F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
June 29, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
TERRY M INTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7011
PRIM E EQUIPM ENT COM PANY, a
Texas corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO R TH E EASTERN DISTRICT O F O K LAH O M A
(D.C. NO . 02-CV-132-W )
John H. Tucker (Colin H. Tucker and Bradley S. Shelts with him on the briefs) of
Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
James W . Connor, Jr. (Rachel C. M athis and Thomas D. Hird with him on the
brief) of Richards & Connor, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendant-Appellee.
Before L UC ER O, M cKA Y, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Terry M inter, the plaintiff-appellant, is a professional painter who was
severely injured after falling from an elevated work platform. He filed a personal
injury lawsuit against the manufacturer and distributor of the work platform.
Although his complaint centered on design and manufacturing defect claims, a
series of procedural maneuvers before trial left him with only a failure to w arn
claim against the distributor. The jury found for the defendant on the failure to
warn claim. M r. M inter appeals that judgment, as w ell as the district court’s
ruling that left him with only one claim. W e must decide whether the district
court abused its discretion by dismissing the plaintiff’s product liability claim
against the distributor for untimeliness and lack of notice and by not allowing an
amendment to the complaint; whether the district court wrongfully excluded from
trial the evidence of the distributor’s subsequent remedial measures; and whether
the district court improperly allowed evidence of comparative negligence into a
strict liability failure to warn case.
W e affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for new proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
I. BAC K GR OU N D
Terry M inter was hired to work as a painter at a construction site in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. On the morning of July 14, 1996, he was using a “scissor lift”— a
type of industrial lift that raises and low ers a platform used for work
positioning— to enable him to paint the underside of a roof at the site. W hile
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working from atop the scissor lift, M r. M inter accidentally stepped off the side of
the lift platform and fell twenty feet to the ground. The impact fractured his
skull, damaged his spinal cord, and resulted in permanent paralysis from the w aist
down.
M r. M inter maintains that his accident was caused by a defect in the scissor
lift. At the time of the incident, he was using a 1987 “Barecat” model scissor lift
manufactured by Economy Company (“Economy”), a foreign corporation. The
Barecat lift was designed to have a solid metal guardrail around the entire
perimeter of the lift platform. On the lift M r. M inter was using, one of the sides
had a chainlink closure instead of a solid guardrail. M r. M inter failed to properly
latch the chainlink closure on the morning of the accident, 1 which allowed him to
step unintentionally off the platform and fall to the ground. The gravamen of the
lawsuit is that the solid guardrail is a necessary part of the B arecat scissor lift’s
fall protection system because it is welded in place and cannot be mistakenly left
open by the user. M r. M inter argues that if there had been a solid guardrail at the
1
According to the workers who came to M r. M inter’s aid after his fall, the
chainlink closure on the lift was not latched. M r. M inter testified that he
remembered closing it, but his memory of the accident was limited due to the
severe head injury he suffered from the fall. At trial, M r. M inter argued that he
latched the chainlink entry, but the latch must have jammed. Prime Equipment
argued that M r. M inter simply failed to latch the chainlink entry. This dispute is
irrelevant for purposes of M r. M inter’s appeal.
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lift’s entrance instead of the chainlink closure, his accident would not have
happened.
The State Court Proceedings
On A pril 2, 1997, M r. M inter filed a personal injury suit in the Tulsa
County District Court in Oklahoma. Case No. CJ-97-01615. His complaint
asserted products liability and negligence claims against the manufacturer,
Economy, for failure to use reasonable care in designing, manufacturing,
inspecting, and testing the scissors lift, and for failure to warn of defects in the
lift. It also asserted strict liability and negligence claims against Appellee Prime
Equipment Company (“Prime Equipment”), a Texas-based corporation that leases,
sells, and services Economy machinery. The pleadings named four other
defendants as well: G& G Leasing, the owner of the lift; M arrs Electric, Inc., the
party leasing the lift at the time of the accident; M anhattan Construction, Inc., the
general contractor on the site; Sundial Painting, Inc., M r. M inter’s employer; and
Silverado Foods, Inc., the owner of the building where M r. M inter w as working.
At the time he filed the lawsuit, the plaintiff believed that Prime
Equipment’s role in the accident was limited to its maintenance and repair work
on the lift. He therefore based his claim against Prime Equipment on the
company’s alleged failure to properly “inspect, repair, and maintain the scissors
lift” when it was brought in for an annual safety inspection, in addition to its
alleged failure to warn. Appellant’s App. 158. During discovery, however, the
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plaintiff learned that Prime Equipment had owned the scissor lift between 1987,
the year the lift w as manufactured, and August 1991, when Prime Equipment sold
the lift to G& G Leasing. Prime Equipment was therefore in the chain of
distribution for purposes of the manufacturer product liability claim against
Economy.
On July 8, 1998, M r. M inter amended his complaint to include a retailer
product liability claim against Prime Equipment. Prime Equipment disclaimed
any responsibility for removing the solid guardrail, and one of its employees
testified that Prime Equipment bought the lift from Economy with the chainlink
entry already installed. The plaintiff responded that, under Oklahoma law, Prime
Equipment was “liable under the theory of manufacturer’s product liability”
because “[t]he liability of the manufacturer and distributor/retailer is coextensive,
even though the latter may not be responsible for the existence or presence of a
defect.” Appellant’s App. 194.
Prime Equipment defended itself against both the retailer product liability
claim and the negligence claim. It responded to the product liability claim by
challenging the qualifications and testimony of the only expert witness to testify
on behalf of M r. M inter that the lift was defective. Prime Equipment also
introduced its own expert witnesses to testify that the lift was neither defective
nor unreasonably dangerous. Those defense witnesses opined that the lift was
safe w hen used properly, and that the A merican National Standard Institute’s
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(ANSI) voluntary industry standards did not require solid guardrails until 1991,
several years after the subject scissor lift was manufactured. Prime Equipment
also presented evidence that M r. M inter caused his own injuries; namely, that he
failed to latch the chainlink closure or use a safety harness. Prime Equipment
also filed a cross claim against Economy seeking indemnity for any liability
arising out of a product liability judgment.
In response to the negligence claims, Prime Equipment relied on its defense
to the product liability claim, and also prepared defenses based on comparative
negligence and assumption of risk. In this connection, Prime Equipment planned
to introduce evidence of M r. M inter’s history of marijuana use during work hours.
M r. M inter admitted during his deposition that he “occasionally” consumed
marijuana while at work, and his medical report from after the accident showed
that he had THC metabolites in his urine, which indicate recent exposure to
marijuana. M r. M inter testified that he was sober at the time of the accident and
that the THC metabolites in his urine w ere from using marijuana two days before
his fall. The defendants intended to introduce the evidence at trial, however, and
let a jury decide whether M r. M inter was intoxicated on the morning of the
accident.
The state court never had an opportunity to address the merits of M r.
M inter’s product liability and negligence claims. After four years of litigation,
the plaintiff settled with G& G Leasing, M anhattan Construction, Sundial Painting
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and Silverado Foods. Once those parties w ere dropped from the litigation, there
w as com plete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendants. O n
M arch 20, 2001, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his state court complaint
against the two remaining defendants, Prime Equipment and Economy, in order to
refile in federal court.
The Federal District Court Proceedings
M r. M inter retained new counsel and refiled in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma on M arch 20, 2002, exactly one year
after the voluntary dismissal of his state court action. The federal complaint was
significantly shorter than his state court complaint had been. Instead of
compartmentalizing his various claims into categories of negligence, strict
liability, and product liability, the federal com plaint simply stated that M r.
M inter’s injuries were caused by “defects in the design and manufacture of a
scissor lift designed, manufactured and sold by Economy,” and by “the failure of
Prime Equipment Co., the owner, to properly inspect, repair and maintain the
lift.” Complaint 1. It also alleged that both defendants had failed “to w arn M r.
M inter of dangers in the subject scissor lift.” Id.
In w hat turns out to be an important fact in this appeal, M r. M inter’s
federal complaint did not expressly set forth a product liability claim against
Prime Equipment based on the company’s alleged responsibility for alteration of
the lift’s guardrail system. The complaint did refer to Prime Equipment as having
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been “the owner” of the lift, 2 which put Prime Equipment in the chain of
distribution of his product liability claim against Economy. This might arguably
have been sufficient under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 to provide notice of a retailer product liability claim against Prime
Equipment. But there is no explicit mention in the complaint of a product
liability claim based on alterations made to the lift after its manufacture.
On June 10, 2002, the parties submitted a Planning M eeting Report to the
district court. The Report contained a summary of M r. M inter’s claims. This,
too, made no mention of either a retailer or alteration product liability claim
against Prime Equipment. The Report read as follow s:
Summary of Claims:
Against defendant Prime Equipment Co.: Failure to inspect, repair
and maintain scissors lift.
Failure to warn.
Against defendant Economy Co.: Defective design and
manufacture of scissors
lift. Failure to warn.
Appellee’s Supp. App. 3. Similarly, in his interrogatory answers, M r. M inter
based his claim against Prime Equipment on its alleged failure “to properly
inspect, repair and maintain the scissor lift” rather than on a product liability
2
There appears to have been some confusion at first as to whether Prime
Equipment still owned the lift at the time of the accident, or whether it had sold
the lift to G& G Leasing in 1991. In either event, Prime Equipment would still be
strictly liable under a product liability theory. See Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges
Travel Serv., Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 227–28 (O kla. 2001).
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theory. Id. at 37–38. The plaintiff did, however, describe his negligent repair
and maintenance claim as predicated on the fact that the scissor lift, “as provided
to [him,] was in a condition” that “was contrary to established safety standards”
because it had “a detachable chain link fitted in place of a solid steel guardrail.”
Id.
Once the case was in federal court, all three parties agreed to use the
discovery material produced in the state court action. M r. M inter and Prime
Equipment also introduced additional expert witness testimony regarding the
safety of the lift. The plaintiff’s new expert claimed that the replacement of the
solid guardrail with a chainlink closure rendered the lift unreasonably dangerous
and defective. Prime Equipment filed reports from two new expert witnesses who
stated that the lift was “safe for its intended use”; that the chainlink modification
“did not violate any ANSI or OSHA Standards applicable to the lift” at the time
of manufacture; that the lift w as “not defective [when] equipped with . . . properly
used access point chains” instead of a solid guardrail; and that M r. M inter caused
the accident. Appellant’s App. 42–43, 50–51.
Shortly before the scheduled start of trial, the defendants came forward
with a new revelation about the history of the scissor lift’s guardrail system.
Throughout the preceding five years of litigation, Prime Equipment had always
maintained that the manufacturer, Economy, was responsible for installing the
chainlink entry on the lift. On June 12, 2003, however, three weeks before the
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scheduled start of trial, Prime Equipment and Economy entered a Joint Stipulation
stating that Economy was not responsible for the missing solid guardrail at the
lift’s entrance. The Joint Stipulation stated that the “Scissor Lift was
manufactured by the Defendant, Economy Company, with four solid top rails,”
and that the “scissor lift’s condition was substantially and materially altered after
the lift left Defendant Economy’s possession and was sold . . . .” A ppellant’s
App. 73. M oreover, Prime Equipment produced a new expert witness report
along with the Joint Stipulation stating that the lift w as manufactured with a solid
guardrail around the entire perimeter of the lift platform. At the same time, Prime
Equipment filed an evidentiary motion that stated that “Plaintiff is pursuing Prime
[Equipment] on a negligence theory only.” A ppellee’s Supp. App. 10. In
combination, these positions had the potential to erase from the litigation M r.
M inter’s product liability claim based on the allegedly defective guardrail system:
the Joint Stipulation absolved Economy of responsibility and the evidentiary
motion took the position that any responsibility that Prime Equipment might have
for altering the guardrail system w as beyond the scope of plaintiff’s negligence
theory.
Six days after the defendants filed the Joint Stipulation, the district court
unexpectedly transferred the case to a different Judge. As a part of the transfer,
the district court struck all of the pending motions and scheduled dates previously
set in the case. A status conference was held before the new judge on July 1,
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2003, at which time the court ordered that all previously decided motions in the
case be re-urged before the court. The court set the deadline for amendments to
the pleadings for July 16, 2003, and scheduled jury selection for December 1,
2003 and the start of trial for December 15, 2003.
The parties resubmitted their Report on the Planning M eeting on July 7,
2003. The new Report was a copy of the one filed a year earlier, 3 and therefore
included the “Summary of Claims” section that failed to mention an alteration
product liability claim against Prime Equipment.
On October 30, 2003, the parties filed their evidentiary motions. M r.
M inter filed motions in limine to exclude evidence of his marijuana use and his
failure to wear a hard hat or safety belt on the day of the accident. Prime
Equipment filed a motion to exclude evidence that it had replaced the chainlink
closure with a solid guardrail after the accident. In that motion, Prime Equipment
again stated that “Plaintiff is pursuing Prime [Equipment] on a negligence theory
only.” A ppellee’s Supp. App. 19.
The parties met in mid-November to discuss jury instructions and draft a
proposed pretrial order. At that meeting, the plaintiff notified Prime Equipment
that it intended to include a product liability claim against Prime Equipment for
3
The parties made a handwritten adjustment to the case number listed on
the Report, indicating that the case had been assigned to a new judge, but
otherw ise left the original Planning M eeting Report unchanged.
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altering the guardrail on the lift. Prime Equipment told the plaintiff that it would
object to inclusion of that claim.
The parties submitted their proposed pretrial order to the district court on
November 24, 2003, two hours before the pretrial conference. The proposed
order contained the plaintiff’s claim that Prime Equipment “materially altered the
subject scissor lift by removal of the [] solid guardrail safety feature rendering the
product defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time of sale.” Pretrial Order
3. It also contained Prime Equipment’s objection to the claim as a “belated
attempt to add a products liability claim against it, for the very first time in th[e]
Pretrial Order.” Id. at 6. The district court did not sign the pretrial order at that
time.
At the conclusion of the pretrial conference, the district court issued its
ruling on the pending evidentiary motions. The court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to exclude evidence of his marijuana use on the ground that it was
relevant for evaluating Prime Equipment’s comparative negligence and
assumption of risk defenses. It also denied the plaintiff’s motion to exclude
evidence that he was not wearing a hard hat or safety belt at the time of the
accident, holding that such evidence was relevant “to show Plaintiff’s conduct in
the workplace.” The court granted Prime Equipment’s motion to exclude
evidence of its subsequent remedial measures to the lift.
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On the morning of December 1, 2003, with the dispute over the alteration
product liability claim still unresolved, the district court signed and entered the
pretrial order. It contained the plaintiff’s product liability claim against Prime
Equipment arising from the “material alterations” to the lift, along with a motion
by Prime Equipment to strike the claim. The pretrial order also specified that the
parties would not dispute that the lift was “manufactured and sold by Economy
Co. with a solid guardrail around entire upper perimeter of the scissor lift
platform,” or that Prime Equipment “sold the scissor lift to G& G Leasing” with
“the solid guardrail . . . removed from the entry end and replaced with a [] chain
entry.” Appellant’s App. 86.
After the district court entered the pretrial order into the record, the
plaintiff announced that he was voluntarily dismissing his negligence claim
against Prime Equipment. He then asked the district court to reconsider its ruling
on the “very prejudicial” marijuana evidence, which he argued was irrelevant to
the product liability claims. Prime Equipment responded that because all of the
claims against it were based in negligence, and because the plaintiff had just
dismissed all of his negligence claims, Prime Equipment should be dismissed
from the lawsuit. The court took all of these matters under consideration.
On December 4, 2003, three days after voir dire, the court heard arguments
regarding the status of the plaintiff’s remaining claims against Prime Equipment
and Economy. At the start of the hearing, the plaintiff stipulated to a dismissal of
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his design and manufacturing product liability claims against Economy,
explaining that the evidence produced by both defendants now showed that
Economy had manufactured and sold the lift with solid guardrails on all four
sides. The only claim remaining against Economy was a product liability claim
for failure to provide adequate warnings on the lift.
On December 12, 2003, three days before the start of trial, the district court
ruled on the outstanding motions. It granted the plaintiff’s motion to exclude the
marijuana evidence. It also allowed M r. M inter to proceed to trial against Prime
Equipment with his failure to warn claim, which the court ruled was based on a
product liability theory. However, the court granted Prime Equipment’s motion
to strike the alteration product liability claim, explaining that “any claim now
asserted by Plaintiff for products liability stemming from the alteration of the
subject lift is deemed to have never been a part of this action.” Order 6. The
court determined that none of the plaintiff’s filings before the pretrial order
provided notice of a product liability claim against Prime Equipment for altering
the lift. It declared that the prejudice to Prime Equipment that would arise from
allowing the claim is “obvious.” Id. at 5. The court noted that “[t]he assertion of
this claim [first] became apparent when the parties attempted to formulate a
Pretrial Order. Contrary to this Court’s Scheduling Order, [the] proposed Pretrial
Order . . . was not submitted to this Court until two hours before the scheduled
Pretrial Conference.” Id. at 5. M oreover, Prime Equipment had already entered
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into a Joint Stipulation with Economy stating that the scissor lift left Economy’s
control with all four solid guardrails in place, which meant that Prime Equipment
could not file a cross-claim against Economy as it did in the underlying state
court case. The court concluded that “[i]t is unlikely that Prime [Equipment]
would have taken this somewhat curious measure unless it believed that a
products liability claim had not been stated against it.” Id. at 6.
The Trial
M r. M inter settled with Economy on the eve of trial. W hen the jury trial
began on December 15, 2003, the only claim remaining in the action was
therefore against Prime Equipment for failure to provide adequate warning of
defects in the lift.
Before the start of opening arguments, the plaintiff tried again to add a
product liability claim against Prime Equipment based on alterations made to the
lift. He filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) motion for an amendment
to conform to the evidence, arguing that the amendment was “necessary to carry
out [his] claim for relief” and w ould “not prejudice Prime [Equipment]’s defense
of the products claim.” Appellant’s App. 262. The court determined that it was
unable to rule on his Rule 15(b) motion at that time. Rule 15(b) authorizes the
amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence presented at trial, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b), and the plaintiff filed his motion before any evidence had been
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presented. The court told the parties that it would reserve its consideration of the
motion until later in the case.
W ith no real alternative left, the plaintiff proceeded to trial with only a
failure to warn claim against Prime Equipment. In presenting his case to the jury,
the plaintiff argued that because the guardrail system had been altered, the
original warnings posted by the manufacturer were no longer adequate, and Prime
Equipment had an obligation to post additional warnings. As a result, much of
the case still concerned the removal of the solid guardrail and whether the
chainlink closure was unreasonably dangerous, even though the plaintiff could not
assert an alteration product liability claim. Prime Equipment consistently
objected to the introduction of evidence regarding the alteration on the ground
that it was irrelevant to the failure to warn claim. The district court usually
overruled the objection, but in each case it noted that the evidence was restricted
to M r. M inter’s failure to warn claim. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the
court denied the plaintiff’s R ule 15(b) motion for leave to amend the pleadings to
conform to the evidence.
Prime Equipment then proceeded to put on its defense. It called a number
of rebuttal witnesses who testified about the safety of the lift and adequacy of the
posted warnings. Prime Equipment also presented evidence that M r. M inter had
failed to latch the chainlink closure, wear a hard hat, or use a safety belt. During
closing arguments, Prime Equipment used this evidence to argue that M r. M inter
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was responsible for his own injuries: “if M r. M inter had latched the chains and/or
put on the safety belt, the accident would not have occurred.” Appellant’s App.
572.
On December 18, 2003, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Prime
Equipment on the failure to warn claim. The court entered the judgment on
December 22, 2003. The plaintiff timely filed his notice of appeal.
Appeal
M r. M inter raises four issues on appeal. The first two relate to his
alteration product liability claim against Prime Equipment: He asserts that the
district court erred by granting Prime Equipment’s motion to strike the product
liability claim from the pretrial order, and that it erred again when it denied his
Rule 15(b) motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. The
second two issues relate to the district court’s evidentiary rulings: The plaintiff
contends that the court wrongfully excluded the evidence of Prime Equipment’s
subsequent remedial measures and that it improperly admitted the evidence that
he failed to wear a hard hat or safety belt on the day of the accident.
II. D ISC USSIO N
A. Amendment to the Pleadings
M r. M inter’s appeal centers on the district court’s decision not to permit
him to pursue an alteration product liability claim against Prime Equipment.
Procedurally, this question arose in two orders of the district court: the order
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striking the plaintiff’s products liability claim from the pretrial order, and the
order denying his Rule 15(b) motion to amend the complaint to conform to the
evidence. M r. M inter raises both issues on appeal, but needs to prevail on only
one. W e address his argument that the district court erred in striking the
alteration product liability claim from the pretrial order. For purposes of this
opinion, we assume without deciding, that M r. M inter did not properly plead the
alteration product liability claim in his federal court complaint, and that the
proposed pretrial order w as the first time M r. M inter raised the alteration claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that, after a responsive
pleading has been served, a party may amend its pleading “only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party.” The Rule specifies that “leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires.” Although the plaintiff included his
products liability claim against Prime Equipment in the proposed pretrial order
without filing a formal Rule 15(a) motion to amend the complaint, “[w]hen an
issue is set forth in the pretrial order, it is not necessary to amend previously filed
pleadings because the pretrial order is the controlling document for trial.” Wilson
v. M uckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Consequently, M r. M inter’s attempt to add a new claim to the pretrial
order was the equivalent of asking leave to amend his complaint, and must be
evaluated by the court under the standards set forth in Rule 15(a). See Wilson,
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303 F.3d at 1215; 6A Charles Alan W right, Arthur R. M iller & M ary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1525 (2d ed. 1990).
“[T]he grant of leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is
within the discretion of the trial court,” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971), and we will not reverse the court’s decision
“absent an abuse of discretion.” Wessel v. City of Albuquerque, 299 F.3d 1186,
1197 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Rule itself
states that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a). The purpose of the Rule is to provide litigants “the maximum opportunity
for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural niceties.”
Hardin v. M anitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 456 (10th Cir. 1982). In
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme Court held:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his
claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason— such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of
the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.— the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be “freely given.”
Id. at 182 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)); see also Duncan v. M anager, Dept. of
Safety, 397 F.3d 1300, 1315 (10th Cir. 2005); Frank v. U.S. West, 3 F.3d 1357,
1365 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court struck M r. M inter’s alteration product
liability claim from the pretrial order on the grounds that it was prejudicial and
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untimely. Prejudice and timeliness are obviously closely related, but we will
evaluate each. 4
1. Timeliness
In Foman, the Supreme Court listed “undue delay” as one of the
justifications for denying a motion to amend. 371 U.S. at 182. Emphasis is on
the adjective: “Lateness does not of itself justify the denial of the amendment.”
R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1975). Rule
15(a) does not restrict a party’s ability to amend its pleadings to a particular stage
in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also 6 W right, M iller & Kane, Federal
4
Neither party has argued that Rule 16(b) is relevant to this question. Some
Circuits hold that a party seeking to amend the pleadings, after the deadline set
for such amendments in the scheduling order, must satisfy a “good cause”
requirement. See, e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340
(2d Cir. 2000); Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 431 F.3d 221,
227 (5th Cir. 2005); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir. 2003); In re
M ilk Prods. Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430, 437–38 (8th Cir. 1999); Johnson v.
M ammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). This requires
the moving party to show that it has been diligent in attempting to meet the
deadlines, which means it must provide an adequate explanation for any delay.
See Parker, 204 F.3d at 340–41; Hawthorne, 431 F.3d at 228; Leary, 349 F.3d at
907; In re M ilk Prods., 195 F.3d at 437–38; Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609–10. This
Circuit adopted a similar interpretation of Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” requirement
in the context of counterclaims asserted after the scheduling order deadline, SIL-
FLO , Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1518–19 (10th Cir. 1990), but has not
done so in the context of an amendment to the complaint.
W e do not decide whether a party seeking to amend its pleadings after the
scheduling order deadline must show “good cause” for the amendment under Rule
16(b) in addition to the Rule 15(a) requirements. Neither party raises the
question, and given the rough similarity between the “good cause” standard of
Rule 16(b) and our “undue delay” analysis under Rule 15, it would not affect the
outcome of this case.
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Practice and Procedure § 1488 (2d ed. 1990). However, “[a] party who delays in
seeking an amendment is acting contrary to the spirit of the rule and runs the risk
of the court denying permission because of the passage of time.” Id. The longer
the delay, “the more likely the motion to amend will be denied, as protracted
delay, with its attendant burdens on the opponent and the court, is itself a
sufficient reason for the court to withhold permission to amend.” Steir v. Girl
Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004); see also USX Corp. v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[D]elay alone is an insufficient
ground to deny leave to amend. At some point, however, delay will become
undue, placing an unwarranted burden on the court, or will be become prejudicial,
placing an unfair burden on the opposing party.” (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted)).
The courts of appeal are not in agreement regarding the showing necessary
to establish “undue” delay. Some circuits hold that an amendment may be denied
for undue delay only if the trial court finds prejudice, bad faith, futility, or (in
some circuits) a substantial burden on the court. 5 This Circuit, however, focuses
5
This is the majority rule, followed by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits. See Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988
F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (“M ere delay, however, absent a showing of bad
faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district court to deny the
right to amend.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Delay alone is an insufficient
reason to deny leave to amend. Rather, the delay must be accompanied by
(continued...)
-21-
primarily on the reasons for the delay. W e have held that denial of leave to
amend is appropriate “when the party filing the motion has no adequate
explanation for the delay.” Frank v. U.S. West, 3 F.3d 1357, 1365–66 (10th Cir.
1993); see also Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“[U]nexplained delay alone justifies the district court’s discretionary decision.”);
Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Courts
have denied leave to amend in situations where the moving party cannot
demonstrate excusable neglect. For example, courts have denied leave to amend
5
(...continued)
prejudice, bad faith, or futility.”) (internal citation omitted); M ayeaux v. La.
Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[D]elay alone is
an insufficient basis for denial of leave to amend: The delay must be undue, i.e.,
it must prejudice the nonmoving party or impose unwarranted burdens on the
court.”); Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 458–59 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“Delay by itself is not sufficient reason to deny a motion to amend. Notice and
substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical factors in determining
whether an amendment should be granted.”); Doherty v. Davy Songer, Inc., 195
F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[M ]ere delay, without a showing of prejudice, is
not sufficient to deny the amendment.”); Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 991 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“Delay alone is not enough to deny a motion to amend; prejudice to
the nonmovant must also be shown.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bowles
v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Undue delay by itself . . . is
insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend . . . [absent] a contemporaneous
specific finding of prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party,
or futility of amendment.”); Atchinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 426
(D .C. Cir. 1996) (“Consideration of whether delay is undue, however, should
generally take into account the actions of other parties and the possibility of any
resulting prejudice.”).
-22-
where the moving party was aware of the facts on which the amendment was
based for some time prior to the filing of the motion to amend.”). 6
Courts will properly deny a motion to amend w hen it appears that the
plaintiff is using Rule 15 to make the complaint “a moving target,” Viernow v.
Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 800 (10th Cir. 1998), to “salvage a lost case
by untimely suggestion of new theories of recovery,” Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d
1017, 1027 (10th Cir. 2001), to present “theories seriatim” in an effort to avoid
dismissal, Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994),
or to “knowingly delay[] raising [an] issue until the ‘eve of trial,’” Walters v.
M onarch Life Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 899, 903 (10th Cir. 1995).
M r. M inter attempted to assert an alteration product liability claim against
Prime Equipment just three weeks before the scheduled start of trial; and the
district court took note of his tardiness when it struck the amended claim from the
6
This approach is also followed by the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits.
See Hayes v. New England M illwork Distribs., Inc., 602 F.2d 15, 19–20 (1st Cir.
1979) (“[W]here, as here, a considerable period of time has passed between the
filing of the complaint and the motion to amend, courts have placed the burden
upon the movant to show some valid reason for his neglect and delay.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Arthur v. M aersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir.
2006) (“W hen a party fails to take advantage of previous opportunities to amend,
without adequate explanation, leave to amend is properly denied.”); Andrx
Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2005) (“W e agree
with the district court that [Plaintiff’s] explanations for its delay in filing for
leave to amend do not demonstrate that justice required the grant of the motion to
amend.”).
-23-
pretrial order. Courts “do not normally expect to see claims or defenses not
contained in the pleadings appearing for the first time in the pretrial order.”
Wilson v. M uckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2002). In this case,
however, the plaintiff has provided an adequate explanation for the delay, and
therefore his alteration product liability claim is not “untimely” or “unduly
delayed.”
W hen the plaintiff filed his complaint on M arch 20, 2002, the evidence
supplied by the defendants during discovery in the state case led him to believe
that Economy had manufactured and sold the scissor lift in a defective condition.
For the first five years of this litigation, Prime Equipment maintained that it had
bought the lift from Economy without the solid guardrail, and presented evidence
to that effect. In accordance with this apparent state of the facts, the stripped-
down complaint filed in federal court included defective design and
manufacturing claims against Economy, while holding Prime Equipment
responsible for negligent maintenance and repair (in addition to suing both for
insufficient warnings). On M ay 21, 2003, however, one week after the close of
discovery, Economy submitted an expert witness report stating that the lift’s
guardrail system had been altered sometime after leaving its control. W ithin a
month, Prime Equipment reversed its position and stipulated that Economy
manufactured and sold the scissor lift with four solid guardrails. The plaintiff’s
attempt to assert a new claim in the pretrial order— to shift from a manufacturer
-24-
product liability claim against Economy to an alteration product liability claim
against Prime Equipment— was a response to these late disclosures from Prime
Equipment and Economy. Consequently, this case is distinguishable from those
where courts denied leave to amend because the “plaintiff was aware of all the
information on which his proposed amended complaint was based prior to filing
the original complaint.” M cKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1130
(10th Cir. 1998).
During oral argument, Prime Equipment argued that the amendment was
untimely because M r. M inter waited more than six months after he learned of the
Joint Stipulation before asserting the alteration product liability claim against it.
The record shows that the plaintiff delayed in asserting the alteration product
liability claim against Prime Equipment because he believed it was already fairly
encompassed by his pleadings. 7 Indeed, on appeal the plaintiff continues to take
that position, arguing that the district court erred in striking the products liability
claim from the pretrial order. Although we do not reach that argument, in light of
the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) w e consider it a colorable
7
W hen the plaintiff asserted his products liability claim in the pretrial
order, Prime Equipment objected on the ground that it was a “belated attempt to
add a products liability claim against it, for the very first time.” Pretrial O rder 6.
The plaintiff responded that his complaint fairly encompassed the claim because it
identified both Prime Equipment and Economy as “sellers of the scissor lift,” and
therefore “alleged facts to support recovery [from Prime Equipment] based upon
products liability.” Appellant’s App. 243–44.
-25-
argument. In retrospect, the plaintiff could have avoided this entire controversy if
he had filed a formal motion to amend his complaint soon after the defendants
entered into the Joint Stipulation. Nonetheless, his assumption regarding the
scope of his original pleading constitutes an excusable cause for the delay,
especially in light of the defendant’s own dilatoriness in w aiting until discovery
was closed and the trial w as shortly scheduled to begin to spring the fact that it
was changing its position regarding a key fact in the case. Consequently, M r.
M inter’s alteration product liability claim cannot be considered “untimely” or
“unduly delayed.”
2. Undue Prejudice
The second, and most important, factor in deciding a motion to amend the
pleadings, is whether the amendment w ould prejudice the nonmoving party.
“Rule 15 . . . was designed to facilitate the amendment of pleadings except where
prejudice to the opposing party would result.” United States v. Hougham, 364
U.S. 310, 316 (1960). See also Evans v. M cDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087,
1090–91 (10th Cir. 1991) (“As a general rule, a plaintiff should not be prevented
from pursuing a valid claim . . . , provided always that a late shift in the thrust of
the case will not prejudice the other party in maintaining his defense upon the
merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eastern Food Servs., Inc. v.
Pontifical Catholic U niv. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Once the
adversary has answered, amendment is no longer allowed as of right, Fed. R. Civ.
-26-
P. 15(a), but in general permission is liberally granted where there is no
prejudice.”); 6 W right, M iler & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487
(2d ed. 1990) (“Perhaps the most important factor listed by the Court and the
most frequent reason for denying leave to amend is that the opposing party will be
prejudiced if the movant is permitted to alter his pleading.”).
Courts typically find prejudice only when the amendment unfairly affects
the defendants “in terms of preparing their defense to the amendment.” Patton v.
Guyer, 443 F.2d 79, 86 (10th Cir. 1971). M ost often, this occurs when the
amended claims arise out of a subject matter different from what was set forth in
the complaint and raise significant new factual issues. Com pare Hom v. Squire,
81 F.3d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding prejudicial a motion “to add an
entirely new and different claim to [the plaintiff’s] suit little more than two
months before trial”), with Gillette v. Tansy, 17 F.3d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding no evidence of prejudice when the “Petitioner’s [amended] claims track
the factual situations set forth in his [original] claims”), Childers v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 1982) (ruling that the district court’s
refusal to allow an amendment was “particularly egregious in this case because
the subject matter of the amendment was already alleged in the complaint”), and
R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 751–52 (10th Cir. 1975)
(finding no prejudice when “[t]he amendments did not propose substantially
different issues”).
-27-
Prime Equipment repeatedly asserts that the addition of an alteration
product liability claim to the pleadings would result in “obvious” prejudice to it,
but offers little explanation as to how it would be prejudiced in light of the
similarities between the complaint and the amended claim. The complaint
asserted a negligence claim against Prime Equipment for failing to “properly
inspect, repair and maintain the lift.” Complaint 1. The new claim against Prime
Equipment was for “materially alter[ing] the subject scissor lift by removal of the
[] solid guardrail safety feature.” A ppellant’s App. 81. W hile the two claims are
different in form, there is a significant overlap in the factual underpinnings and
defenses. Both claims rely on the proposition that M r. M inter was injured
because “the scissor lift as provided to [him] was in a condition with a detachable
chain link fitted in place of a solid steel guardrail[, which] . . . was contrary to
established safety standards.” Appellee’s Supp. App. 37–38. M oreover, most of
Prime Equipment’s defenses to the negligence claim apply with equal force to the
product liability claim, including its defenses that the lift was safe for its intended
use, that it did not violate the applicable ANSI or OSH A standards at the time of
manufacture, that it was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and that M r.
M inter’s actions w ere the sole cause of the accident. Prime Equipment’s only
defense to the negligence claim that it could not use against the product liability
claim is comparative negligence, which would include the marijuana evidence.
M oreover, Prime Equipment defended against a retailer’s product liability claim
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in the underlying state court action, and all of the discovery materials from that
case were available to Prime Equipment in its defense below . These
circumstances belie Prime Equipment’s argument that it was unprepared for M r.
M inter’s late assertion of an alteration product liability claim.
Prime Equipment’s claim of prejudice thus rests, in reality, on the viability
of two defenses it argues it would have prepared if it had known about the
alteration product liability claim at an earlier stage in the litigation. First, Prime
Equipment alleges that it would have conducted more discovery to determine who
was responsible for altering the lift. Second, it argues that it never would have
signed the Joint Stipulation, which helped to exonerate Economy from the product
liability claim, if it thought there was a product liability claim against it as well.
Prime Equipment contends that it would have been prejudiced by the late
addition of an alteration product liability claim because “the evidence was
inconclusive as to w ho altered” the lift, and it would have “discovered this case
up differently” if it thought the case “was about alteration.” Appellee’s Br. 6–7,
12. The Plaintiff counters that “[t]he fact that ‘Prime [Equipment] removed the
bar’ is evident from the [Joint] Stipulation, and the Record,” A ppellant’s Reply
Br. 2, since Prime Equipment stipulated that the “scissor lift was . . .
manufactured and sold by Economy Co. with a solid guardrail around the entire
upper perimeter of the scissor lift platform,” and that “[w]hen Prime Equipment
sold the scissor lift, the solid guardrail had been removed from the entry end and
-29-
replaced with a [] chain entry.” Pretrial Order 8. Nonetheless, Prime Equipment
maintains that the lift may have been altered by someone else. During arguments
before the district court, Prime Equipment explained that Economy had “two
[sales] invoices on the same day; one [scissor lift] goes to [a company named]
Forte Rents up north someplace, and the other one goes to . . . Prime
[Equipment].” A ppellee’s B r. 12. Prime Equipment speculates that Forte Rents
may have modified the guardrail system on the lift it bought from Economy, and
then sold that lift to Prime Equipment.
Although an amendment may be prejudicial if its timing prevents the
defendant from pursuing a potentially promising line of defense, Prime
Equipment’s assertion that Forte Rents may have altered the lift and sold it to
Prime Equipment is far too speculative to support such a finding. Prime
Equipment does not cite any evidence indicating that it purchased the lift from
Forte Rents. 8 In fact, before Prime Equipment entered into the Joint Stipulation,
it argued that it purchased the lift from Economy with a chainlink entry; and at
trial one of Prime Equipment’s employees testified that the company bought the
lift “brand new” from Economy, and that “Prime [Equipment] did not buy used
8
Prime Equipment argues that the “[e]vidence indicated that it was not
Prime [Equipment] that altered the lift,” Appellee’s B r. 22, but the evidence it
refers to is the testimony of a witness who claimed that Economy altered the
lift— a position that Prime Equipment explicitly disavowed in the Joint
Stipulation.
-30-
equipment for rental.” Appellee’s Supp. App. 81; Appellant’s App. 311.
M oreover, if there was any evidence that Forte Rents was responsible for the
alteration, it should have surfaced during the underlying state court action, where
Prime Equipment was defending against a retailer product liability claim and
could have impleaded any upstream distributor. Prime Equipment had incentive
and opportunity to conduct discovery on this issue during the underlying state
court litigation, from which most of the discovery in this case was gathered, and
we therefore find no support for its claim of prejudice.
M ore importantly, however, Prime Equipment’s claim of prejudice fails
because its attempt to pin responsibility for the alteration on an upstream
distributor is not a defense to an alteration product liability claim. Even if Prime
Equipment could produce evidence to support its theory that Forte Rents altered
the lift, “[i]n a strict liability action it is immaterial to the plaintiff’s case that the
defect in the product was not caused by the distributor.” Braden v. Hendricks,
695 P.2d 1343, 1350 (Okla. 1985). Under Oklahoma law, it is enough that Prime
Equipment admits to selling the lift in its altered condition. Id. Consequently,
there is no merit to Prime Equipment’s claim that the amendment is prejudicial
because it was prevented from arguing that Forte Rents altered the lift. 9
9
Although Prime Equipment might wish to implead the upstream
distributor, the fact that it could not do so in this action does not constitute
prejudice. If Prime Equipment were to be found liable under an alteration product
(continued...)
-31-
Prime Equipment’s second claim of prejudice arises out of the Joint
Stipulation. During the underlying state court action, where the plaintiff asserted
negligence and product liability claims against both defendants, Prime Equipment
filed a cross-claim against Economy for indemnity from the plaintiff’s
manufacturer product liability claim. The Joint Stipulation prevented Prime
Equipment from filing a similar motion in the federal case, and Prime Equipment
argues that it “never would have made such a stipulation had there been an
alteration product liability claim against it.” A ppellee’s Br. 7. The district court
agreed with Prime Equipment, concluding that the “somewhat curious” Joint
Stipulation was consistent with Prime Equipment’s position that “it believed that
a products liability claim had not been stated against it.” Order 6.
W e believe that concerns about prejudice run the other way. It is true, as
the district court observed, that the strategy behind the Joint Stipulation is
“somewhat curious.” But one thing is clear: the defendants’ change in position
potentially undermined the plaintiff’s entire products liability case. During the
first five years of the litigation, when the complaint was formulated and until
after completion of discovery, Prime Equipment maintained and presented
9
(...continued)
liability theory, and after the judgment it discovered evidence establishing that
Forte Rents altered the lift, Prime Equipment could file a separate action for
indemnity against Forte Rents as an upstream distributor. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
14(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2014; State Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Perry, 104
P.3d 1136, 1138–39 & n.3 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
-32-
evidence that the chainlink closure had been installed on the lift before it came
into Prime Equipment’s possession. Plaintiff crafted his case accordingly, suing
Economy for defective design and manufacture, and Prime Equipment for
negligent maintenance and repair. The revelation of June 12, 2003 changed all of
that. Prime Equipment entered a Joint Stipulation and submitted evidence that at
the time the lift was sold by Economy, it was equipped with a solid metal
guardrail. At the same time, Prime Equipment filed an evidentiary motion
limiting the plaintiff to “a negligence theory only.” A ppellee’s Supp. App. 10.
Unless his complaint were construed to include a products liability claim against
Prime Equipment or he were permitted to amend, M r. M inter would be left with
no products liability claim at all. If Prime Equipment could absolve Economy of
responsibility for the defect, and simultaneously avoid liability by holding the
plaintiff to a narrow construction of the complaint, this w ould mean that no one
could be held responsible for the alleged defect. We do not think it is
“prejudicial” to Prime Equipment not to allow this gambit to succeed. On the
contrary, allowing M r. M inter to assert an alteration product liability claim
against Prime Equipment is necessary so that he is not prejudiced by Prime
Equipment’s extraordinary change in its account of what happened.
Due to the rather unusual circumstances surrounding the Joint Stipulation
and Prime Equipment’s objection to the pretrial order, we agree with the plaintiff
that the district court’s finding of prejudice was a clear error. “The Federal Rules
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of Civil Procedure are designed to put an end to the ‘sporting theory of justice,’
by which the result depends on . . . the skill and strategy of counsel.” M id-West
Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted). See United States ex rel. Precision Co. v.
Koch Indus., Inc., 31 F.3d 1015, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The Federal Rules . . .
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision
on the merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 6 W right, M iller & Kane,
Fed. Prac. & Proc. 3d § 1488 (2d ed. 1990). Although Prime Equipment gave up
the ability to file a cross-claim against Economy when it entered into the Joint
Stipulation, it did so as part of a strategy designed to avoid a decision on the
merits of M r. M inter’s product liability claim. Prime Equipment cannot now
argue that the amendment to add an alteration product liability claim against it is
prejudicial because of the Joint Stipulation. W hatever harm befalls Prime
Equipment as a result of entering into the Joint Stipulation is of its own making,
and therefore does not qualify as prejudice under Rule 15(a).
B. Evidentiary R ulings
M r. M inter argues that the jury verdict in favor of Prime Equipment on the
failure to warn claim must be vacated because of two allegedly erroneous
evidentiary rulings in the proceedings below. The first alleged error is the district
court’s decision to exclude the evidence of Prime Equipment’s repair work on the
scissor lift after M r. M inter’s accident. The second is the district court’s decision
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to admit evidence that M r. M inter was not wearing a safety belt or hard hat on the
day of his injury. W e review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion, United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1198 (10th Cir. 2006),
and affirm.
1. Subsequent Remedial M easure
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides:
W hen, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures
are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or
harm less likely to occur, evidence of subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures,
if controverted, or impeachment.
Rule 407 “codifie[s] the generally accepted common law rule which excluded
remedial measures which were taken after an accident.” Rimkus v. Northwest
Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1983). The Advisory Committee
articulated two rationales for Rule 407. First, it observed that subsequent
remedial measures often are “not in fact an admission, since the conduct is
equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory
negligence.” Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory comm ittee’s note. Second, it found that
there is an important “social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.” Id.; see
also Rimkus, 706 F.2d at 1064. The application of R ule 407 in any particular case
-35-
must be guided by these two considerations. See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970
F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1992).
M ore than a year after M r. M inter’s accident, Prime Equipment was hired
to perform the annual safety inspection on the scissor lift. It made a number of
repairs while it had possession of the lift. One of those was to replace the
chainlink entry with a solid metal guardrail. In the proceedings below, the
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of Prime Equipment’s repair work on the
scissor lift. Before the start of trial, Prime Equipment filed a motion in limine to
exclude the evidence of this repair work pursuant to Rule 407. The district court
granted Prime Equipment’s motion, concluding that “the addition of the metal rod
represents a subsequent remedial measure.” Order, Nov. 24, 2003, at 4–5. On
appeal, the plaintiff offers two reasons why the district court’s ruling was
erroneous.
The plaintiff first contends that Prime Equipment should be estopped from
arguing that the installation of a solid guardrail constitutes a “remedial measure”
because at trial it took the position that a chainlink entry is just as safe as a bar.
Rule 407 defines a remedial measure as one that, “if taken previously, would have
made the injury or harm less likely to occur.” Fed. R. Evid. 407. If Prime
Equipment had, as the plaintiff contends, “submitted evidence that the [solid
guardrail] would not have made the event less likely to occur because the chain
was just as safe and effective as the bar,” Appellant’s Br. 33, then this Court
-36-
would have to address the legal underpinnings of this estoppel claim. Yet Prime
Equipment never argued that a chainlink entry is just as safe as a solid guardrail.
It argued that a “properly used” chainlink entry is just as safe as a solid guardrail,
and that M r. M inter caused his own accident by failing to close the chainlink
entry before operating the scissor lift. Prime Equipment does not dispute M r.
M inter’s claim that a solid guardrail would have helped prevent his fall. Under
Rule 407, therefore, Prime Equipment’s act of replacing the chainlink entry with a
solid guardrail is undoubtedly a subsequent remedial measure.
M r. M inter’s second argument is that the evidence of Prime Equipment’s
subsequent repair work on the lift should have been admitted at trial to rebut the
testimony of one of Prime Equipment’s witnesses. Rule 407 states that it “does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as . . . impeachment.” Fed. R. Evid. 407. The
impeachment exception to Rule 407 is necessary to prevent litigants from taking
“unfair advantage” of the Rule by adopting a position at trial that is inconsistent
with their previous decision to take remedial measures after the accident. Wood
v. M orbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 1995) (evidence of
subsequent modifications can be introduced to rebut testimony that “left the jury
with the impression that [the defendant] had made no modifications to the
[product]”); see also In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 531 (6th Cir. 1996)
(evidence of subsequent design changes to correct deficiencies is admissible to
-37-
rebut a witness’s claim that the product was “state of the art”); Polythane Sys.,
Inc. v. M arina Ventures Int’l., LTD., 993 F.2d 1201, 1210–11 (5th Cir. 1993)
(evidence of subsequent modifications is admissible to impeach testimony that the
product was “one of the strongest in the world”).
The impeachment exception, however, must be read narrowly, lest it
swallow the rule. Applied loosely, “any evidence of subsequent remedial
measures might be thought to contradict and so in a sense impeach [a party’s]
testimony.” Complaint of Consolidated Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 136 (3d Cir.
1997) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Seventh Circuit
explained in Probus v. K-M art, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1986):
It is undoubtedly true that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
can be said to contradict, and hence, in a sense, ‘impeach’ a
defendant’s contention that he was exercising due care or that
materials used in the manufacture of a product were appropriate for
their intended application. Yet allowing that and no more to satisfy
the impeachment exception would elevate it to the rule.
Id. at 1210. Consequently, the impeachment exception has been confined to
evidence of subsequent remedial measures that is “necessary to prevent the jury
from being misled.” Wood, 70 F.3d at 1208; see also Complaint of Consolidated
Coal Co., 123 F.3d at 136 (“[T]he evidence offered for impeachment must
contradict the witness’s testimony directly.”); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that the impeachment exception requires
-38-
“a great[] nexus between the statement sought to be impeached and the remedial
measure”).
According to the plaintiff, the evidence of Prime Equipment’s subsequent
remedial measures should have been admitted at trial to rebut the testimony from
Prime Equipment’s expert witness that the chainlink entry was “basically
equivalent” to a solid guardrail. Appellant’s A pp. 493–94. Yet this testimony is
not directly contradicted by the evidence of Prime Equipment’s decision to install
a solid guardrail on the lift. The witness testified that a chainlink entry is
“basically equivalent” to a solid guardrail “as long as [it is] in place,” and that the
chainlink entry was not unreasonably dangerous because “if [it] would have been
properly latched, [M r. M inter] would not have fallen out of the scissor lift and
been injured.” Id. at 493–95. This testimony is consistent with the evidence at
trial that the ANSI safety standards w ere changed in 1991 to require solid
guardrails in response to reports of workers operating the lift without latching the
chainlink entry. M oreover, Prime Equipment did not dispute that a solid guardrail
reduces the danger of falls for lift operators who might otherwise forget to latch
the chainlink entry or fail to do so properly. Consequently, the evidence of Prime
Equipment’s subsequent repair work on the guardrail does not fall within the
impeachment exception to Rule 407.
-39-
2. The Safety Belt and H ard H at Evidence
M r. M inter’s last argument on appeal is that the district court wrongfully
denied his motion in limine regarding the evidence that he was not wearing a
safety belt or hard hat at the time of the accident. Both types of safety equipment
were available to M r. M inter on the day of the incident, and the district court
concluded that the safety belt and hard hat evidence “is admissible to show
Plaintiff’s conduct in the workplace. The resulting effect from the failure to
employ these safety devices is a matter for the jury to consider in their
deliberations.” Order, Nov. 24, 2003, at 3. Consequently, Prime Equipment was
allowed to argue at trial that “a safety belt would have prevented [M r. M inter]
from falling out of the lift had he been wearing it,” Appellant’s A pp. 495, and to
introduce the portions of M r. M inter’s deposition testimony where he admitted
that a hard hat “might have saved [his] head from hurting.” Appellee’s Supp.
App. 29. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the safety belt and hard hat
evidence was relevant only to a comparative negligence defense, and since he
voluntarily dismissed his negligence claims against Prime Equipment before trial,
the evidence should have been excluded. Prime Equipment defends the admission
of the safety belt and hard hat evidence on the ground that it was relevant to the
issues of causation and mitigation of damages, and was therefore properly
admitted at trial.
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W e affirm the district court’s ruling on the narrow ground that the safety
belt and hard hat evidence was relevant to the specific causation issues raised by
M r. M inter’s failure to warn claim. Oklahoma law requires the plaintiff, in a
failure to warn lawsuit, to “establish that the failure to warn was a proximate,
producing cause of the injuries received.” Duane v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 833
P.2d 284, 286 (Okla. 1992). M r. M inter therefore had to show that if Prime
Equipment had posted an adequate warning on the lift, he would have heeded it.
See, e.g., Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996).
Although there is a presumption under Oklahoma law that the plaintiff would
have read and heeded an adequate warning, the defendant may rebut that
presumption by showing that the w arning would not have altered the plaintiff’s
behavior. Id. at 1332. Prime Equipment argues that M r. M inter’s failure to wear
a safety belt or hard hat on the day of the accident demonstrates his “propensity
for recklessness.” Appellee’s Br. 35. W hile Prime Equipment may be overstating
its case, we find that the safety belt and hard hat evidence bears sufficient relation
to the question of whether M r. M inter would have heeded an adequate warning
that Prime Equipment was entitled to present the safety belt and hard hat evidence
to the jury. Cf. Daniel, 97 F.3d at 1333.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
The order of the district court striking from the pretrial order M r. M inter’s
product liability claim against Prime Equipment stemming from the alteration of
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the scissor lift is therefore REVERSED, and the case is REM ANDED to the
district court for further proceedings. The evidentiary rulings of the district court
related to the failure to warn claim are upheld, and the jury verdict on that claim
is AFFIRM ED.
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