IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-20403
Summary Calendar
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ANNE W. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA-96-H-3702)
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January 19, 1999
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
In this title VII employment discrimination case, Anne
Robinson appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendant Baker
Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (“Baker”). Because Robinson
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Baker's
proffered evidence of a nonretaliatory motive, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I.
Robinson worked for Teleco Oilfield Services, Inc. (“Teleco”),
from January 1984 until she was laid off in July 1986. In 1989,
she was rehired as an assembler. In June 1992, Baker purchased
Teleco and relocated Robinson from Connecticut to Houston, Texas,
where she was assigned to work as an electronic assembler.
From 1993 through 1996, Connie Desiata served as Robinson’s
supervisor. Desiata testified that she noticed recurrent job
performance problems with Robinson and that Robinson reacted
defensively to constructive criticism. At one point, Robinson
claimed that her co-workers had sabotaged her work product, a claim
that was not substantiated by Baker's investigation. Robinson’s
co-workers began to complain of difficulty in working with her.
On a more objective level, Desiata documented Robinson’s poor
handback record. “Handbacks” are products returned to the
assembler on account of their substandard assembly. Between
September and December 1995, only 15 of Robinson’s 37 assembled
products were deemed acceptable, and Robinson’s 68% handback rate
far exceeded Baker’s workmanship standards.
In February 1996, the “Lead Night Person” position became
available in Houston, and Robinson applied for it. Her application
was rejected, and Desiata explained to her that this was because of
her performance and conduct. Robinson was upset and suffered an
anxiety attack requiring hospitalization. She also claims that she
was denied the position because of her race: Robinson is black,
and the co-worker who was promoted to the Lead Night Person
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position was not black.
In the days following the Lead Night Person announcement,
Robinson showed up at work sporadically and spoke to Desiata in
abusive terms. Robinson was warned that her conduct would not be
tolerated and that her quality of work needed to improve. Baker
arranged for an additional workmanship training class for Robinson;
she was upset by this, calling it punishment. Following the
recommendation of Robinson’s doctor, Baker placed Robinson on
short-term disability leave and sought a less stressful position
for her.
On April 3, 1996, Robinson filed a discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that
Baker had discriminated against her when it failed to assign her to
the Lead Night Position. On April 29, Robinson returned to work in
the repair group, a transfer Baker had arranged in its effort to
accommodate her condition. Baker contends that Robinson’s work
performance and conduct problems persisted, leading to her firing
on May 17, 1996. Robinson contends that this was in retaliation
for her complaint to the EEOC.
II.
Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee in
retaliation for his exercise of title VII rights. Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 336 (1997). The elements for a title VII claim are:
(1) an employee’s exercise of his title VII rights; (2) the
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employer’s decision to take adverse employment action; and (3) a
causal connection between the employee’s title VII activity and the
adverse action. Id.
The parties do not dispute that the first two of these
elements have been satisfied. The sole issue is whether Baker’s
action against Robinson was causally connected to the EEOC claim.
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a title VII
plaintiff must first establish the prima facie elements of his
claim. See Hall v. Gillman, 81 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1996).
Robinson has done so: The satisfaction of elements one and two is
undisputed, and the satisfaction of the third element can be
inferred from the proximity of the EEOC complaint to the discharge.
See Swanson v. General Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 366 (1997).
Following the presentment of a prima facie case, a title VII
defendant is entitled “to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its disparate treatment of the
plaintiff.” Hall, 81 F.3d at 37. That is, Baker had an
opportunity to rebut the inference that the third element of
Robinson’s claimSScausationSS has been established. Baker
successfully availed itself of this opportunity by explaining that
Robinson was fired not because of the EEOC complaint but because of
poor workmanshipSSan explanation fully supported by the record.
“[O]nce [an] employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the
plaintiff must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer
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that retaliation was the real motive.” Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188.
This Robinson utterly failed to do. Instead, she asserts that
Baker has never rebutted the inference of retaliatory motive, for
Baker’s explanation does not account for both the adverse action
and its timing. More specifically, Robinson avers that Baker has
failed to explain why it discharged her when it did.
Robinson’s argument does not hold water. The record indicates
that Baker had good reason to fire her for poor workmanship and
attitude since, at the very least, December 1995. Thus, Baker
would have been justified in firing Robinson at any time during
1996, and the interposition of an EEOC claim did not undermine the
legitimacy of Baker’s decision. To hold otherwise would give even
the worst of employees a means of protection against discharge via
the filing of frivolous title VII claims.
Moreover, Baker’s explanation did go specifically to the
timing of its decision to terminate Robinson: She was terminated
only after she failed to perform satisfactorily in a different
capacity in another department. Baker gave Robinson several
“second chances” to improve her performance and fired her only
after she had failed to avail herself of yet another one of these
opportunities.
Because Robinson has not established a genuine issue of
material fact with regard to the credibility of Baker’s asserted
reason for firing her, summary judgment was the appropriate vehicle
for disposing of her claim. See Hall, 81 F.3d at 37; Ray v. Tandem
Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that
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“bald assertions of . . . discrimination are inadequate” to rebut
a title VII defendant’s reasonable explanation). The judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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