F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 21, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES of AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-1519
v.
(D.C. No. 03-CR-530-D)
(D. Colo.)
DAVID STEPHENSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, MCKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant David Stephenson pleaded guilty to transport of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). On appeal, he alleges that
he is entitled to be resentenced in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), because the district court mandatorily imposed a sentence according to the
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We agree. Mr. Stephenson also argues that on
remand the district court is limited to considering facts, including prior
convictions, alleged in the indictment to calculate the appropriate advisory
Guideline range. We reject both of these arguments as contrary to Supreme Court
and Tenth Circuit case law.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2003, police officers executed a search warrant at Mr. Stephenson’s
home and found on his computer numerous depictions of children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. A grand jury subsequently indicted Mr. Stephenson on
three counts: the first two accused Mr. Stephenson of transmitting images of child
pornography in interstate commerce and the third count charged him with
possessing child pornography on his own computer, violations of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(1) & (a)(5)B).
After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), Mr. Stephenson pleaded guilty to Count One,
admitting that he sent the referenced child pornography images in interstate
commerce, and the Government agreed to dismiss Counts Two and Three. Mr.
Stephenson also stipulated to a prior conviction for attempted sexual assault on a
child in violation of Colorado state law. He also admitted the following: 1) that
the images serving as the basis for Count One depicted prepubescent minors, 2)
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that he used his computer, 3) to distribute these images, and 4) that other images
found on his computer portrayed children engaging in sadistic or masochistic
conduct. These factors are listed as “specific offense characteristics” in U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2.
A probation officer prepared a Presentence Report (“PSR”), which
recommended a total of 15 points be added to the base offense level of 17 as
enhancements for this conduct and a 3-point downward adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility. Based on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history
category III, the PSR calculated the Guideline sentencing range to be 108 to 135
months in prison and further recommended a sentence of imprisonment of 108
months, at the bottom of the range.
Mr. Stephenson raised three objections to the PSR. First, he raised a
Blakely objection and asked the district court to impose a discretionary sentence.
Second he argued that facts increasing a sentence must be alleged in the
indictment. Finally, he objected to the PSR and requested that his sentence be
capped on the ground that the indictment failed to charge that Mr. Stephenson had
been previously convicted of a felony.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled all of Mr.
Stephenson’s objections. The district judge noted that Mr. Stephenson’s
stipulation to specific offense characteristics undermined his argument that their
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omission from the indictment constrained his sentence. Accepting the PSR
recommendation, the judge sentenced Mr. Stephenson to 108 months’
imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Mr. Stephenson appeals that
sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Stephenson raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that
his sentence was prejudicial error under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), because the district court imposed a mandatory sentence under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Second, Mr. Stephenson claims that the district court
erred by sentencing him beyond the statutory maximum available on the facts
charged in his indictment in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to fair notice
and his Fifth Amendment right to indictment and grand jury presentment and that
these uncharged facts may therefore not be considered on resentencing.
Specifically, he argues that he could not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
longer than seventy-one months because that was the maximum sentence under
the Guidelines supported by the factual allegations in the indictment to which he
pleaded guilty. Finally, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
cap the sentence on the ground that his indictment failed to charge that he was
previously convicted of a felony. We find only the first argument meritorious and
remand this case for resentencing.
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A. Booker Issue
Sentencing Mr. Stephenson pre-Booker, the district court committed non-
constitutional Booker error by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. 1
See United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (2005). Mr. Stephenson preserved that error by
raising a Blakely objection. See United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d
1140, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005). We therefore review for harmless error. Id. The
burden of demonstrating harmless error by a preponderance of the evidence is on
the Government in this case. United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1280-81
(10th Cir. 2005).
“[N]on-constitutional [Booker] error is harmless unless it had a ‘substantial
influence’ on the outcome or leaves one in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such
an effect.” United States v. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1424 (2005); see also Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d at 1143.
Where, as here, a district court sentences the defendant “at the bottom of the
1
Mr. Stephenson does not allege nor does the record reflect any
constitutional Booker error because Mr. Stephenson stipulated to all of the
enhancement-facts used by the judge to mandatorily increase his Guidelines
range. See Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d 731-32.
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guidelines range” and says nothing on the record indicating that it would have
imposed the same or higher sentence under a non-mandatory scheme, “to say that
the district court would have imposed the same sentence given the new legal
landscape (even after consulting the Sentencing Guidelines in an advisory
capacity) places us in the zone of speculation and conjecture.” Labastida-Segura,
396 F.3d at 1142-43. Thus, as the Government concedes, the Booker error in this
case was not harmless and Mr. Stephenson’s sentence must be remanded for
resentencing.
B. Indictment Issue
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stephenson objected to enhancement of his
sentence based on facts not alleged in the indictment. The indictment alleged that
Mr. Stephenson 1) used his computer 2) to distribute 3) pornographic images of
prepubescent children. Each of these sentencing facts enhanced the base offense
level of 17 by two points, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1), (b)(2)(E), & (b)(5)
for a total offense level of 23. With a criminal history category III, the applicable
Guideline range would be fifty-seven to seventy-one months. Mr. Stephenson
therefore claims that at the time he pleaded guilty and was sentenced, the heaviest
punishment he faced on this indictment was seventy-one months. 2 And, he
2
The indictment did not allege that Mr. Stephenson 1) “engaged in a
pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” for
(continued...)
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renews this argument on appeal. Our decision in United States v. Glover, 413
F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2005), forecloses any such argument. See id. at 1208-09
(holding that Apprendi and its progeny, including Booker, do not require that
factors supporting sentencing enhancements be alleged in the indictment).
Furthermore, Mr. Stephenson correctly acknowledges that his argument has
no merit under the current advisory Guideline system mandated by Booker. See
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761-62 (recognizing the difficulties of incorporating
sentencing factors into indictments); Glover, 413 F.3d at 1208-09 (holding that
Booker does not require facts supporting sentencing enhancements to be alleged
in the indictment). He argues, however, that Booker’s remedial opinion, which
made the Guidelines advisory, applies only prospectively and that, because he was
indicted, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced pre-Booker, at resentencing the
district court should be limited to facts charged in the indictment.
We reject Mr. Stephenson’s invitation to violate the Supreme Court’s
explicit instruction to “apply . . . [Booker’s] Sixth Amendment holding and . . .
remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act—to all cases on direct review.”
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Rines, 419
2
(...continued)
which the district court enhanced his base offense by five levels pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4), or 2) distributed or possessed “sadistic or masochistic”
images, for which the district court enhanced his base offense level by four points
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3).
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F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 14, 2005) (No.
05-7719) (rejecting the argument that applying Booker’s “remedial holding in
sentencing for an offense that predated Booker would violate” a defendant’s
constitutional rights); Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d at 1142 (“We must apply the
remedial holding of Booker to [the defendant’s] direct appeal even though his
sentence does not involve a Sixth Amendment violation.”). 3 Instead, we conclude
that in resentencing Mr. Stephenson in accordance with Booker on remand, the
district court may properly consider sentence enhancement facts in determining
the advisory Guideline range, even if those facts were not alleged in the
indictment. 4
3
The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have held
that the remedial portion of Booker may be properly applied retroactively to cases
on direct appeal. See United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005); United
States v. Vaughn, --- F.3d ----, 2005 WL 3219706 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jamison, 416 F.3d 538
(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dupas, 417 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.), amended by
419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 432 (2005). However, we note that most of these were
(judicial) ex post facto cases rather than Fifth Amendment indictment by grand
jury issues.
4
In his reply brief, Mr. Stephenson argues that applying Booker’s remedial
holding to Fifth Amendment violations would violate substantive due process and
double jeopardy. We grant the Government’s motion to strike these arguments
because Mr. Stephenson did not raise them in his opening brief. See State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). In any event,
we note that Mr. Stephenson argument is foreclosed by our decision in Rines, in
which we declined the defendant’s “invitation to hold that the Supreme Court
ordered us to violate the Constitution” and instead concluded that Booker’s
(continued...)
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C. Prior Conviction Issue
For preservation purposes only, Mr. Stephenson reasserts on appeal that the
district court erroneously denied his motion to cap his sentence on the ground that
his indictment failed to charge that he was previously convicted of a felony. We
conclude, and Mr. Stephenson concedes, however, that this third objection is
foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). See
United States v. Martinez-Villalva, 232 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating
that we are “bound by [Almendarez-Torres] to hold that the fact of defendant's
prior felony conviction is not an element of the offense with which he was
charged by indictment, but is, instead, a sentencing factor”); see also United
States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 587 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's efforts
to challenge the continuing validity of Almendarez-Torres).
III. CONCLUSION
Because the district court committed non-constitutional Booker error that
affected Mr. Stephenson’s substantial rights, we REMAND this case with
instructions to resentence him in accordance with Booker, which does not require
that facts supporting sentencing factors be included in the indictment.
4
(...continued)
remedial decision could apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal without
violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. 419 F.3d at 1106.
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ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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