F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 2, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
RAYMOND POTTS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 05-6075
v. (D.C. No. 04-CV-685-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
RON WARD; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
OKLAHOMA,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Raymond Potts, a state inmate appearing pro se, seeks
a certificate of appealability (“COA”) so as to appeal from the district court’s
denial of his habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In order to merit a COA,
Mr. Potts must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
To make such a showing, he must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s resolution of the constitutional issue contained in his motion
debatable or wrong. Id.; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because
we find that Mr. Potts has not made such a showing, we deny a COA and dismiss
the appeal.
On June 20, 2002, Mr. Potts pled guilty to one count of first degree
burglary and no contest to one count of assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon. After a sentencing hearing on October 23, 2002, the court sentenced Mr.
Potts to twenty years imprisonment on each count to be served consecutively.
The plea arose from an incident where Mr. Potts broke into the home of a former
employer with the intent to steal $100. Mr. Potts broke a window in a door
separating the kitchen from the den, and in the process confronted a twelve-year
old child. Though Mr. Potts denies any intent to harm or frighten the child, the
child testified at a sentencing hearing that a few seconds prior to hitting the glass
with his arm, Mr. Potts stared at him, yelled out and frightened him. R. Doc. 12,
Ex. 4 at 7-8. The flying glass cut the child, who bled profusely. Id. at 9.
On November 4, 2002, Mr. Potts, through counsel, sought to withdraw his
guilty plea. He testified that after his arrest, he accepted a plea agreement
stipulating he would be sentenced to two twenty-year terms of imprisonment to be
served concurrently. Mr. Potts testified that after he accepted the agreement but
before the hearing, he traveled to California and was unable to appear as
scheduled in Oklahoma due to the events of September 11, 2001. Mr. Potts
testified he voluntarily surrendered to California authorities but upon his return to
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Oklahoma, the state withdrew its plea offer. In his application to withdraw his
plea, Mr. Potts argued he should have been sentenced in accord with the original
agreement. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on
November 22, 2002.
Mr. Potts, represented by new counsel, appealed to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA) and argued (1) his convictions violate the prohibitions
against double jeopardy and double punishment, (2) that the trial court erred in
denying his application to withdraw his guilty pleas, (3) that the trial court
committed reversible error in failing to inform him of the elements of each
offense charged when it accepted the guilty pleas, and (4) there was an inadequate
factual basis for his guilty pleas. A majority of the OCCA denied certiorari under
Rule 4.2(B), Rules of the OCCA, 22 Okla. Stat. Ch. 18, because Mr. Potts
presented issues not raised in his application to withdraw his guilty plea.
In his federal habeas petition, Mr. Potts asserted (1) that his convictions
violate prohibitions on double jeopardy and double punishment and (2) the trial
court committed reversible error in accepting the pleas without informing Mr.
Potts of the elements of the offense charged. In its response, the state argued that
Mr. Potts is procedurally barred from raising his claims based on Rule 4.2(B).
On April 18, 2005, the district court adopted the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge. The district court determined that Rule
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4.2(B) was inadequate to bar review of Mr. Potts’ claims, and denied relief on the
merits. On appeal, Mr. Potts contends that his convictions violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy and double punishment, and that the state trial court erred
by accepting his no contest plea, not establishing a factual basis for the charge,
and refusing to grant his motion to withdraw the plea.
We do not think that the following conclusions of the magistrate judge and
the district court are reasonably debatable: (1) Mr. Potts’ plea was voluntary and
intelligent, and (2) as a result, his double jeopardy challenge (which is meritless
given the different elements of the offenses and the facts of this case) is
foreclosed. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569-71 (1989). There is no
requirement as a matter of federal constitutional law that the state trial court
review the elements of each offense before accepting a voluntary and intelligent
guilty plea. United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1991).
We also agree with the district court that there was a sufficient factual basis
to support the pleas. See R. Doc. 18, Ex. C at ¶ 24 (“I admit I broke a window”);
R. Doc. 18 Ex. D (warrant affidavit describing Mr. Potts’ interaction with the
injured child as a “confrontation” and incorporated by reference into Mr. Potts’
signed plea summary of facts at R. Doc. 18, Ex. C at ¶ 31). That Mr. Potts
contends now, as he did at his sentencing hearing, that he did not intend to
commit assault and battery (but merely intended to break a window) is beside the
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point. The state had evidence that Mr. Potts confronted the victim with a yell and
then broke the window, frightening the victim, as well as injuring him.
Accordingly we DENY the application for COA, DENY the motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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