F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
January 30, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-3478
v.
RAUL CORNELIO-PENA, also known
as Raul Puente-Cuevas,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 04-CR-40090-SAC)
Ronald E. Wurtz, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. Phillips, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-
Appellant.
James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Eric F. Melgren, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
Defendant-Appellant Raul Cornelio-Pena was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas of illegal reentry following
deportation. The district court sentenced him to fifty-seven months’ custody,
based in part on a sixteen-level enhancement for prior deportation after a
conviction for a felony crime of violence. The district court reasoned that
solicitation to commit burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2003) (“USSG” or
“Guidelines”). The district court also imposed an identical alternative sentence of
fifty-seven months in the event the Guidelines were declared unconstitutional.
Cornelio-Pena appealed his sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Because solicitation to commit burglary of a
dwelling is a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2, and the district court’s
imposition of an alternative sentence rendered its non-constitutional Booker error
harmless, we affirm.
II. Background
In 1992, Cornelio-Pena, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted in Arizona of
solicitation to commit burglary in the second degree. 1 He received three years’
Under Arizona law, a person commits solicitation “if, with the intent to
1
promote or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, such person
commands, encourages, requests or solicits another person to engage in specific
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probation and was deported. Subsequently, Cornelio-Pena returned to the United
States and was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, illegal reentry following
deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). At sentencing, the district court
applied § 2L1.2 of the November 5, 2003 version of the Guidelines. Cornelio-
Pena’s base offense level was eight. The district court applied a sixteen-level
enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), reasoning that solicitation of
burglary is a crime of violence. The district court also applied a three-level
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and entry of a guilty plea,
bringing Cornelio-Pena’s adjusted offense level to twenty-one. Cornelio-Pena’s
criminal history category was determined to be IV, resulting in a Guidelines range
of fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The district court sentenced Cornelio-Pena
to fifty-seven months’ custody. Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding the
constitutionality of the Guidelines at the time of Cornelio-Pena’s sentencing, the
district court also announced an alternative sentence of fifty-seven months.
III. Discussion
A. Crime of Violence
conduct which would constitute the felony or misdemeanor or which would
establish the other’s complicity in its commission.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1002.
A person commits burglary in the second degree if he “enter[s] or remain[s]
unlawfully in or on a residential structure with the intent to commit any theft or
any felony therein.” Id. § 13-1507.
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Cornelio-Pena first argues the district court erred in concluding solicitation
of burglary is a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). We review a
district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Torres-
Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2004). “Generally speaking, we
interpret the Sentencing Guidelines according to accepted rules of statutory
construction. In interpreting a guideline, we look at the language in the guideline
itself, as well as at the interpretative and explanatory commentary to the guideline
provided by the Sentencing Commission. Commentary in the Guidelines Manual
that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline.” Id. at 1181 (citations, quotations, and alteration
omitted).
It is uncontested that burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence under
USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). We must decide whether solicitation to commit
burglary of a dwelling is also a crime of violence under this provision. This issue
is one of first impression in the Courts of Appeals.
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Guidelines provides for a sixteen-level
enhancement if the defendant was previously deported, or unlawfully remained in
the United States, after a conviction for a felony crime of violence. “Crime of
violence” is defined in the section’s commentary as
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any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of
a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.
USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. application n.1(B)(iii). Application Note 5 further provides
that “[p]rior convictions of offenses counted under subsection (b)(1) include the
offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting, to commit such
offenses.” Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. application n.5.
Cornelio-Pena argues that because solicitation is not expressly mentioned in
the application note, solicitation of a crime that otherwise meets the definition of
“crime of violence” is not itself a crime of violence under the canon of statutory
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another). Cornelio-Pena cites United States v. Cardenas, in
which this court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) does not prohibit transportation of
firearms. 864 F.2d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1989). In Cardenas, we noted that the
statute at issue expressly prohibited only using or carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking offense. Id. Moreover, we found it persuasive that another provision
of the same statute used the term “transport” in criminalizing the transportation of
firearms in interstate commerce. Id. Thus, we concluded Congress knew how to
use the term “transport,” and Congress’ failure to include the term in the relevant
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statutory provision indicated its intent not to prohibit the transportation of
firearms during a drug trafficking offense. Id. at 1534.
The term “solicitation” is used throughout the Guidelines, 2 and thus it is
clear the Sentencing Commission knew how to use the term. The Commission’s
failure to include solicitation in the application note in § 2L1.2, however, is not
2
The term “solicitation” is used in the Guidelines in three ways. First,
solicitation is included in the section of the Guidelines relating to “Other
Offenses,” along with conspiracy and attempt. USSG § 2X1.1. This provision
requires the application of the base offense level for the underlying offense, plus
any adjustments for specific offense characteristics relating to the fact that the
crime was inchoate. Id. The provision is only to be applied when the crime of
solicitation is not expressly covered by another offense guideline section. Id. §
2X1.1(c)(1); see also, e.g., id. § 2A4.1 cmt. application n.4 (referencing
adjustments in USSG § 2X1.1 with respect to conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation
to kidnap). Second, the Guidelines specifically include solicitation of certain
offenses as offense conduct. E.g., id. § 2C1.1 (Soliciting a Bribe); id. § 2A1.5
(Solicitation to Commit Murder). Finally, solicitation appears in the commentary
to several Guidelines’ provisions. Although none of these provisions are identical
to the application note at issue here, they are similar in that they require
solicitation to be treated like the underlying offense in certain circumstances. Id.
§ 1B1.3 cmt. application n.6 (“Unless otherwise specified, an express direction to
apply a particular factor only if the defendant was convicted of a particular statute
includes the determination of the offense level where the defendant was convicted
of conspiracy, attempt, solicitation, aiding or abetting, accessory after the fact, or
misprision of felony in respect to that particular statute”); id. § 1B1.3 cmt.
application n.10 (“In the case of solicitation, misprision, or accessory after the
fact, the conduct for which the defendant is accountable includes all conduct
relevant to determining the offense level for the underlying offense that was
known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant.”); id. § 2C1.1
cmt. background (“solicitations and attempts [to commit bribery] are treated as
equivalent to the underlying offense”).
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dispositive of the Commission’s intent in this case. Unlike the statute in
Cardenas, which expressly criminalized only using or carrying a firearm, the
application note at issue here uses the term “include” before listing aiding and
abetting, conspiracy, and attempt. USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. application n.5. We must
give effect to the term “include.” See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534
U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
“Include” can be interpreted both as a word of illustrative application and
as a word of limitation. Black’s Law Dictionary 763 (6th ed. 1990). The
commentary to the Guidelines’ general application principles, however, expressly
states that “[t]he term ‘includes’ is not exhaustive.” USSG § 1B1.1 cmt.
application n.2. Thus, by using the term “include” in the application note, the
Commission clearly expressed its intent that the offenses listed in the note were
not exhaustive, and we do not apply expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Instead, based on the Commission’s articulation, offenses similar to aiding and
abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit offenses that otherwise meet the
definition of “crime of violence” are included in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Although no circuit has addressed the crime of solicitation under USSG §
2L1.2, several circuits have addressed solicitation under § 4B1.1, a similarly
constructed provision of the Guidelines. Section 4B1.1 provides for sentencing
enhancements for career offenders. A career offender is defined as a person who,
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inter alia, “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence
or a controlled substance offense.” Id. § 4B1.1(a). Similar to the application
note at issue in this case, the career offender provision contains an application
note which states, “‘[c]rime of violence’ and ‘controlled substance offense’
include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit
such offenses.” Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. application n.1. In United States v. Shumate,
the Ninth Circuit examined whether solicitation of delivery of marijuana qualifies
as a controlled substance offense under the career offender provision. 329 F.3d
1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). The court reasoned that the omission of solicitation
from the offenses listed in the application note was not legally significant
because, under the Guidelines, the term “includes” is not exhaustive. Id. at
1030–31. Thus, the court concluded solicitation of delivery of marijuana is a
controlled substance offense. Id.
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite result in United States v. Dolt when
it concluded that solicitation to traffic in cocaine is not a controlled substance
offense under the career offender provision. 27 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 1994).
The court noted that “the fact that the Sentencing Commission did not include
solicitation in its list of predicate crimes in [the application note] is evidence that
it did not intend to include solicitation as a predicate offense for career offender
status.” Id. at 239. The court, however, did not address the use of the term
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“include” or the definition of that term provided in the Guidelines’ general
application principles. See Shumate, 329 F.3d at 1031.
Finally, the Second Circuit has implicitly concluded that because of the
term “include,” the list of offenses in the application note to the career offender
provision is merely illustrative. United States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir.
1991). In Liranzo, the Second Circuit examined whether criminal facilitation of
the sale of cocaine is a controlled substance offense. Id. at 78–79. Although the
court ultimately concluded criminal facilitation is not sufficiently similar to
aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempt to be encompassed by the application
note, it observed that the application note “may not be an exhaustive list” and
proceeded to decide “whether . . . criminal facilitation should be included in that
list.” 3 Id. at 79.
3
Two circuits have held that solicitation is a crime of violence under the
career offender provision. United States v. Cox, 74 F.3d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1996)
(solicitation of murder); United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 780–81 (6th Cir.
1999) (solicitation to commit aggravated robbery). These decisions are not
persuasive in this case, however, because the definition of “crime of violence” in
the career offender provision is substantially different than that contained in
USSG § 2L1.2. Under the career offender provision, a crime of violence
includes, inter alia, “any offense . . . that . . . involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a). The
holdings in Cox and Walker are based, at least in part, on this definitional
wording. Cox, 74 F.3d 190 (observing that “ask[ing] someone to murder your
wife . . . involves a high degree of threat of physical force against one’s wife”);
Walker, 181 F.3d at 781 (“solicitation to commit aggravated robbery [in
Tennessee] inherently involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
injury to another”). But see United States v. Shumate, 329 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th
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In any event, because the Guidelines expressly provide that the term
“include” is not exhaustive, crimes of violence under USSG § 2L1.2 are not
limited to aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit offenses that
otherwise meet the definition of “crime of violence.” Instead, crimes of violence
include offenses that are sufficiently similar to aiding and abetting, conspiracy,
and attempt when the underlying offense is a crime of violence. Thus, we must
now decide whether solicitation is sufficiently similar to aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, and attempt, such that solicitation to commit burglary of a dwelling is
a crime of violence. 4
Cir. 2003) (arguing that Cox relied on the use of “include” in the application note
to conclude solicitation was a crime of violence).
Additionally, Cornelio-Pena argues our decision should be informed by
Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997), and Leyva-Licea v. INS,
187 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1999). In these cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Arizona’s solicitation statute is not a law relating to a controlled substance or an
aggravated felony under § 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when
the underlying offense solicited is a narcotics violation. Coronado-Durazo, 123
F.3d at 1326; Leyva-Licea, 187 F.3d at 1150. These cases are inapposite,
however, because the statutory definition at issue did not contain expansive
language similar to the term “include” used in the Guidelines. Leyva-Licea, 187
F.3d at 1150 (“the Controlled Substances Act neither mentions solicitation nor
contains any broad catch-all provision that could even arguably be read to cover
solicitations”).
4
This court’s determination of whether solicitation of burglary is a crime of
violence under the Guidelines is not dictated by Arizona state law regarding
whether solicitation is a crime of communication or a crime of violence. In
Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the term
“burglary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act “means ‘burglary’ however a state
chooses to define it.” 495 U.S. 575, 579, 592 (1990) (quotation omitted).
Instead, the Court concluded Congress intended burglary to mean generic burglary
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A person commits solicitation if he commands, encourages, requests, or
solicits another person to commit a crime with the intent to promote the
commission of that crime. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1002; Model Penal Code §
5.02. As with most crimes, solicitation requires both mens rea and actus reus.
Because the mens rea and actus reus required for solicitation are similar to those
required for aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempt, we conclude that
solicitation is sufficiently similar to the offenses listed in the application note to
be encompassed by the note.
Conspiracy involves an agreement between two or more people for the
purpose of promoting or committing a crime. E.g., United States v. Small, 423
as currently defined in the criminal codes of most states. Id. at 598. The Court
reasoned: “[i]t seems to us to be implausible that Congress intended the meaning
of ‘burglary’ . . . to depend on the definition adopted by the State of conviction”;
such a conclusion would lead to “the unfairness of having enhancement [under
Federal law] depend upon the label employed by the State of conviction.” Id. at
589–90; cf. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119–20 (1983)
(noting that state law that expunged conviction after completion of probation did
not erase conviction for purposes of Gun Control Act because “federal program
would be impaired if state law were to control”); United States v. Nardello, 393
U.S. 286, 293–95 (1969) (prohibition of extortion in violation of state law in the
Travel Act is not limited to only those extortionate activities that a particular state
defines as extortion). Similarly, state law characterizations of solicitation are
irrelevant to our analysis of whether generic solicitation is a crime of violence
under the Guidelines. The purpose of the Sentencing Commission is to provide
“certainty and fairness” in sentencing and to avoid “unwarranted sentencing
disparities.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). Dependence on state law
characterizations of what constitutes a crime of violence would inhibit these
objectives.
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F.3d 1164, 1182 (10th Cir. 2005); Model Penal Code § 5.03. Additionally, in
some jurisdictions, conspiracy requires an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Compare United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1155 (10th Cir.
2005) (providing that conspiracy requires intent to commit crime and overt act in
furtherance of that intent) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-202 (stating that overt act is
element of conspiracy) with Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.490 (providing that overt act is
not required for conspiracy to commit, inter alia, murder, robbery, and sexual
assault) and Model Penal Code § 5.03(5) (stating no overt act requirement for
felony of the first or second degree). We need not decide whether generic
conspiracy under the Guidelines requires an overt act, however, to decide this
case. Even where an overt act is required, the overt act can be that of any
member of the conspiracy. E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-202(b); Model Penal Code
§ 5.03(5). A defendant need not perform an act beyond mere agreement in order
to be guilty of conspiracy, so long as one conspirator performs an overt act.
Thus, both conspiracy and solicitation require only intent that the underlying
offense be committed and a minimal act such as agreeing or soliciting. Moreover,
in some instances, conspiracy may be regarded as less severe than solicitation. A
conspiracy is frequently formed between individuals who have already formed the
intent to commit the underlying crime. People v. Kauten, 755 N.E.2d 1016, 1019
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001). Solicitation, on the other hand, may involve the recruitment
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of one who has not yet formed criminal intent. Id. at 1020. Because conspiracy
and solicitation have similar mens rea and actus reus requirements and are of
similar severity, they are sufficiently similar to be included together in the
application note.
A defendant is guilty of attempt if he intends to commit a crime and takes a
substantial step toward the commission of that crime. E.g., United States v.
Haynes, 372 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2004); Model Penal Code § 5.01. Thus,
to be guilty of attempt a defendant must intend to commit the crime himself,
while for solicitation a defendant need only intend that another person commit the
crime. This difference, however, carries little practical distinction because in
both instances, the defendant intends that the underlying crime be accomplished.
Additionally, although the actus reus requirement for an attempt must go beyond
mere preparation, it need not be a greater act than that required for solicitation.
In many jurisdictions, soliciting another person to engage in criminal conduct can
satisfy the substantial step requirement for an attempt. Model Penal Code §
5.01(2)(g); United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1120 n.10 (listing
states where solicitation can constitute an attempt). Thus, attempt and solicitation
also have similar mens rea and actus reus requirements.
Aiding and abetting requires an intent to facilitate the commission of a
crime, affirmative conduct furthering the commission of that crime, and proof that
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the underlying crime was in fact committed. United States v. Sarracino, 131 F.3d
943, 946 (10th Cir. 1997). While the mens rea and actus reus requirements for
aiding and abetting and solicitation are similar, aiding and abetting requires an
additional element not present in solicitation. Aiding and abetting requires the
actual commission of the underlying offense. As an inchoate crime, however,
solicitation does not. Instead, if a person who is solicited to commit a crime
actually engages in criminal conduct, the solicitor becomes culpable as an
accomplice for the underlying crime. Model Penal Code § 2.06(1)–(3). Because
aiding and abetting requires commission of the underlying offense, aiding and
abetting and solicitation have important distinctions. Aiding and abetting in the
application note, however, is only one offense in the illustrative list including the
inchoate crimes of conspiracy and attempt. Because solicitation is at least as
similar to conspiracy as aiding and abetting is to conspiracy, solicitation should
be included in the list. 5
5
The notion that attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are of similar severity,
while aiding and abetting is more serious, is implicit in the Guidelines. Section
2X1.1 of the Guidelines provides for a three-level decrease in the offense level of
a defendant convicted of attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of a crime so long as
the crime was not completed or was incomplete as a result of apprehension.
USSG § 2X1.1(b). The portion of the provision relating to solicitation was
amended in 1989 to be identical to the portions regarding attempt and conspiracy
“to clarify the treatment of [solicitation] in a manner consistent with the treatment
of attempts and conspiracies.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C amend.
238. The treatment of aiding and abetting in the Guidelines, however, is more
harsh. Instead of decreasing the offense level, the offense level for aiding and
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In Liranzo, the Second Circuit held that criminal facilitation is not
sufficiently similar to aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempt to qualify as a
controlled substance offense under the Guidelines’ career offender provision. 944
F.2d at 79. Although we do not express any opinion as to the correctness of the
Second Circuit’s decision in Liranzo, the case is elucidative because the
differences the court identifies between facilitation and the offenses listed in the
application note do not similarly distinguish solicitation from those offenses. The
court in Liranzo reasoned that, unlike aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and
attempt, facilitation does not involve an intent to commit the underlying offense;
rather, it requires only that the defendant know his conduct is aiding in the
commission of a crime. Id. Solicitation, on the other hand, requires that the
defendant intend that the underlying crime be committed. Moreover, in Liranzo,
the court reasoned that a “facilitator’s conduct . . . is . . . so attenuated from the
final stages [of commission of the crime] that the role of the facilitator is only
remotely related as a cause or contributor to the ultimate crime.” Id. This
attenuation is not present with solicitation. Solicitation seeks to induce the
commission of a crime, and thus is the original, direct cause of the crime if it is
subsequently committed.
abetting is the same as that for the underlying offense. Id. § 2X2.1.
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Because the offenses listed in Application Note 5 to USSG § 2L1.2 are
merely illustrative, and solicitation is sufficiently similar to the listed offenses to
be encompassed by the application note, we conclude that solicitation of an
offense that otherwise meets the definition of “crime of violence” is also a crime
of violence. Therefore, the district court did not err in applying a sixteen-level
enhancement to Cornelio-Pena’s sentence.
B. Constitutional Booker Error
Cornelio-Pena next argues the district court committed constitutional
Booker error when it found facts not admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt in determining that Cornelio-Pena’s prior conviction
for solicitation of burglary was a crime of violence. This argument, however, is
foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Moore. 401 F.3d 1220 (10th
Cir. 2005). In Moore, we held that “scrutinizing the statutory definition of a prior
offense to ascertain if it [is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal
Act] involves a question of law for a court to decide, and not a question of fact
for a jury.” 401 F.3d at 1224. As a question of law, a district court’s
determination that a prior conviction is a “violent felony” does not implicate the
Sixth Amendment concerns addressed in Booker. Id. at 1225; see United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Moreover, we recognized that because
determining whether a prior conviction is a “violent felony” involves an inquiry
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intimately related to whether a prior conviction exists, Apprendi’s exception for
prior convictions applies to the inquiry of whether a prior conviction constitutes a
“violent felony” as well. Id.; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The
same principles apply to enhancements under the Guidelines. Therefore, the
district court did not commit constitutional Booker error in determining that
Cornelio-Pena’s prior conviction for solicitation of burglary was a crime of
violence. 6
C. Non-Constitutional Booker Error
Cornelio-Pena also challenges his sentence under Booker because the
district court viewed the Guidelines as mandatory. Under Booker, the district
court’s mandatory application of the Guidelines was erroneous. 125 S.Ct. at 764.
Although Cornelio-Pena was sentenced before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Booker, he objected to the application of the Guidelines under Blakely v.
6
In a Rule 28(j) letter, Cornelio-Pena argues that the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Washington should inform our analysis. 404 F.3d 834
(4th Cir. 2005). Washington dealt with the applicability of the Sixth Amendment
when a district court relies on information beyond the documents permitted by
Shepard v. United States in determining that a prior conviction is a crime of
violence. Washington, 404 F.3d at 841–42; Shepard, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1263
(2005). Washington is inapplicable to the present case, however, because here the
district court relied only on the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of
solicitation to commit second degree burglary in determining Cornelio-Pena’s
prior conviction was for a crime of violence. See United States v. Moore, 401
F.3d 1220, 1225 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515,
522–523 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Washington at his sentencing hearing. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Thus, our review is
for harmless error. United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1142–43
(10th Cir. 2005). Under the harmless error analysis, we must remand for
resentencing unless we determine, “without undue speculation, that the district
court would have imposed the same sentence on remand.” United States v.
Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 821 (10th Cir. 2005).
After announcing Cornelio-Pena’s sentence under a mandatory application
of the Guidelines, the district court announced an alternative sentence. The
district court stated,
In the event that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are found to be
unconstitutional and incapable of being constitutionally applied in
this sentencing, then the Court will impose the following alternative
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), treating the
guideline [sic] as advisory only: It is the judgment and order of the
Court that the defendant is sentenced to the term of 57 months, and
all other conditions that the Court has indicated are appropriate and
shall be applied.
In United States v. Serrano-Dominguez, we held non-constitutional Booker
error was harmless when the district court imposed an alternative sentence. 406
F.3d 1221, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2005). Although the district court in Serrano-
Dominguez explicitly applied the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as suggested by
the Court in Booker, we have subsequently held that a district court need not
explicitly examine each of the § 3553(a) factors so long as the court consults the
Guidelines and the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which analyzes
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several of the § 3553(a) factors. Corchado, 427 F.3d at 821. The district court
did not specifically discuss the § 3553(a) factors in this case. It did, however,
consult the Guidelines and the PSR and consider Cornelio-Pena’s motion for a
downward departure. Thus, the district court examined several of the § 3553(a)
factors in imposing its alternative sentence. Because we are confident Cornelio-
Pena would receive the same sentence on remand, the district court’s error was
harmless.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Cornelio-Pena’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
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