F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
December 20, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LOUIS HAROLD NORTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7133
THE CITY OF MARIETTA,
OKLAHOMA, a municipal
corporation; LOVE COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS; MARION
JOE RUSSELL, Sheriff of Love
County; JEFF POTEET; RAYMOND
DUCHARME; JOHN DOES;
STEPHANIE LEE; MIKE BUXTON;
CASEY LAWSON; CHARLIE
HUGHES; IVAN KNOWLES; ERIK
GRISHAM; JAMES DIGGS;
BARNEY BEAVERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CV-04-38-W)
Submitted on the briefs:
Corrine O’Day, Locke & Moore, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Charles D. Neal, Jr., Eric D. Janzen, Steidley & Neal, McAlester, Oklahoma,
Jason C. Wagner, Stephen L. Geries, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellees.
Before HENRY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Louis Harold Norton appeals from eight separate orders granting
summary judgment and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of his
alleged mistreatment while he was incarcerated in the Love County jail in
Marietta, Oklahoma. Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends
that there were material facts in dispute that precluded summary judgment.
Second, he contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
based on the claims alleged in the Amended Complaint when plaintiff had
clarified his claims in the proposed pre-trial order. Lastly, plaintiff challenges the
district court’s denial of his motion to compel discovery against the Love County
defendants.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons
discussed below, we reverse in part and affirm in part the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants Marion Joe Russell, Jeff Poteet, and
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Raymond Ducharme, and we remand for further proceedings. *
We affirm
summary judgment with respect to the City of Marietta, Mike Buxton, Casey
Lawson, Charlie Hughes, Ivan Knowles, Erik Grisham, and Barney Beavers. We
conclude that the district court correctly ruled based on the claims alleged in the
Amended Complaint rather than the proposed pre-trial order, and we find no
abuse of discretion concerning the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to
compel discovery.
I. Background
Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Love County jail from September 2002 to
March 2003. On January 28, 2004, he filed a pro se complaint against the City of
Marietta (City); the Love County Board of Commissioners; 1
Marion Joe Russell,
the Sheriff of Love County; and Jeff Poteet and Raymond Ducharme, two
Marietta police officers. On February 27, 2004, plaintiff amended his complaint
to add the rest of the individual defendants, all of whom worked at the jail during
his incarceration. In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff claimed that defendants
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Plaintiff does not appeal the district court’s order granting the Board of
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.
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physically assaulted him in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Because his excessive force claims stemmed from
incidents that occurred while he was an inmate, the district court construed the
claims as arising under the Eighth Amendment. The court also construed the
Amended Complaint as stating a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
and state law claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery.
On April 15, 2004, counsel entered an appearance for plaintiff, and over the
next five months, the parties engaged in discovery and trial preparation. On
September 10, 2004, the City defendants (the City, Poteet, Ducharme, Buxton,
and Diggs 2) filed a joint motion for summary judgment. That motion was
followed on September 17, 2004, by separate summary judgment motions filed by
each of the remaining defendants.
While the summary judgment motions were pending, the parties submitted a
proposed pre-trial order to the court. Plaintiff included in his description of his
claims a variety of allegations about conditions of his confinement that he had not
alleged in the Amended Complaint, including the denial of a special diet and
other medical care and the denial of legal materials and access to the courts.
Plaintiff did not, however, seek to amend his complaint to add claims based on
2
James Diggs was subsequently dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a joint
stipulation.
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these allegations. Defendants objected to plaintiff’s inclusion in the proposed
pre-trial order of any allegations or claims that were not in the Amended
Complaint. At the pre-trial conference held on October 14, 2004, the district
court ordered the parties to revise and resubmit the proposed pre-trial order by
October 28. They never did so, however, because by then the court had granted
all of defendants’ summary judgment motions, finding that defendants’ actions
did not rise to the level of constitutional violations. For the most part, the district
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claims. However, it appears that the district court dismissed some of the state law
assault and battery claims on the merits.
Plaintiff argues that the district court’s dismissal of his case on summary
judgment was based on impermissible credibility determinations and findings of
fact in favor of defendants. He also argues that it was error for the district court
to rule on the summary judgment motions without first resolving the parties’
dispute over which claims would be included in the pre-trial order. Plaintiff
argues that the district court should not have granted summary judgment based
solely on the claims alleged in the Amended Complaint because the discovery
process made it clear to all the parties that plaintiff had suffered constitutional
deprivations beyond those specifically pled in the pro se Amended Complaint.
Finally, he contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to compel
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discovery against the Love County defendants. We address these arguments
below along with the relevant facts as they relate to plaintiff’s claims against each
defendant.
II. Administrative Exhaustion
Before turning to the merits of plaintiff’s claims, we must first consider the
issue of administrative exhaustion. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
imposes specific filing requirements on prisoners seeking to file civil actions
regarding prison conditions, which include “all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong,” Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002). One requirement is that a prisoner exhaust all available
administrative remedies before bringing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion
under § 1997e(a) is mandatory, Porter , 534 U.S. at 524, and we have held that the
fact of exhaustion must be specifically pled by the plaintiff, Steele v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons , 355 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). In particular, the plaintiff must
“attach a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint, or,
in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the
administrative proceeding and its outcome.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
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Because plaintiff did not plead exhaustion in his Amended Complaint, we
issued an order directing him to show cause why his case should not be dismissed
for failure to exhaust, and we invited the defendants to file a reply to the
plaintiff’s submission. See Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons , 413 F.3d 1225,
1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2005) (reversing merits disposition and remanding to
district court to dismiss action without prejudice for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies). In response, plaintiff argued that he was not required to
exhaust his administrative remedies because he was not incarcerated at the time
he filed suit. The defendants did not reply. This is an issue of first impression in
the Tenth Circuit, but one on which our sister circuits are in accord.
Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The PLRA defines
“prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused
of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or
diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h).
In light of the PLRA’s plain language, the other circuits to have addressed
the issue have unanimously held that it is the plaintiff’s status at the time he files
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suit that determines whether § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision applies. See
Nerness v. Johnson , 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Witzke v.
Femal , 376 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2004); Cox v. Mayer , 332 F.3d 422, 424-25
(6th Cir. 2003); Ahmed v. Dragovich , 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002);
Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo , 292 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2002); Page v.
Torrey , 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000); Greig v. Goord , 169 F.3d 165, 167
(2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Therefore, other circuits have concluded that a
plaintiff who seeks to bring suit about prison life after he has been released and is
no longer a prisoner does not have to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements
before bringing suit. Nerness , 401 F.3d at 876; Ahmed , 297 F.3d at 210; Page ,
201 F.3d at 1140; Greig , 169 F.3d at 167.
We agree with our sister circuits. The statutory language is plain and
unambiguous: no “prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility” may bring a suit concerning prison life until he first exhausts his
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore plaintiff, who was not
a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility when he brought
suit, did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies first.
Further, we do not find this reading “an absurd and unjust result which
Congress could not have intended,” such that we should not apply the plain
statutory language in this fashion. Robbins v. Chronister , 402 F.3d 1047, 1050
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(10th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted , No. 02-3115 (10th Cir. Aug. 15, 2005). 3
Rather, distinguishing between current and former prisoners “is compatible with
the purpose of the PLRA. Prisoners often have an abundance of time, while
facing a restricted number of enjoyable activities with which to pass the time
other than filing suits.” Witzke , 376 F.3d at 750; see also Greig , 169 F.3d at 167
(noting two senators’ statements about the incentives for prisoners to file suit);
Kerr v. Puckett , 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Congress deemed prisoners
to be pestiferous litigants because they have so much free time on their hands and
there are few costs to filing suit.”). Once a prisoner is released, however,
“[o]pportunity costs of litigation rise . . . , diminishing the need for special
precautions against weak suits.” Kerr , 138 F.3d at 323. Applying the plain
language of § 1997e(a), we conclude that plaintiff was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies and his case is not subject to dismissal for failure to
exhaust. We turn, then, to the merits of plaintiff’s appeal.
3
Our decision is not irreconcilable with the majority decision in Robbins,
which held that applying the plain language of the PLRA’s attorney fee cap to an
inmate’s suit for civil rights violations that occurred before he happened to be
incarcerated would produce an absurd result that Congress did not intend.
402 F.3d at 1054. The Robbins majority’s reasoning was based primarily on
factors that are not present here.
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III. The Proposed Pre-Trial Order
Through his counsel, plaintiff inserted allegations in the proposed pre-trial
order to support a variety of Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims
and First Amendment denial of access claims. Plaintiff repeats some of those
allegations on appeal, where he is also represented by counsel. Specifically,
plaintiff notes that he was denied his medically-required special diet, which
caused him to lose forty pounds, that he was denied medical care, and that he was
denied access to the law library. Defendants objected to the insertion of these and
other allegations in the proposed pre-trial order because they were not pled in the
Amended Complaint. Defendants did not address these allegations in their
motions for summary judgment, which responded only to the claims asserted in
the Amended Complaint. Ultimately, the district court disposed of the entire case
on summary judgment without directly addressing the parties’ dispute over the
pre-trial order. The district court did note in its summary judgment orders,
however, that plaintiff’s responses to the summary judgment motions contained
allegations and causes of action not pled in the Amended Complaint, which the
court said were not properly before it.
Plaintiff argues that the district court’s dismissal was premature and in
error. He argues that defendants were adequately put on notice of all his claims
through the discovery process, his trial brief, and his contributions to the
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proposed pre-trial order, and accordingly “it was error for the trial judge to
dismiss the case without addressing the additional issues clarified after the
Amended Complaint was filed.” Aplt. Br. at 8. We are not persuaded.
Plaintiff correctly points out that entry of a pre-trial order would have
clarified the issues for trial and eliminated the need to amend previously filed
pleadings, Wilson v. Muckala , 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002), but this
argument ignores the key fact that the proposed pre-trial order was never finalized
and entered in this case. Plaintiff may have been confident that defendants knew
the true nature of his constitutional claims, but it is undisputed that the conditions
of confinement and denial of access claims appear nowhere in the Amended
Complaint.
The responsibility for ensuring that one’s claims are properly presented lies
with the litigant, not the court. If plaintiff was concerned that some of his
constitutional claims were omitted from the Amended Complaint, the proper
course would have been to file a motion to amend rather than to hope that the
district court would enter an expansive pre-trial order before ruling on dispositive
motions. Having failed to submit a second amended complaint, plaintiff will not
be heard to complain about the court’s and defendants’ reliance on his last
operative pleading, the Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Green Country Food Mkt.,
Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC , 371 F.3d 1275, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
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that while Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) permits implied amendments to conform to the
evidence, if an opposing party objects to an implied amendment, then the
complaining party must file a motion to amend and the opposing party must fail to
demonstrate prejudice from the proposed amendment, before the district court
may allow the amendment). We find no error in the district court’s decision to
rule on the summary judgment motions before the pre-trial order was finalized.
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IV. Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
We review the entire record on summary judgment de novo in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. We must
consider factual inferences tending to show triable issues in the light
most favorable to the existence of those issues. Where different
ultimate issues may properly be drawn, the case is not one for a
summary judgment.
Seamons v. Snow , 206 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). As we have pointed out, “cases involving constitutional or civil
rights frequently are unsuitable for summary judgment because a necessary
element of the claim for relief presents an inquiry into the state of mind of one or
more of the parties.” Id. at 1028 n.2 (quotation marks omitted). Of course,
summary judgment is appropriate in any case “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
B. Marion Joe Russell, Raymond Ducharme, and Jeff Poteet
At the time of plaintiff’s incarceration, defendant Russell was the Sheriff of
Love County, and Poteet and Ducharme were Marietta police officers. The
parties do not dispute that on December 23, 2002, Russell, Poteet and Ducharme
entered plaintiff’s cell, restrained him, handcuffed him to a backboard, and
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sprayed him with pepper spray. However, all of the other facts relating to this
“backboard incident” are in dispute.
Defendants contend that the incident began with an argument between
plaintiff and defendant Knowles, a sheriff’s deputy, over how many vitamins
plaintiff would receive that day. According to Sheriff Russell, plaintiff’s
uncontroverted deposition testimony establishes that he became upset with
Knowles and started kicking his cell door, which prompted other inmates to kick
their cell doors. Knowles ordered plaintiff to stop kicking, but plaintiff kicked
the cell door at least one more time. Knowles responded by calling Sheriff
Russell to the jail, who brought in officers Poteet and Ducharme. Russell, Poteet,
and Ducharme entered plaintiff’s cell with a backboard, a device used to restrain
inmates, and ordered plaintiff to get on the backboard. Plaintiff refused and then
resisted as the officers physically put him on the backboard. 4
Russell concedes
that during the incident, plaintiff was sprayed with pepper spray, probably by
Officer Ducharme. Plaintiff ceased resisting the officers after he was sprayed.
Russell contends that the use of pepper spray was warranted under the
4
When asked at his deposition whether he complied with the officers’ orders
to get on the backboard, plaintiff responded: “Not exactly. I did go down, but I
didn’t lay on the board.” Love County Suppl. App. at 121. Regarding his
resistance, plaintiff testified: “[T]hey did reach for my arm one time, and pulled
it out, and I did pull it back.” Id. Plaintiff conceded that he did not cooperate
with the officers. Id. at 121-23.
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circumstances because it was necessary to maintain order and restore discipline.
This is apparent, he argues, from the fact that after plaintiff was sprayed, he
stopped resisting the officers’ efforts to restrain him.
Poteet and Ducharme claim that plaintiff’s kicking the cell door incited the
other inmates to begin kicking, yelling, and screaming, and that the situation
became riotous. They contend that when plaintiff was ordered to lie down on the
backboard, he became combative and that the use of force and pepper spray was
necessary to regain control of the situation.
Plaintiff denies that he was combative. He maintains that the situation was
never riotous and that the force used and the pepper spray were unnecessary to
restrain him. In support, plaintiff points to Poteet’s deposition testimony that at
the time of the incident plaintiff was in his sixties, whereas Poteet was only
twenty-two years old and Ducharme was thirty-two or thirty-three. Plaintiff also
provided an affidavit from fellow inmate Lynwood Moore, who averred that he
personally witnessed the backboard incident. 5
According to Moore, although
5
Defendants object to the inclusion of Moore’s and certain other inmates’
affidavits in plaintiff’s appendix because they are not file-stamped copies and
plaintiff did not explain how these documents were before the district court. We
too are dismayed by the state of plaintiff’s appendix (prepared by counsel), which
hindered rather than assisted our review of this appeal. Nonetheless, plaintiff
does state that these affidavits were included in his response to the summary
judgment motions (Aplt. Br. at 7) and none of the defendants disputes this
contention. Accordingly, we consider Moore’s affidavit as part of the district
(continued...)
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plaintiff and some other inmates did kick their cell doors that night, the situation
in the jail never became riotous. He averred that plaintiff sat down on the
backboard when ordered to do so, but told the officers that he did not want to lay
down. He stated that Sheriff Russell sat on plaintiff’s lower body while the other
officers held his arms. Plaintiff resisted out of instinct, but did not become
combative.
With respect to the pepper spray, Moore averred that one of the police
officers “was holding the can about two inches from [plaintiff’s] eyes” and “was
waving the can around like he was spray-painting [plaintiff’s] face. He sprayed
. . . 5-7 seconds.” Aplt. App. at 203. Moore stated that after they sprayed
plaintiff, they handcuffed his arms and legs to the board and then one of the
officers held plaintiff’s head back and tossed some water in his eyes. Finally,
Moore stated that after the officers removed plaintiff from the cell, he could hear
plaintiff crying and begging for hours to be let up, telling the officers that he was
in pain, but that the officers kept telling plaintiff to shut up. This evidence is
consistent with plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the pepper spray “soaked
[him] pretty good,” Love County Suppl. App. at 123. Plaintiff testified: “It was
5
(...continued)
court record and will therefore consider it on appeal. All of the other affidavits
submitted by plaintiff pertain to his conditions of confinement and denial of
access claims, which we have already concluded were not properly before the
district court.
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running plumb down between my legs, even on the first spray – and down my
lungs, my nostrils, my eyes. I was soaked.” Id.
“[P]epper spray is an instrument with which prison officers wield their
authority, or force, and thus its use implicates the excessive use of force.”
DeSpain v. Uphoff , 264 F.3d 965, 978 (10th Cir. 2001). To succeed on his
excessive use of force claim, plaintiff must show (1) that the alleged wrongdoing
was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation; and (2)
that defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Smith v.
Cochran , 339 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003). “The objective component . . . is
contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. The subjective
element . . . turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the facts relevant to both the objective and subjective elements
of the excessive force test are hotly contested. Whether defendants’ use of the
spray was objectively harmful enough to violate plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
rights turns in part on how long plaintiff was sprayed and whether he was
adequately irrigated afterwards or left to suffer unnecessarily. The parties dispute
these issues. They also disagree as to whether defendants sprayed plaintiff in a
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good faith effort to restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
purpose of causing harm.
The district court concluded that “the fact that the Plaintiff may have been
injured was not the intent of the Defendants. The intent was to restrain the
Plaintiff until he was willing to comply with jailhouse rules.” Aplt. App. at 22,
see also id. at 25. The court also found that it was plaintiff who “created the
necessity for the use of force.” Id. at 22. Given the dearth of evidence in the
record, the district court could not have reached these conclusions unless it chose
to believe defendants over plaintiff. However, “a judge may not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses in deciding a motion for summary judgment.” Seamons ,
206 F.3d at 1026. “In cases which involve delving into the state of mind of a
party, the granting of summary judgment is especially questionable.” 6
Id. at 1028
(quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Because we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist surrounding
defendants’ use of pepper spray, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment with respect to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendants
6
Although we do not address plaintiff’s conditions of confinement and
denial of access claims, we have not ignored the affidavits submitted by plaintiff
describing his alleged mistreatment while incarcerated. See Aplt. App. at 68-70,
71-73, 74-77. This evidence, which tends to show that plaintiff may have been
generally disliked by jail personnel, renders even more problematic the district
court’s findings of fact with respect to defendants’ state of mind with regard to
the use of excessive force.
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Russell, Poteet, and Ducharme. We also vacate the district court’s merits
dismissal of plaintiff’s state law claim for assault and battery against these
defendants and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 7
Plaintiff contends that the district court failed to address his Fourteenth
Amendment claim. This is incorrect. Rather, the district court simply dismissed
the claim, citing Thompson v. Gibson , 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). In
Thompson , we reiterated the general rule that a prisoner asserting an equal
protection claim must show how he was treated differently based on a suspect
classification and not based on a legitimate penological purpose. Id. Even
assuming all of plaintiff’s allegations are true, he has not alleged that any of the
defendants treated him differently based on his membership in a suspect class.
Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff’s claims against any of the defendants are
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm the district court’s dismissal
of those claims.
C. The City of Marietta
Plaintiff also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
City. Plaintiff seeks to hold the City responsible for the actions of its officers,
7
Our vacation of the district court’s premature merits ruling does not prevent
the district court from declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s state law claims on remand.
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Poteet and Ducharme, and argues that the police officers’ use of the backboard
violated state law.
A municipality cannot, however, be held liable for the actions of its
employees under the theory of respondeat superior. Instead, it must be
shown that the unconstitutional actions of an employee were
representative of an official policy or custom of the municipal
institution, or were carried out by an official with final policy making
authority with respect to the challenged action.
Seamons , 206 F.3d at 1029 (citation omitted). Plaintiff fails to identify any
official policy or custom of the City which resulted in the deprivation of his
constitutional rights. His conclusory allegation that the use of the backboard
violated Oklahoma law is insufficient to state a constitutional claim against the
City. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of
Marietta is affirmed.
D. Mike Buxton
Defendant Mike Buxton was the Marietta Chief of Police during the
relevant period. When plaintiff was asked at his deposition whether Buxton ever
participated in an assault and battery upon him, he responded: “Not directly.
Maybe he indirectly influenced the ones that – in the [back]board incident.” City
Suppl. App. at 20-21. However, when questioned further, plaintiff conceded that
he had no evidence of Buxton’s indirect involvement in the backboard incident.
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Setting aside the conditions of confinement allegations, the entirety of
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Buxton is based on some allegedly
disparaging remarks that Buxton made about plaintiff in front of jail personnel.
Even assuming the truth of such allegations, a police officer’s disparaging
remarks about an inmate clearly do not give rise to a constitutional violation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with
respect to Mike Buxton.
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E. Ivan Knowles, Charlie Hughes, Stephanie Lee, Casey Lawson
Defendants Knowles, Hughes, Lee, and Lawson were sheriff’s deputies
working at the Love County jail during plaintiff’s incarceration. Plaintiff
conceded at his deposition that none of these defendants ever physically assaulted
him. However, he argues on appeal that these defendants “were involved in the
conditions of confinement claims and state law claims of assault and battery.”
Aplt. Br. at 17. We have already held that since plaintiff failed to include
allegations relating to his conditions of confinement in his Amended Complaint,
such claims were not properly before the district court when it ruled on
defendants’ summary judgment motions. Moreover, plaintiff’s concession that
none of these defendants ever physically assaulted him is fatal to any Eighth
Amendment claim based on the use of excessive force. See DeSpain , 264 F.3d at
978 (holding that “the ultimate constitutional inquiry is directed at whether an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain has occurred”) (quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
plaintiff’s constitutional claims against these defendants.
F. Erik Grisham and Barney Beavers
Defendants Grisham and Beavers were also sheriff’s deputies working in
the jail during the relevant period. Plaintiff claims that he had physical
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altercations with each of these defendants that resulted in a violation of his
constitutional rights. Plaintiff testified that Grisham once came to his cell in
response to a plumbing problem and ordered him to lay on his bed. Instead of
complying with that order, plaintiff squatted down, at which point Grisham
“grabbed [him] around the neck and went to twisting it and hurting it.” Love
County Suppl. App. at 299. He also testified that Beavers once came to his cell to
look for something and plaintiff stepped towards him and fell. According to
plaintiff, Beavers then grabbed him around the neck and “kind of hurt [him].” Id.
at 350. Both Grisham and Beavers deny that they used excessive force against
plaintiff.
Even accepting plaintiff’s version of these events as true, we fail to see
how these defendants’ actions were objectively harmful enough to establish a
constitutional violation. See Smith , 339 F.3d at 1212. “Not every push or shove,
even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates
a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” DeSpain , 264 F.3d at 978 (quotation marks
omitted). Plaintiff points to no evidence indicating that the officers’ physical
response on these occasions was excessive under the circumstances, and we see
no such evidence in the record before us. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to defendants Grisham and
Beavers.
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V. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery
Plaintiff also appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to
compel discovery, filed October 12, 2004. 8
The discovery in question sought the
criminal records of the Love County defendants, Russell, Lee, Lawson, Hughes,
Knowles, Grisham, and Beavers. We review a district court’s ruling denying a
motion to compel for an abuse of discretion. Cummings v. GMC , 365 F.3d 944,
952 (10th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, we will not disturb a trial court’s
decision absent a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear
error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
circumstances.” Id. at 953 (quotation marks omitted).
It is clear from the district court docket sheet that plaintiff filed his motion
to compel well after the close of discovery and only two days before the pre-trial
conference. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s late motion.
8
Although plaintiff’s notice of appeal failed to designate the order denying
his motion to compel as required by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), plaintiff’s designation
of the final judgment is sufficient to support our review of all earlier interlocutory
orders. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1382 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
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VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, the summary judgment orders in favor of defendants Russell,
Poteet, and Ducharme are REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and the case
is REMANDED for further proceedings. The summary judgment orders in favor
of defendants City of Marietta, Buxton, Lee, Lawson, Hughes, Knowles, Grisham,
and Beavers are AFFIRMED . The order denying plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery is AFFIRMED .
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