then they’re also
given first consideration.” Id., vol. VI at 1042; id., vol. II at 389.
Ms. Bisno testified her initial understanding of Ms. Miller and her
12
mother’s concerns regarding “discrimination” was that “perhaps other employees
were being treated better.” Id., vol. II at 327. She stated she knew the women
(continued...)
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Ms. Yager was involved in drafting the job descriptions for the new
positions. She maintained that they were not written with any one person in mind
but instead were based on the business needs of her department. As she testified
at trial, she and her colleagues
looked at the needs of the department and wrote the job description around
that. And when [she eventually] shared the job description with [Ms.
Miller], [she] told her . . . “We can’t write this job description specifically
for you, because when you leave the company, then we have a job
description that fits you but not the needs of the business. And so what we
have to do is write the job description so it fits the need of the business and
choose the most qualified candidate.”
Id., vol. IV at 925. She also testified that if Ms. Miller had applied for job, she
would have considered her for the position because she “was the most qualified
candidate.” Id. at 927. She commented that
[e]ven though . . . there were additional things in the job description
that [Ms. Miller] hadn’t done before, I felt that it was something that
she could do. She could learn many of those things that she hadn’t
done in the past, and even though we were changing the focus of the
job from . . . the primary focus before was traffic reporting and we
were actually changing that to become a very minor part of the job
and the public affairs piece was the greater piece, I felt [Ms. Miller]
could do the job.
Id., vol. II at 300. Ms. Yager also noted that while the new position required
12
(...continued)
were dissatisfied with issues regarding their pay, benefits, and job titles. Id. at
322. However, it was not until after both Ms. Miller and Ms. Matthewson left
AAA New Mexico that she came to understand their claims of discrimination
were grounded on “some protected basis.” Id. at 322, 327.
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some heavy lifting, she had previously made accommodations for Ms. Miller in
this respect in her hourly position and would do the same in the new job.
The new jobs were not merely reclassified positions representing the work
previously being performed by Ms. Miller and her mother. Rather, they included
“everything they were doing plus things.” Id., vol. IV at 903, 918. Ms. Yager
noted that her department’s needs included positions in which the employees
could devote more hours to their tasks as well as perform additional job duties.
For example, she needed someone to act as an advocate on behalf of the company.
Ms. Yager commented that “[w]e analyze information, and based on the
information we analyze, propose legislation. So I certainly wanted [someone
doing legislative advocacy work].” Id., vol. II at 294. She also stated she needed
“someone to be able to synthesize, research and be able to come up with programs
based on research.” Id.
In regard to the position best suited for Ms. Miller, Ms. Yager testified
there were several aspects of the new job Ms. Miller did not perform as an hourly
employee. 13 In reviewing the job description for the new post, Ms. Yager noted
Ms. Miller
13
When asked to compare Ms. Miller’s performance of public affairs duties
against that of a job description for a similar regular post at the Automobile Club
of Southern California, Ms. Yager testified that under that job description, Ms.
Miller was not fulfilling all the duties that would be expected of a full-time
regular Public Affairs Specialist.
-20-
wasn’t developing strategic approaches to project assignments. She
was doing limited research and investigation. She was not providing
technical authoritative information resource. She was not . . .
[c]omp[iling] and synthesiz[ing] information . . . . [S]he was not
evaluating “research findings and interpret[ing] for policy
development.” She was not tailoring “research results to become
[an] advocacy tool in [the] public forum. She was not recommending
“strategies and issues to management for policy development.” She
was doing very limited “influenc[ing] and persuad[ing] policy of
affiliate organizations.” . . . She was not . . . [acting as an] “advocate
within coalitions to further organizations, member and insured
interests.” She was not interpreting and refining “policy
incorporating affiliate and organizational feedback.”
Id. at 294-95. None of these tasks had previously been assigned to Ms. Miller in
her hourly position. Rather, Ms. Yager had been performing the tasks herself.
Likewise, there were duties inherent to a regular public relations position, like
being on-call for the company, that Ms. Miller was not performing.
Ms. Miller and her mother sent a memorandum to Ms. Bisno soon after the
February 2000 meeting outlining their understanding of what transpired and
asking a series of follow-up questions. Id., vol. VI at 1298-1300. Nothing in the
memorandum alleged discrimination based on protected status. On February 24,
Ms. Bisno informed Ms. Yager and the other human resources staff members
involved in the restructuring of Ms. Yager’s department that she
did not intend to respond to the memo . . . it’s all the same issues
discussed at our meeting in New Mexico. The employees simply do
not like the answers they got and, until we come to some resolution, I
don’t intend to change them and don’t see much value in repeating
them.
-21-
Id., vol. II at 381; see also id. at 332.
In early March 2000, Ms. Miller had a meeting with Clarence Sandy, the
human resources staff person assigned to AAA New Mexico, to “address some of
[her] concerns over departmental inequities as they relate to job title, description,
status, compensation and benefits.” Id. at 384. In a follow-up memorandum
memo to Mr. Sandy, Ms. Miller noted that all the male traffic reporters hired in
the PGA department had started at higher rates of pay than her starting rate of
pay, even though they came to the job “with little or no broadcast experience.”
Id. at 385. She further asserted that
I currently make a few cents more per hour than the two other Traffic
Reporters I trained and continue to manage, both men. I perform
“LEAD Traffic Reporter” operational duties while wearing the
second hat of “Public Affairs Specialist,” while these other
employees do nothing more than come and go to report traffic on a
part-time or back-up basis.
Id. While she understood that “club policy on compensation and benefits can vary
widely from department to department within the company,” id. at 386, she
nonetheless believed that “this type of arbitrary allocation [where she was
working 35 hours a week, but still being paid as a part-time hourly employee]
appears unusual in [her] experience and because it is arbitrary – inherently
discriminatory.” Id. 14 She also stated that as a result of the company’s
14
Ms. Matthewson sent a similar e-mail message to Ms. Yager on March 13,
(continued...)
-22-
“inequities and inconsistencies . . . in compensation,” she
felt particularly exploited. It’s led me to believe, after having
forthrightly expressed my concerns to [Ms. Yager] over the years
about compensation, lack of communication and direction, etc., that
the treatment I’ve received in this department as to compensation and
the denial of benefits, is egregiously unfair, retaliatory and
discriminatory.
Id. at 385.
In response, Mr. Sandy testified that “none of [Ms. Miller’s] statements . . .
would fit ‘discriminatory’ because hourlies don’t have benefits unless you became
a regular employee.” Id., vol. I at 214. He also testified that in response to Ms.
Miller’s allegation as to discriminatory payment practices in the PGA department,
he examined the departmental file but found Ms. Miller was making more than
any of the other men in her department. Hence, he determined there was “really
nothing there to support [a] discrimination [charge].” Id.
14
(...continued)
2000, stating she and Ms. Miller were
disadvantaged as compared to you and the majority of AAA New
Mexico employees who enjoy full benefits. . . . Of course, it is easy to
see that the results of these inequities have created a condition which
results in discrimination. I would think that the company would want
to administer their wages and benefits consistently from department to
department to eliminate the injustices [Ms. Miller] and I have
suffered.
Id. at 382. Ms. Matthewson was eventually dismissed from her position. Ms.
Yager testified that Ms. Matthewson was insubordinate and created a hostile
working environment by refusing, among other things, to perform certain job
duties asked of her.
-23-
Ms. Yager usually met with her staff for annual employee evaluations in the
early spring, but she did not engage in a performance review with Ms. Miller in
February 2000. She testified that Ms. Miller’s
performance had not been good, but I certainly understood, and
wanted to be fair to her. She was very upset about the situation and I
understood her being upset with [the new job creation process]. It
took longer than any of us had ever anticipated, and I didn’t think it
would be fair to her to do an evaluation at that point. . . . [S]he had
spent all of her time writing all of these memos [regarding the
position evaluation process] and doing all this stuff . . . [so] I didn’t
think that [it] was fair to review her in this time period.
Id., vol. II at 304-05. She also noted that within a week of the meeting with Ms.
Bisno, Ms. Miller protested being evaluated in light of her unresolved questions
regarding the reorganization of the department and the new public affairs
position. Ms. Yager did perform an evaluation, however, for one of the men in
the department, who subsequently received a wage increase.
Ms. Miller declined to apply for the new position. At trial, she explained
I knew that they wanted me out, and they were going to get rid of me
no matter what. So I knew they had already made up their minds,
that no matter what hoops I jumped through to apply for this
position, I was not going to get the position. But beyond that . . . I
would have not been eligible for the position by a couple of criteria.
Id., vol. III at 738-39. In particular, Ms. Miller contended she did not meet two
of the qualifications listed for the new post: a minimum of five years experience
and a lifting requirement. Therefore, she thought that even if she applied for the
post, it would not have been offered to her. Ms. Yager testified to the contrary
-24-
that Ms. Miller was “way over” qualified for the position in light of her work
experience prior to joining AAA New Mexico. Id., vol. IV at 923. Moreover, as
referenced earlier, the company had already made accommodations to Ms. Miller
regarding her lifting limitations, and would have done the same for her in the new
post.
In light of Ms. Miller’s decision not to apply for the new position, Ms.
Yager contacted Mr. Sandy, who informed her that “once the full-time position
was filled . . . the other position . . . would end.” Id., vol. II at 310. After a
number of conversations between Ms. Miller and Ms. Yager, it was decided that
Ms. Miller’s last day of work would be May 5, 2000. Ms. Miller ended her
employment with AAA New Mexico on that day. After screening applicants for
the newly-created position, AAA New Mexico offered the job to a female
applicant. That applicant declined the company’s offer. AAA New Mexico then
offered the position to a male, Dan Ware, who accepted the job at an annual
starting salary of $35,000.
Ms. Miller filed this action in federal district court against AAA New
Mexico. As relevant to this appeal, she claimed the company discriminated
against her in violation of Title VII and the EPA. She specifically alleged AAA
New Mexico did not adequately pay her for the work she was performing as
compared to the compensation of men in her department, and that the company
-25-
paid the man who was offered the new position substantially more than she had
been earning doing the same job. She also asserted she suffered retaliatory
discharge under state and federal law when the company, in response to her
allegations that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her sex,
eliminated her position and forced her to apply for the newly created position.
Finally, she brought New Mexico state law claims for breach of implied contract
and breach of the covenant of good faith and dealing. These claims were
premised on her assertion that AAA New Mexico promised she would
automatically be placed in the upgraded position, but had, in bad faith, failed to
do so.
A magistrate judge handled the initial stages of Ms. Miller’s litigation,
including the discovery process during which Ms. Miller and the company had
some disputes. AAA New Mexico eventually moved for summary judgment on all
of Ms. Miller’s claims. The district court granted summary judgment on Ms.
Miller’s Title VII and EPA discrimination claims as well as her federal and state
retaliation claims. The remaining claims proceeded to trial. After both parties
presented their evidence, AAA New Mexico moved for judgment as a matter of
law. The district court reserved its ruling on this matter and the case was
submitted to the jury. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the court
declared a mistrial. The company renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of
-26-
law, which the district court subsequently granted. Ms. Miller now raises a host
of challenges to the district court’s rulings.
II
In order to address Ms. Miller’s challenge to the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on her discrimination and retaliation claims, we must also
disentangle a knotty discovery issue Ms. Miller raises. She requests that we
reverse a ruling of the magistrate judge denying her motion to compel AAA New
Mexico to produce specific documents and answer interrogatories. On appeal, she
contends the evidence denied to her by the magistrate judge’s ruling undermined
her ability to sufficiently challenge AAA New Mexico’s motion for summary
judgment. Ms. Miller’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s ruling is thus
inextricably intertwined with her challenge to the district court’s summary
judgment ruling.
As we discuss in more detail throughout this section, we determine the
district court implicitly rejected Ms. Miller’s challenge to the magistrate judge’s
ruling. So doing, and in the course of concluding the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to AAA New Mexico, we also conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Ms. Miller’s challenge to the
magistrate judge’s decision. Because our resolution of Ms. Miller’s discovery
-27-
claim is best understood in light of our examination of the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, we will address her challenges to the summary judgment
ruling and intersperse within our analysis the relevant aspects of her discovery
issues.
As mentioned earlier, “we review a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the district court.” Coldesina, 407 F.3d at
1131 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV .
P. 56(c). “When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001).
A. Title VII discrimination claim
Pursuant to Title VII, Ms. Miller alleged she was compensated worse than
similarly situated male employees. We apply the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), framework for evaluating Title VII claims. See
Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); Bullington
v. United Air Lines, 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other
-28-
grounds sub nom. by Boyler v. Cordant Techs., Inc., 316 F.2d 1137, 1140 (10th
Cir. 2003). Under McDonnell Douglas, Ms. Miller is required to first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. In this context, we have stated “a female Title
VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that
she occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males.” Sprague v. Thorn Ams.,
Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Meeks v. Computer Assocs.
Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994)). The district court determined Ms.
Miller failed to make out a prima facie case. We agree.
Ms. Miller contends there was a disparity in pay between what she received
and how the other men in the PGA department were compensated. She also
claims there was a disparity in compensation between what she was paid for doing
public affairs duties and what was paid to the man who was hired for the new
position. She has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination with
respect to either of these claims.
First, Ms. Miller has not shown that she was paid less than any of the other
men in the PGA department. As noted earlier in the opinion, she and her male
colleagues in the PGA department were all classified in the same manner and
none of the men in the department ever earned more than she did barring a three
month period in 1997 during which one man earned eight cents an hour more.
Ms. Miller makes no effort to undermine these facts. Instead, she argues that
-29-
because she was performing additional public affairs duties as well as serving as
“lead traffic reporter” for the PGA department, her rate of pay should have been
substantially higher than that paid to the men in her department, who were only
performing traffic duties. While this may be true, her argument is not that she
was working the same hours as these men during which time she was doing far
more work but only getting paid marginally more. Instead, the record reflects she
was working thirty-five hours a week while the men in her department were only
working fifteen hours a week. 15 While it is uncontested Ms. Miller performed
more duties than the men in her department, she worked more hours than they did
and was compensated at a slightly higher rate than they were. Hence, Ms. Miller
has not shown she “occupied a job similar to that of higher paid males.” Id.
Nor can Ms. Miller establish her prima facie case by arguing there was
disparity in the pay she received and that paid to the man who accepted the new
post. She essentially argues she was replaced by Mr. Ware, who then earned
substantially more than she did for performing the same work. On these grounds,
she appears to argue she was treated less fairly than a similarly situated employee.
But Ms. Miller and Mr. Ware were not similarly situated employees
because they held two different positions. First, Ms. Miller was an hourly part-
15
In her March 2000 memorandum to Mr. Sandy, Ms. Miller commented
that the male employees “do nothing more than come and go to report traffic on a
part-time or back-up basis.” Id. at 385; see also Aplt. Reply Br. at 21-22.
-30-
time employee who performed a variety of traffic reporting and public affairs
duties. Conversely, Mr. Ware filled a newly-created, full-time, regular position.
Second, while there is no question Ms. Miller performed some of the duties that
were included within the job description for the new post, the record indicates
there were a number of central components of the new job that Ms. Miller did not
perform in her capacity as “clerk, intermediate.” Her case is similar to the female
employee in Sprague who took on some advanced duties similar to those
performed by other higher paid men in her company, but could not show that she
“de facto” held the same position as the men. Id. at 1359, 1363. In like fashion
to the employee in Sprague, Ms. Miller cannot show she was similarly situated
with Mr. Ware such as to make out a discrimination claim. Her status as an
hourly employee and the duties she performed in that position are not sufficiently
similar to the position held by Mr. Ware. We therefore agree with the district
court’s conclusion that Ms. Miller failed to make a prima facie case of gender
discrimination. 16
16
Ms. Miller’s additional contentions regarding her alleged adverse
treatment also fail. She asserts her starting pay in 1996 was less than that paid to
men who joined the PGA department between 1998 and 2000. While this is true,
none of the men during this time ever had hourly wages that surpassed Ms.
Miller’s. Second, she points to one instance in which a male employee in the
PGA department received an employment evaluation and raise in 2000, while she
did not. However, the record indicates Ms. Yager’s decision not to engage in an
employee evaluation with Ms. Miller in 2000 was in response, in part, to Ms.
Miller’s own protest that such an evaluation would be unfair in light of the
(continued...)
-31-
In order to so conclude, we must return to the thorny discovery question
intertwined with Ms. Miller’s summary judgment challenges. This requires us to
detail some of the earliest stages of Ms. Miller’s litigation against AAA New
Mexico.
The majority of the pre-trial proceedings in Ms. Miller’s action were
conducted before a magistrate judge. During the course of discovery, a dispute
arose between Ms. Miller and AAA New Mexico. On November 15, 2002, Ms.
Miller filed a Combined Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and
Production of Documents and Motion for Sanctions against the company. On
December 2, AAA New Mexico filed its response. It asserted that Ms. Miller’s
requests for discovery had been overly broad, and that it had long since objected
to them. The company noted that five and a half months after it had objected to
her discovery requests, on October 31, 2002, Ms. Miller sent a letter to AAA New
Mexico outlining her specific disagreement with the company’s discovery
objections and demanding a response in five days. By that point in time, the
discovery cutoff date of October 25, 2002 had passed and the magistrate judge
had denied a motion to extend discovery. The company had advised Ms. Miller
16
(...continued)
outstanding questions regarding her proper job classification and duties. Finally,
Ms. Miller makes vague reference to an equally vague notation found in Ms.
Yager’s notes regarding the job evaluation process stating, “sex change.” App.,
vol. II at 311. None of these things are sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of gender discrimination.
-32-
that it intended to respond but could not do so in the stated time frame. It pointed
out that it had responded to Ms. Miller’s letter on November 20, attempting to
narrow or resolve the discovery disputes, but Ms. Miller had not replied to the
letter. Given these circumstances, AAA New Mexico objected to Ms. Miller’s
motion to compel and for sanctions as untimely. It then reiterated some of its
prior objections regarding the breadth of Ms. Miller’s requests and also offered to
produce some additional documents. In her Reply, Ms. Miller agreed to some of
AAA New Mexico’s requested limitations regarding the breadth of a few of her
requests but also continued to make certain objections to the company’s refusal to
produce some information.
On December 23, 2002, prior to entry of any decision on Ms. Miller’s
motion to compel and for sanctions, AAA New Mexico moved for summary
judgment. Ms. Miller filed an additional motion for sanctions on December 26.
On January 21, 2003, the magistrate judge denied as untimely Ms. Miller’s motion
to compel and for sanctions, as well as her second motion for sanctions. The
court cited Local Rule 26.6, which requires a party to file a motion to compel
within twenty calendar days after a response. That “[r]ule states that ‘failure to
proceed within this time period constitutes acceptance of the objection.’” App.,
vol. II at 217. The magistrate judge also denied the motions for sanctions as
untimely, pointing out the discovery cutoff date of October 25, 2002. Id.
-33-
On January 30, 2003, Ms. Miller filed a motion with the district court
pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 72(a) objecting to the magistrate judge’s denial of her
motion to compel. The next day, she filed her brief in response to the company’s
motion for summary judgment. That document included the following language:
Ms. Miller has a motion to compel pending which seeks additional
discovery responses, including the personnel files of the males [sic]
traffic reporters and the public affairs specialist, which could create
additional factual support for [t]his Response if granted. Ms. Miller
requests supplemental briefing of these issues if her motion to
compel is granted.
Id. at 248. Throughout the rest of her summary judgment response, however, Ms.
Miller never explicitly stated what additional evidence she needed from AAA
New Mexico in order to sufficiently challenge its request for summary judgment.
In February, AAA New Mexico responded to Ms. Miller’s objection to the
magistrate judge’s ruling on her motion to compel and for sanctions, disputing her
claims that she had acted diligently in seeking additional discovery from the
company on an informal basis. Ms. Miller filed a reply. The record does not
reflect anything further regarding this matter until June 24, 2003, when the court
filed the final pre-trial order. The pre-trial order contained a section asking
whether there existed any discovery matters of which the court should be aware.
In response, the following appeared: “Yes, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s
denial of her motion to compel and motion for sanctions . . . . The additional
discovery Plaintiff seeks relates primarily to comparable and similarly situated
-34-
employees.” Id. at 414.
In a telephonic hearing on July 11, 2003, the district court addressed what
it described as Ms. Miller’s Motion for Discovery Sanctions. The court stated it
had “considered the materials submitted in support and opposition” to the motion.
Aple. App. at 6. It then focused on AAA New Mexico’s belated production of
two memorandums from Ms. Yager, which it characterized as “extremely relevant
to the issue of breach implied employment contract.” Id. at 7. Concluding that
AAA New Mexico did not intentionally delay in producing the Yager
memorandums, the court declined to grant monetary sanctions but did order the
company to produce Ms. Yager for a supplemental deposition.
During the hearing, the court also indicated to the parties it was planning to
grant summary judgment on the sex discrimination, retaliation, and EPA claims.
At one point, the court addressed the parties and stated, “[i]f there are any
discovery disputes, I do not want those matters to fester . . . . So do you have any
questions of me?” Id. at 9. Ms. Miller’s attorney did not mention the motion to
compel nor did she object to the court’s verbal indication of its intention to grant
summary judgment to AAA New Mexico on the basis that she needed further
discovery. On July 28, the district court issued its partial summary judgment
ruling in favor of the company.
On appeal, Ms. Miller requests that in light of the district court’s failure to
-35-
respond to her Rule 72(a) objection, we reverse the magistrate judge’s denial of
her motion to compel. For the following reasons, we decline to do so.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), magistrate judges have the authority
to enter discovery rulings. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir.
1997). “Review of the magistrate judge’s ruling is required by the district court
when a party timely files written objections to that ruling, and the district court
must defer to the magistrate judge’s ruling unless it is clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.” Id. Ms. Miller timely objected to the magistrate judge’s
discovery ruling, but there is no indication the district court explicitly ruled on
her objections to the denial of her motion to compel. Nonetheless, we may
properly construe a district court’s failure to address arguments raised in a Rule
72(a) objection “as an implicit denial of those arguments” and a refusal to
overrule the magistrate judge’s order. Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393
F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB,
205 F.3d 208, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2000). Based on our review of the record, we are
convinced the district court implicitly denied Ms. Miller’s Rule 72(a) challenge.
During the course of the district court’s telephonic hearing on Ms. Miller’s
sanction requests, the court stated it had reviewed all the materials in support of
and opposition to her requests for sanctions. The record indicates Ms. Miller’s
initial motion for sanctions was combined with her motion to compel. The parties
-36-
engaged in significant briefing in regard to this initial motion, as well in response
to Ms. Miller’s additional sanctions request. The magistrate judge’s ruling
addressed both of Ms. Miller’s requests for sanctions as well as her motion to
compel. In her Rule 72(a) objection to this ruling, Ms. Miller challenged the
denial of both her motion to compel and her motions for sanctions. She also
mentioned her pending motion to compel in her response to AAA New Mexico’s
motion for summary judgment, albeit in a very general manner. Likewise, the
pre-trial order indicates Ms. Miller again raised her outstanding discovery issues.
Taken together, we are convinced the district court was duly apprised of the scope
of Ms. Miller’s arguments relating to both her motion to compel and her motion
for sanctions. Given the court’s denial of her motion for sanctions in conjunction
with its subsequent order granting AAA New Mexico summary judgment on a
number of the claims implicated by her discovery requests, we conclude the
district court’s silence on Ms. Miller’s motion to compel was a conscious and
implicit denial of her discovery requests and a refusal to overrule the magistrate
judge’s order. See Hill, 393 F.3d at 1116; Alpine View Co., 205 F.3d at 219-20.
On appeal, Ms. Miller asks that we reverse the magistrate judge’s ruling.
In light of our conclusion that the district court implicitly rejected her motion to
compel, it is more appropriate for us to determine whether the district court
abused its discretion in so doing. See Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d
-37-
944, 952-53 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547,
1550 (10th Cir. 1995)) (court of appeals will not set aside district court discovery
rulings absent abuse of discretion). In this regard, “[s]uch an abuse will occur
only when the judge renders ‘an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable’ judgment.” Id. at 953 (quoting Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control,
165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999) (further internal quotations and citations
omitted)). 17
We also note that if Ms. Miller’s true goal in challenging the denial of her
17
motion to compel was to reopen discovery so as to garner additional evidence
before the district court’s summary judgment ruling, she should have filed an
affidavit pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(f) seeking a continuance and explaining
why she could not currently present facts to justify her opposition to the
company’s motion. Ms. Miller concedes she did not file such an affidavit. Aplt.
Reply Br. at 26. Her failure to do so further undermines her challenge to the
magistrate judge’s discovery order, as well as her challenge to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to AAA New Mexico.
Ms. Miller nonetheless argues that taken as a whole, her discovery
pleadings, the statement regarding the pending motion to compel in her response
to AAA New Mexico’s motion for summary judgment, and her Rule 72(a)
objection are sufficient to satisfy Rule 56(f). We do not agree. Rule 56(f) “may
not be invoked by the mere assertion that discovery is incomplete or that specific
facts necessary to oppose summary judgment are unavailable.” Pasternak v. Lear
Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 833 (10th Cir. 1986). Moreover,
unverified statements in attorney memoranda, including a response opposing
summary judgment, are not sufficient for a Rule 56(f) continuance. Comm. for
the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992). Ms.
Miller’s other attempts to halt the district court’s summary judgment ruling are
insufficient to square with our precedents.
We have held that “[w]here a party opposing summary judgment and
seeking a continuance pending completion of discovery fails to take advantage of
the shelter provided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, there is no abuse of
discretion [by the district court] in granting summary judgment if it is otherwise
(continued...)
-38-
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly
denying Ms. Miller’s Rule 72(a) objection. As discussed above, the court had
before it all of the arguments and materials it needed to make this determination.
Included within these materials was Ms. Miller’s response to AAA New Mexico’s
motion for summary judgment, in which she included only a very limited
statement indicating that the personnel files of the other male traffic reporters in
the PGA department as well as the personnel file for Mr. Ware, the man who held
the new job, might “create additional factual support” for her summary judgment
response. App., vol. II at 248. The statement in the pre-trial order was similarly
limited. See id. at 414. Ms. Miller provided no details in these materials
regarding how her opposition to AAA New Mexico’s motion for summary
judgment was undermined by the lack of additional discovery, nor did she file an
affidavit pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(f). Under these circumstances, we cannot
say the district court’s implicit rejection of Ms. Miller’s motion was “arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Cummings, 365 F.3d at 953.
(...continued)
17
appropriate.” Pasternak, 790 F.2d at 832-33; see also Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773
F.2d 1073, 1082 n.10 (10th Cir. 1985) (listing cases). Hence, even if we were to
determine the district court did not implicitly deny Ms. Miller’s Rule 72(a)
motion to compel in the course of making its sanctions ruling and granting
summary judgment to AAA New Mexico, Ms. Miller’s failure to comply with
Rule 56(f) would also undermine her challenge on appeal.
-39-
B. EPA claim
Ms. Miller contended AAA New Mexico violated the EPA because it paid
her a lower wage than members of the opposite sex doing equal work. To make a
prima facie case under the EPA, Ms. Miller
has the burden of proving that (1) she was performing work which
was substantially equal to that of the male employees considering the
skills, duties, supervision, effort and responsibilities of the jobs; (2)
the conditions where the work was performed were basically the
same; (3) the male employees were paid more under such
circumstances.
Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1364 (quoting Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406,
409 (10th Cir. 1993) (further citations omitted)). We agree with the district
court’s determination that Ms. Miller failed to make out a prima facie case.
Ms. Miller’s EPA claims mirrored her Title VII claims. She asserted the
men in the PGA department were better compensated than she, and that Mr. Ware
was paid more than she was for a substantially similar position. As we discussed
above, the evidence indicates Ms. Miller was paid a higher hourly wage than all
the men in her department. Her comparison of her work with Mr. Ware’s job is
equally faulty.
When addressing the “equal work” requirement of the EPA, we do not
construe it broadly. “[W]e have stated that failure to furnish equal pay for
‘comparable work’ or ‘like jobs’ is not actionable.” Id. (citations omitted).
Instead, “in order to prevail in such an EPA action, the jobs must be substantially
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equal in terms of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.” Id.
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Again, much like the employee in
Sprague who performed some but not all of the duties of higher paid male
employees, id. at 1364-65, the same can be said of Ms. Miller. As we have
thoroughly discussed, the record makes clear that while Ms. Miller did perform
some of the duties that were included in the newly created post, she did not
perform all of those duties. She simply has not made a prima facie case that the
jobs were substantially similar. As with the Title VII claim addressed above, we
conclude the district court did not err in its summary judgment ruling, or abuse its
discretion in impliedly rejecting Ms. Miller’s Rule 72(a) motion.
C. Retaliation claim
Finally, Ms. Miller claimed AAA New Mexico retaliated against her by
eliminating her hourly position and forcing her to apply for the new post after she
had complained of sex discrimination. In order to state a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was engaged in protected
opposition to discrimination; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, City & County of
Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1314 (10th Cir. 2005); Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064,
-41-
1070-71 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Co-op, Inc.,
850 P.2d 996, 1006 (N.M. 1993) (setting out New Mexico state law requirements
for retaliatory discharge claim). Once a plaintiff establishes her prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to offer a facially legitimate rationale for the
adverse action. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show the
employer’s explanation is pretext. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071. The district court
determined that Ms. Miller failed to make her prima facie case because there was
not a sufficient causal connection between her complaints of discrimination and
the elimination of her position and application requirement for the new post. The
court also held Ms. Miller had failed to show the company’s decision to perform a
job study, create two new regular positions, and eliminate her hourly part-time
position, was pretextual. We agree.
We find no real contest regarding Ms. Miller’s assertions that she satisfied
the first two prongs of the prima facie analysis for retaliation claims. The record
indicates that in early November 1999, during a meeting with Ms. Yager, Ms.
Miller first stated she “thought the company was not treating her equitably . . . it
wasn’t fair . . . [and] was discriminatory.” App., vol. II at 289. Lodging a
discrimination complaint is protected activity for retaliation claim purposes. See
O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001); Archuleta
v. Colo. Dep’t of Insts., Div. of Youth Servs., 936 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1991);
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Martinez v. City of Grants, 927 P.2d 1045, 1053 (N.M. 1996). Likewise, the
elimination of Ms. Miller’s hourly position, along with the company’s failure to
promote her as allegedly promised, constitute adverse employment actions.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (“A tangible
employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”); Duncan,
397 F.3d at 1314 (“An adverse employment action must be materially adverse to
the employee’s job status. The adverse action must amount to a significant
change in employment status, such as firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.”) (quotation omitted). 18
The evidence also indicates that soon after Ms. Miller stated she believed
18
We note that generally, “[i]n order for a plaintiff to assert that her
employer retaliated against her by failing to hire, rehire, or promote her, that
employee must have applied for the position she was denied.” Stover v. Martinez,
382 F.3d 1064, 1072 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, Ms. Miller did not apply for the new
position. But at this point in our analysis, we are not entirely convinced this fact
wholly undermines her retaliation claim. Even if Ms. Miller could not assert that
AAA New Mexico’s failure to promote her was an adverse employment action,
her hourly position was terminated. Moreover, her retaliation allegations appear
to go hand in hand, rather than to be mutually exclusive. It was the final action of
AAA New Mexico in restructuring the PGA department, in which Ms. Miller’s
current hourly position was eliminated and she was required to apply for the new
job which supposedly had the same duties as her former post, that was the alleged
retaliatory act committed by AAA New Mexico.
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she was being treated in a discriminatory fashion, Ms. Yager and Ms. Bisno met,
on November 17, 1999, to begin discussing how the PGA department might be
reorganized to include two new full-time regular positions. During the course of
these meetings and into January 2000, it was decided that Ms. Miller’s hourly
position would be eliminated, and she would have to apply for the newly created
position pursuant to AAA New Mexico policy. This decision was announced to
Ms. Miller in early February 2000, three months after her first articulated
allegations of discrimination. It was not until after Ms. Miller decided not to
apply for the new position and it was determined her last day at AAA New
Mexico would be May 5, 2000, however, that her hourly position was eliminated.
The district court determined Ms. Miller failed to show a causal connection
between her complaints of discrimination and the adverse employment actions she
suffered. We agree, although on a slightly different timeline. The district court
reasoned Ms. Miller began to complain of adverse treatment in March 1998, but it
was not until May of 2000, nearly two years after her initial allegations of unfair
treatment, that Ms. Miller’s position was eliminated. On these grounds, the court
determined that a sufficient temporal proximity was lacking between Ms. Miller’s
allegations of unfair treatment and her job termination. We draw a more narrow
time frame.
Ms. Miller certainly expressed discontent from at least March 1998, and
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throughout her employment at AAA New Mexico, regarding her compensation,
job title, and work duties. But it was not until early November 1999 that she
made any specific allegations regarding being treated in an unfavorable manner
because of her sex. Within that same month, Ms. Yager and Ms. Bisno initiated a
series of meetings to discuss how to restructure the PGA department and
eventually settled on the elimination of Ms. Miller’s hourly position and the
creation of a new post for which she could apply. Ms. Miller was informed of
these facts in February 2000, and in May of that year her hourly position was
eliminated at the conclusion of her employment with AAA New Mexico. Hence,
instead of a two year window of time between Ms. Miller’s general complaints
about her treatment and her departure from the organization, as found by the
district court, there exists a six month window between Ms. Miller’s allegations
of discrimination based on her sex and the elimination of her post. Even within
this more narrowly circumscribed timeline, however, Ms. Miller failed to satisfy
the causal connection prong of her prima facie case.
We have held “[t]he causal connection may be demonstrated by evidence of
circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected
conduct closely followed by adverse action.” Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan.,
Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982). However, “unless the [adverse action]
is very closely connected in time to the protected activity, the plaintiff must rely
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on additional evidence beyond mere temporal proximity to establish causation.”
Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson
v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999)). In Meiners, we
determined that a “six-week period between protected activity and adverse action
may be sufficient, standing alone, to show causation, but a three-month period,
standing alone, is insufficient.” Id. Here there exists a six month window
between Ms. Miller’s allegations of sexual discrimination and the elimination of
her hourly position. This alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case, and
Ms. Miller does not point to much other evidence to support her cause.
Ms. Miller generally argues that the slow progress of the job review process
led her to “suspect that something unlawful accounted for the delay.” Aplt. Br. at
39. That seeming unlawfulness was connected to Ms. Miller’s perception that she
was being compensated less favorably than the men in her department. But her
own suppositions regarding the delay in the job review process are not sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Cf. Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d
790, 798 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2000) (employee’s own perceptions of lack of fair
treatment insufficient to state Title VII claim); Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 220 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff cannot create a triable
issue of fact by making an assertion without supporting facts.”); Jones v. Denver
Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753-54 (10th Cir. 2000) (manager’s perception of
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employee performance is relevant for demotion claim, not employee’s own
evaluation of performance). She also argues that AAA New Mexico effectively
“scrapped its promise” to upgrade her and “then set about finding a way to get rid
of [her] . . . without it looking illegal.” Aplt. Br. at 40. A review of the record
negates this argument.
Long before Ms. Miller raised her concerns regarding discrimination, Ms.
Yager had been advocating for changes in the PGA department. In particular, and
in large measure due to Ms. Miller’s inquiry as to whether she was being
appropriately compensated for her work, Ms. Yager sought to obtain two regular
employees in her department to perform public affairs duties, rather than having
the work done by part-time hourly employees. During a series of depositions, Ms.
Yager was repeatedly questioned regarding the process of deciding to eliminate
Ms. Miller’s hourly position and to create a new post in its place. Ms. Yager
consistently testified that
[t]here wasn’t a conscious decision to eliminate positions. It was
looked at what the business needs of the operation were and we
decided that those two part-time positions were not serving the needs
of the department and that we needed two full-time positions. And it
was my understanding that that’s what the two employees were
requesting as well.
App., vol. I at 156. When asked the same question later, Ms. Yager responded:
“I don’t think my answer is any different to that question. We had two hourly
positions which . . . were not meeting the needs of the department, and so when
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we looked at all the information, we knew that full-time positions were needed.”
Id. When questioned yet again as to why she did not just seek to upgrade the
positions rather than create two new posts, she stated
I don’t see that as a separate entity. When we looked at the tasks that
were currently being done and the tasks that needed to be done, and
we knew that the part-time hours were not enough, we knew that the
employees were upset by being in part-time positions, we looked to
see what would serve the needs of the department to the best of our
ability.
Id. at 209. 19
Ms. Bisno was posed with a similar series of questions, and responded in
kind. She stated that the decision to eliminate the two hourly positions was made
at the time that we were evaluating what we needed to do for public
affairs in AAA New Mexico, what kinds of positions we needed.
And since the determination was that we needed – we wanted two
full-time positions rather than two part-time hourly positions, that’s
when the discussion was started . . . . [T]he plan when we started
developing [it] was that we were not [going to] have hourly
positions, we were [going to] have full-time positions.
Id., vol. II at 326. When pressed as to why they eliminated the hourly jobs rather
than reclassifying their status from hourly to regular, she stated
While Ms. Yager may have expressed a desire and intent to have Ms.
19
Miller serve in the regular position once it was created, the record indicates that it
was “company policy that any new position in the company needed to be posted,
and that [Ms. Miller] would have to apply for the position[].” App., vol. II at
299. When Ms. Yager learned of this fact, she knew Ms. Miller would be
disappointed and upset, but Ms. Yager “thought it was just a matter of policy so
[she] didn’t think it was an unfair or unreasonable request to make.” Id. at 300.
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[b]ecause . . . aside from the hours, the positions were different. We
looked at not only what we were doing, but what we needed to do,
where we had to be in the future, and what the responsibilities of the
positions ought to be. And they were not the same as we had under
the current arrangement. So they were different enough. And
constantly in conversation with our hierarchy, with Human
Resources, the decision was, we would eliminate the old, create the
new.
Id. at 326-27. She further commented that “if [a] position changes sufficiently,
you essentially eliminate the old group of positions and you create new
positions.” Id. at 327. When pressed by counsel as to why the hourly positions
were not merely reclassified as regular, she again emphasized that the
existing position as defined by the duties that were being done was
not deemed to be the one that we needed for Public Affairs and AAA
New Mexico, that we needed different responsibilities . . . . My
understanding of a reclassification is when you look at the existing
position and you evaluate the existing position and decide, for
whatever reason, whether internal or external, that you need to
change where you have that. The whole position gets moved. But
the position itself doesn’t change. The job duties don’t change. The
qualifications needed don’t change.
Id. at 329 (emphasis added). Ms. Miller has pointed to nothing contrary in the
record except her own assertions that she was entitled to be placed in the new
position. We thus conclude she has failed to “provide evidence other than
temporal proximity to establish a prima facie case.” Meiners, 359 F.3d at 1231.
We also agree with the district court’s ruling on pretext. Ms. Miller’s
pretext argument seems to dovetail with her prima facie position regarding AAA
New Mexico’s elimination of her hourly post and creation of the regular position.
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A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff cannot meet the
burden of proving that an employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason for an
alleged retaliatory action is pretextual. Kelley, 220 F.3d at 1174. “An employee
may demonstrate pretext by showing the employer’s proffered reason was so
inconsistent, implausible, incoherent, or contradictory that it is unworthy of
belief.” Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071 (citing Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252
F.3d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 2001)). Ms. Miller has failed to do so here.
In an attempt to show AAA New Mexico’s elimination of her position and
creation of the new post were pretext for dismissing her for her complaints of
discrimination, Ms. Miller cites to Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736
(10th Cir. 1999). While Butler does present some initial similarities to Ms.
Miller’s case, we are not persuaded it supports her pretext argument.
In Butler, an employee brought a retaliation claim under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), asserting he was terminated as a result of his
requests for accommodations under the ADA. Id. at 751-52. In response, his
employer maintained his position was eliminated as a result of the reorganization
of the department in which he worked. On appeal, we held that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for
terminating the plaintiff was pretextual. We noted most of the plaintiff’s former
job duties were resurrected in a new position nine months after the departmental
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reorganization and his termination. Moreover, after he had requested an
accommodation, “he received more work than he could successfully complete and
his supervisors complained about having too much work because they had to
cover for him.” Id. at 752. Finally, his position was the only one to be eliminated
while it was occupied. Id. We also pointed to the temporal proximity of other
events during the plaintiff’s employment which supported his pretext argument.
For example, the employer’s “decision to reorganize [the department] occurred
within weeks of Plaintiff’s delivery of a complaint” to the mayor about his
supervisor, id., and his work evaluations “declined sharply within the months
after” he informed his employers of his disability and need for accommodations.
Id. We also commented that the duties of the new position appeared to
substantially overlap the duties the plaintiff had previously held. Id. at 750.
These facts together created genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the
employer’s reasons for terminating the plaintiff were pretextual.
Ms. Miller claims her case is sufficiently analogous to Butler to warrant a
reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to AAA New Mexico
on her retaliation claim. We disagree. First, in contrast to Butler, Ms. Yager
instigated the job study and departmental reevaluation process long before Ms.
Miller ever alleged she was being discriminated against because of her sex. As
we have already stated, Ms. Yager’s initiation of this process was driven in large
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measure by Ms. Miller’s own questions as to whether she was appropriately
classified and paid for the work she was performing. Moreover, Ms. Yager, as
well as Ms. Bisno, testified it was always their understanding that as a result of
the job study, there would no longer be two hourly part-time positions in the PGA
department, but instead the department would have two full-time hourly positions.
While the review of the department’s needs and the final creation of the two new
positions did not occur until after Ms. Miller raised her claims of discrimination,
we do not think this temporal proximity is sufficient to undermine the record
presented by AAA New Mexico that it had been involved in the job evaluation
process for some time, and that the decision to create two regular positions in lieu
of the hourly posts was anything other than a legitimate business decision. 20
20
We are also not convinced by Ms. Miller’s argument that failure to
exempt her from AAA New Mexico’s requirement that the new jobs be posted
was evidence of pretext. AAA New Mexico’s posting policy indicates that “[a]ll
positions are listed in the job vacancy bulletin, ‘Opportunity Knocks.’ Exceptions
may be made to: Consider [an] employee returning from a family, pregnancy or
illness/injury leave of absence, if qualified for a job guarantee. Consider an
employee whose position is being phased out through the Staff Reduction
Program.” Id. at 389. Ms. Miller makes no convincing argument as to how she
would be exempted under the policy.
We further disagree that the close timing of Ms. Matthewson’s termination
in relation to the events in this case is additional evidence of pretext. Ms.
Matthewson, who is not a party in this litigation, was fired within a month of the
February 2000 meeting for insubordination and for creating a hostile work
environment. But Ms. Miller poses no challenge to the articulated reasons given
by AAA New Mexico for her mother’s termination. Rather, she merely contends
that the close proximity of her mother’s firing with her own allegations of
discrimination creates pretext as to AAA New Mexico’s decision to eliminate Ms.
(continued...)
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Second, Ms. Miller argues that similar to the employer in Butler, AAA New
Mexico eliminated her position but then created a new position with substantially
the same job duties. We have already rejected this similar argument in the
context of Ms. Miller’s Title VII and EPA claims, and do so again here. The new
job held by Dan Ware was not merely a refashioning of the work previously
performed by Ms. Miller. Rather, it represented a significant refocus in job duties
as well as additional duties that Ms. Miller had not performed in her hourly post.
Ms. Miller also contends Ms. Bisno’s statement that she did not intend to
respond to Ms. Miller’s concerns regarding discrimination is additional evidence
of pretext. We are not convinced. Nothing in the follow-up memorandum Ms.
Miller and her mother sent to Ms. Bisno after the February 2000 meeting
indicated they had any workplace discrimination concerns. Nor has Ms. Miller
presented anything to undermine Ms. Bisno’s statements that it was not until after
Ms. Miller quit working for the company that Ms. Bisno became aware her claims
of discrimination were based on “some protected basis.” App., vol. II at 322,
327. Hence, Ms. Miller has presented nothing to indicate Ms. Bisno’s
20
(...continued)
Miller’s hourly position and create a new regular position for which she could
apply. Even if the temporal proximity of her mother’s firing with Ms. Miller’s
allegations of discrimination might support her initial retaliation charge, Ms.
Miller has failed to demonstrate pretext by showing AAA New Mexico’s reason
for firing her mother “was so inconsistent, implausible, incoherent, or
contradictory that it is unworthy of belief.” Stover, 382 F.3d at 1070-71.
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disinclination to respond to the women’s articulated concerns, none of which
addressed issues of sex discrimination, is further evidence that AAA New Mexico
intended to retaliate against Ms. Miller for her claims of discrimination.
Finally, we reject Ms. Miller’s claim that the process by which the AAA
Texas office treated an employee in a situation somewhat similar to Ms. Miller’s
supports her pretext argument. Ms. Miller asserts that around the same time AAA
New Mexico was engaged in the job study for the new position, the AAA office
in Texas was engaged in a similar process. The Texas organization was in the
final stages of receiving approval to fill a newly created Public Affairs Specialist
position and in the mean time, was given permission by human resources to
employ a woman named Rose Rougeau as a part-time temporary hourly employee.
Ms. Rougeau was to perform the duties of the soon to be finalized position. Once
final approval for the position was received, the Texas office had permission to
migrate Ms. Rougeau from the temporary hourly position into the regular post.
Ms. Bisno, who was involved in this process, testified that “when we arranged the
temporary hours, it was with the understanding that if the relationship worked out
satisfactorily when the position was created, that [Ms. Rougeau] would be moved
into it.” Id. at 325. She also stated Ms. Rougeau and the Texas office “knew
what duties she was hired to perform, but [Ms. Rougeau] was aware that at the
time we did not have a position to offer her.” Id. at 324. Ms. Rougeau did not
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oppose the terms of this arrangement, and after working on a temporary hourly
part-time basis for about four months, and upon the finalization of the regular
Public Affairs Specialist position, she moved into that job without having to apply
for it.
Based on the events which occurred in the Texas AAA office, Ms. Miller
contends AAA had a policy of automatically transferring hourly employees into
regular positions and should have done the same for her. She argues the
company’s failure to do so is further evidence of pretext. While the two
situations do bear a measure of similarity, we are not convinced the facts
surrounding Ms. Rougeau’s job advancement are sufficiently analogous to Ms.
Miller’s case to support her argument. In contrast to Ms. Rougeau’s situation,
when Ms. Miller began working for AAA New Mexico, she began as an hourly
employee and continued to do so throughout her tenure for the company. Nor was
any promise made to Ms. Miller in the hiring process that a regular position was
on the verge of creation and immediately available for her to fill if she was
interested. Furthermore, unlike Ms. Rougeau, who was specifically hired to
perform the duties of a Public Affairs Specialist, despite the salaried position not
being quite yet finalized, Ms. Miller was hired to perform traffic reporting duties
within an established clerk position. It was only later during her time at the
company that Ms. Miller agreed to take on additional public affairs duties.
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Therefore, the facts surrounding Ms. Rougeau’s advancement are inapposite to
Ms. Miller’s situation and insufficient to support her claims of pretext.
In conclusion, Ms. Miller has made numerous broad assertions in an
attempt to show that AAA New Mexico’s decision to eliminate her hourly
position and create a new post for which she was required to apply was pretext for
its alleged retaliation against her for making a discrimination claim. Viewing
these assertions as whole, we agree with the district court that Ms. Miller has
failed to show that the specific manner in which AAA decided to reorganize the
PGA department was pretext for releasing her.
Nor are we persuaded the district court abused its discretion in implicitly
rejecting Ms. Miller’s Rule 72(a) motion regarding this claim. In the assorted
material before the district court, Ms. Miller asserted generally that she needed a
variety of additional documents. These included information on how other
complaints of employment discrimination or retaliation were handled by AAA
New Mexico, as well as any documentation regarding her own claims of
discrimination; personnel files regarding other public affairs specialist positions
with the larger AAA organization; any additional documents in Ms. Yager’s
possession regarding Ms. Miller or Ms. Matthewson; and any documents having
to do with Ms. Miller’s job evaluations and the job study process. As noted
earlier, however, Ms. Miller did not highlight in her response to AAA New
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Mexico’s motion for summary judgment what additional information she was
lacking, and how the presence of such evidence would support her in undermining
AAA New Mexico’s motion for summary judgment on her retaliation claims.
Rather, the single sentence in her summary judgment response seems to speak
more in terms of her Title VII and EPA claims and does not make any direct
reference to her retaliation claims. Ms. Miller’s statement included in the pre-
trial order is similarly silent regarding her retaliation claims. Nor did she file a
Rule 56(f) affidavit. Finally, in her reply brief on appeal, Ms. Miller limits her
discovery argument to her Title VII and EPA claims stating “if remand occurs on
the discrimination or EPA claims, production should too.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 26.
Coupled with our determination that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to AAA New Mexico on Ms. Miller’s retaliation claims, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying her
Rule 72(a) motion.
III
We finally address Ms. Miller’s argument that the district court erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law to AAA New Mexico on her claims for
breach of an implied employment contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. A close read of the trial record indicates the district court permitted Ms.
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Miller’s breach of implied contract claim to be presented to the jury on very
narrow grounds. The court construed Ms. Miller’s claim to be that, after
allegedly agreeing to place Ms. Miller in a promoted position and after Ms. Miller
allegedly fulfilled the duties of the new position, AAA New Mexico retroactively
altered the terms of the agreement by failing to place Ms. Miller into the position
once it was finally created. The court concluded such a claim was not barred as a
matter of law, and permitted evidence to be presented to the jury. The jury was to
determine if, in fact, AAA New Mexico had entered into such an agreement with
Ms. Miller, and if so, whether she was entitled to retroactive pay in light of AAA
New Mexico’s failure to comply with the alleged contract.
After each side presented its evidence, the company moved for judgment as
a matter of law. While the district court expressed great skepticism that sufficient
evidence existed to support Ms. Miller’s claim, it nonetheless reserved its ruling
on the company’s motion and referred the matter to the jury. The court declared a
mistrial after the jury was unable to reach an unanimous verdict on Ms. Miller’s
claims. In accordance with F ED . R. C IV . P. 50(b)(2)(B), AAA New Mexico
renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court subsequently ruled
in the company’s favor, reasoning that Ms. Miller had failed to point to “any
specific and binding promise by AAA,” app., vol. II at 552, that would permit a
jury to determine the company had impliedly contracted with Ms. Miller to
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upgrade her position, or that she should receive retroactive compensation.
AAA New Mexico presents two alternative arguments in challenging Ms.
Miller’s appeal on this issue. It initially contends that pursuant to the New
Mexico Court of Appeals rulings in Stieber v. Journal Publ’g Co., 901 P.2d 201,
204 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), and Gormley v. Coca-Cola Enters., 85 P.3d 252, 259
(N.M. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 109 P.3d 280 (N.M. 2005), Ms.
Miller’s at-will status precludes her implied breach of contract claim as a matter
of law. In the alternative, it contends that even if Ms. Miller was entitled to bring
the contract claim, she failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a jury to
determine that such a contract existed. Ms. Miller’s implied contract claim fails
under either approach. 21
A. Claim barred as a matter of law
We begin by noting that we need not employ the same analysis relied upon
by the district court. Rather, “we may affirm the judgment of the district court on
any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law,
even grounds not relied upon by the district court.” V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94
21
In light of our conclusion that Ms. Miller’s implied breach of contract
claim fails, we need not decide whether the district court erred in granting
judgment as a matter of law on her breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim. We likewise need not address her associated challenges to the
district court’s jury instructions on her breach of contract claim, or its limitations
on damages available for the same.
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F.3d 1420, 1423 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223,
1227 (10th Cir. 2003); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp.,
269 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2001). Addressing the company’s first argument
against Ms. Miller, we conclude that as a matter of New Mexico law, Ms. Miller’s
implied contract claim against AAA New Mexico was precluded on the basis of
her at-will employment status.
AAA New Mexico contends that Stieber and Gormley wholly control the
disposition of this case and bar any implied contract action by Ms. Miller. While
we inevitably determine the rationale underlying Stieber and Gormley supports
the company’s argument, we are not entirely persuaded these two cases
automatically preclude Ms. Miller’s claims. Stieber and Gormley certainly do
place limits on an at-will employee’s ability to bring certain types of implied
contract claims. However, those two appellate court cases do not definitively
answer the question at issue here: can an at-will employee bring an implied
contract claim for an employer’s failure to fulfill promises to make future changes
to a job?
When assessing the propriety of a district court’s disposition of state law
claims, we have the “duty to apply state law as announced by the state’s highest
court.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000). Absent
controlling precedent, we “must attempt to predict how the state’s highest court
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would resolve the issue.” Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393 F.3d
1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Rancho Lobo, Ltd. v. Devargas, 303 F.3d
1195, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002); FDIC v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2000). “In conducting our inquiry, we are free to consider all resources
available, including decisions of New Mexico courts, other state courts and
federal courts, in addition to the general weight and trend of authority.”
Schuchmann, 235 F.3d at 1225. Decisions of intermediate courts, while not
controlling authority, may be evidence for “ascertaining state law which is not to
be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data
that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Rancho Lobo, Ltd.,
303 F.3d at 1202 n.2 (quoting Webco Indus., Inc. v. Thermatool Corp., 278 F.3d
1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002) (further internal citations omitted)).
In New Mexico, employment contracts are generally for an indefinite
period and deemed to be at-will. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
Dist., 918 P.2d 7, 10 (N.M. 1996); see also Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857
P.2d 776, 779 (N.M. 1993). “An at-will employment relationship can be
terminated by either party at any time for any reason or no reason, without
liability.” Hartbarger, 857 P.2d at 779. There exist two exceptions to this rule,
however: “wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (retaliatory discharge),
and an implied contract term that restricts the employer’s power to discharge.”
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Id.
A majority of New Mexico at-will employment implied contract cases
address the standard question of whether an implied contract has “restrict[ed] the
employer’s power to discharge.” Id.; see also id. at 786-87 (neither company
policies nor verbal and written statements by employer were sufficiently explicit
to create an implied contract limiting employer’s ability to terminate employee
without just cause); McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 457-58 (N.M.
1990) (implied contract existed by virtue of company’s published policies that
altered employer’s ability to fire employee at-will); Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d
191, 192 (N.M. 1980) (company personnel policy guide sufficient to create
implied contract limiting employer’s right to discharge employee without just
cause); Hudson v. Vill. Inn Pancake House of Albuquerque, Inc., 35 P.3d 313, 318
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (policies outlined in handbook and company’s general
adherence to policies, created an implied contract by which company could not
fire employee without just cause, or without following specified procedures);
Mealand v. E. N.M. Med. Ctr., 33 P.3d 285, 292 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (handbook
altered at-will relationship, thereby precluding employer from at-will discharge of
employee); Kiedrowski v. Citizens Bank, 893 P.2d 468, 472-73 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995) (terms of handbook and employer’s conduct raised genuine issues of
material fact warranting implied contract claim to be submitted to jury).
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New Mexico law also makes clear that where an employment relationship
remains at-will, an employee cannot bring a breach of implied contract claim
against her employer for prospective changes the employer makes to the
conditions of employment. See Gormley, 85 P.3d at 259; Stieber, 901 P.2d at
204. AAA New Mexico contends that the facts of Ms. Miller’s case fall squarely
within the ambit of Stieber and Gormley, and Ms. Miller is therefore precluded as
a matter of law from bringing an implied breach of contract claim against AAA
New Mexico for failing to promote her. But a careful examination of Stieber and
Gormley leads us to conclude that the type of implied contract claim raised and
rejected in those cases is distinguishable from the implied contract claim asserted
by Ms. Miller.
In Stieber, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected an at-will
employee’s implied breach of contract claim where the employee claimed that
after her employer assigned her job duties representing a promotion, she was later
assigned tasks contrary to the promotion, effectively resulting in a demotion. 901
P.2d at 203-04. In essence, the breach of contract claim was based on the
assumption that the employee had a vested right in the current terms of her
employment, i.e., the duties associated with her promotion. When her employer
changed those terms by requiring her to perform duties not in accord with her
promoted status, she alleged her employer breached the terms of her employment.
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The court rejected the employee’s argument, reasoning that “an employer’s right
to terminate an employee at will necessarily and logically includes what may be
viewed as a lesser-included right to insist upon prospective changes in the terms
of that employment as condition of continued employment.” Id. at 204. The
court went on to hold that “[n]o breach of contract action may lie where the
employer in an at-will employment relationship may prospectively change the
conditions of employment at will.” Id.
A similar situation was presented in Gormley. There, an at-will employee
had worked for his employer for approximately ten years as a route driver and
delivery man. Gormley, 85 P.3d at 254. His employer eventually assigned him to
a warehouse position which included lighter duties but did not impact his hours or
pay. He was told he could remain in the warehouse position and maintain his
work hours until he retired. Approximately four years later, the employee’s hours
were decreased and his duties altered. He continued working for at least another
year, but subsequently resigned from the position. Id. at 254. He brought an
implied breach of contract claim, asserting he had a contract right to the specified
number of hours and duties promised to him until he retired. Id. at 259. While
the appellate court determined a grant of summary judgment to the employer on
this question was inappropriate, it nonetheless emphasized that on remand,
“resolution of this issue depends on the fact-finder’s determination regarding [the
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employee’s] employment status.” Id. Citing to Stieber, the court stated that if an
employee remains at-will, “then any claims regarding breach of contract as to
hours and duties would necessarily fail.” Id. at 259.
The type of claims raised and subsequently deemed invalid in Stieber and
Gormley are different from Ms. Miller’s claim. She is not asserting AAA New
Mexico breached a contract with her by altering the terms of her current
employment. Rather, we construe the essence of Ms. Miller’s claim to be that
AAA New Mexico promised to promote her and failed to do so. Hence, Ms.
Miller’s claim is not about her reliance on present employment terms which were
undermined by AAA New Mexico’s alteration of those terms. Instead, she is
contending that AAA New Mexico’s promise regarding future terms was never
fulfilled. We therefore cannot fully agree with AAA New Mexico that Ms.
Miller’s claim is wholly resolved by the rulings in Stieber and Gormley.
Nonetheless, we are persuaded the rule articulated in those cases can legitimately
and logically be extended to bar an at-will employee from bringing a breach of
implied contract claim for an employer’s failure to fulfill a promise to make
future changes to the terms of employment.
If, pursuant to Stieber and Gormley, an at-will employee cannot rely on her
present terms of employment because the employer retains the right to make
prospective changes to the terms and conditions of employment, Stieber, 901 P.2d
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at 204, then it is reasonable to conclude that an at-will employee is equally barred
from relying on an employer’s statements regarding future changes regarding the
terms of employment. Where an at-will employee cannot bring a breach of
contract claim for alteration of her current terms of employment, a breach of
contract claim for violation of potential future terms appears equally, if not more,
tenuous.
Other jurisdictions addressing a similar issue have rejected at-will
employees’ breach of implied contract claims. See, e.g., Rouse v. Boehringer
Mannhiem Corp., 108 F.3d 859, 859 (8th Cir. 1997) (pursuant to Iowa law, at-will
employee cannot enforce employer’s promise to promote merely by continuing to
work); Shelton v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 143 F. Supp. 2d 982, 991-92 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (under Illinois law, at-will employee cannot bring failure to promote
claim); Edwards v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1460, 1465 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (under Maryland law, at-will employee cannot bring breach of contract
claim for rescinded promotion); Rodgers v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 803 F.
Supp. 1024, 1031-32 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania law precludes at-will
employee from bringing breach of contract claim for employer’s promise to
promote); Moore v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., 534 S.E.2d 133, 135-36 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000) (under Georgia law, no claim for failure to promote can be brought by
at-will employee); Tinkham v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Mass.
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App. Ct. 1998) (under Massachusetts law, promise to promote at-will employee is
illusory). In light of the rationale supporting the Stieber and Gormley decisions,
neither of which has been corrected or undermined by subsequent New Mexico
Supreme Court rulings, coupled with supporting authority from other states, we
predict that if faced with this particular question, the New Mexico Supreme Court
would hold an at-will employee is barred from bringing an implied breach of
contract claim for an employer’s failure to promote. On purely legal grounds,
therefore, we conclude Ms. Miller was barred from bringing her breach of implied
contract claim against AAA New Mexico.
B. Judgment as a matter of law
Even if we are wrong in divining the decision the New Mexico Supreme
Court would reach on this question, we are persuaded the district court did not err
in granting judgment as a matter of law to AAA New Mexico on Ms. Miller’s
implied breach of contract claim for lack of an evidentiary basis.
As referenced earlier, we review de novo a district court’s grant of
judgment as matter of law under F ED . R. C IV . P. 50(b). Tyler, 232 F.3d at 812;
Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996).
Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when “a party has been fully
heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
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reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 50(a)(1). We
review all the evidence in the record, construing it and any inferences therefrom
in favor of the non-moving party, and refraining from making credibility
determinations and weighing evidence. Tyler, 232 F.3d at 812. Thus, “a court
may grant the motion ‘only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible
to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party’s position.’”
Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Q.E.R., Inc. v.
Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1989)). Even extending to Ms. Miller
the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we cannot conclude the district court
erred in its ruling.
Generally, the New Mexico courts have “upheld findings that there was no
implied contract in cases where the alleged promise by the employer was not
sufficiently explicit.” Hartbarger, 857 P.2d at 780. “An employer creates
expectations by establishing policies or making promises. An implied contract is
created only where an employer creates a reasonable expectation. The
reasonableness of expectations is measured by just how definite, specific, or
explicit has been the representation or conduct relied upon.” Id. at 783. In ruling
in favor of AAA New Mexico, the district court concluded that Ms. Miller failed
to present the jury with anything but evidence of vague and indefinite promises
that her position was being reviewed for an upgrade. The court ruled that none of
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the promises could give rise to a reasonable expectation of a promotion, or a
promise to retroactively pay Ms. Miller for the additional services she provided
AAA New Mexico in anticipation of her potential upgrade.
In challenging the district court’s ruling, Ms. Miller contends “there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to decide that the statements, policies, conduct
and practices of AAA [New Mexico], in combination, created a reasonable
expectation by Ms. Miller that her position would be upgraded.” Aplt. Br. at 19.
We disagree. Certainly, there were statements made to Ms. Miller which could
have led her to hope the current position which she held would be upgraded and
she would be able to continue to work for AAA New Mexico in the newly created
position. But our review of the record indicates the evidence is simply
insufficient to show that AAA New Mexico’s statements, policies, or practices
were specific enough to create a binding promise upon which Ms. Miller could
reasonably rely. Hartbarger, 857 P.2d at 783.
Ms. Miller first points to sections from AAA New Mexico’s employee
handbook and human resources manual to support her allegation that the policies
outlined in those documents were sufficiently explicit to support her reasonable
expectation that once she had started performing additional duties outside of her
job description, she would be upgraded. We do not agree.
Under New Mexico law, an employee handbook or personnel manual may
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alter the terms of an at-will relationship and give rise to an implied contract
where the manual “controlled the employer-employee relationship and an
employee could reasonably expect his employer to conform to the procedures it
outlines.” Garcia, 918 P.2d at 11; see also Mealand, 33 P.3d at 292 (“Plaintiff
can prevail if the handbook modifies or supplements a pre-existing oral
employment agreement.”). Moreover, “an implied contract can still exist in spite
of a [handbook] disclaimer, where the employer’s conduct reasonably leads
employees to believe that they will not be terminated without just cause and a fair
procedure.” Kiedrowski, 893 P.2d at 471. We do not question the expansive
nature of the general terms appearing in the AAA New Mexico employee
handbook, nor do we need to question what impact its disclaimer may have had on
Ms. Miller’s at-will employment at AAA New Mexico. Regardless of the
handbook’s terms, we find nothing in it of a sufficiently explicit nature to enable
Ms. Miller to reasonably conclude that AAA New Mexico was obligated to
upgrade her upon her performance of additional duties for the organization.
The employee handbook’s section on compensation contains language
which reads “[t]he objective of the compensation plan is to pay employees for the
total contribution they make to the organization each year, tying employee
performance to meeting organizational goals, and on paying for results, not just
activity and effort.” App., vol. VII at 1565. When discussing promotions, the
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handbook indicates that
[p]romotional increases are financial rewards which recognize
increased responsibilities when employees are assigned to a higher
grade level. Promotional increases are not automatic. . . . When the
promotion involves an increase of more than four grades, the
promoting authority must submit a written recommendation to the
Vice President, outlining the reasons and justification for the
promotion. Each situation will be reviewed individually to determine
the appropriate salary increase.
Id. at 1567-68. The handbook also details that
[t]he Club maintains a position classification system whereby each
position has a unique title and description of duties and
responsibilities. All positions are ranked in relation to others, and
positions similar in level of responsibility and complexity are
classified at the same grade level. The classification plan,
consisting of all grade level classifications and position titles, is
evaluated by Human Resources.
Any new classification or reclassification of an existing position will
be based upon written analysis of the duties and responsibilities
assigned to the position.
A review of all jobs is periodically conducted by Human Resources.
Salary ranges will be adjusted periodically as external conditions
warrant.
Id. at 1569-70. Finally, in discussing temporary assignments, the handbook states
[i]t may be necessary to assign an employee temporarily to a job
within another salary range because of vacation, illness or other
reasons. A temporary assignment of this type does not require a
status change. However, if the assignment exceeds 30 days, Club
policy requires that a formal change of status be submitted to Human
Resources.
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Id. at 1567. 22
First, nothing in the handbook’s statements regarding AAA New Mexico’s
overall objectives regarding its compensation plan, when promotions might be
granted to employees, or how a job might be newly classified or reclassified, is
specific or definite enough for Ms. Miller to believe that she was individually
entitled to have her position upgraded from an hourly post to a regular position.
Rather, the cited portions of the handbook speak in qualified generalities. See id.
at 1565 (“[t]he objective of the compensation plan . . . .”); id. at 1567-68
(“Promotional increases are not automatic. . . . Each situation will be reviewed
individually to determine the appropriate salary increase.”); id. at 1569-70 (“Any
new classification or reclassification of an existing position will be based upon
written analysis of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the position. A
review of all jobs is periodically reviewed by Human Resources. Salary ranges
will be adjusted as periodically external conditions warrant.”) (emphasis added
throughout).
Second, an examination of the procedures outlined in the human resources
manual regarding the creation of new positions not already classified, see id. at
22
The human resources manual, which will be discussed in more detail
below, contains highly similar if not identical provisions to those identified in the
employee handbook. See App., vol. VI at 1320 (objective of compensation plan);
id. at 1323 (promotion policy); id. at 1325-26 (detailed description of job
classification, reclassification, and creation of new job process); id. at 1323
(temporary assignment policy).
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1326, indicates that AAA New Mexico followed these procedures, resulting in the
new public affairs post in the PGA department. However, nothing in the human
resources manual indicates that the company, in engaging in a job review process
for a new position, was obligated to give Ms. Miller the new job. Furthermore,
Mr. Sandy affirmed at trial that there was “nothing novel” about the process by
which the new position was created. Id., vol. IV at 1069.
Ms. Miller’s reliance on the temporary assignment policy does not assist
her. See id., vol. VII at 1567; id., vol. VI at 1323. When she began performing
additional duties in her capacity of “senior clerk” and then “clerk, intermediate,”
she was not performing a job in “another salary range.” Id., vol. VI at 1323. Mr
Sandy testified that Ms. Miller did not qualify for the terms outlined in the
temporary assignments policy because she merely took on “additional
responsibilities in her position as an intermediate clerk. That would not have
been a temporary assignment. That would have been additional responsibilities in
the position.” Id., vol. IV at 1061. Mr. Sandy further indicated that when Ms.
Yager asked Ms. Miller in 1996 if she would be interested in taking on some
public affairs work for the department, “there had been a discussion about the
additional responsibilities and there was a discussion of what the salary would be
for the position, and that’s what was accepted. That would not be a temporary
assignment. That would be a change in duties.” Id. at 1082-83. Moreover, he
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testified that the temporary assignment policy did not apply to hourly employees
and that “[t]o [his] knowledge, the only people [he knew to] have been on
temporary assignment [were] . . . regular employees within the organization.” Id.
at 1062.
Echoing the arguments she raised in her retaliation claim, Ms. Miller also
points to the AAA Texas office’s migration of Ms. Rougeau into a regular
position as evidence that AAA New Mexico should have done the same for her.
However, as we discussed earlier, we are not convinced the facts concerning Ms.
Rougeau’s advancement are sufficiently analogous to Ms. Miller’s situation to
warrant her belief that the company had a policy of automatically shifting
employees from hourly to regular positions. In particular, in contrast to Ms.
Rougeau’s situation, when Ms. Miller began working for AAA New Mexico there
was no regular position in existence, or even in formulation, in which she could
be employed. Throughout her entire employment at AAA New Mexico, she
worked as an hourly employee with a full understanding of the limitations of such
a position. Nor, unlike Ms. Rougeau, was she promised at the start of her
employment that a regular position would soon be in existence and hers for the
taking. The facts surrounding Ms. Rougeau’s advancement are inapposite to Ms.
Miller’s case and insufficient to support her implied contract claim.
Finally, Ms. Miller contends that AAA New Mexico, primarily through the
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statements made by Ms. Yager, promised Ms. Miller that she would be upgraded
to a regular position. Based on our review of the record, in which we have given
her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, see Finley, 82 F.3d at 968, we
conclude Ms. Miller has been unable to point to any sufficiently specific promise
made by Ms. Yager upon which she could base a reasonable expectation that she
was going to receive an automatic upgrade.
We, of course, accept Ms. Miller’s assertions that Ms. Yager made
promises and gave assurances that the upgrade process was moving forward and
was going to happen. As Ms. Miller testified, Ms. Yager told her a number of
times she was in the process of seeking an upgrade for her position, and that it
was going to happen soon. See App., vol. III at 642 (company was going to
evaluate positions and “good chance” post would be reclassified and graded at
higher rate); id. at 643 (job review process would take “a few weeks, . . . maybe
two to three months at the most”); id., vol. IV at 1279 (Ms. Yager sent letter to
supervisor requesting positions be upgraded); id., vol. III at 657 (Ms. Miller
“would receive an upgrade and be reclassified based on the information that [Ms.
Yager] received from her management”); id. at 658-59 (upgrade would happen
soon, within a few months); id. at 675 (upgrade process ongoing and would
happen); id., vol. IV at 891 (Ms. Yager included two regular positions in 2000
budget proposal); id., vol. III at 678-79, id., vol. IV at 892-94 (Ms. Yager
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informed Ms. Miller job was in budget, upgrade would happen soon, and she
could start using business cards); id., vol. III at 684 (despite delays, upgrade
going to take place); id. at 690 (upgrade “just around the corner”); id., vol. IV at
894 (Ms. Yager informed Ms. Miller job study would be completed by end of
year); id., vol. III at 696 (Ms. Yager promised Ms. Miller upgrade was going to
happen).
Ms. Yager’s own testimony affirmed she made promises to Ms. Miller
about the upgrade process. She testified, however, that her promises were more
limited in nature than how Ms. Miller interpreted them. She noted “[w]hat was
promised was the job study, but there was no promise of anything else.” Id., vol.
V at 1161. “I definitely promised that the job study would go on and that there
certainly weren’t any guarantees, but I was doing everything possible to try to
upgrade the positions.” Id. at 1163; see also id., vol. IV at 946 (Ms. Yager
informed Ms. Miller she did not know extent of input she would have in upgrade
process); id. at 891-92 (Ms. Yager noted initial success in keeping positions in
2000 budget, but also that there was a “long way” to go); id., vol. III at 687 (Ms.
Yager unclear about upgrade time line); id. at 702 (Ms. Yager had no idea when
job review process would be completed).
Likewise, while Ms. Yager may have promised Ms. Miller she would
receive an upgrade, the record makes clear that Ms. Yager did not possess the
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power to fulfill such a promise. See id., vol. IV at 855, 1032 (Automobile Club
of Southern California directs all human resources decisions); id. at 857-58, 872-
76, 1064, id., vol. VI at 1279-80 (Ms. Yager required to ask direct supervisor for
permission to request human resources to perform job study); id., vol. IV at 1037,
id., vol. VI at 1325-26 (final upgrade approval required at executive levels); id.,
vol. IV at 946 (Ms. Yager indicated she did not know extent of input she would
have in upgrade process); id. at 891-92 (Ms. Yager able to keep positions in 2000
budget, but noted there was a “long way” to go); id., vol. III at 687 (Ms. Yager
not clear about timeline for upgrade); id. at 702 (Ms. Yager uninformed as to
when job review process would be completed). Ms. Yager may have genuinely
wanted to upgrade Ms. Miller, and Ms. Miller certainly believed Ms. Yager’s
promises and assurances. Nevertheless, Ms. Miller’s reliance on Ms. Yager’s
promises evinces her lack of an understanding of AAA New Mexico’s job review
and new job creation process.
Finally, regardless of the promises Ms. Yager made, Ms. Miller was unable
to articulate with any specificity the exact nature of what was promised. At most,
Ms. Miller testified she was promised an upgrade. However, she was unable to
state any of the specifics: when exactly the upgrade would occur, what exactly her
anticipated job duties or job title would be, or how she would be compensated.
See id. at 659 (Ms. Miller was not told when upgrade would occur or what
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compensation she would receive); id., vol. VI at 1296 (Ms. Miller notes in
memorandum to Ms. Bisno that she has “no idea of the job responsibilities and
parameters” or grade classification or salary band of potential new position).
At trial, Ms. Miller argued that her compensation could be properly
calculated based on the pay range finally settled upon for the new position, and
the wage paid to the individual who eventually accepted that post. 23 But, Ms.
Miller has basically worked her way backwards into establishing a personal
conclusion of what she might have been compensated, if she had applied for the
position. She has failed to present any evidence that in the course of her ongoing
discussions with Ms. Yager, she was ever given a specific salary amount of what
she would receive in the new position.
Finally, Ms. Miller was unable to point to any specific promise made to her
that she would receive retroactive payment for the public affairs duties she
performed for AAA New Mexico in her hourly position. First, Ms. Miller stated
at trial that she had “never testified that anyone told me I was going to receive
retroactive compensation.” Id., vol. III at 773. Likewise, all of her statements
about her conversations regarding retroactive pay with Ms. Yager indicate that her
supervisor agreed that she should receive retroactive pay, but never guaranteed
23
The base pay for the new position was just over $40,000, with the market
rate being $44,308. When the position was finally filled, the new employee’s
salary, as determined by his experience and qualifications, was $35,000.
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that such payment would occur. See id. at 681, 772 (Ms. Yager expressed opinion
that Ms. Miller should receive retroactive pay for additional duties); id., vol. IV at
950 (Ms. Yager expressed opinion that it was highly unlikely company would give
Ms. Miller retroactive pay). Moreover, Ms. Miller’s prior receipt of retroactive
pay from the company did not necessarily indicate that in the present context,
AAA New Mexico was obliged to pay her retroactively for the additional public
affairs duties she performed. Mr. Sandy testified retroactive pay is generally
awarded when there
was an oversight. If an employee was supposed to be making $12 an
hour, and the staff form was submitted for $10, and that’s what [the
company] had been committed to, then yes, we certainly would
retroact back to that date, if the information supported the situation
. . . . And also if the manager had committed to paying a person a
certain amount, and the manager states that’s what they told them,
but for some reason, when the paperwork was submitted, there’s a
different amount, then we certainly would honor what the manager
had committed to.
Id., vol. IV at 1081. 24
Having extensively reviewed the record and giving to Ms. Miller all
inferences in her favor, we conclude the district court did not err in granting
He also indicated that where an hourly position is replaced by a regular
24
position, the hourly employee is not paid retroactively back to date of hire with
regular pay. Id., vol. IV at 1082. Rather, the date of the position advancement
serves as the employee’s new date of service for compensation purposes. Id., vol.
VI at 1328. Hence, even if Ms. Miller had filled the new position, she would not
have been retroactively compensated for her prior public relations work for AAA
New Mexico.
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judgment as a matter of law to AAA New Mexico on Ms. Miller’s implied
contract claim. AAA New Mexico’s polices, procedures, and statements were not
definite, specific, or explicit enough for Ms. Miller to reasonably rely upon them
to support her implied contract claim.
IV
In light of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court.
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