F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 21, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-3422
v. District of Kansas
ED GAR N UÑEZ-FUEN TES, (D.C. No. 05-CV-3197-M LB)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Edgar Nuñez-Fuentes, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal the district
court’s order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that M r. Nuñez-Fuentes has failed
to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we DEN Y
his request for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
I. Background
M r. Nuñez-Fuentes pleaded guilty to felony conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In his plea
agreement, M r. Nuñez-Fuentes waived his right to appeal and to collaterally
attack his conviction and sentence, including motions brought under 28 U.S.C. §
2255, except as limited by United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187
(10th Cir. 2001). The district court accepted the plea and sentenced him to 135
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.
Judgment was entered on August 16, 2004. Pursuant to the plea agreement, M r.
Nuñez-Fuentes did not file a direct appeal.
On April 6, 2005, M r. Nuñez-Fuentes filed a motion to vacate the judgment
of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel and challenging the validity of the plea agreement. In his petition, M r.
Nuñez-Fuentes argued that his plea agreement was the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel because counsel (1) allowed the plea agreement to be based
on a different quantity of drugs than was originally included in the indictment,
and failed to object to an alleged miscalculation of the base offense level; (2)
failed to request downward departures based on the defendant’s extraordinary
family circumstances; (3) allowed for the inclusion of a five-year period of
supervised release in the plea agreement even though, according to M r. Nuñez-
Fuentes, the district court had no jurisdiction to impose supervised release; and
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(4) failed to secure “safety valve” credit for which M r. Nuñez-Fuentes was
eligible under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The district court rejected each of M r. Nuñez-
Fuentes’s arguments and denied the motion. M r. Nuñez-Fuentes then filed an
application for a COA in this Court. Because M r. Nuñez-Fuentes’s’ ineffective
assistance claim challenges the validity of his plea, it falls outside the waiver of
post-conviction rights in the plea agreement. See Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1187.
II.
The denial of a motion for relief under § 2255 may be appealed only if the
district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A
COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make such a
showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In order to establish an ineffective assistance claim sufficient to warrant
reversal of a conviction or a sentence, a convicted defendant must show both that
counsel’s performance was so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The ultimate
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question, according to the Supreme Court, is “whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
[proceedings] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686.
A. Discrepancy Between the Indictm ent and the Plea Agreem ent
M r. Nuñez-Fuentes first argues that his counsel was ineffective because the
plea agreement was based on a higher quantity of drugs than was specified by the
indictment. The indictment charged him with conspiracy to distribute
“approximately two (2) pounds” of methamphetamine, R. Doc. 23, p. 1, whereas
the plea agreement and the petition to plead guilty both specified 1,183, or
roughly 2.6 pounds, of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine. In a sentencing regime w here Guideline ranges may vary
dramatically on the basis of a few grams of narcotics, such a discrepancy could,
in some cases, have a significant effect on a defendant’s sentence. In this case,
however, the base offense level would have been the same w hether the plea
agreement was based on 1,183 grams or two pounds (approximately 907 grams) of
methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(2) (specifying a base offense level of
36 for offenses involving “at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms of
methamphetamine (actual).”). Thus, M r. Nuñez-Fuentes has not made a
substantial showing that the discrepancy between the indictment and the plea
agreement had a prejudicial effect on his sentence.
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M r. Nuñez-Fuentes also argues that his base offense level should have been
32 rather than 36, based on the quantity of the methamphetamine involved in his
offense. This calculation stems from a misreading of the Guidelines. Under N ote
B to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), courts are instructed to “use the offense level
determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance [containing
methamphetamine], or the offense level determined by the weight of the . . .
methamphetamine (actual), whichever is greater.” According to the record, the
1,183 grams of methamphetamine involved in the defendant’s case was of 70%
purity. Therefore the actual quantity in the plea agreement was approximately
828 grams, and the actual quantity charged in the indictment was approximately
635 grams, both of which fall w ell w ithin the range for a base offense level of 36.
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). Thus, M r. Nuñez-Fuentes’s counsel could not have
been ineffective for failing to object to the court’s calculation of the base offense
level.
B. Extraordinary Fam ily Circum stances
M r. Nuñez-Fuentes also claims that his counsel was ineffective because she
failed to request downward departures for w hich he was eligible due to his
“extraordinary family circumstances” and because of his pending deportation. The
district court found that M r. Nuñez-Fuentes’s family circumstances fall well below
the “extraordinary” threshold that would entitle him to a downward departure, and
we find nothing in the record suggesting otherw ise.
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M r. Nuñez-Fuentes relies primarily on a case from the Eastern District of
W isconsin, which he interprets as holding that when a defendant’s family resides
in the United States, and he will be deported following his release from prison, he
is entitled to a three-level downward departure. See United States v. Ferreria, 239
F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (E.D. W is. 2002). W e do not interpret Ferreria as adopting
such a per se rule. The decision merely shows one possible outcome for such a
case in the Seventh Circuit, where district courts are free to consider a downward
departure if a defendant suffers “unusual or exceptional hardship in his conditions
of confinement” as a result of his status as a deportable alien. United States v.
Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit’s case law does
not support the rule that sentencing courts must award departures every time the
defendant is a deportable alien. See United States v. Gallo-Vasquez, 284 F.3d 780,
785 (7th Cir. 2002). Unlike the Seventh Circuit, this Court has not decided
whether a defendant’s status as a deportable alien may justify a departure when it
creates an unusual or exceptional hardship in the conditions of a defendant’s
confinement. Even if it had, M r. Nuñez-Fuentes has failed to establish any such
hardship. Accordingly, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a
downw ard departure on that basis.
C. Supervised Release
M r. Nuñez-Fuentes also argues that his counsel was ineffective because she
allowed the plea agreement to include a five-year term of supervised release,
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which he claims the district court lacked jurisdiction to impose. This argument,
however, is contradicted by the language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which not
only authorizes but requires the district court to impose a five-year term of
supervised release in this case. Contrary to M r. Nuñez-Fuentes’s elaborate theory
concerning a sequence of amendments to the statute during the mid-1980’s, the
codification at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) is an accurate rendition of the relevant
portion of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1002, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (enacted October 1986). Thus, M r. Nuñez-Fuentes has failed to make a
substantial showing that his counsel was ineffective with respect to the inclusion
of supervised release in the plea agreement.
D. “Safety Valve” Credit
Finally, we turn to M r. Nuñez-Fuentes’s claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to secure “safety valve” sentence credit under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The
district court found that the defendant was not eligible for credit, based on
information from a case agent’s affidavit and an assistant U.S. attorney’s
statement that M r. Nuñez-Fuentes had not been truthful during his debriefing with
government agents. Out of “an abundance of caution,” the court allowed M r.
Nuñez-Fuentes to respond to the affidavit, which detailed a number of
inconsistencies in his statements to the government. W e have reviewed the record,
including M r. Nuñez-Fuentes’s response to the affidavit, and we agree with the
district court that the defendant did not adequately account for his untruthful
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statements, especially with respect to his statements regarding the
methamphetamine and heroin. As the district court observed, M r. Nuñez-
Fuentes’s “response essentially is that his failure to tell the truth just was not
important.” R. Doc. 98, at 3. Thus, as with the other claims of ineffective
assistance, we hold that M r. Nuñez-Fuentes has failed to make a substantial
showing that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.
Accordingly, we D EN Y Edgar Nuñez-Fuentes’s request for a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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