UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-3166
ALONZO L. PLAKIO, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Filed December 16, 2005
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Appellant’s motion to publish the order and judgment filed October 3, 2005,
is granted. The published opinion is attached.
Entered for the Court
Clerk of Court
By:
Deputy Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 3, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-3166
ALONZO L. PLAKIO, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 03-CR-40096-RDR)
Eric F. Melgren, United States Attorney and Nancy Landis Caplinger, Assistant
United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender and Melody Evans, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellant.
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Alonzo Plakio, Jr. pled guilty to being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 1 Pursuant to USSG §2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 2 the
district court calculated Plakio’s base offense level as 20 based on a prior state
felony drug conviction. Plakio objected, claiming his prior drug conviction did
not constitute a felony offense under §2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because the maximum
punishment for the offense for someone with his criminal history category was
eleven months under the state sentencing guidelines. By his reasoning, the base
offense level for the federal offense was 14, not 20. The district court disagreed
and sentenced him to thirty months imprisonment. Plakio appeals pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). We exercise jurisdiction, REVERSE and REMAND for re-
sentencing.
1
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) provides:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person--
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
....
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
2
Because Plakio was sentenced pursuant to the November 5, 2003 edition of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual all guideline citations refer to the 2003
edition, unless noted otherwise.
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A NALYSIS
We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de
novo. United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 875 (10th Cir. 2003). Section
2K2.1(a)(4)(A) dictates a base level of 20 for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), if “the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent
to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense . . . .”
Application Note 5 of the Commentary to USSG §2K2.1 refers to USSG
§4B1.2(b) for the definition of “controlled substance offense.” Section 4B1.2(b)
defines a controlled substance offense as an “offense under federal or state law,
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance
. . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture,
import, export, distribute, or dispense.” (Emphasis added). Application Note 5 of
the Commentary to §2K2.1 highlights that a prior felony conviction “means a
prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by . . .
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is
specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence
imposed.” (Emphasis added). Thus, what matters is not the classification of the
offense nor the actual sentence imposed, but the maximum possible sentence. See
United States v. Arnold, 113 F.3d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding the
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possibility of an upward departure from a presumptive eleven month sentence
rendered the offense a felony for purposes of § 922(g)).
In order to determine the maximum possible sentence for the prior
conviction in this case, we look to the state sentencing scheme. Under the Kansas
Sentencing Guidelines, a felony sentence is determined by two factors: the crime
of conviction and the offender’s criminal history. State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801,
811 (Kan. 2001). Under K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 65-4141(c), Plakio’s drug offense
was a severity level 8, nonperson felony, which allows for a range of possible
sentences between seven and twenty-three months depending on the defendant’s
criminal history. K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4704(a). A grid box divides the overall
sentencing range for the offense level into nine subsets, ranging from A to I,
based on the defendant’s criminal history. 3 Under K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4704
(2000 Supp.), “[t]he sentence contained in the grid box at the juncture of the
severity level of the crime of conviction and the offender’s criminal history
category is the presumed sentence.” Gould, 23 P.3d at 811. Plakio’s offense
severity level was 8 and his criminal history score was G, exposing him to a
presumptive sentencing range of nine to eleven months. Plakio received an
3
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704(c) provides that “[t]he sentencing guidelines grid is
a two-dimensional crime severity and criminal history classification tool. The grid's
vertical axis is the crime severity scale which classifies current crimes of conviction. The
grid's horizontal axis is the criminal history scale which classifies criminal histories.”
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eleven month suspended sentence and was placed on probation.
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to “impose
the presumptive sentence provided by the sentencing guidelines . . . .” K AN .
S TAT . A NN . § 21-4716(a) (2000 Supp.). Prior to June 26, 2000, however, Kansas
courts could impose an upward departure from the presumed sentence pursuant to
K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4716 (2000 Supp.). “Greatly simplified, K.S.A. 2000
Supp. 21-4716 allows imposition of a term beyond the maximum specified in the
appropriate sentencing grid box based upon a court finding the existence of one or
more aggravating factors.” Gould, 23 P.3d at 812.
Ordinarily, the mere possibility of an upward departure (beyond one year)
would render Plakio’s conviction punishable by a term exceeding one year
regardless of the actual sentence received. See United States v. Norris, 319 F.3d
1278, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding the possibility of an upward departure
under K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4719(b)(2) qualifies an offense as one punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year for purposes of § 922(g)(1) even
though defendant’s maximum presumptive sentence was less than one year and no
upward departure was imposed). However, on June 26, 2000, the United States
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000). The Kansas Supreme Court presciently applied the principles laid down
in Apprendi to limit the ability of Kansas courts to depart upward from the
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presumptive sentence under K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4716 (2000 Supp.). Gould, 23
P.3d at 814; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2547
n.1 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Kansas Supreme Court in
Gould was the only state court, prior to Blakely, to apply Apprendi to invalidate
application of its sentencing guidelines). Under Gould (and Blakely), upward
departures cannot be based on judicial fact-finding. Gould, 23 P.3d at 814.
Gould retroactively applied its invalidation of K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4716 (2000
Supp.) to June 26, 2000, the date Apprendi was decided. Id. at 814; see Norris,
319 F.3d at 1282. Thus, from June 26, 2000, until June 6, 2002, the date Kansas
implemented its new sentencing scheme in K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 21-4718 (2003
Cum. Supp.), sentences in Kansas were limited to the maximum presumptive
sentence.
Plakio’s state sentencing occurred on May 9, 2001. Thus, Plakio argues
that at the time of his sentencing, the maximum sentence he could receive was
eleven months because the state court lacked the authority to depart from the
guidelines and impose a higher sentence. The district court rejected this
conclusion based on the principle of uniformity in sentences and a putative
distinction between the felony analysis under § 922(g)(1) and §2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
Because the maximum sentence was twenty-three months, the district court
deemed Plakio’s prior conviction a felony for purposes of §2K2.1(a)(4)(A). We
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disagree with the district court’s analysis.
Plakio’s offense never qualified as a felony for purposes of the sentencing
guidelines, regardless of state terminology, because he was never subject to a
sentence greater than a year under Kansas law. We alluded to this conclusion in
Norris where the defendant raised the same argument on appeal as Plakio. 319
F.3d at 1282. In Norris, however, we rejected the defendant’s argument because
his conviction became final before the date Apprendi was decided. Id. at 1283.
However, we suggested in dicta that “[h]ad [the defendant’s] state convictions
become final after June 26, 2000, we would have before us a very different case.”
Id. Plakio now presents that case and we give effect to the logic of Norris.
Because the sentencing court could not have imposed a sentence greater than one
year, Plakio’s state conviction was not a felony for the purposes of the federal
sentencing guidelines. Cf. United States v. Place, 561 F.2d 213, 215 (10th Cir.
1977) (stating the relevant inquiry under § 922(g) is whether the district court
“could have imposed” a longer sentence).
The district court’s concern that Plakio’s argument “allows a felony
conviction under the guidelines to be determined by the peculiarities of state law”
is unfounded. (R. Doc. 23 at 8.) While it is true that we have declined to look to
state law for defining felonies under the sentencing guidelines, such cases
involved rejecting the state’s “terminology” and “nomenclature,” United States v.
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Dell, 359 F.3d 1347, 1349 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hines, 133 F.3d
1360, 1364 (10th Cir. 1998), preferring instead to look to the substance of the
offense. This is precisely what the sentencing guidelines direct us to do by
requiring us to evaluate the maximum possible sentence under state law and not
whether the offense is labeled a felony or whether the sentence imposed actually
exceeded one year. Additionally, the district court had to first look to the Kansas
provision setting forth the sentencing range of seven to twenty-three months for a
level 8 offense (but not considering the criminal history category which limits the
range to eight to eleven months) in order to qualify Plakio’s offense as a felony.
We cannot look at a portion of state law to determine that the offense constituted
a felony and then decry the use of state law standards as threatening
inconsistency. In any event, although we have previously noted the importance of
uniformity in sentences as a consideration in interpreting the guidelines, see
United States v. Diaz-Bonilla, 65 F.3d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1995), such
considerations do not trump the constitutional infirmities recognized by Apprendi
and applied to Kansas’ sentencing scheme by Gould.
The district court also based its decision on the fact that it was “not
persuaded that the definition of felony conviction under §2K2.1 must be treated in
the same way as the felony conviction requirement of § 922(g)(1).” (R. Doc. 23
at 7.) While similar, but not identical, language in the sentencing guidelines and
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the substantive criminal offense is sometimes interpreted and applied differently,
such divergence is predicated on the actual differences in language or definitions.
See United States v. Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d 1238, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2005)
(interpreting “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) differently from
“drug trafficking offense” under USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(B)). We need not decide in
this case whether to interpret the felony conviction requirement in § 922(g)(1)
differently from the felony conviction language in §2K2.1 or the same language in
§4B1.2(b). But see United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005)
(interpreting § 922(g)(1) and §4B1.2(b) identically).
We do note, however, that the inquiry under the statute is separate from and
independent of the one under the sentencing guidelines, unless indicated
otherwise. Thus, the statutory definition is controlling for the actual offense, but
the commentary to the guidelines controls for purposes of determining the
sentence. See United States v. Morris, 139 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1998). This is
why Plakio’s plea to being a felon-in-possession is not determinative of his
objection that his prior state drug conviction is not a felony for purposes of
sentencing. 4 Plakio’s plea resolves the question of guilt but not of sentence.
4
Plakio provides a separate argument that he had a prior state conviction for
domestic battery which precluded him from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), which is why he pled to being a felon-in-possession. We note, however, that
the indictment to which he pled specifically listed the state drug conviction as the
predicate felony.
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While Plakio pled to a predicate felony underlying the actual § 922(g)(1) offense,
§2K2.1 requires the district court to conduct an examination of the state
sentencing scheme to determine if the offense is a felony for sentencing purposes.
We are not persuaded by the dissent’s reliance on Harp insofar as
suggesting Plakio’s criminal history is irrelevant. Harp follows United States v.
Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), which concludes that for a crime to be
punishable for a term exceeding one year, there is no need to look at the
maximum sentence the individual defendant could receive. Instead, the
maximum sentence is the maximum aggravated sentence without regard to a
defendant’s criminal history. First, such an approach is contrary to our cases
which suggest that the focus is on the particular defendant. In Arnold, we
focused on the sentence that could have been imposed and in Norris we strongly
implied that had the defendant’s convictions become final after the Kansas court
eliminated the departure power, the state offense would not have been a felony.
Norris, 319 F.3d at 1283; Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1148. Second, such an approach
disregards an integral component of the Kansas sentencing scheme–criminal
history. The fact that criminal history might not be known with certainty at the
time of conviction cannot justify disregarding this component. Taken to its
logical conclusion, such disregard means that the maximum possible sentence is
the same for every defendant, regardless of criminal history, a result clearly not
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contemplated by the Kansas scheme. Third, such an approach ignores that a
crime must have an actor and that Kansas may (and very reasonably does) tie the
maximum punishment to the characteristics of that actor. Fourth, uniformity in
sentencing is not advanced when there is no possible way a defendant could have
committed a felony (as defined) given the punishment scheme of a state. To the
contrary, such a system seems arbitrary, treating truly unlike defendants in a like
manner without regard to the actual offense.
C ONCLUSION
Plakio’s Kansas conviction for a controlled substance offense is not a
felony for purposes of §2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and the appropriate offense level is 14.
Therefore, the district court’s imposition of a six level enhancement was in error
and is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for re-sentencing.
We note that Plakio’s sentence should have been in the range of twelve to
eighteen months. Because Plakio has continually been in custody since November
22, 2003, which is more than the eighteen month maximum, he should be released
pending re-sentencing.
On June 15, 2005, Plakio filed a Motion for Release Pending Appeal. It is
DENIED as moot.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
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O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The federal sentencing guidelines direct us to consider whether the
defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year imprisonment,
not whether the defendant was actually punished by more than a year
imprisonment. See USSG §2K2.1, cmt. n. 5; §4B1.2(b). “What matters is not the
actual sentence which the appellant received, but the maximum possible
sentence.” Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1148 (emphasis added). Plakio argues the
maximum possible sentence must be determined in reference to a defendant’s
particular criminal history category. But in defining a “felony” for purposes of
§2K2.1(a)(4)(A), we look to the maximum sentence possible at the time of
conviction, at which the defendant’s criminal history is undetermined. At the
time Plakio pled to the Kansas controlled substance offense, the maximum
possible sentence for someone convicted of a level 8 non-drug offense under
Kansas law was twenty-three months. Because his criminal history category was
not a factor at the time of conviction, the offense to which he pled guilty
constituted a felony under §2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
This approach best comports with the language of §2K2.1 cmt. n.5 and
§4B1.2(b), which directs us to consider whether the crime and not the particular
defendant is punishable by more than a year imprisonment. In addition, it furthers
the general policy of the guidelines to promote uniform sentences, see Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996); Diaz-Bonilla, 65 F.3d at 877; United
States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 121 (10th Cir. 1990), by looking at defendants as
a group rather than as individuals under state sentencing guidelines. This position
is also in accord with the fourth circuit’s recent opinion in Harp. There, under
the plain error standard, it held that “to determine whether a conviction is for a
crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year [under §4B1.2(b)], . . . we
consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime
upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history.” Harp, 406 F.3d at
246. See also United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1999)
(applying the same standard to § 922(g)(1)). I find the fourth circuit’s reasoning
persuasive. When considering state sentencing schemes under §2K2.1(a)(4)(A),
we should ignore the individual defendant’s criminal history category and look
only to the maximum possible sentence allowed for any defendant convicted of
the particular crime. This is a logical extension of our precedents in Norris, 319
F.3d at 1281-82, 1 and Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1148, which direct us to look at the
maximum possible sentence and not the sentence actually imposed.
Because I would affirm Plakio’s sentence, I respectfully dissent.
1
While the majority is correct that the defendant in Norris raised the same
arguments as Plakio, this Court’s suggestion in Norris that “[h]ad Mr. Norris’ state
convictions become final after June 26, 2000, we would have before us a very different
case,” was dicta. 319 F.3d at 1283. We did not have to decide the issue in Norris
because the defendant’s conviction became final prior to the Apprendi decision and we
are therefore not bound by the analysis suggested in Norris.
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