F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 2, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-1133
(D.C. No. 04-CR-411-B)
vs. (D.Colo.)
ROBERTS SCHUYLER BENNETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant Roberts Schuyler Bennett pleaded guilty to possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and was sentenced to 71
months imprisonment, and three years supervised release. Although Mr.
Bennett’s offense and plea (December 3, 2004) occurred prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), his sentencing
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
occurred subsequent to that decision, and the district court treated the Sentencing
Guidelines as advisory.
On appeal, Mr. Bennett contends that the district court erred by sentencing
him based upon specific offense characteristics not contained in the count of
conviction of the indictment. According to Mr. Bennett, because the count of
conviction did not allege that 600 or more images were involved, or that some of
the images involved a prepubescent minor or portrayed sadistic or masochistic
conduct, the district court could not rely upon these facts in sentencing him. See
Aplt. Br. at 12; U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(b)(1) (2003) (two-level enhancement for
material involving a prepubescent minor), § 2G2.4(b)(4) (four-level enhancement
for material portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct), § 2G2.4(b)(5)(D) (five-
level enhancement for 600 or more images). 1 Mr. Bennett makes this argument
even though (1) he stipulated to the all of the facts underlying these specific
offense characteristics and (2) the indictment (in a count which referenced the
count of conviction, but was later dismissed) contained these offense
characteristics. Mr. Bennett maintains that his sentence must be tethered to those
1
Mr. Bennett only takes issue with the additional three-levels of the five-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(b)(5)(D), because the count of
conviction alleged at least ten images which would result in a two-level
enhancement under § U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(b)(5)(A). Mr. Bennett argues that his
adjusted offense level should have been 19 resulting in a guideline range of 33-41
months (criminal history category of II), instead of 25 which indicates a guideline
range of 63-78 months.
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facts contained in the count he pleaded to, resulting in a maximum sentence of 41
months.
In making this argument, Mr. Bennett invokes his Sixth Amendment right
to fair notice of the charges against him and his Fifth Amendment right to
indictment and grand jury presentment. He also relies upon the prohibition on
double jeopardy and argues that applying the remedial holding of Booker to his
offense would violate Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
In a similar challenge involving a guilty plea and stipulated facts, we
recently held that the Apprendi line of cases (including Booker) does not require
that factors supporting sentencing enhancements be alleged in the indictment.
United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2005). Like Mr.
Bennett, the defendant in Glover pleaded prior to the Court’s decision in Booker.
Thus, we must reject Mr. Bennett’s claim that the “indictment, or more
accurately, the facts alleged in the indictment’s count of conviction, capped any
possible sentence he could receive.” Aplt. Br. at 11.
Mr. Bennett concedes that in the current advisory guideline system
mandated by Booker, his argument has no merit. Id.; II R. 9 (“Booker fixes it, but
it only fixes it prospectively.”); see also Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761-62
(commenting on the difficulties of incorporating sentencing factors into
indictments were the guidelines mandatory). Instead, he argues that because he
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was indicted and pleaded guilty prior to Booker, the district court was limited to
sentencing him based upon facts alleged in the indictment’s count of conviction,
even though he would not be entitled to a jury on those facts, having waived any
such right. Aplt. Br. at 13. An obvious answer to this is that the facts serving as
the basis for the challenged enhancements were contained on the face of the
indictment, in a count that clearly referenced the count of conviction, thereby
obviating any concerns about presentment to a grand jury. Mr. Bennett plainly
had notice of those facts, having stipulated to them as part of the plea.
Regardless, Mr. Bennett’s argument is an invitation not only to ignore his
admissions, but also to apply the substantive holding of Booker while
disregarding the remedial holding (making the guidelines advisory) that in fact
was applied in his case. This we cannot do. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (both
substantive and remedial holding must be applied to all cases on direct review);
United States v. Rines, No. 04-4182, 2005 WL 1953505 at * 2 (10th Cir. Aug. 16,
2005) (rejecting invitation to apply only substantive holding). Moreover, the
contended-for remedy in this case is precisely what the Supreme Court rejected in
Booker–the companion case, Fanfan, was remanded even in the absence of a Sixth
Amendment violation to apply the remedial holding. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
Finally, Mr. Bennett’s argument is inconsistent with the broad power of
sentencing courts to consider information beyond the indictment. 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3661; United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1997) (per curiam).
The premise of Mr. Bennett’s remaining arguments is that the indictment
serves as a cap limiting any enhancement or departure under the guidelines. We
have rejected that premise. With that, we reject his arguments that applying
Booker to his case violates substantive due process, raises double jeopardy
concerns, contravenes retroactivity principles, or results in sentencing him to a
greater offense when he pleaded to a lesser.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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