F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 17, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAMES K. IRONS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 05-1412
(D.C. No. 05-cv-1251-ZLW)
AL ESTEP, Warden, L.C.F.; (Colorado)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, SEYMOUR, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
James K. Irons, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. §
2254 petition as time barred. The district court denied Mr. Irons’ request to
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
proceed in forma pauperis (ifp). We review Mr. Irons’ pleadings liberally, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991), and exercise jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c). In so doing, we conclude jurists of reason would not
find debatable the district court’s rejection of Mr. Irons’ petition for relief, nor its
conclusion that he has not shown the existence of a reasoned non-frivolous
argument. We therefore deny Mr. Iron’s application for a COA as well as his
request to proceed ifp.
Mr. Irons was convicted in 2003 in Colorado state court of various drug
crimes. He was sentenced to eight years in prison and three years of mandatory
parole. He did not file a direct appeal. In April 2005, he sought state post
conviction relief by filing a motion under Rule 35(c) of the Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure. While that motion was still pending, he filed the instant
petition in federal court claiming his state sentence violated Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because he had received a sentence outside the
presumptive sentencing range based on facts determined by a judge rather than by
a jury.
The district court ordered Mr. Irons to show cause why his application
should not be denied as time barred by the one-year limitation period applicable
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to his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), 1 based on its determination that Mr.
Irons’ sentence became final in 2003. Consequently, barring equitable tolling
under Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998), the one-year limitations
period during which Mr. Irons could file his § 2254 petition expired in 2004.
In responding to the show cause order, Mr. Irons raised a number of
arguments claiming grounds for both statutory tolling under § 2244(d) and
equitable tolling. He first asserted the one-year limitation period did not begin to
1
The statute directs that
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the
latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward
any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
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run in 2003 when his conviction became final because his state appointed attorney
was ineffective and therefore represented a state-created impediment under §
2244(d)(1)(B). He also contended he did not become aware of the factual
predicate of his claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D) until he learned in the fall of 2004
that the Colorado courts were applying the rulings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely to Colorado sentences. Therefore, Mr. Irons
asserted, the tolling period for his claims had either not expired, or he should be
granted equitable tolling to challenge his state sentence.
The district court rejected Mr. Irons’ arguments. Citing to Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the court noted that ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot constitute a state-created impediment under § 2244(d)(1)(B)
because defense attorneys are not state actors when “performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at
325. Nor did Mr. Irons demonstrate how the actions of his attorney prevented
him from filing his § 2254 petition in a timely manner.
The district court also rejected Mr. Irons’ argument that he did not discover
the factual predicates for his claim until the fall of 2004. The court noted that
Mr. Irons was aware at the time of his sentencing in 2003 that he was sentenced
outside of the presumptive range of two to six years. This was the factual
predicate of his claim, not Mr. Irons’ subsequent discovery of a legal argument
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that might further his petition for relief. Finally, the court determined Mr. Irons
failed to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control that prevented him from filing his § 2254 action in a timely manner so as
to warrant an equitable tolling of § 2244(d). See Miller, 141 F.3d at 978. The
court dismissed Mr. Irons’ § 2254 petition as untimely.
We grant COA only where “the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We have reviewed the district
court’s ruling, the record on appeal, and Mr. Irons’ submissions to this court, and
are not persuaded jurists of reason would find debatable the district court’s
dismissal of Mr. Irons’ petition. In addition, we conclude he has not shown “the
existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of
the issues raised on appeal.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812
(10th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Irons’ petition for ifp status and his
application for a COA, and we DISMISS the appeal.
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SUBMITTED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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