F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 25, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 04-2030
v. (D.C. No. CR-02-1987)
(D.N.M.)
NICOLE WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. *
Defendant-Appellant Nicole Wright seeks to appeal her sentence for
conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and
attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The
government has moved this court to enforce the provision in its plea agreement
with Ms. Wright waiving her right to appeal the sentence of the district court.
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we hold that Ms. Wright
waived her right to appeal her sentence by knowingly and voluntarily entering
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
into the plea agreement, we grant the government’s motion to enforce the plea
agreement and dismiss the appeal.
Background
The parties are familiar with the facts in this case, and we need only repeat
those pertinent to our discussion here. On March 5, 2003, the defendant entered
into a plea agreement with the government. The agreement detailed the maximum
penalty for her offenses and noted her comprehension “that determination of the
sentencing range or guideline level, as well as the actual sentence imposed, is
solely in the discretion of the Court.” Plea Agree. at 3. In addition, the
agreement contained the following waiver of appellate rights:
The defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code,
§ 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence imposed.
Acknowledging that, the defendant knowingly waives the right to
appeal any sentence within the applicable guideline range as
determined by the court after resolution of any objections by either
party to the presentence report to be prepared in this case, and the
defendant specifically agrees not to appeal the determination of the
court in resolving any contested sentencing factor. In other words,
the defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this
case except to the extent, if any, that the court may depart upwards
from the applicable sentencing guideline range as determined by the
court.
Id. at 5-6. The district court entered judgment in the case on February 3, 2004,
sentencing the defendant to 135 months in prison. Ms. Wright timely noticed
appeal on February 13, 2004. On August 18, 2004, after briefing in this case had
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commenced, the government filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement.
On appeal, Ms. Wright alleges the district court erred in the following
respects: (1) applying an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; (2) denying Ms. Wright a downward adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; (3) applying a three level upward
adjustment for environmental harms pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(B)
(2003); (4) applying sentencing enhancements in contravention of the rule
propounded in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755-56 (2004). While
denying error, the government urges that Ms. Wright has waived her right to
appeal.
Discussion
Because the issue is dispositive, we must first determine whether the
government’s motion to enforce the plea agreement should be granted. We have
both “statutory and constitutional subject matter jurisdiction over appeals when a
criminal defendant has waived his appellate rights in an enforceable plea
agreement.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 2004).
“Given the importance of plea bargaining to the criminal justice system, we
generally enforce plea agreements and their concomitant waivers of appellate
rights.” Id. at 1318.
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I. Timeliness of the Government’s Motion
As a preliminary matter, Ms. Wright argues that the government’s motion
should be denied as untimely and that this court should proceed to an examination
of the merits of her appeal. Ms. Wright’s argument centers on the new procedure
we established in Hahn for the enforcement of plea agreements. 359 F.3d at
1328. In that case, we announced that 10th Cir. Rule 27.2 would be amended to
permit the government to file a “Motion for Enforcement of the Plea Agreement.”
Id. Rule 27.2 requires a party to file a dispositive motion within fifteen days of
the notice of appeal. 10th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(3). If the motion is filed after fifteen
days, the party must provide explanation for the delay. Id. The government’s
motion in this case was not filed until August 18, 2004, long after the expiration
of the fifteen day period. Nor did it contain an explanation for the delay. As a
result, Ms. Wright contends that the motion is time barred. This argument is
foreclosed, however, by our decision in United States v. Clayton, ___ F.3d ___,
2005 WL 1799819, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005). As we explained in Clayton,
“[n]othing in Rule 27.2 provides that a contention that can be raised by motion
must be raised by motion, on pain of forfeiture.” Id. (emphasis in original). The
government is free to forego the benefit provided by Rule 27.2 and seek
enforcement of a valid waiver as part of its brief on the merits. Id.
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II. Enforcement Analysis
When determining whether to enforce a particular waiver, we inquire (1)
whether the issue on appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights, and (3) whether enforcing
a waiver would constitute a miscarriage of justice. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
A. Scope
In determining the scope of a waiver of appellate rights, we strictly
construe the agreement, reading any ambiguities against the government. Id.
Having carefully reviewed the plea agreement in this case, it is clear that the
waiver of appellate rights contained therein encompasses Ms. Wright’s appeal.
Ms. Wright’s substantive arguments touch on the district court’s determination
with respect to contested sentencing factors. In that the “defendant specifically
agree[d] not to appeal the determination of the court in resolving any contested
sentencing factor,” Plea Agree. at 5, the language of the plea agreement embraces
the instant appeal.
B. Knowing and Voluntary
When determining whether the defendant has entered into a plea agreement
knowingly and voluntarily, we (1) examine the language of the plea agreement
and (2) look for an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. After reviewing both the plea agreement and the
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transcript of the sentencing hearing, we are satisfied that Ms. Wright’s waiver of
appellate rights was both knowing and voluntary. In fact, Ms. Wright does not
argue that the language of the agreement and the Rule 11 colloquy were
insufficient. Rather, her principal argument with respect to this element is that
she could not have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a waiver of the right to
appeal a legally erroneous sentence. Resp. to Motion for Enforcement of Plea
Agree. at 5-6. Ms. Wright’s argument is foreclosed by our precedent. In fact, it
is precisely the argument we rejected in Hahn. 359 F.3d at 1326-27.
C. Miscarriage of Justice
Finally, in determining whether a waiver of appellate rights is enforceable,
we seek to ascertain whether enforcement will result in a miscarriage of justice.
Id. at 1327. A miscarriage of justice will only result “(1) where the district court
relied on an impermissible factor such as race, (2) where ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid, (3) where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) where the
waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id. (citing United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171,
1173 (10th Cir. 2001)). A waiver is “otherwise unlawful” where the alleged error
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)(internal citation
omitted; alteration in original); see also Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
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Although Ms. Wright’s argument in this regard is less than clear, she
appears to assert that her waiver of appellate rights is otherwise unlawful because
the district court erred in enhancing her sentence for obstruction of justice,
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and environmental hazard, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(B). She
further asserts that under the rule propounded in Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756
(holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by
a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt”), would render enforcement of the waiver in the
instant case a miscarriage of justice.
First, we can discern no error in the district court’s determination of the
contested sentencing factors, much less error that would “affect[] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
We find that Ms. Wright’s disappearance during the course of an undercover
operation, cessation of rendering assistance and information, use of drugs, and
lying about her identity, amply support an enhancement for obstruction of justice
under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Moreover, facts establishing the presence of chemicals
used in the methamphetamine production process at Ms. Wright’s lab, coupled
with exposure and risk to others, were sufficient to support an enhancement for
environmental hazard under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(B). Indeed, these facts were
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based on Ms. Wright’s own admissions. See PSR at ¶¶ 5-6. Finally, although the
district court apparently did not make explicit factual findings, such findings were
contained in the presentence report adopted by the court, see United States v.
Bell, 154 F.3d 1205, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 1998), and as noted fully support the
district court’s determination.
Second, Ms. Wright’s arguments with respect to Booker are foreclosed by
our decision in United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2005).
In Porter, we held that a sentence imposed in violation of the rule propounded in
Booker did not render an enforceable waiver of appellate rights “otherwise
unlawful.” Id. As we emphasized therein, “[t]he essence of plea agreements . . .
is that they represent a bargained-for understanding between the government and
criminal defendants in which each side foregoes certain rights and assumes
certain risks in exchange for a degree of certainty as to the outcome of criminal
matters. One such risk is a favorable change in the law.” Id. at 1145 (emphasis
added). In that the district court’s determinations were clearly lawful under then-
existing law, Ms. Wright cannot disturb them on the basis of a change in law
unforeseeable to either party to the agreement. This is especially the case where
Ms. Wright did not reserve the right to appeal based on subsequent changes in the
law. See United States v. Allen, No. 04-6283, 2005 WL 1349984, at *2-3 (10th
Cir. June 8, 2005) (involving an express reservation of the right to appeal based
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on a subsequent change in the law).
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Ms. Wright’s plea agreement is valid
and enforceable. Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to enforce
the plea agreement and DISMISS the appeal. Those documents filed
provisionally under seal shall remain sealed.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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