F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
March 30, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-3230
GERARDO ALCARAZ-ARELLANO,
Defendant - Appellant.
.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 03-CR-40015-01-SAC)
Marilyn M. Trubey, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. Phillips, Federal
Public Defender, with her on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for the Defendant -
Appellant.
James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Eric F. Melgren, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for the Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before HENRY, McKAY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ , Circuit Judge.
On February 11, 2003, Gerardo Alcaraz-Arellano was indicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas on one count of possessing with
intent to distribute three kilograms of cocaine and one count of possessing with
intent to distribute one kilogram of heroin. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He
pleaded guilty to the second count. Before pleading guilty he had moved to
suppress evidence seized during a vehicle search after a traffic stop and, alleging
selective enforcement (racial profiling), had moved to dismiss the indictment.
The district court denied both motions. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s plea agreement
preserved his right to appeal the district court’s rulings on the motions, and he
now appeals those rulings. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s opening brief also raised a
challenge to his sentence, but he later filed a pleading with this court abandoning
the challenge. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A. Background
On February 9, 2003, Russell County Sheriff’s Deputy Kelly Schneider,
who was driving westbound on I-70, determined by radar that Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano, who was driving eastbound, was driving 77 mph in a 70 mph zone.
Deputy Schneider turned around to pursue Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s car, a gold
2001 Oldsmobile Alero. He pulled alongside the car and observed two men
inside, both of whom appeared to be Hispanic. He then directed Mr. Alcaraz-
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Arellano to stop. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano brought his car to the side of the highway
at 2:42:20 p.m. The stop was recorded by a videorecorder inside Deputy
Schneider’s patrol car.
Deputy Schneider exited his car, stood behind Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s car,
and signaled to Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano to come to him. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
complied. When Deputy Schneider asked for his license, Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
retrieved his license from his car and gave it to Deputy Schneider. Deputy
Schneider then asked for Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s registration, and Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano again returned to his car, obtained the registration, and gave it to him.
Deputy Schneider examined the documents, which showed that Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano was licensed to drive in New York and had purchased the car in
California three days earlier. The address for Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano on the
registration was in California. In response to Deputy Schneider’s questions,
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano said that he lived in New York, had traveled to California,
had stayed there one and one-half days, had purchased the car, and was en route
back to New York. Deputy Schneider observed that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
appeared extremely nervous.
At 2:44:30 p.m. Deputy Schneider returned to his patrol car. At 2:45:09 he
invited Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano into the patrol car, telling him, “let’s get you where
it’s warm.” Deputy Schneider then informed Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano that he was
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writing him a warning, which would not cost him any money. While he was
writing the warning ticket, Deputy Schneider asked Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano when he
had bought the car and what he did for a living. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano told
Deputy Schneider, among other things, that he worked in landscaping, but had not
worked for two months.
At 2:46:38 p.m. Deputy Schneider radioed the dispatch operator to verify
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s license. The operator responded with the license
information at 2:52:06 p.m. During that interval Deputy Schneider continued
questioning Mr. Alacaraz-Arellano, asking whether he liked his car, whether there
was much snow in New York, who his passenger was, where his passenger lived,
what he typically did during the winter since he had not worked for a couple
months, whether he owned the car, and how much he paid for it. Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano said that he had bought the car for $4,000.
Deputy Schneider gave Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano the warning ticket and bid
him “adios” at 2:52:44 p.m., 10 minutes after the stop. But as Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano was leaving the patrol car, Deputy Schneider requested permission to
ask a few more questions. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano agreed. Deputy Schneider asked
whether he had any contraband in the car. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano replied that he
did not. Deputy Schneider asked to “look in” the car, and Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
consented.
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While inspecting the trunk, Deputy Schneider noticed that its floor was
green rather than gold, whereas, to his knowledge, the original undercoating
almost always matches the exterior paint. He also noticed that the caulking
around the floor was new, thick, and white, and that the carpet padding in the
spare-tire compartment was glued to the floor, whereas in most cars the carpet
padding can simply be pulled away from the floor. He then conducted a “finger
test” inside the trunk, placing one hand on the inside of the trunk and one hand
underneath the car, and tapping on the trunk to listen for signs of a gap between
the top and the bottom. He concluded that there was such a gap and estimated it
to be about three inches, indicating a concealed compartment. He told
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano that he had found a false compartment, and that he would
take the car to the sheriff’s department to be searched. The subsequent search
revealed a hidden compartment containing three kilograms of cocaine and one
kilogram of heroin.
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during
the search of his car, arguing that the traffic stop itself was illegal because he was
not speeding, that Deputy Schneider’s subsequent detention of him was illegal
because its scope and duration exceeded what was justified by the purpose of the
stop, and that Deputy Schneider did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify the questioning during the stop. In denying Mr. Alcaraz-
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Arellano’s motion to suppress evidence, the district court ruled that Deputy
Schneider’s stop of Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano was valid because he had reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano was speeding, that Deputy Schneider’s
further detention and questioning of Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano was justified by
reasonable suspicion, and that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano gave valid consent for
Deputy Schneider to search his car.
On appeal Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano argues that Deputy Schneider violated the
Fourth Amendment by asking him questions unrelated to the initial purpose of the
stop; that Deputy Schneider did not have reasonable suspicion to ask these
unrelated questions; that he did not validly consent to Deputy Schneider’s
continued questioning of him after returning his license; that he did not validly
consent to Deputy Schneider’s search of his car; and that if the search was
consensual, Deputy Schneider exceeded the scope of consent.
B. Analysis
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano argues that Deputy Schneider’s detention and
questioning of him violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A
traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure “even though the purpose of the stop
is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
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648, 653 (1979). A traffic stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if
“the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic . . . violation has
occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th
Cir. 1998). “When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we
consider the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government.” U.S. v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir.
1999). “We accept the district court’s factual findings unless [they] are clearly
erroneous.” Id. “The ultimate determination of reasonableness . . . is a question
of law reviewable de novo.” Id.
Deputy Schneider’s initial stop of Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano is not challenged
on appeal; he observed (with a radar device) Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano driving
77 mph in a 70 mph zone. Mr. Alcaraz argues, however, that the stop became
unlawful when Deputy Schneider asked him questions unrelated to the purpose of
the stop. In United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), we stated that the reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on both “the
length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out.” It is reasonable
for an officer to ask questions about the motorist’s travel plans and authority to
operate the vehicle. United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir.
2005). Although Holt held that further questioning is justifiable only if it is
reasonable in relation to the initial purpose of the traffic stop, Holt, 264 F.3d at
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1228, the scope of this holding has been limited by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005).
In Muehler the Supreme Court upheld the police officers’ questioning of
Ms. Iris Mena, whom they were detaining while they executed a search warrant in
the house she occupied; the questioning related to her immigration status, a matter
unrelated to the purpose of the search. Id. at 1471. The court of appeals had
ruled the questioning unconstitutional, apparently on the ground that “the officers
were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question
Mena . . . because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment
event.” Id. The Supreme Court reversed. It stated that “mere police questioning
does not constitute a seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a
particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to
examine the individual’s identification; and request consent to search his or her
luggage.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As Ms. Mena’s
detention was not prolonged by the questioning, the questioning did not create an
additional seizure. Id. The Court analogized questioning during a search to
performing a dog sniff during a traffic stop, which does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if it does not extend the stop “‘beyond the time reasonably required
to complete [the stop’s original purpose].’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543
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U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005)). The Court concluded: “[T]he Court of
Appeals did not find that the questioning extended the time Mena was detained.
Thus no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Mena’s
immigration status was required.” Id. at 1471-72. In light of Muehler, we have
held that “[a]s long as the [deputy’s] questioning did not extend the length of the
detention, . . . there is no Fourth Amendment issue with respect to the content of
the questions.” United States v. Wallace, 429 F.3d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 2005).
Applying this law, we first address Deputy Schneider’s questioning of
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano before returning his license. This questioning can be
divided into three intervals: the initial encounter outside the cars, the time during
which Deputy Schneider was writing the warning ticket, and the time while
Deputy Schneider was waiting for the dispatch operator to verify Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano’s license. During the first interval Deputy Schneider asked only a few
questions about travel plans and vehicle ownership before going to his patrol car
to issue a warning. Such limited questioning is proper, because an officer may
routinely ask about travel plans and ownership during a lawful traffic stop. See
Bradford, 423 F.3d at 1156.
During the second interval Deputy Schneider questioned Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano in the patrol car while he was writing the warning ticket. This
questioning was not limited to travel plans and ownership of the vehicle, but it
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did not appreciably lengthen the detention and therefore the Fourth Amendment
requires no justification. See Wallace, 429 F.3d at 974. As Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
entered the patrol car, Deputy Schneider told him that he was writing a warning
ticket. Deputy Schneider testified at the suppression hearing that he was writing
the warning ticket while Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano was in the patrol car. Writing the
warning ticket occupied two minutes, one minute and 29 seconds of which was
while Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano was sitting in the patrol car. Even if this task might
have been performed slightly faster had Deputy Schneider not been asking
questions, the time involved was not “beyond the time reasonably required to
complete that [task].” Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837; see United States v. Martin,
422 F.3d 597, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A traffic stop does not become
unreasonable merely because the officer asks questions unrelated to the initial
purpose for the stop, provided that those questions do not unreasonably extend the
amount of time that the subject is delayed.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d
947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“questions that do not increase the length of
detention (or that extend it by only a brief time) do not make the custody itself
unreasonable”). Therefore, this questioning was lawful.
As for the third interval, the period Deputy Schneider questioned
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano while he was waiting for the radio dispatcher to verify
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s license (2:46:38 p.m. through 2:52:16 p.m.), the license
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check itself was permissible, see Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221 (“[D]uring a routine
traffic stop the officer may ask to see a driver’s license and registration and check
that they are valid.”), and the questioning did not prolong the detention while the
license check was being performed. As a result, the questioning, regardless of the
topic, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In short, we reject Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano’s challenges to the questioning before his license was returned.
The questioning after the return of the license, however, must be analyzed
differently because it did prolong the stop. After Deputy Schneider returned the
documentation to Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano and said “adios,” he requested permission
from Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano to ask a few more questions. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
agreed and then consented to a search of his car. He contends that this
questioning impermissibly extended the traffic stop. We disagree. The additional
questioning could be justified if the encounter at this point was consensual, see
United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997), or if prolongation of
the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, Wallace, 429 F.3d at 974.
Because the district court did not address the possibility of consent, we consider
only reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is a “particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). It
“represents a ‘minimum level of objective justification’ which is ‘considerably
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less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” United
States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).) In our view, Deputy Schneider possessed
reasonable suspicion.
Although the district court ruled that Deputy Schneider had acquired
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano for questioning at some point
during their conversation in the patrol car, we need address only whether there
was reasonable suspicion when Deputy Schneider returned the license to
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano. By that time, Deputy Schneider had the following
information: Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano said that he had driven across the country from
New York to California for a one-and-a-half-day visit during which he purchased
a not-unusual used vehicle for $4,000; he told Deputy Schneider that he lived in
New York, but the vehicle registration showed a California address; he was
unemployed; and he was extremely nervous. We agree that it was implausible
that an unemployed New Yorker would innocently drive to California from New
York, visit there for less than two days, purchase a vehicle (giving a California
address for the registration), and then drive back. Deputy Schneider thus had
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano for further investigation after
returning his license and registration . See United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d
1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Implausible travel plans can contribute to
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reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534-35 (10th
Cir. 1996) (apparent contradiction between dates on defendant’s car rental
agreement and alleged travel plans contributed to reasonable suspicion); United
States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1995) (officer had reasonable
suspicion to detain motorist in part because he “did not find it plausible that
Defendant would drive from California to North Carolina merely to take a very
dilapidated sofa to some friends”).
Finally, Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano challenges Deputy Schneider’s search of his
car. He argues that his consent was invalid because it was the fruit of an
unlawful detention. But this argument fails because we have held that the
detention was lawful. He also argues that his consent was involuntary. But the
record does not indicate that he argued voluntariness in district court, except,
perhaps, on the ground that he did not adequately understand English, an
argument not raised on appeal. Ordinarily we do not address arguments not made
below. United States v. Moore, 22 F.3d 241, 243 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (“We will
not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, on which no adequate record
was created below.”). That practice is particularly appropriate here, because his
failure to raise the argument below deprives us of any fact finding on the matter
by the district court. Accordingly, we will not consider the issue of voluntariness.
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano further argues, however, that even if the consent was
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valid, the search was illegal because the scope of his consent was exceeded when
the car was transported to the sheriff’s department and dismantled. It is not clear
whether Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano raised this issue in district court. It appears that all
he argued was that he consented only to a mere peek inside, and not to the search
conducted while the car was by the side of the highway. But the government does
not claim that the issue was not preserved, so we will give Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
the benefit of the doubt and address it.
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano may be correct that his consent did not extend to
transporting the car to the sheriff’s department and dismantling it there. But
consent was unnecessary because these actions were supported by probable cause.
A police officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if there is
“probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence
which is subject to seizure under law.” United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226,
1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Deputy Schneider
discovered in the initial vehicle search that there was probably a concealed
compartment in the car. “It is well established that evidence of a hidden
compartment can contribute to probable cause to search.” United States v.
Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Jurado-Vallejo we held that “[w]hether probable cause to search a
vehicle can be based on evidence of a hidden compartment depends on two
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factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence—that is, the likelihood that there
really is a hidden compartment; and (2) the likelihood that a vehicle with a hidden
compartment would, in the circumstances, be secreting contraband.” Id. Deputy
Schneider testified that based on the unexpected color of the car’s undercoating
(it was green, not gold like the outside of the car); the new thick, white caulking
around the floor; the gluing down of the trunk carpet padding; and the
observations from his “finger test,” he knew from his training and experience that
there was a hidden compartment in the car. He also testified that he had found
about 50 concealed compartments in vehicles over the course of his career and all
but one contained contraband. The district court accepted this testimony. This
evidence satisfies both Jurado-Vallejo factors in determining probable cause. See
id. Deputy Schneider’s transportation of the car to the sheriff’s department and
subsequent search was therefore lawful. See United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188,
191-92 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If supported by probable cause, every part of a vehicle
which may conceal the object of the search may be searched.”); see also Mercado,
307 F.3d at 1231 (officer’s dismantling of the altered ceiling of a van to search
hidden compartment was legal because supported by probable cause). Thus, the
district court did not err in denying Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s motion to suppress.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Background
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Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for selective
enforcement, arguing that Deputy Schneider’s decision to stop him was based, at
least in part, on his race. He also requested discovery regarding selective
enforcement, seeking information on various policies governing the Russell
County Sheriff’s Department, including policies to guard against racial profiling
and document-retention policies; personnel files of Deputy Schneider and any
records regarding racial-profiling complaints against him; records of Deputy
Schneider’s vehicle stops from the beginning of 2000 until February 9, 2003; and
materials relating to Deputy Schneider’s drug-interdiction training.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated to admitting
into evidence the record of the hearing in United States v. Mesa-Roche, 288
F. Supp. 2d 1172 (2003), on a similar motion to dismiss for racial profiling. That
hearing focused on a study commissioned by the Kansas legislature and released
in early 2003 (the Lamberth study). The Lamberth study examined stops made by
law-enforcement officers in several Kansas metropolitan areas and along certain
stretches of interstate highway in Kansas. The highway stops included in the
study occurred between October 2001 and March 2002. The study attempted to
compare the proportion of drivers of certain racial or ethnic groups stopped by
police officers (stop data) to the proportion of drivers who belonged to those
groups (benchmark data). Among the findings was that on I-70 between the
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Colorado border and mile marker 50 (near Colby, Kansas), 6.8% of stops made by
the Kansas Highway Patrol were of Hispanics, while the proportion of Hispanics
traveling on that stretch of highway was only 1.8%.
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano also presented data regarding traffic stops and arrests
by officers in the Russell County Sheriff’s Department, including (1) records of
Deputy Schneider’s stops, which showed that 33.69% of those he stopped between
September 2000 and April 2003 were Hispanic; and (2) a report showing that
during January through October 2002, in cases involving Deputy Schneider, 57%
of the people arrested for drug crimes after being stopped for traffic violations
were Hispanic. In district court and on appeal Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano did not
compare these percentages to those of fellow officers except that at oral argument
in this court his counsel pointed out that Deputy Bauske did not stop any
Hispanics in 2000.
The district court denied Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s motion to dismiss. The
court noted that “[a]lthough [Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s] motion is styled as a motion
regarding selective prosecution, . . . it is in fact a motion regarding selective
enforcement [because it] challenges the decision and actions of the law
enforcement officer, not the exercise of discretion by the prosecutor.” Vol. I,
Doc. 70 at 16. It ruled that he did not carry his burden of producing “some
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evidence” of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent as required by United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468-69 (1996).
Relying in part on testimony at the Mesa-Roche hearing by Dr. Brian
Withrow, a professor of Criminal Justice at Wichita State University, the district
court found the Lamberth study to be “irrelevant and unreliable.” Vol. I , Doc. 70
at 23. It pointed out that the Russell County Sheriff’s Department did not
participate in the study and that Deputy Schneider had not worked in any of the
areas covered in the study. (In fact, the record shows that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
was stopped at mile marker 188 in Russell County, at least 138 miles east of the
western portion of 1-70 canvassed by the Lamberth study, and more than 160
miles from the eastern portion of 1-70 canvassed by the study.) The court said
that data regarding highway travelers in other counties would be transferable to
Russell County only under the assumption that the percentages of racial groups in
the population and among drivers are the same in both locations, but Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano had shown no reason to make such an assumption. It also doubted the
accuracy of the benchmark data in the counties studied. The court declared that
(1) the study did not include an appendix showing how the data was collected in
the field, (2) the sample size was “too small to provide reliable statistical results,”
id. at 25, and (3) the surveyors’ attempts to determine the ethnicity of drivers
were based on “subjective and swift, if not split-second observations” and was
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therefore not reliable, id. In addition, the court said that the stop data was
untrustworthy because the law enforcement agencies and the areas included in the
study were not selected at random and because the law enforcement officers who
recorded the stop data knew that their activity was being observed.
The court further stated that even if the study was accepted as reliable, its
results did not necessarily show racial profiling because racial or ethnic groups
may not commit traffic violations in exact proportion to their representation on
the highway. Finally, the court said that the arrest statistics could not satisfy
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s burden under United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1179
(10th Cir. 2001), to show that “‘a similarly-situated individual of another race
could have been, but was not, arrested or referred for federal prosecution for the
offense for which the defendant was arrested and referred,’” Vol. I, Doc. 70 at 31
(quoting James, 257 F.3d at 1179). For the arrest statistics to be relevant to
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s case, they would have to show “that non-Hispanics
stopped for traffic violations were not detained and searched, even if they
displayed indicators of drug trafficking, while similarly situated Hispanics [sic]
drivers were detained and searched.” Id. at 32.
As for the evidence specifically relating to Deputy Schneider, the court said
that records of arrests and charges had no bearing on Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s
claims of selective stops. The court also found unremarkable the evidence that
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Deputy Schneider stops Hispanics more frequently than other Russell County
officers, as Officer Schneider patrols I-70 almost exclusively, while the other
officers patrol the surrounding city and county of Russell, and “there are more
Hispanics traveling on I-70 than there are living in the surrounding city and
county of Russell.” Id. at 33-34. The court decided that any comparison between
the Hispanic component of stops made by the Kansas Highway Patrol on the
50-mile stretch of I-70 near Colby (6.85%) and the Hispanic component of stops
made by Officer Schneider (33.69%) would be invalid because he had found that
the Lamberth study was fatally flawed. In sum, the court ruled that Mr. Alcaraz-
Arellano’s statistics were insufficient to show discriminatory effect.
The district court was also unpersuaded that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano had
produced evidence of discriminatory intent. The court said that in order to show
discriminatory intent, Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano must “present some non-statistical
evidence to demonstrate that Deputy Schneider acted with discriminatory intent
when he stopped defendant.” Id. at 36. It noted that Deputy Schneider “is not
alleged to have engaged in any racial language or actions other than the stop
itself.” Id. at 36-37. The court considered the Lamberth study to be irrelevant to
discriminatory intent because it did not attempt to show that the observed law-
enforcement officers knew the race of drivers before making the decision to stop
them.
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B. Analysis
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano appeals the district court’s denial of his selective-
enforcement motion to dismiss and his accompanying motion for discovery. The
“Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations
such as race.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1985) (ban on discriminatory law
enforcement applies to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment).
“Racially selective law enforcement violates this nation’s constitutional values at
the most fundamental level; indeed, unequal application of criminal law to white
and black persons was one of the central evils addressed by the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157,
1167 (10th Cir. 2003).
The Supreme Court has held that a person making a selective-prosecution
claim must establish two elements: “[1] the federal prosecutorial policy had a
discriminatory effect and [2] it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish a
discriminatory effect in a [selective-prosecution] race case, the claimant must
show that similarly-situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.”
Id. The elements are essentially the same for a selective-enforcement claim. A
defendant “challenging alleged racial discrimination in traffic stops and arrests
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must present evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the law
enforcement officials involved were motivated by a discriminatory purpose and
their actions had a discriminatory effect.” Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp.,
345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003). To satisfy the discriminatory-effect
element, one who claims selective enforcement “must . . . make a credible
showing that a similarly-situated individual of another race could have been, but
was not, [stopped or] arrested . . . for the offense for which the defendant was
[stopped or] arrested . . . .” James, 257 F.3d at 1179. And the discriminatory-
purpose element requires a showing that discriminatory intent was a “motivating
factor in the decision” to enforce the criminal law against the defendant.
Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1168. Discriminatory intent can be shown by either direct
or circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1299
(10th Cir. 2005).
The standard for proof of a selective-prosecution claim is a “demanding”
one, Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463, because a selective-prosecution claimant is
requesting the judiciary to exercise power over a “special province” of the
executive branch, id. 464, and judicial review of prosecutorial decisions could
“chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness
by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy,” id. at 465 (internal quotation
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marks omitted). Similar caution is required in reviewing a claim of selective law
enforcement. “[C]harges of racial discrimination . . . may be easy to make and
difficult to disprove.” Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1167. Executive-branch officials
possess broad discretion in determining when to make a traffic stop or an arrest.
See id. Judicial interference with law-enforcement discretion might “induce
police officers to protect themselves against false accusations in ways that are
counterproductive to fair and effective enforcement of the laws,” such as by
directing law-enforcement resources away from minority neighborhoods. Id.
Accordingly, the standard for proving a selective-enforcement claim should be, as
with selective-prosecution claims, “a demanding one.” Marshall, 345 F.3d at
1167, (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463).
For similar reasons discovery is limited. As we stated in James, “the
showing necessary to obtain discovery for a selective prosecution defense must
‘itself be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial claims.’” James,
257 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464). Although defendants
seeking discovery need not establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution,
id. at 1178, they must satisfy a “rigorous standard,” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468.
They must produce “some evidence” of both discriminatory effect and
discriminatory intent. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470; accord United States v. Bass,
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536 U.S. 862, 863 (2002) (per curiam). In James we applied this standard to a
claim of selective enforcement. See id. at 1178-81.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court's grant or denial of a
motion to dismiss an indictment. United States v. Furman, 31 F.3d 1034, 1037
(10th Cir. 1994). In James, 257 F.3d at 1178, we reviewed a selective-
prosecution discovery order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion. We
distinguished Furman on the grounds that the defendant in James was seeking
discovery rather than dismissal and that review of the discovery order involved
only a determination of the legal adequacy of the evidence rather than a
determination of facts. See id. at 1178. When, however, as in this case, the
decision regarding discovery properly rests on fact-finding, we review the
findings under the clearly-erroneous standard. Cf. English v. Cody, 241 F.3d
1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 2001) (we review a “district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s claims fail on the intent prong of the tests for
dismissal and discovery. He attempts to prove intent through statistical evidence
of a discriminatory effect. He argues that the “sheer disparity” between the
percentage of Hispanics on the road and the percentage of Hispanics stopped
shows that Deputy Schneider targets them. Aplt. Br. at 40. See Int’l Bhd. of
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Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (“Statistics showing
racial or ethnic imbalance are probative . . . because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination”). Here, however, we have direct
evidence of Deputy Schneider’s motivation in stopping Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano. At
the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Deputy Schneider testified that he had
decided to stop Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano as soon as he had determined by radar that
he was speeding. The district court accepted Deputy Schneider’s testimony,
stating: “[Deputy Schneider] noticed a gold car traveling eastbound, and
determined by radar that it was going 77 m.p.h. in a 70 m.p.h. zone. Deputy
Schneider routinely stops cars going that speed . . . and decided to stop this one as
well.” Vol. I, Doc. 70 at 1. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano contends that Deputy
Schneider does not make a decision based solely on speeding but also considers
the driver’s ethnicity. He points to Deputy Schneider’s practice of pulling
alongside the vehicle to look inside before executing a stop, thus allowing him to
determine the race of the individuals inside. He also notes the disproportionate
number of Hispanic drivers that Deputy Schneider stops—34% of his stops in a
two-year period were of Hispanics. This evidence has substantial appeal. But we
defer to the factfinder’s evaluation of credibility. See Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). And the district court’s finding that the
decision to stop Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s car was made before Deputy Schneider
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drove up to it forecloses any possibility that he made the decision to stop based on
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s ethnicity. Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano does not argue that
Deputy Schneider could have determined Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano’s ethnicity at the
time of the radar reading, when the vehicles were approaching one another at
something like 140 mph.
Because the district court made a factual finding that Deputy Schneider
made the decision to stop Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano before knowing his ethnicity, he
cannot satisfy the discriminatory-intent prong of the Armstrong standard for
obtaining discovery or dismissal on the basis of selective enforcement. Perhaps
Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano could have convinced the district court otherwise if he were
able to obtain the requested discovery. But he does not argue on appeal how
discovery would help in that regard, and it is not apparent to us. The data on
Deputy Schneider presented to us by Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano indicates that he
already possesses the relevant information regarding Deputy Schneider’s stops
and arrests. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery 1
Having held that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano failed to present evidence satisfying
Armstrong’s discriminatory-intent prong, we need not address whether the
1
Although direct evidence establishes that Deputy Schneider was not
motivated by race in his decision to stop Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano, the stop statistics
that Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano has presented are disturbing. We assume that in future
investigations federal prosecutors will take the utmost care to assure themselves
that racial profiling is not lurking behind such statistics.
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evidence he presented satisfied the discriminatory-effect prong. See James, 257
F.3d at 1181.
III. CONCLUSION
Deputy Schneider’s detention of Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano and his search of the
car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district
court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence. Also, Mr. Alcaraz-Arellano
has not satisfied his burden to present some evidence of discriminatory intent, so
we AFFIRM the order of the district court denying his motions to dismiss and for
discovery.
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