F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 7, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
ALTON RAYMOND AMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Nos. 05-6226
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, LOGAN (D.C. No. CIV-05-0266-HE)
COUNTY; CITY OF GUTHRIE,
OKLAHOMA; LOGAN COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; MARK
SHARPTON, Logan County
Commissioner; CLARENCE J.
CREWS, Logan County
Commissioner; LEON VADDER,
Logan County Commissioner;
LOGAN COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; LOGAN
COUNTY JAIL; OFFICER
SCOTT, “Big Scott”; KENNETH
DALE HIGGINS; MARK
BRUNING; JIM TAFF; STEVE
MIZE; REX BROWN; MICHAEL
DEAN METCALF; SEAN SUGUE;
JOHN DOE;
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
(continued...)
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Alton Ames, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his sixteen-count civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Mr. Ames also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district
court determined that, pursuant to its screening obligations set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, Mr. Ames’s complaint should be dismissed. The district court
concluded that (1) certain of Mr. Ames’s claims were duplicative of other claims
in related litigation, (2) other claims were premature, and (3) the remaining
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
*
(...continued)
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th C IRCUIT R ULE
36.3.
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Mr. Ames’s complaint, filed on March 9, 2005, sought monetary damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged violation of his constitutional
rights stemming from his October 4, 2000 arrest in Logan County, and his
subsequent detention in the Logan County jail. His claims include allegations of
excessive force, conspiracy, denial of adequate medical care, search and seizure
violations, loss of property, planting of evidence, the giving of false testimony,
“cover up,” failure to train, and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. In a
separate case, No. CIV-02-1368-HE, Mr. Ames filed a complaint, dated
September 30, 2002, that alleged unreasonable search and seizure and the use of
excessive force involving the same October 4, 2000 incident. In that action, the
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on October 24, 2005.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo an order dismissing a prisoner’s § 1983 complaint for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d
1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001). On appeal, we construe pro se pleadings liberally,
applying a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Upon review of the record, we agree
with the magistrate judge’s rulings.
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On appeal, Mr. Ames contends that, as to the claims that were deemed
duplicative of other litigation, this second § 1983 action should have been
incorporated with the earlier action. He also maintains that certain claims have
not completed accruing because he continues to be unlawfully confined. Finally,
he argues that he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations, noting he was
unable to comply with the statute of limitations due to legal disability, cover up,
setbacks, and withholding of evidence. Finally, he contends he did not know the
identities of certain defendants when he filed his original action is Case No. CIV-
02-1368-HE, and that he is therefore entitled to tolling. He also maintains that
various other restrictions impeded his ability to timely file, such as his lack of
legal expertise, limited education, restricted access to legal materials, and
incarceration.
First, as to the excessive force claims against Mr. Brown, Mr. Higgins, and
Mr. Brunning, we conclude that Mr. Ames’s second § 1983 action attempts to add
additional claims and defendants to his now-dismissed complaint in case number
CIV-02-1368-HE, filed on September 30, 2002, and dismissed on October 24,
2005. In that previous action, Mr. Ames sought leave to amend the complaint to
include allegations of additional injuries. That request was denied because it was
untimely and because it sought to include a claim that was directly contrary to his
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previous assertions. We conclude that the district court was correct to dismiss
these excessive force claims.
Second, to the extent Mr. Ames contends he is falsely imprisoned and seeks
relief out of the alleged use of false testimony, planted evidence, and the
destruction of favorable evidence, we hold that the district court properly
dismissed these claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). Finally, as to the remaining claims, we agree with the district court
that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Mr. Ames has not
alleged any facts to support statutory or equitable tolling.
Oklahoma law provides a statutory tolling period for persons who are
“under any legal disability,” but the statute does not define the term “legal
disability.” O KLA . S TAT . tit. 12, § 96. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has never squarely addressed the prisoner-tolling issue. See e.g., Garrison v.
Wood, 957 P.2d 129, 130 n.3 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997) (“It is the well established
rule that exceptions to the operation of a statute of limitations which toll its
running in favor of persons under disability are to be strictly construed, and never
extended beyond their plain input.”) (quotation omitted). We find the argument
that incarceration amounts to a “legal disability” unconvincing. Similarly, the
argument that the circumstances of this case warrant application of equitable
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tolling principles fails. We are aware of no Oklahoma authority for equitable
tolling under these circumstances, and Mr. Ames cites to none.
III. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the order of the district court for substantially the
same reasons given by the magistrate judge and the district court, and DENY Mr.
Ames’s motion to proceed IFP, and we DENY any outstanding motions. Mr.
Ames is responsible for the immediate payment of the unpaid balance of the
appellate filing fee.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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