F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 18, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-3087
ION MINDRECI, (D. Kan)
(D.C. No. 04-CR-20067-01-JWL)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant was charged in Minnesota state court with fleeing a peace officer,
misdemeanor assault, obstructing arrest, expired registration, and no insurance.
Defendant appeared for several hearings prior to trial. Defendant’s last appearance
in state court was on September 11, 2001, the day he was scheduled for trial. Due
to the terrorist attacks, the judge postponed the trial until November 6, 2001. The
court gave Defendant verbal notice of the November 6th trial date. Several days
later the court set a pretrial hearing for October 23, 2001. The court and the
*
This order and judgement is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
prosecutor sent Defendant several notices regarding the October hearing. The
notices were returned to the sender. Some of the returned notices contained the
following handwritten notation: “Refusal for cause without dishonor and without
recourse to me.” Defendant failed to appear for the October hearing and the
November trial. Warrants were issued for his arrest.
In May 2004, police officers arrived at an apartment complex in Olathe,
Kansas to execute an outstanding arrest warrant for an individual named Michael
Strain. Defendant was with Strain when police arrested Strain in the parking lot of
the apartment complex. The officers detained Defendant but released him when they
did not locate any outstanding warrants. Michelle Knight, another resident in the
apartment complex, observed Defendant and Strain’s encounter with the police.
Approximately ten minutes after the police left with Strain, she witnessed Defendant
hurriedly carrying several items from his apartment to a nearby garage. The next
day, Knight contacted the FBI and described what she had witnessed. She told FBI
Agent Cudmore she saw Defendant carrying a long object covered by an orange
sheath. She assumed the object was a shotgun because of its shape and the manner
in which Defendant was holding it. She also reported that on two additional trips to
the garage, Defendant carried several black boxes about the size of shoe boxes and
a medium size cardboard box.
Based on this information, Agent Cudmore drafted an affidavit and submitted
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it to a magistrate judge. The affidavit included the following information:
[T]he neighbor observed Mindreci exit his apartment carrying a shotgun
and a cardboard box containing an unknown number of smaller black
boxes. The neighbor observed Mindreci holding the shotgun to his
waist with the barrel pointed upward. The neighbor further described
the shotgun as being “long” and its barrel as being partially covered
with “an orange colored sheet.” The neighbor observed Mindreci, upon
leaving his apartment, as “making haste” and “feverishly” carrying the
shotgun and cardboard box to a nearby garage . . . . The neighbor then
observed Mindreci making two additional trips from his apartment to
the aforesaid garage. The trips were also characterized, by the
neighbor, as “hasty” and also involved Mindreci carrying cardboard
boxes containing an unknown number of smaller black boxes. Such
descriptions are consistent with either ammunition boxes and/or storage
containers for handguns.
The magistrate judge issued a search warrant based on the affidavit. During
the execution of the search warrant, the FBI located seven firearms in Defendant’s
garage including a 7.62 x 30 mm SKS rifle; a 9mm Intratec; a .357 Smith &Wesson
revolver; a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver; a .22 caliber Sturm, Ruger and Co.
rifle; a 12 gauge Savage shotgun; and a Turkish Mauser Rifle. At least two of the
handguns were found in black gun boxes, 1 and the SKS rifle was partially covered
with an orange hunting vest. Police also found ammunition in the garage and in
Defendant’s apartment. Defendant was charged with being a fugitive in possession
of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2).
1
Defendant asserts that one of the gun cases was maroon, not black.
Nothing in the record on appeal supports his claim, and both the Government’s
brief and the trial court’s order state three black cases containing handguns were
found in the garage.
3
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming the
affidavit in support of the search warrant contained false or reckless statements in
violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The court held a Franks
hearing and afterward issued an order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The
case proceeded to trial where a jury convicted Defendant of being a fugitive in
possession of firearms. The jury specifically found Defendant possessed all seven
firearms seized in the garage. After trial, Defendant filed a Rule 29 motion for
judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Defendant argued insufficient
evidence of a nexus between himself and the firearms because his wife and Strain
had access to the garage. The court found insufficient evidence to link Defendant
to the 12 gauge Savage shotgun; the Turkish Mauser Rifle; and the .22 caliber Sturm,
Ruger and Co. rifle, and therefore, granted Defendant’s motion as to those weapons.
The court denied Defendant’s motion as to the SKS rifle and the handguns (9 mm
Intratec, .357 Smith & Wesson revolver, .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver)
reasoning that Ms. Knight’s observations sufficiently proved a nexus between
Defendant and the guns.
I.
Defendant first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress,
arguing no probable cause existed to issue the search warrant because Agent
Cudmore’s affidavit contained information that was intentionally false or in reckless
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disregard for the truth. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d
1261, 1269 (10th Cir. 2002). We review the ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo. Id.
“It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an affiant to knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make a false statement in an
affidavit.” United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72). Where a false statement is made in an affidavit for a
search warrant, the search warrant must be voided only if the affidavit’s remaining
content is insufficient to establish probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. In
determining whether probable cause supports a search warrant, we review the
sufficiency of the underlying affidavit by looking at the totality of the circumstances
and ensuring “ the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.” United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Probable cause to issue a search warrant
exists only when the supporting affidavit sets forth facts that lead a prudent person
to believe a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. See United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972-73 (10th
Cir. 1993).
5
The court held a Franks hearing where Ms. Knight testified about information
she relayed to Agent Cudmore. She stated she told Agent Cudmore she saw a
covered object she believed to be a shotgun because of its shape and because of the
manner in which Defendant carried it. She maintained she never told Agent
Cudmore she actually saw the shotgun. She also testified she saw a long object
covered in a “sheath” not a “sheet.” Ms. Knight noted she had difficultly explaining
what she saw because she was not familiar with guns. Nevertheless, she maintained
she believed Defendant was carrying a shotgun. She also explained she saw
Defendant making two additional trips to the garage. On one trip he carried a
cardboard box, and on the next trip he carried several black boxes. Agent Cudmore
also testified at the hearing. He stated Ms. Knight told him she saw Defendant
carrying a shotgun, “like the kind you see on T.V.” Agent Cudmore admitted Ms.
Knight did not use technical terms like “barrel,” but instead used descriptive words
like “long part” in describing the barrel.
The district court concluded Agent Cudmore’s representation in the affidavit
that Defendant carried a “cardboard box containing an unknown number of smaller
black boxes” was either intentionally false or in reckless disregard of the truth. The
court noted Ms. Knight testified she could not see the contents of the cardboard box,
and Agent Cudmore could not have drawn such a conclusion based on the
information Ms. Knight provided. As required by Franks, the court did not use the
6
information in its probable cause analysis. As to Agent Cudmore’s representations
concerning the shotgun, the court determined that the affidavit included Agent
Cudmore’s conclusions based on Ms. Knight’s statement. The court reasoned that
while it would have been better to include only the facts the witness presented, Agent
Cudmore did not intend to “embellish upon the information provided by Ms. Knight,”
but instead, used his experience as a law enforcement officer to clarify Ms. Knight’s
statements. The court noted the discrepancies between Ms. Knight’s statements
regarding the shotgun and the affidavit could be attributed to Ms. Knight’s difficulty
in describing what she saw.
Defendant asserts the district court erred in crediting Agent Cudmore’s
representations in the affidavit regarding the shotgun because Ms. Knight’s
testimony conflicted with the information in the affidavit and with Agent Cudmore’s
testimony. As noted above, at the Franks hearing Ms. Knight maintained she did not
tell Agent Cudmore she saw a shotgun, but instead, testified she saw what she
assumed was a shotgun. Agent Cudmore, however, testified Ms. Knight told him she
saw a shotgun, “like the kind on T.V.” On appeal, our role is not to reevaluate the
facts, and “‘where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’” United States v. Colonna, 360
F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985)). Moreover, in a motion to suppress, “‘the credibility of witnesses, the
7
weight to be given to evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence fall within the province of the district court.’” Id. (quoting Higgins, 282
F.3d at 1269).
Here, the court obviously found Agent Cudmore’s testimony credible when it
determined he did not intend to embellish the facts provided by Ms. Knight regarding
the shotgun. The district court noted that while Ms. Knight may not have
specifically said she saw a shotgun or part of a shotgun, she was “unwavering in her
belief that she had seen the defendant carrying what she believed was a gun.” We
find no clear error in the district court’s decision to credit Agent Cudmore’s
testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Agent
Cudmore’s representations in the affidavit regarding the shotgun were not
intentionally false or in reckless disregard for the truth
Defendant also argues the district court erred because it could not have found
Agent Cudmore’s representations credible as to the shotgun while simultaneously
finding his representations about the cardboard box were either intentionally false
or in reckless disregard of the truth. This argument is foreclosed by our previous
decision in Colonna where we found no support for the proposition that if the district
court finds one or more false statements in a warrant, than all other statements must
be deemed false as well. 360 F.3d at 1175. In fact, we noted such a proposition
would be at odds with Franks, “which permits reliance on a warrant affidavit ‘when
8
[the] material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to
one side [and] there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a
finding of probable cause.” Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).
Having determined the district court properly considered information about the
shotgun in the probable cause analysis, we now must consider whether the remaining
information in the affidavit was sufficient for a finding of probable cause. In
weighing the totality of the circumstances, we find the district court correctly
concluded probable cause supported issuance of the search warrant. Ms. Knight
observed Defendant, approximately ten minutes after his companion was arrested,
making several trips from his apartment to a nearby garage. Defendant’s demeanor
was described as “feverish” or “hasty. ” On one such trip he carried a long item Ms.
Knight believed was a shotgun. Also, the affidavit noted Defendant was a known
associate of Mr. Strain who had a conviction for being in possession of a pipe bomb
and was found to be in possession of over 100 firearms. This information would lead
a prudent person to believe contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in
Defendant’s garage or his home. See Wicks, 995 F.2d at 972-73. Therefore, we find
no error in the district court’s probable cause determination.
II.
Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty
verdict. Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal issue we review de novo. United
9
States v. Lewis, 240 F.3d 866, 870 (10th Cir. 2001). On appeal, we “ask only
whether taking the evidence . . . together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom–in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hanzlicek, 187
F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999). The jury convicted Defendant of being a fugitive
from justice in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2).
Defendant alleges the Government did not prove he fled Minnesota with the specific
intent to avoid prosecution–an essential element of the crime.
A fugitive from justice is defined as “any person who has fled from any state
to avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testimony in any criminal
proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15). At trial, the evidence showed Defendant was
well aware of the charges pending against him in Minnesota. He had appeared for
several hearings and appeared for the September 11, 2001 trial. The court told
Defendant in person his trial was rescheduled for November 6th, and several notices
were sent regarding the October 23rd hearing. Some of the notices were returned in
different envelopes than those in which they had been sent in, and the words:
“Refusal for cause without dishonor and without recourse to me” were written across
the notices. At least one such notice was returned in an envelope with Defendant’s
return address in the top left corner of the envelope. Although when Defendant left
Minnesota is unclear, we conclude the jury could have reasonably inferred from this
10
evidence that Defendant left Minnesota with the intent to avoid prosecution for the
pending charges. See United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir.
2001) (“In making its determination regarding a defendant’s intent, a jury is
permitted to draw inferences of subjective intent from a defendant’s objective acts.”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also United States v. Rolle, 2001 WL
1141390, at *2 (10th Cir. September 27, 2001) (unpublished) (finding sufficient
evidence for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(2) where defendant failed to
appear on a charge of driving under the influence in Montana, was aware there was
a warrant for his arrest, and was subsequently found in Wyoming).
III.
Defendant lastly argues the district court erred in finding a nexus between him
and three handguns. Defendant argues insufficient evidence exists to show a nexus
between himself and the handguns because the guns were found in a garage he shared
with his wife and Mr. Strain. Specifically, Defendant argues the government failed
to present evidence that ruled out Strain or his wife as the rightful possessors of the
three handguns. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, nothing in our case law requires
the government to rule out joint occupants as possessors, instead, the government
must show defendant had access to the firearms and knowledge of the firearms.
“Possession” can be either actual or constructive under § 922(g)(1). United
States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). A person has constructive
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possession when he or she “knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over
the object and the premises where it is found.” Id. United States v.
Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 843 (10th Cir. 1999). Knowledge, dominion, and
control are properly inferred if the defendant has “exclusive possession of the
premises.” United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1177 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Mills, 29 F.3d at 549). If more than one person occupies the premises, however, no
such inference is allowed. “In cases of joint occupancy, where the government seeks
to prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence
to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other
contraband.” Mills, 29 F.3d at 549. Furthermore, in order to sustain a conviction
based on constructive possession in joint occupancy cases, the government must
show “evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had
knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.” United States v. Hien Van
Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Heckard, 238
F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001)). Thus, in the joint occupancy context, “knowledge
and access are required to prove that the defendant knowingly held the power to
exercise dominion and control over the firearm.” Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179 (citing
United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002)).
In ruling on Defendant’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal, the district court found
sufficient nexus between Defendant and the handguns noting Defendant had access
12
to the garage where the guns were found, and Ms. Knight’s eye witness testimony
linked Defendant to the guns. As the district court noted, Defendant was seen
carrying “several black boxes, consistent with handgun cases to the garage.” 2 One
day after Defendant was seen carrying the boxes, three boxes containing the
handguns were found in the garage. A careful review of the record shows that these
were the only small dark colored boxes found in the garage. Viewing this evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, we find these facts support an
inference that Defendant had “knowledge” of and “access” to the firearms, the two
requirements for a finding of possession in the joint occupancy context.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Defendant
guilty of possessing the three handguns.
2
Defendant claims the physical characteristics of the evidence conflict
with Ms. Knight’s testimony. Defendant cites several trial exhibits in arguing one
of the handgun cases was maroon, not black, and the boxes found in the garage
were not shaped like shoe boxes. We have no way to verify if one of the gun
cases was maroon or the shape of the boxes because Defendant failed to designate
as part of the record the photographic evidence he refers to in his brief. See 10th
Cir. R. 10.3 (D)(4) (“[T]rial exhibits . . . must be included [in the record on
appeal] when they are relevant to an issue raised on appeal and are referred to in
the brief.”). Even assuming Defendant’s claim that one of the gun cases was
maroon and boxes were flatter and wider than shoe boxes, we find no error in the
district court’s determination that a sufficient nexus existed between Defendant
and the handguns. Maroon and black are both dark colors that could easily be
mistaken for each other at a distance and even if we accept Defendant’s
description of the boxes, the boxes are at least relatively the size and shape
(rectangular) as a shoe box.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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