F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 17, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
GREGGORY W ADE OLIVER,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v.
No. 05-1286
CARL ZENON, W arden, Arkansas (D.C. No. 05-CV-648-ZLW )
V alley C orrectional Facility; THE (D . Colo.)
A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE
STA TE OF C OLO RA D O ,
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, M C KA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Gregory W ade O liver, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the
district court, we D EN Y a COA and DISM ISS.
Oliver was convicted in 1995 of first degree assault and two counts of
com mitting crimes of violence and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He
appealed his conviction, but his appeal was denied and, on September 28, 1998,
the Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Oliver
did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.
Before his conviction became final, Oliver filed a post-conviction petition
pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, but this
petition was dismissed. On August 9, 1999, he filed another petition for post-
conviction relief, this one pursuant to Rule 35(c). This w as dismissed as w ell,
with the Colorado Supreme Court finally denying his petition for a writ of
certiorari on August 30, 2004.
On April 1, 2005, Oliver filed this § 2254 habeas petition. The district
court concluded that Oliver’s habeas petition was time-barred and denied his
application for a COA. Oliver now seeks a COA from this court. 1
The statute of limitations for applications for a writ of habeas corpus is set
forth in 28 U .S.C. § 2244(d). It states:
1
Oliver’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act (“AEDPA”); as a result, AEDPA’s
provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1
(10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. M urphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). AED PA
conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254
upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A ). A COA may be issued “only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires O liver to show “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quotations omitted). Because the district court denied Oliver a COA ,
he may not appeal the district court’s decision absent a grant of a COA by this
court.
-2-
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the
latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review ;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward
any period of limitation under this subsection.
Because his petition for a writ of certiorari on direct appeal was denied by the
Colorado Supreme Court on September 28, 1998, Oliver had until December 28,
1998, to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
See Sup. Ct. R. 13. At that point, his conviction became final and the limitations
period for his habeas petition began to run. See Locke v. Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269,
1273 (10th Cir. 2001); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999).
Oliver’s first post-conviction motion was filed before his conviction was
final and hence did not toll the statute of limitations. He filed his second motion
-3-
for post-conviction relief on August 9, 1999, 223 days after his conviction
became final. Dismissal became final on August 30, 2004, and Oliver did not file
his federal habeas petition until 213 days later. The statute of limitations was
running for both of these two periods of time; together, they amount to well over
the one-year period during which a habeas petition can be filed. As such,
Oliver’s § 2254 petition was filed after the end of the statute of limitations.
Failure to file in an a timely manner can be excused if there is reason to
equitably toll the statue of limitations. Equitable tolling “is only available when
an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely
file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” M arsh v.
Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Oliver has not shown any
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from filing in
a timely manner. His petition is therefore time-barred.
For the reasons set forth above, Oliver’s request for a COA is DENIED and
the appeal is DISM ISSED. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-4-