F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 14, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-1482
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-01667-LTB)
(D. Colo.)
BERT SANDERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Bert Sanders, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks
a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing him to appeal the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The district court denied the motion as
time-barred under the one-year limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and as we determine that
Mr. Woods has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000),
we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Sanders was convicted following a jury trial of possession with intent
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and of possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. He was sentenced to 151 months
imprisonment, and concurrent four- and five-year terms of supervised release. A
panel of this court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See United States v.
Sanders, 87 Fed. Appx. 83 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished). Mr. Sanders’
judgment of conviction became final on June 14, 2004, when the Supreme Court
denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Sanders v. United States, 542 U.S.
911 (2004).
On August 26, 2005, Mr. Sanders filed his § 2255 motion claiming: (1)
denial of his right to trial by jury, due to the trial court’s application of the
Sentencing Guidelines; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (3)
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (4) failure of the prosecution to
disclose favorable evidence.
As noted, the district dismissed Mr. Sanders’ § 2255 petition as time-barred
and concluded that equitable tolling was not appropriate in the absence of any
argument by Mr. Sanders on the issue. Where a district court dismisses a § 2255
motion on procedural grounds, a COA requires the movant to demonstrate that it
is reasonably debatable whether (1) the motion states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court’s procedural ruling is correct.
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
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On appeal, Mr. Sanders maintains that the district court should have held an
evidentiary hearing so he could demonstrate his due diligence in seeking to have
counsel file a § 2255 motion and counsel’s failure to follow through. As there is
no right to counsel in collateral proceedings, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555 (1987), it would take truly extraordinary circumstances beyond the
control of Mr. Sanders to demonstrate equitable tolling on this basis. As for Mr.
Sanders’ Sixth Amendment argument, we once again repeat that United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review. United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005). As for
Mr. Sanders’ remaining claims, those are clearly barred by the one-year statute of
limitations in § 2255, and the district court’s resolution is not reasonably
debatable.
We DENY a COA, IFP, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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