F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 19, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-1224
A N SELM O REY ES-SO TO , (D.C. No. 04-CR-396-N)
(D. Colorado)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H ENRY, BRISCO E, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, ordered submitted without oral argument.
Anselmo Reyes-Soto was convicted of possession with intent to distribute
500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A ) and 18 U .S.C . § 2, and sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. On
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
appeal, Reyes-Soto challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm Reyes-Soto’s sentence.
I.
In April 2004, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents began an
investigation of Pedro Ortiz-Barrios. Through a confidential informant, the DEA
learned of Ortiz-Barrios’ involvement with cocaine and “ice” methamphetamine
distribution activities in the Los Angeles, California area. Eventually, Ortiz-
Barrios agreed to sell ten pounds of methamphetamine to the confidential
inform ant in C olorado. The confidential informant subsequently had two
telephone conversations with Reyes-Soto concerning the price of the
methamphetamine. On September 7, 2004, in D enver, Colorado, DEA agents
arrested Ortiz-Barrios, Reyes-Soto, and a third individual identified as Filemon
Bustos-M edina, after the three men removed a large amount of methamphetamine
from their Ford Explorer and attempted to sell the drugs to the confidential
informant.
On November 17, 2004, a grand jury issued a superseding indictment
charging Reyes-Soto with one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute a substance containing 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846 (Count 1), and one count
of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing 500 grams or more
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 18
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U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2). Following each enumerated count, the superseding
indictment also contained a section entitled “Alleged Offense Characteristics.”
The additional allegations for each count were identical, and stated in relevant
part:
As to the offense alleged in Count One of the Indictment, the
government further alleges the following:
1. Specification One: Drug Quantity
The defendants engaged in a conspiracy involving at least 1.5
kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine.
Vol. I, Doc. 41 (emphasis added).
On December 13, 2004, Reyes-Soto’s case proceeded to jury trial on both
counts. After the government presented its case in chief, the district court granted
Reyes-Soto’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count 1, but denied the
motion as to Count 2. Vol. I, Doc. 62. During the instruction conference, the
district court struck the “Alleged Offense Characteristics” section under Count 2,
concluding that the government had erroneously repeated the conspiracy
allegations from Count 1 verbatim, and thus failed to tailor the allegations to
Count 2. The court then informed the parties that it would not use a special
verdict form on drug quantity, and would simply ask the jury to decide whether
Reyes-Soto was guilty or not guilty of possession with intent to distribute 500
grams or more of methamphetamine. On December 16, the jury returned a verdict
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of guilty on Count 2.
The presentence report (PSR ) recommended an offense level of 38 under
the guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (providing for a
base offense level of 38 for 1.5 kilograms or more of methamphetamine “ice”).
Specifically, the PSR relied on a laboratory report from Reyes-Soto’s trial that
found that the substance seized when Reyes-Soto was arrested contained a net
quantity of 4,356 grams of methamphetamine “ice.” The PSR also recommended
a criminal history category I because Reyes-Soto did not have a prior criminal
history. Based on an offense level of 38, and a criminal history category I,
Reyes-Soto’s guideline range was 235 to 293 months.
Reyes-Soto objected to the PSR, contending that under Blakely v.
W ashington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), there must be a jury finding regarding the quantity of methamphetamine
“ice” he possessed, and therefore, the total offense level should be 32 based on a
conviction for possession of 500 grams of methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c)(4) (providing for a base offense level 32 for quantities of
methamphetamine at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms). Additionally,
Reyes-Soto argued that his role in the offense was minor and that he qualified for
a safety valve reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Further, he argued that he was
similarly situated to co-defendant Bustos-M edina, who was offered a plea bargain
which would result in the government’s recommendation of a sixty-month
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sentence.
At the sentencing hearing held on April 21, 2005, the district court rejected
Reyes-Soto’s argument under Blakely and Booker, concluding that under the
remedial majority opinion in Booker, a judge may find facts by a preponderance
of the evidence at sentencing provided that the guidelines are applied in an
advisory manner. Supp. Vol. I at 15-17. The court then set Reyes-Soto’s base
offense level at 38. The court reasoned that Reyes-Soto had not seriously
disputed the laboratory report and evidence at trial that verified the net weight of
the methamphetamine to be 4,445 grams, with a purity level of 98% , for a total of
4,356 grams of methamphetamine “ice.” Id. The district court emphasized that it
did not hesitate to reach this conclusion because the base offense level of 38
applied to any amount above 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine ice, and the
quantity at issue exceeded 1.5 kilograms by almost three times. Id. The district
court also denied Reyes-Soto’s arguments for a minor role adjustment and a
safety valve adjustment. Id. Finally, the district court rejected Reyes-Soto’s
assertion that he w as similarly situated to Bustos-M edina. The district court
explained that the evidence showed that Reyes-Soto had a larger role in arranging
the drug transaction, and the court further noted that it was not certain what
sentence Bustos-M edina would receive because the court had not yet accepted
Bustos-M edina’s plea agreement.
The district court concluded that Reyes-Soto’s guideline sentencing range
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was 235 to 293 months based on an offense level of 38 and a criminal history
category I. Id. After reciting the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), and stating that it had considered those factors, the court sentenced
Reyes-Soto to 235 months’ imprisonment. The district court added that nothing
in Reyes-Soto’s background was so extraordinary or unusual to justify a sentence
below the advisory guideline range, and that Reyes-Soto’s sentence avoided
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct. Id. at 19-21.
II.
Reyes-Soto challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. For sentences
imposed after Booker our review is for “reasonableness,” and we look to the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for guidance in determining whether
the sentence imposed is reasonable. United States v. M orales-Chaires, 430 F.3d
1124, 1128 (10th C ir. 2005) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 261). In this circuit, w e
utilize a two-step approach when review ing a sentence for reasonableness. First,
we review, if challenged, whether the district court correctly calculated the
defendant’s guideline sentence, reviewing the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050,
1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006). Second, if the district court correctly determined the
guideline sentence, we then review the sentence for reasonableness, applying a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for sentences imposed within the
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advisory guideline range. Id.
First, Reyes-Soto contends that his base offense level would have been 32
if the district court had sentenced him pre-Booker. Reyes-Soto suggests that
under Blakely the district court would not have made drug quantity findings by a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Instead, he submits that the district court
would have relied on the jury’s verdict that he possessed 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine and applied a base offense level 32 for quantities of
m etham phetamine of at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms. See U.S.S.G .
§ 2D1.1(c)(4).
Rather than engage in speculation, we review only the district court’s
actual calculation of Reyes-Soto’s base offense level. 1 The district court’s drug
quantity finding based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard was
permissible because it applied the guidelines in an advisory manner. See United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006) (“As before Booker, the
standard of proof under the guidelines for sentencing facts continues to be
preponderance of the evidence.”); United States v. Dalton, 409 F.3d 1247, 1252
(10th Cir. 2005) (“Booker . . . does not render judicial fact-finding by a
preponderance of the evidence per se unconstitutional. The remedial portion of
1
W e note, however, that the jury did not find that Reyes-Soto possessed at
least 500 grams, but less than 1.5 kilograms. The jury decided that Reyes-Soto
possess 500 or more grams of methamphetamine.
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Booker demonstrates that such fact-finding is unconstitutional only when it
operates to increase a defendant’s sentence mandatorily.”) (emphasis in original);
United States v. M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a
district court makes a determination of sentencing facts by a preponderance test
under the now-advisory Guidelines, it is not bound by jury determinations reached
through application of the more onerous reasonable doubt standard.”). As a
result, we review the district court’s factual findings regarding drug quantity for
clear error. Dalton, 409 F.3d at 1251 (citation omitted). At sentencing, Reyes-
Soto did not present any evidence disputing the drug quantity and quality
provided by the laboratory report. On appeal, Reyes-Soto fails to argue that the
district court committed clear error in finding that he possessed 4,356 grams of
“ice” methamphetamine. W e therefore conclude that the district court’s drug
quantity findings were not clearly erroneous.
Next, Reyes-Soto asserts that his sentence is unreasonable because “the
Drug Quantity Table in Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1(c) is an arbitrary and purely
mechanical assignment of guideline base offense levels of varying weights of
drugs involved in the offense of conviction.” A plt. Br. at 15. Reyes-Soto’s
argument is without merit. Our reasonableness review “necessarily encompasses .
. . the method by which the sentence was calculated,” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055,
and it is clear here that the district court properly relied on the Drug Quantity
Table to calculate Reyes-Soto’s guideline offense level. “A lthough under Booker,
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the Sentencing Guidelines are an advisory rather than a mandatory regime, the
district court is obliged to ‘consult’ . . . the Guidelines in sentencing” and this
“requirement, at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the
sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines[.]” United States v. Crawford, 407
F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th C ir. 2005); see Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55 (stating that w e
must generally remand, without evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence, if the
district court erred in applying the Guidelines). M oreover, on several occasions
we have rejected challenges to the constitutionality of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, as well
as arguments that its formulas for determining the weight of controlled substances
are arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., United States v. Ashley, 26 F.3d 1008,
1013 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1399-1400 (10th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 11 F.3d 953, 955-56 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Cody, 7 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947, 950-53 (10th Cir. 1993). W e therefore conclude that the
district court properly calculated Reyes-Soto’s base offense level to be 38 under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1), and Reyes-Soto’s advisory guideline range to be 235 to
293 months.
Finally, Reyes-Soto contends that at sentencing the district court adopted a
“near-mandatory application” of the sentencing guidelines. Aplt. Br. at 15. W e
recently rejected this argument in United States v. Davis, 437 F.3d 989 (10th Cir.
2006). The defendant in Davis argued that the district court treated the guidelines
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as “de facto mandatory.” Id. at 997. W e disagreed, observing that the record
clearly indicated that the district court thoroughly considered the sentencing
factors set forth in § 3553(a) before it sentenced the defendant at the bottom of
the advisory guideline range. Id. Here, the district court followed the dictates of
Booker by first consulting the guidelines, and then considering the more general §
3553(a) sentencing factors before imposing a sentence at the bottom of the
advisory guideline range. The district court emphasized the need to impose a
sentence equivalent to the sentences of defendants with similar records w ho were
found guilty of similar conduct, as well as the absence of any evidence in Reyes-
Soto’s record that justified a sentence below the recommended guideline range.
Reyes-Soto has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that we attach to
sentences that are within the recommended guideline range. Kristl, 437 F.3d at
1054. Accordingly, we conclude that Reyes-Soto’s sentence was reasonable.
AFFIR M ED.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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