Revised February 8, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
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No. 98-40977
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United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
Juan Raul Garza,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
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January 14, 1999
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Juan Raul Garza has applied for a
certificate of appealability ("COA") to challenge the district
court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his
sentence. For reasons that follow, his application for a COA is
denied.
I.
The factual and procedural history of this case was discussed
in detail in our previous opinion on direct appeal. See United
States v. Garza, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, only
those parts of the history immediately relevant to Garza’s
application for a COA are set forth here.
In July 1993, a federal jury convicted Garza of operating a
continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE"), three counts of killing in
furtherance of the CCE, and five violations of drug and money
laundering laws. At sentencing, the Government introduced
aggravating factors evidence of four unadjudicated murders in
Mexico in which Garza was involved. The jury sentenced Garza to
death for the three counts of killing in furtherance of the CCE,
and to prison terms for the other crimes.
Garza’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on
direct appeal in a lengthy written opinion. Id. Garza petitioned
for rehearing, and rehearing was denied. United States v. Garza, 77
F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 1995) (table). Garza then petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied. United States v.
Garza, 117 S. Ct. 87 (1996). In December 1997, Garza filed a motion
to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court
denied relief. United States v. Garza, Civil Action No. B-97-273
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 1998). Garza then filed a motion for relief from
judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) and a separate motion to alter
and amend judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). The district court
denied both motions, and denied Garza a COA. Garza subsequently
filed a notice of appeal and the present application for a COA.
II.
This Court may not take an appeal from the denial of a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion unless either the district court or this Court
issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The standard we follow in
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determining whether to issue a COA is set forth in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 28 U.S.C. §§
2241 et seq. To obtain a COA, Garza must make a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);
see also United States v. Kimler, 150 F.3d 429, 431 n. 1 (5th Cir.
1998). Garza need not establish that he will win on the merits in
order to obtain a COA; he need only demonstrate that the questions
he raises are debatable among reasonable jurists. United States v.
Rocha, 109 F.3d 225, 227 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1997).
III.
Garza raises two constitutional questions in his application
for a COA.1 First, he argues that this Court violated his Eighth
Amendment right to meaningful appellate review. He contends that
the violation occurred when this Court affirmed his death sentence
on direct appeal without addressing his challenge to the sentencing
evidence regarding his involvement in the four unadjudicated
murders in Mexico. He cites this Court’s "meticulous" review of all
other issues as evidence that the Court overlooked the challenge to
1
Garza also argues as a preliminary matter that the district
court’s order should be remanded because the district court did not
give him notice and opportunity to respond to the Government’s
answer under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), and because the district court
did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. These arguments are unpersuasive. The text of 28
U.S.C. § 2255 expressly authorizes the district court to dispose of
a motion summarily where "the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief." That is plainly what happened here. The fact that the
Government filed an answer on its own initiative does not deprive
the district court of its statutory authority to dispose of a
meritless motion summarily.
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the aggravating factors evidence, thereby denying him his
constitutional right to full consideration of every issue raised on
review. We disagree.
A litigant’s right to have all issues fully considered and
ruled on by the appellate court does not equate to a right to a
full written opinion on every issue raised. United States v.
Pajooh, 143 F.3d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1998). Even though this Court
did not expressly discuss Garza’s challenge to the aggravating
factors evidence, the issue nonetheless received full consideration
and a ruling. This is apparent from the Court’s opinion on direct
review. The opinion begins with a clear, general finding of "no
reversible error" affirming both Garza’s conviction and his
sentence. Garza, 63 F.3d at 1351. Moreover, the opinion
specifically states with respect to the aggravating factors
evidence that "Garza has shown no error." Id. at 1364. Each of
these statements is broad enough to encompass Garza’s challenge to
the aggravating factors evidence.2 It is evident that the Court
simply felt that the argument did not merit individual attention.
We therefore conclude that Garza has failed to make a substantial
showing that his right to meaningful appellate review was denied.
Second, Garza argues that he was denied due process of law at
the punishment stage of his trial. This argument again centers on
2
Garza challenges the phrase "no reversible error" as
inadequate, and urges that we require the following language
instead: "We reject all of the claims and all of the remaining
claims." We decline to require such talismanic formalities. The
Court’s finding of "no reversible error" was sufficient to indicate
full consideration of all issues raised on appeal.
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the aggravating factors evidence of Garza’s involvement in the four
unadjudicated murders in Mexico. Garza contends that he did not
have a fair opportunity to deny or to explain the Government’s
evidence, because he had no right to compulsory process or subpoena
in Mexico and therefore no ability to procure favorable witnesses
or to protect against the suppression, destruction, or fabrication
of evidence by Mexican authorities. Garza further contends that the
Government had a duty under the Due Process Clause to use its power
to obtain exculpatory evidence that Garza could not subpoena from
the Mexican government, and to disclose that evidence to Garza.
This argument is unconvincing.
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.
Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Government is required to turn over to a
defendant any exculpatory or impeachment evidence in the
Government’s possession. Here, the Government turned over to Garza
every document that it received from Mexico, including the police
reports, investigative reports, and certified translations of the
autopsy reports. Garza was given express notice that the Government
intended to rely on the extraneous murders at sentencing, was
provided full pretrial discovery of all evidence in the
Government’s possession, and was given the opportunity to cross-
examine all witnesses presented by the Government at sentencing.
There is no question, and indeed Garza does not even contest, that
the Government satisfied its duty under Brady.
The Government is under no obligation to conduct a defendant’s
investigation or to make a defendant’s case for him. United States
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v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 148 (5th Cir. 1996). Vague allegations of
unidentified favorable witnesses and unspecified exculpatory
evidence simply will not suffice to show a violation of due
process. Garza has therefore failed to make a substantial showing
that his right to due process of law was denied.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, no jurist of reason could find
that Garza was denied his constitutional rights to meaningful
appellate review or due process of law. Garza has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of any constitutional right, so
his application for a COA must be
DENIED.
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