F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 23, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CHARLES W ILLIAM FLETCHER,
III-EL,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
No. 05-1349
v. (D.C. No. 04-CV-2320)
(D . Colo.)
GARY GOLDER, W arden; JOHN W .
SU THERS, Attorney General of the
State of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Charles Fletcher, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his federal habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for
failure to exhaust state court remedies. Because petitioner’s direct appeal in state
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
court has yet to be adjudicated, we AFFIRM the district court’s application of the
exhaustion requirement to bar his federal petition.
Petitioner was convicted in Colorado in 2001 of numerous crimes,
including kidnaping, assault, aggravated robbery, and attempted second-degree
murder. A s a habitual felon, he was sentenced to 320 years’ imprisonment.
He filed a direct appeal with the Colorado Court of Appeals in February 2003.
W hile that appeal was pending (and, indeed, it is still pending), petitioner filed
his pro se § 2254 habeas application. In it, petitioner raised three constitutional
challenges to his state court conviction, as well as a due process claim that the
state’s appellate process was ineffective and, therefore, excused the requirement
that he exhaust state remedies.
In general, “[b]efore a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state
prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words,
the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims
before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State.”). State claims remain unexhausted if state proceedings
remain pending at the time the petition is filed.
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Nonetheless, we have held that unjustified delay by a state court in
adjudicating a direct criminal appeal may give rise to both a due process violation
and relief from the exhaustion requirement itself. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d
1538, 1555, 1557 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that “inexcusable or inordinate delay
by the state in processing claims for relief may make the state process ineffective
to protect the petitioner’s rights and excuse exhaustion”) (quotation omitted);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (permitting grant of § 2254 application
when state process would be ineffective to protect applicant’s rights). A delay
of more than two years gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of the
“(i) ineffectiveness of state appellate procedures sufficient to excuse exhaustion
on the petitioner’s underlying claims of unconstitutional trial error, and
(ii) prejudice necessary to support an independent constitutional claim of
deprivation of an effective direct appeal because of delay.” Harris v. Champion,
48 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 1995).
Because petitioner’s direct appeal remains pending in state court, the
district court dismissed his § 2254 habeas application without prejudice for
failure to exhaust state court remedies. In so doing, the district court did not
address the merits of petitioner’s claim that his due process rights had been
violated due to the inordinate delay in the resolution of his direct criminal appeal
or his argument that the exhaustion requirement should be excused. W e granted
petitioner a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) on the issues of
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“[w]hether [p]etitioner should be excused from exhausting his state remedies
because of inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state of Colorado in
adjudicating his direct appeal,” and whether “[p]etitioner has raised an
independent due process claim arising from Colorado’s delay in adjudicating his
direct criminal appeal.” Order filed Feb. 8, 2006 at 1, 2.
On appeal, petitioner asserts the same due process and waiver-of-
exhaustion arguments raised in his habeas petition. W e review de novo the
district court’s legal basis for dismissing M r. Fletcher’s petition. Jackson v.
Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1998). It is clear that the delay in
adjudicating petitioner’s state direct appeal has extended beyond two years from
the filing of his notice of appeal. Thus, there is a presumption of ineffective
appellate process in this case. Nonetheless, we have examined the status of
M r. Fletcher’s state appeal, and we conclude that the presumption has been
rebutted. The appellate process was not ineffective because petitioner, through
his counsel, “affirmatively sought or caused the delay,” Harris, 15 F.3d at 1547,
and the delay was not unjustified under the facts and circumstances of this case,
id. at 1556 (noting that “in particular cases, the [s]tate may show that a delay of
more than two years is justified, and therefore, [that] good cause exists for not
excusing exhaustion.”). The record and state court docket sheet indicate M r.
Fletcher’s court-appointed public defender requested various extensions of time,
delaying the appeal, in order to obtain missing trial transcripts and records he
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considered necessary for the appeal, to substitute new counsel, and to file the
appellate briefs.
Specifically, M r. Fletcher’s counsel requested and obtained numerous
extensions of time in 2003 to complete the record on appeal. In M ay 2004,
counsel filed a sixteen-volume, nine-envelope record with the Colorado Court of
Appeals. The opening brief was originally due to be filed in June 2004, but
counsel requested and received an extension of time. Then, in August 2004,
counsel requested and obtained a stay of the briefing schedule because he had
determined that a small portion of the designated trial transcripts and many of the
designated exhibits had not, in fact, been transmitted to the state appellate court.
A supplemental record of three trial transcripts was filed in October 2004.
M r. Fletcher’s counsel later determined, however, that the missing trial
exhibits were still missing from the record on appeal, and were believed to be
lodged with the trial record of M r. Fletcher’s co-defendant. Counsel then
requested a limited remand to settle or correct the trial record. (A week later,
petitioner filed his pro se § 2254 application.) The Colorado Court of Appeals
granted the requested extension, but ordered counsel to file regular status reports.
In M arch 2005, the state court ordered M r. Fletcher’s counsel to file a motion in
the co-defendant’s case to transfer the missing exhibits to M r. Fletcher’s case.
The supplemental record was then filed in July 2005. M r. Fletcher’s counsel then
requested and received permission to withdraw due to a conflict of interest, and
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his new counsel requested and received numerous extensions of time to file
the opening brief.
In January 2006, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that no further
extensions of time would be allowed, and M r. Fletcher’s opening brief was filed
in February 2006. W ith one extension of time, the state filed its answ er brief in
April 2006, and M r. Fletcher’s counsel requested and received an extension of
time to reply by M ay 22, 2006.
It is clear that the Colorado Court of Appeals has not abandoned
M r. Fletcher’s appeal, as evidenced by its orders granting M r. Fletcher’s multiple
requests for extensions of time in order to obtain the records he considered
necessary to his appeal; requiring status reports because of its concern about the
length of time needed to complete the record; ordering counsel to take action to
obtain the transfer of the needed exhibits from the co-defendant’s file; and
ultimately disallowing additional extensions of time to file the opening brief in
order to expedite the appeal. Notably, the state appellate court’s docket sheet
indicates that the appeal has been tracked for expedited consideration.
M r. Fletcher’s direct appeal is still actively pending. The state has demonstrated
that the delay is not unjustified and that it would be beneficial to allow the state
appeal process to be completed. Thus, we conclude that M r. Fletcher has not
demonstrated that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement or that
his due process rights have been violated.
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The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED. Appellant’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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