F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 30, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
A M R IT M O H A N TH O MPSO N ,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 05-5196
v. (N .D. of Okla.)
STEVEN BECK, W arden, (D.C. No. CV -02-628-CV E)
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Amrit Thompson, a state prisoner appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. W e agree with the district
court that the COA should not issue because Thompson has not made a substantial
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
show ing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we DENY the COA
and DISM ISS the appeal.
I. Background
In 1999 Thompson was convicted by an Oklahoma jury for first degree
murder with intent to kill. The basis for this conviction was a shooting earlier
that year in which Thompson and others shot from one moving car at three
victims in another moving car. One of the three w as killed; the other two were
wounded but survived.
Thompson appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA) but did not seek post-conviction relief through the Oklahoma
state courts. He subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma. In his federal petition, Thompson claimed his constitutional rights
had been violated based on (1) the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on
second degree murder and manslaughter, (2) the trial court’s refusal to give an
accomplice instruction, and (3) the insufficiency of the evidence. The petition
was denied in a well-reasoned order by the district court. Thompson now raises
these same issues on appeal to this court.
II. Analysis
Before Thompson may proceed with his appeal, he must obtain a COA. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). W e will issue a CO A “only if the applicant has made a
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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). W here a district court “has rejected the constitutional claims on the
merits,” an applicant meets this standard by “demonstrat[ing] that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (quoting
Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). In general, the COA analysis
“requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits” rather than “full consideration of the factual or legal
bases adduced in support of the claims.” M iller-El, 537 U.S. at 336.
Here, reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s assessment of
Thompson’s claims debatable or wrong. He therefore has failed to make a
sufficient showing that he is entitled to a COA on any of his claims.
A. Refusal to Instruct Jury on Lesser Included Offenses
Thompson first argues that his trial violated due process because the court
refused to instruct the jury on two lesser included offenses (second degree murder
and manslaughter). The district court rejected this argument, concluding (1) that
the refusal was not so fundamentally unfair as to deprive him of due process, (2)
that, in any event, jury instruction claims were not reviewable in habeas
proceedings, and (3) that the OCCA decision was not contrary to clearly
established federal law. W e agree.
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The district court correctly observed that “[a]s a general rule, errors in jury
instructions in a state criminal trial are not reviewable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings, unless they are so fundamentally unfair as to deprive petitioner of a
fair trial and to due process of law.” Patton v. M ullin, 425 F.3d 788, 807 (10th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1357 (10th Cir. 1997)).
In applying this standard, we typically consider whether the denied instruction
was warranted under the facts of the case. See, e.g., Tyler v. Nelson, 163 F.3d
1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 1999) (turning to state law to determine whether defendant
was entitled to requested instruction); Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1035–36 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding that refusal to give instruction did not violate due process
where the record contained no evidence that would support the instruction).
Some of our cases have even recognized “a rule of ‘automatic non-reviewability’
for claims based on a state court’s failure, in a non-capital case, to give a lesser
included offense instruction.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir.
2004).
Under this authority, reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s
reasoning debatable or wrong. Here, the OCCA made clear that “[s]econd degree
depraved mind murder and manslaughter are lesser included offenses of first
degree murder” and that “[t]he trial court should have given both instructions if
they were supported by the evidence.” Doc. 5, Ex. C, Pg. 3. However, the OCCA
further held that as a matter of Oklahoma law, under these facts, instructions for
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the lesser included offenses need not be given. Our appellate review is to assess
whether the OCCA’s decision was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because reasonable jurists would not differ on
this claim , the district court did not err by failing to issue a COA.
B. Failure to Give Accom plice Instruction
Thompson’s second claim is a variation of his first. He argues the trial
court’s failure to give an accomplice instruction also violated due process.
Although the OCCA ruled that “[t]he jury should have been instructed that [the
witness] was an accomplice as a matter of law,” the court further concluded that
any error was harmless. D oc. 5, Ex. C, Pg. 7. After reviewing the record, we
agree w ith the error w as harmless. In light of the foregoing authorities, we
cannot say that the failure to instruct the jury on this issue made Thompson’s trial
fundamentally unfair or that the OCCA misapplied Supreme Court precedent.
Thus, Thompson is not entitled to a COA on this claim either.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Thompson finally claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict,
specifically that the state had not established his intent to kill any of the three
victims. The Supreme Court has stated that a sufficiency challenge requires us to
ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). As the district court and OCCA pointed out, the record amply established
Thompson’s guilt under such a deferential standard. A COA is not proper on this
claim either.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we DEN Y Thompson’s application for a CO A and DISM ISS
this appeal. Thompson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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