F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 4, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-4243
v. (D. Utah)
ELIAS SALAZAR, (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-819-TC)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, HARTZ, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Elias Salazar appeals from his sentence on a conviction for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that the
district court should have granted him a downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 3E1.1 (2005).
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
We disagree and affirm the sentence. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Mr. Salazar had been arrested for firing a handgun from a moving car at a
house after he had been disinvited from a party there. At trial Mr. Salazar either
stipulated to or testified to each of the elements of the charged offense—that he
possessed a firearm, it had traveled in interstate commerce, and he had previously
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
But he defended the charge on the ground that possession of the gun was justified
because he fired it in self-defense. Witnesses for the government disputed his
version of events.
The jury convicted Mr. Salazar. At sentencing he argued that he should be
given an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because he had admitted all
the facts necessary to convict him. See USSG § 3E1.1 (providing for two-level
decrease in offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense”).
Application note 2 to USSG § 3E1.1 states that the provision is not
intended to apply to defendants who exercise their right to trial, although “in rare
situations” the adjustment still may apply, as when a defendant “goes to trial to
assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a
constitutional challenge . . . .).” The district court emphasized that Mr. Salazar’s
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“justification defense is not really a constitutional challenge[, i]t was a factual
challenge.” R. Vol. IV at 11. Moreover, the court expressed its belief that he had
lied on the witness stand. Therefore, in the court’s view, this was not one of the
rare situations in which the adjustment might apply. The court sentenced him to
77 months in prison.
“Whether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous
standard.” United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir. 2004). “‘The
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of
responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is
entitled to great deference on review.’” Id. (quoting USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5).
We agree with the district court that there were no exceptional
circumstances to make this one of the “rare situations” in which the adjustment
applies despite the defendant’s having gone to trial. Indeed, Mr. Salazar’s perjury
at trial could in itself present a bar to this adjustment. See United States v.
Sarracino, 340 F.3d 1148, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[F]alse testimony that results
in an enhancement for obstruction of justice generally is inconsistent with an
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.”); USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4 (perjury or
other obstruction of justice ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not
accepted responsibility).
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Because the district court could properly find on this record that
Mr. Salazar had not accepted responsibility for his actions, we AFFIRM the
sentence below.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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