F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 28, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-4213
JOE M ARIO VELARDE, a/k/a Paul (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-457-TC)
Tafoya, a/k/a Jose Velarde, (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BRISCO E and H ARTZ, Circuit Judges, and KRIEGER, District Judge. **
Joe M ario Velarde appeals his jury conviction of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Velarde contends
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial
after two government witnesses made several prejudicial remarks about his
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable M arcia S. Krieger, United States District Judge for the
District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
criminal history and dangerous character. W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm Velarde’s conviction.
I.
On M ay 23, 2003, at around three o’clock in the morning, Deputy Nathan
Clark initiated a traffic stop of a gold Honda Accord for improper registration.
Vol. III at 3-4. As he approached the vehicle, Deputy Clark noticed three
occupants: a male driver, later identified as Troy Richards; a female in the front
passenger seat, later identified as Danielle Corbin; and a male in the right rear
passenger seat, later identified as V elarde. Id. at 5, 16. Deputy Clark also
observed a blue tent bag on the floorboard behind the driver’s side seat, next to
Velarde’s feet. Id. at 5.
Deputy Clark returned to his patrol car to have dispatch run a background
check on Richards. W hile Deputy Clark was waiting for the results, he observed
Velarde acting “extremely nervous” and “very fidgety.” Id. at 8. Several minutes
later, Deputy Clark learned that Richards had an outstanding warrant for his
arrest, as well as a “violent tendencies” warning. Id. at 6. M eanwhile, Deputies
Kenneth Callahan and Shawn Fausett arrived to assist Deputy Clark with the
traffic stop. Id. at 6-7. Deputy Callahan testified that from his patrol car, he saw
Velarde fidgeting around in the back seat and acting nervous. Vol. IV at 5.
After the background check on Richards w as completed, Deputy Clark
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walked back to the driver’s side of the vehicle, while Deputies Callahan and
Fausett approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Vol. III at 8. According to
Deputy Callahan, he noticed a bag on the seat next to Velarde and that Velarde’s
hand was on the bag. Vol. IV at 6, 23. Deputy Callahan testified that he then
looked away from Velarde as Deputy Clark arrested Richards after ordering
Richards to get out of the vehicle. Vol. III at 8, Vol. IV at 6. Deputy Callahan
recalled that when he looked back at Velarde, he noticed that the bag was on the
floorboard behind the driver’s seat, within six inches of V elarde’s feet. Vol. IV
at 6-7. Soon thereafter, Deputies Callahan and Fausett obtained Velarde’s and
Corbin’s identification and asked them to step out of the vehicle. Vol. III at 9.
Deputy Clark searched the vehicle incident to Richards’ arrest. Id. In the
backseat of the car, on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat, Deputy Clark
recovered the bag that he had noticed earlier in the traffic stop. Id. at 9-10.
Deputy Clark testified that inside the bag he “found a blue and white bandana, a
pair of black athletic gloves, and a 12 gauge sawed-off shotgun that had been
wrapped in a blue blanket.” Id. at 10. Deputy Clark also recalled that the “gun,
both the stock and the handle, were wrapped in blue electrical tape.” Id. at 11.
The officers arrested Velarde for possession of the sawed-off shotgun after
performing a background check and learning that Velarde had a prior felony
conviction.
Both Richards and Corbin testified that earlier in the evening Velarde
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arrived at Richards’ residence carrying at least two duffel bags. Vol. IV at 41-42,
97. They recalled that at Richards’ residence, Velarde had pulled out a sawed-off
shotgun from a smaller bag and showed it to them. Id. at 43, 60, 97-98. Corbin
testified that when Velarde got inside Richards’ vehicle later that night, Velarde
placed the bag with the shotgun in it on the seat next to him. Id. at 99. Further,
Richards testified that during the traffic stop he asked Velarde if Velarde had
brought the shotgun with him, and Velarde responded affirmatively. Id. at 44-45.
Both Richards and Corbin also confirmed that Velarde often wore blue clothing,
including a blue bandana. 1
Based on the above testimony, the jury found Velarde guilty of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but not
guilty of possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d). 2 The district court sentenced Velarde to 92 months’
1
Before trial, the district court ruled that the government could not present
evidence about Velarde’s gang affiliation to connect him to the gun and the color
blue. Vol. II at 4. Rather, the district court concluded that the government could
present evidence demonstrating that Velarde liked the color blue and that he often
wore a blue bandanna or blue clothing. Id. at 5-6.
2
The district court instructed the jury that to find Velarde guilty for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, the government had the burden to prove: (1) he
was previously convicted of a felony; (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm after
the conviction; and (3) the firearm affected interstate commerce. Vol. I, Doc. 59,
Instr. No. 12. Additionally, the district court instructed the jury to that to convict
Velarde for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, the government had to prove: (1)
Velarde knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) Velarde knew the firearm had a barrel
length of less than 18 inches or had an overall length of less than 26 inches; (3)
(continued...)
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imprisonment, followed by a term of 36 months’ supervised release.
II.
Velarde contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for a mistrial which was based upon the unsolicited remarks of Deputy
Clark and Deputy Callahan during their trial testimony. Specifically, Velarde
argues that Deputy Clark and Deputy Callahan made prejudicial remarks about his
criminal history and dangerous character that violated his right to a fair trial.
Velarde first argues that the jury likely convicted him of being a felon in
possession of a firearm based on Deputy Clark’s statement at trial that Velarde
“had an extensive criminal history, including weapons violations.” Vol. III at 9.
The testimony that is relevant to this argument occurred during the prosecutor’s
direct examination of Deputy Clark on the first day of Velarde’s trial:
Q. W ere . . . [Corbin and Velarde] eventually taken out of the car?
A. Yes, they were. State law states that I have the right to search a
vehicle incident to arrest. The feeling of the warrant [for Richards’
arrest]–the nature of the warrant, I felt there was a possibility of
maybe weapons or drugs in the car, so the two passengers were asked
to exit.
2
(...continued)
the firearm was or could readily have been put in operating condition; and (4) the
firearm was not registered to Velarde. Id. at Instr. No. 17. At trial, the parties
stipulated to the shotgun’s measurements and to the fact that the shotgun had
affected interstate commerce. Vol. IV at 134. Further, the parties stipulated that
Velarde had been previously convicted of a felony. Id.
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Beforehand, Callahan and Fausett had returned to their cars
after receiving their information, and Callahan had notified me that
the rear passenger, Joseph Velarde, had an extensive criminal
history, including weapons violations.
M r. Donaldson: Objection, Your Honor. M ove to strike.
The Court: Sustained. And disregard that.
Id.
Additionally, Velarde argues that portions of Deputy Callahan’s testimony
portrayed him as an individual who was “dangerous and likely to use the
firearm.” Aplt. Br. at 9. The testimony at issue here occurred on the second day
of trial during the prosecutor’s re-direct examination of Deputy Callahan:
Q. You were asked about . . . what you did with this information that
you had about the bag being on the seat. When was it that you told
officer Clark about this information?
A. About the bag being on the seat?
Q. Yes.
A. It was after he had found the firearm that was in the vehicle. I
made a statement to him that–I believe I said, “I think it was a good
thing that we came by tonight because I think you could have been
taken out tonight.”
M r. Donaldson: Objection. M ove to strike.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Just answer the questions I ask you.
A. Okay.
...
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Q. Did you clearly see the bag on the back seat?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you see the defendant’s hands on that bag?
A. Yes, one hand.
Q. You were asked about how that’s possible w hen you did not write
a report. How is it that you remember that?
A. W hen you have big situations like this where somebody’s life
could have been taken at anytime–
M r. Donaldson: I’m going to object, Your Honor.
The Court: Sustained . . . .
Vol. IV at 22-23.
Immediately after the district court’s ruling, the district court sua sponte
excused the jury. Id. at 23. Velarde’s defense counsel then moved for a mistrial
based on Deputy Clark’s and Deputy Callahan’s remarks. Id. at 24. The
prosecutor responded that Deputy Callahan’s remarks w ere completely
unexpected and unresponsive to his questions, and were properly stricken from
the record. Id. at 24-25. The prosecutor added that, if necessary, a cautionary
instruction could be provided to the jury. Id. at 25. The district court then denied
the motion for a mistrial, and instructed the government’s witnesses not to make
inflamm atory comments and to answer only the questions asked of them. Id.
W hen the jury returned to the courtroom, counsel for Velarde did not request a
cautionary instruction and the district court did not provide one. Id. Deputy
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Callahan completed his testimony without further objection. Id.
On appeal, Velarde asserts that the officers’ testimony likely influenced the
outcome of his trial because of the weak and contradictory evidence the
government presented to establish that he knowingly possessed the shotgun.
Velarde also points to the inconsistent verdicts the jury rendered in his case as
further evidence of the effect the officers’ prejudicial remarks had upon the jury.
W e review a district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1317 (10th Cir. 2006)
(citing United States v. M eienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001)). “A
mistrial may only be granted when a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial
has been impaired.” U nited States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). W hen a prosecutor asks a question and the w itness
answers in an improper way, we must evaluate: “(1) whether the prosecutor acted
in bad faith, (2) whether the district court limited the effect of the improper
statement through its instructions to the jury, and (3) whether the improper
remark was inconsequential in light of the other evidence of the defendant’s
guilt.” United States v. M eridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir.
2002) (stating that to determine “whether an improper reference to a defendant’s
prior conviction” requires a mistrial, we must evaluate whether the error had a
substantial influence on the jury’s decision in light of all the evidence presented
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against the defendant at trial) (citations omitted); United States v. Sloan, 65 F.3d
861, 865 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an improper reference to a defendant’s
criminal record is harmless w here the evidence against the defendant is
overwhelming) (citation omitted). In conducting our review, we bear in mind that
the district court “is in the best position to evaluate the effect of the offending
evidence on the jury.” U nited States v. Laymon, 621 F.2d 1051, 1053 (10th Cir.
1980) (citations omitted).
The non-responsive answ ers given by Deputy Clark and Deputy Callahan to
the prosecutor’s questions were clearly improper and arguably intended to inflame
the jury. Deputy Clark’s reference to Velarde’s “extensive criminal history,
including weapons violations” is particularly troubling during a criminal trial
where the jury was to determine whether Velarde was guilty of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the district court’s
denial of Velarde’s motion for a mistrial was an abuse of discretion.
First, there is no evidence in the record to show that the prosecutor acted in
bad faith. Although we may question whether the prosecutor sufficiently
counseled Deputies Clark and Callahan prior to trial to limit their answers to the
questions posed, it is evident that the prosecutor’s questions w ere not phrased to
elicit the challenged testimony.
Second, the district court properly ruled on the admissibility of the officers’
inflam matory statements, and then adequately limited the effect of the statements
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through its instructions to the jury. The district court sustained defense counsel’s
objection to Deputy Clark’s testimony. W hile the district court did not provide a
model curative instruction, the district court immediately instructed the jury to
“disregard that.” The district court also sustained defense counsel’s objections to
Deputy Callahan’s testimony. Although the district court did not provide a
curative instruction, the district court admonished the government’s witnesses out
of the hearing of the jury to respond only to the prosecutor’s questions and to
avoid further inflammatory remarks. 3 And lastly, the district court instructed the
jury before deliberations to entirely disregard any evidence “to which an
objection was sustained by the court, and any evidence ordered stricken by the
court[.]” Vol. I, Doc. 59, Instr. No. 5. W e must presume that the jury followed
this instruction. See Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1243 (“W e presume that jurors w ill
follow clear instructions to disregard evidence unless there is an overwhelming
probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a
3
W e note that defense counsel did not request a curative instruction when he
moved for a mistrial, despite the prosecutor’s suggestion to the district court that
such an instruction would be appropriate. See Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1245
(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion
for mistrial based in part on the defense counsel’s failure to “ask the court to
strike the [prosecutor’s] offending remark or issue a limiting jury instruction,
though both the prosecution and the court suggested such a course”). Here, we do
not fault defense counsel for failing to request a curative instruction. As both
counsel acknowledged at oral argument before this court, defense counsel’s
failure to ask for an instruction was likely the result of defense counsel’s tactical
decision not to draw additional attention to the officers’ testimony.
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strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the
defendant.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. M assey, 48 F.3d
1560, 1569 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Cautionary instructions are ordinarily sufficient to
cure alleged prejudice.”) (citations omitted).
Third, and most importantly, we are confident that any prejudice to Velarde
was harmless because the evidence demonstrating Velarde’s possession of the
sawed-off shotgun was overwhelming, and the jury considered other evidence
regarding Velarde’s criminal history and dangerous character. Testimony from
both Deputy Clark and Deputy Callahan provided direct and circumstantial
evidence to establish Velarde’s possession of the sawed-off shotgun. During the
traffic stop, Deputy Clark noticed the tent bag with the shotgun on the floorboard
behind the driver’s seat, in close proximity to Velarde. Deputy Clark also found
the tent bag in the same location during his search of the vehicle. Deputy
Callahan testified that he initially observed the tent bag on the seat next to
Velarde, with Velarde’s hand on the bag. Deputy Callahan stated that he looked
away to watch Deputy Clark arrest Richards, and that when he looked back at
Velarde, the bag was on the floorboard next to Velarde’s feet. 4
M oreover, Richards’ and Corbin’s testimony provided a strong link
4
W e do not agree with Velarde’s assertion that Deputy Callahan’s testimony
about the position of the bag in the vehicle contradicts Deputy Clark’s testimony.
It is reasonable to assume that Deputy Clark w as not focused on the bag’s
location when he was involved in the arrest of Richards.
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between Velarde and the sawed-off shotgun. Richards and Corbin testified that
Velarde arrived earlier at Richards’ residence carrying at least two duffel bags,
and that Velarde showed them that he had a shotgun in a smaller bag. Corbin
testified that when they left Richards’ residence in the Honda Accord, Velarde
took the bag containing the shotgun with him. Similarly, Richards testified that
he asked Velarde during the traffic stop if Velarde had the shotgun with him, and
that Velarde answered that he did. Lastly, both Richards and Corbin confirmed
that Velarde liked to wear the color blue, including blue bandanas. The evidence
established that the shotgun was wrapped in blue electrical tape, was covered in a
blue blanket, and was found in a blue tent bag which also contained a blue and
white bandana. W hile the credibility of Richards and Corbin was challenged by
Velarde, the weight to be given to their testimony was within the province of the
jury.
W e are also convinced that the deputies’ statements were harmless in light
of other evidence presented to the jury about Velarde’s criminal history and
dangerous character. W hile D eputy Clark improperly referred to V elarde’s
“extensive criminal history,” we point out that the parties’ stipulated for purposes
of the felon in possession of a firearm count that Velarde had been previously
convicted of a felony. Further, even before Deputy Callahan’s challenged
statements about Velarde’s dangerous character were objected to at trial, Deputy
Clark testified that when he arrested Velarde, Velarde made the following
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inflamm atory statement to him: “Had the gun been mine, it would have been
strapped, and I would have drawn mine on you had you drawn your weapon, and I
would have drawn mine a lot quicker than you would have drawn yours. I’m not
afraid to die.” Vol. III at 16.
Finally, in further support of his contention that the challenged testimony
of Deputy Clark and Deputy Callahan prejudiced his trial, Velarde emphasizes the
inconsistent verdicts reached in his case and speculates about the jury’s reasoning
underlying those verdicts. This argument is not compelling. It is well established
that an inconsistent verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting a verdict aside.
See, e.g., United States v. Pow ell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1984); United States v.
Harris, 369 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d
1493, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1433 (10th
Cir. 1985). M oreover, the jury’s inconsistent verdicts arguably support the
conclusion that the officers’ remarks did not violate Velarde’s right to a fair trial.
Had the jury been truly swayed by the officers’ remarks, they would have more
likely convicted Velarde of both charges. In light of the prosecutor’s lack of bad
faith, the district court’s instructions to the jury, the overwhelming evidence to
support Velarde’s conviction, and the other evidence presented to the jury
concerning his criminal history and dangerous character, we conclude that the
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district court’s denial of Velarde’s motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of
discretion.
A FFIRME D.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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