Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practice Litigation v. Sprint Communications Co.

                                                                     F I L E D
                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                      Tenth Circuit
                                     PUBLISH
                                                                   November 8, 2005
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                     Clerk of Court
                               TENTH CIRCUIT



 IN RE UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND
 TELEPHONE BILLING PRACTICE
 LITIGATION,

             Plaintiff - Appellee,

       v.                                            No. 04-3241

 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS
 COMPANY, L.P.; AT&T
 CORPORATION,

             Defendants - Appellants,

 HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS
 LLP,

             Respondent - Appellee.


        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
                   (D.C. No. 02-MD-1468-JWL)


Mark D. Hinderks, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Overland Park, Kansas for
Defendant - Appellant Sprint Communications Company, L.P.

Michael Doss (Mark S. Blocker with him on the briefs), Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood L.L.P., Chicago, Illinois for Defendant - Appellant AT&T Corp.

Marc M. Seltzer (David H. Orozco and Stephen E. Morrissey, Susman Godfrey
L.L.P., Los Angeles, California; Samuel D. Heins, Stacey L. Mills, Vincent J.
Esades, and Barbara J. Felt, Heins Mills & Olson, PLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Barry C. Barnett and Shawn J. Rabin, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Dallas, Texas;
Marc R. Stanley, Roger L. Mandel, and Martin Woodward, Stanley Mandel &
Iola, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas; and Isaac Diel, Bonner Springs, Kansas, with him on
the brief) Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., Los Angeles, California for Plaintiffs -
Appellees.


Before EBEL and PORFILIO, Circuit Judges, and HERRERA, District Judge. *


PORFILIO, Circuit Judge.



      Appellants AT&T Corporation (“AT&T”) and Sprint Communications

Company, L.P. (“Sprint”) (jointly “Defendants”) seek reversal of an order of the

district court denying their motion to compel arbitration and stay in this multi-

district class action. Appellees (“Plaintiffs”) have challenged our jurisdiction to

hear this interlocutory appeal. We conclude the appeal does not comply with the

interlocutory appeal provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); therefore,

we grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

      The underlying action is predicated upon a complaint which avers

Defendants conspired with each other and MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc.




*
       The Honorable Judith C. Herrera, United States District Judge for the
District of New Mexico, sitting by designation.


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(“MCI”) 1 to violate provisions of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.

§§ 201 and 202; the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26; and the Sherman Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1. This appeal, however, pertains only to the district court’s denial of

mandatory arbitration and a stay under the FAA. The district court concluded

there was no legal basis for granting that relief. In re Universal Service Fund

Telephone Billing Practices Litigation, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Kan. 2004).

The Defendants urge us to review the merits of that holding.

      Plaintiffs’ complaint avers AT&T and Sprint conspired among themselves

and with MCI to recover funds from the federal Universal Service Fund program.

During the course of litigation, as provided by the terms of a written arbitration

agreement, the district court compelled arbitration of the claims of plaintiff

residential customers of MCI. 2 After passage of some time, Defendants moved to

compel arbitration of the claims of MCI business customers and to stay the

litigation pending the outcome of that arbitration. Even though Defendants had

no arbitration agreements with those business customers, both asserted an

equitable right to arbitration through equitable estoppel. Their claim was based

on the assertion that because those business customers had agreed to arbitration

with MCI, equity required Defendants be placed on an equal footing. The district

1
      MCI is not a party to this appeal.
2
  See In re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation, 300 F.
Supp. 2d. 1107 (D. Kan. 2003).

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court denied the motions on the specific ground of waiver, but additionally

concluded it would not apply equity to enforce arbitration of the MCI business

claims. Id.

      Before proceeding to the merits of this appeal, our first responsibility is to

determine whether we have jurisdiction to do so. “[J]urisdiction is a threshold

question which an appellate court must resolve before addressing the merits of the

matter before it.” Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir.

2002), citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).

Ordinarily, federal courts only have appellate jurisdiction over “final decisions.”

28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits

and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v.

United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see also Rekstad v. First Bank System,

Inc., 238 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001).

      Because the district court’s order denying the motion to compel did not end

the litigation on the merits, it was not a final decision. Therefore, as the basis for

our jurisdiction, Defendants have relied upon 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) and (B),

both of which grant interlocutory appeal in matters involving applications for

mandatory arbitration and stays under the FAA.

      Section 16(a)(1)(A) provides an appeal from an order “refusing a stay of

any action under section 3” of the FAA. Section 3 creates the availability of a


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stay of an action based upon “any issue referable to arbitration under an

agreement in writing for such arbitration.” (emphasis added). Section

16(a)(1)(B) permits an appeal from an order “denying a petition to order

arbitration under section 4” of the FAA. Section 4, in turn, creates a right of

action for “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged . . . refusal of another to arbitrate

under a written agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added). Therefore, whether

Defendants are appealing from the district court’s denial of a stay or its refusal to

compel arbitration, the plain language of the applicable jurisdictional statute

mandates Defendants’ prior reliance upon a written agreement to arbitrate as a

condition precedent to our jurisdiction.

      Citing that plain language, Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the appeal

because neither of the Defendants could have relied upon such written agreements

because none exists. Therefore, they argue, Defendants cannot be “aggrieved”

parties who have the right to an interlocutory appeal within the context of § 16(a).

This court has not yet considered this precise issue.

      However, in DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp, 349 F. 3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003),

(“DSMC”), the D.C. Circuit decided a virtually identical appeal. The court

dismissed an interlocutory appeal in which the appellants sought review of orders

denying a stay and compelling arbitration under 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4. The

appellants asserted jurisdiction by relying upon equitable estoppel as a substitute


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for the statutory requirement of a written arbitration agreement. Focusing on the

strict construction required of statutes which create interlocutory appeals and the

elements of jurisdiction established in 9 U.S.C. § 16(a), the court held an

appellant’s prior reliance upon a written agreement to compel arbitration is a

necessary predicate to an interlocutory appeal under the FAA. Id. at 683.

Moreover, the court concluded a theory of equitable estoppel is incompatible with

that jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 683-84.

       Although the facts of DSMC are convoluted, we relate them because of the

implications arising from their similarity to the facts of this case. The underlying

action was instituted by DSMC Inc. claiming NGT Library (“NGTL”) breached a

contract between DSMC Inc. and NGTL by entering a subsequent contract with

Convera Corporation. DSMC Inc.’s claim against NGTL was referred by the

district court to arbitration under provisions of an arbitration clause in the contract

in litigation.

       DSMC Inc. then filed a parallel action against Convera on several grounds

based upon the contract between NGTL and Convera. NGTL later filed a motion

to intervene in that action for the purpose of seeking a stay of the suit pending the

outcome of the DSMC Inc.-NGTL arbitration. NGTL contended because the

arbitration and the action between DSMC Inc. and Convera contained the same




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issues, the suit threatened the outcome of the arbitration, and NGTL was entitled

therefore to a stay until arbitration was completed

      Although it had no arbitration agreement with DSMC Inc, Convera then

filed a motion to compel DSMC Inc. to arbitrate its claim against Convera.

Convera theorized equitable estoppel and the federal policy favoring arbitration

supported its motion.

      Treating the arguments of the appellants separately, the court first disagreed

with NGTL’s contention the “identicality” of the issues in the parallel action and

those in arbitration entitled NGTL to a § 3 stay despite the absence of arbitrable

issues between DSMC Inc. and Convera. Assuming the validity of the identicality

theory, the court held: “the litigation may not be stayed under Section 3 because

the issues in the litigation are not ‘referable’ to arbitration under an agreement.”

349 F.3d at 684 (citation omitted). The court continued, “NGTL is a signatory, to

be sure, but its issues with DSMC. are already subject to arbitration. There is no

arbitration agreement between DSMC and Convera, and so Section 3 does not

apply in this case.” Id. (emphasis in original). With that conclusion, the court

dismissed NGTL’s appeal. See also, IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 103

F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 1996).

      Convera’s attempt to appeal the order denying arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4

was subject to the same analysis. As the court explained, § 4 “applies only to ‘an


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alleged failure . . . to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration’ –not an

alleged failure to arbitrate when principles of equitable estoppel indicate that you

should.” 349 F.3d. at 383. Like the position advocated by Defendants here,

Convera maintained the arbitration between DSMC Inc. and NGTL, which was

required by a written arbitration agreement, related to issues in the pending suit,

giving Convera an equitable right to arbitration under § 4. Again the court

disagreed, stating, “Section 4 does not merely require that there be a written

agreement somewhere in the picture. It requires that the motion to compel be

based on an alleged failure to arbitrate under that written agreement.” Id.

(emphasis added). 3 We believe that analysis is sound.

      Defendants attempt to avoid this reasoning and the result it portends by

subscribing to a broad interpretation of 9 U.S.C. §16(1). They posit the general

federal policy favoring arbitration does not permit such a “cramped reading of

section 4 of the FAA.” Indeed, they argue, “[s]ection 4 broadly provides standing

to move to compel on [sic] any party ‘aggrieved’ by another’s failure to arbitrate.”

They stoutly maintain they satisfy section 4’s requirement of a “written agreement

for arbitration” simply because “MCI’s business customers entered into written



3
  The court also noted the effort to compel arbitration by estoppel was an
antithetical to § 4 because the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies only in the
absence of a written agreement. DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 683
(D.C. Cir. 2003).

                                           -8-
arbitration agreements with MCI.” Thus, because of the conspiracy claims against

Defendants and MCI, the latter’s agreements “are encompassed within the broad

arbitration provisions in these MCI small business agreements.” Essentially,

Defendants’ position is that they are “aggrieved” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C.

§ 4 because they must be put to the expense of litigation rather than to simple

resolution of the claims against them by the expedience of arbitration. 4

      Defendants maintain “[c]ourts have repeatedly accepted appellate

jurisdiction where the district court had denied arbitration motions by litigants that

were not signatories to the relevant arbitration agreement.” They support this

contention with a number of cases which simply are not apposite, however,

because none of them rule upon the jurisdictional basis for their holdings. Indeed,

none of them consider the issue before us. Defendants artfully seek to avoid this

problem by arguing:




4
  Defendants have also suggested jurisdiction can be obtained through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) which grants interlocutory jurisdiction over appeals from specific
decisions involving injunctions. Indeed, this court has previously accepted this
statute as permitting interlocutory appeal from the denial of an application to
compel arbitration. See Peterson v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 849 F. 2d 464,
465 (10th Cir. 1988). However, that decision was reached prior to the enactment
of 9 U.S.C. § 16 which uniquely addresses appeals from denials of motions to
compel and stay arbitration. Because § 16 specifically deals with the subject of
arbitration, it has superceded Peterson and makes § 1292(a)(1) inapposite to this
case. See DSMC, 349 F.3d at 682; McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix
Int’l Co., 105 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1997.

                                          -9-
      That these decisions did not discuss the basis for their jurisdiction
      over the appeal does not lessen their import, as every court of appeals
      is obliged to evaluate and confirm its jurisdiction whether or not
      raised by either party.

While arguable, that contention is not persuasive because although Defendants’

assumption is an apt statement of federal jurisprudence, it does not necessarily

flow from the opinions of the courts. The only logical inference we can make is

that the courts simply did not consider the matter of jurisdiction. As Judge

Roberts observed in DSMC:

      We are also cognizant that jurisdictional rules should be, to the extent
      possible, clear, predictable, bright-line rules that can be applied to
      determine jurisdiction with a fair degree of certainty from the outset.
      Asking whether the parties are signatories to a written agreement to
      arbitrate satisfies these criteria. On the other hand, the application of
      equitable estoppel - if permitted in this context - requires a
      multifactor factual and legal inquiry to determine whether the issues
      to be litigated by the non-signatory are sufficiently intertwined with
      the issues subject to arbitration. That type of analysis, in turn, would
      require this court to delve deeply into the merits of a case before even
      deciding whether we had interlocutory appellate jurisdiction - an
      unattractive prospect.

DSMC, 349 F.3d at 683-84.

      Defendants miss the point on another level as well. The issue in this appeal

is not whether they have a right to compel arbitration, but whether they have a

right to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion seeking to compel

arbitration. Given that statutes allowing interlocutory appeals should be narrowly

construed, Defendants stand the scope of appellate jurisdiction on its head. See


                                         -10-
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983);

Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R Passenger Corp. 333 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir.

2003).

         We also agree with the DSMC court that dismissing this appeal does not

mean equitable estoppel cannot be employed to compel arbitration. Indeed, our

holding is limited to whether Defendants can invoke interlocutory appellate

jurisdiction to challenge the merits of the district court’s order. In the absence of

jurisdiction, any thoughts we might express on whether the doctrine of equitable

estoppel can or should be recognized in the circumstances of this case would be

without effect. Thus, on the merits of the district court’s order, we express no

opinion. Judgment AFFIRMED.




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