F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 7, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RO NA LD G . PIERCE,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 05-1458
(D. Colorado)
RICK A. SO ARES, Ordway (D.C. No. 02-CV -1487-EW N-OES)
C orrectional Facility, and JO H N
W . SU THERS, the Attorney
General of the State of Colorado, *
Respondents-Appellees.
OR DER
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Ronald G . Pierce, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s decision
dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, based on
various alleged failures to investigate his mental capacity, allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct and purported
violations of his plea agreement. M r. Pierce also seeks to proceed in forma
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), John W . Suthers, Ken Salazar’s
successor, has been automatically substituted as a party to this appeal.
pauperis (“IFP”). Because we determine that he has not made “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny
his request for a COA and dismiss the matter. W e grant his motion to proceed
IFP.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 1988, M r. Pierce pleaded guilty to two counts of felony murder
with stipulated consecutive life sentences, in exchange for the government to
withdraw its request for the death penalty. The plea agreement included an
agreement that if M r. Pierce cooperated w ith the district attorney’s office’s
investigation regarding other involved parties, and testified to that regard, that the
district attorney would not object to M r. Pierce’s request that the sentences run
concurrently. During the course of the plea negotiations, M r. Pierce was
represented by three separate attorneys. M r. Pierce did not file a direct appeal.
In M arch 1989, M r. Pierce filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas pursuant to Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c), alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel and challenging the validity of his guilty plea. Over the next decade, tw o
separate attorneys were appointed to assist M r. Pierce. The first attorney was
allowed to withdraw in 1996, and the second in 1999. Thereafter, M r. Pierce
proceeded pro se, and filed another postconviction motion that alleged he was
legally incompetent to proceed. After two hearings and a mental health
examination, M r. Pierce w as determined to be legally competent to proceed. In
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2000, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the original Rule 35(c)
motion and denied it on the merits. In 2001, the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court, and on April 29, 2002, the C olorado Supreme Court
denied M r. Pierce’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
On August 12, 2002, M r. Pierce filed a timely petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, alleging five errors related to his plea bargain:
1. violations of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the
trial judge, prosecuting attorney and defense counsel failed to properly investigate
his mental state of mind before he entered the plea bargain,
2. denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed
to (a) investigate the case, (b) secure expert testimony, (c) request evaluation of
his mental state, and (d) when trial counsel functioned as a “third arm” for the
prosecution,
3. denial of his constitutional rights when the trial court failed to determine
that his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made,
4. violation of his right to due process when the prosecution (a) failed to
follow the provisions of the plea agreement, (b) failed to inquire into his mental
functioning, and (c) when the prosecution coerced him into pleading guilty, and
5. denial of constitutional rights when the trial court denied him (a) counsel
in his postconviction hearings, and (b) the right to testify due to the refusal to
appoint advisory counsel.
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The state argued that M r. Pierce did not exhaust his final claim. The
magistrate judge recommended dismissal of each of the above claims, and
recommended the denial of habeas relief. He found the fifth claim meritless and
dismissed it w ithout reference to exhaustion. See Moore v. Schoeman, 288 F.3d
1231, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and denied M r. Pierce’s application for a certificate of
appealability. M r. Pierce can only prevail on those claims in this federal habeas
proceeding if he can demonstrate that the state court’s ruling, rejecting each of his
claims, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). For substantially the same reasons provided in the magistrate judge’s
thorough and well-reasoned report and recommendation, we reject M r. Pierce’s
arguments.
II. DISCUSSION
“[U]ntil a COA has been issued, federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction
to rule on the merits of appeals for habeas petitioners.” M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A COA can issue only “if the applicant has made a
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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To do so, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
M r. Pierce raises the same five issues before us. First, as to the failure to
investigate M r. Pierce’s competency when he pleaded guilty, the state courts
reviewed evaluations from two psychiatrists and a neurologist, who found no
concerns about M r. Pierce’s mental condition. Second, M r. Pierce cannot
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. “[T]he two-part Strickland v.
Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)] test applies to challenges to guilty pleas
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985). “[T]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59. W e agree
with the magistrate judge’s recommendation that, “[g]iven the strength of the
government’s case against [M r. Pierce], to include the unsuppressed confession
and testimony of witnesses, the seriousness of the crimes with which [M r. Pierce]
was charged, and the success at negotiating a plea agreement that significantly
limited [his] exposure under the charges, there is no reasonable probability that
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[M r. Pierce] would have insisted on going to trial.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 27, at 14
(R ecommendation for D ismissal, filed July 2, 2003).
Third, the trial court did inquire as to whether M r. Pierce’s plea bargain
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as evidenced in the plea colloquy. As to
M r. Pierce’s fourth contention, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, the plea
agreement does not specify that the government was obliged to approach M r.
Pierce with respect to the prosecution of other involved parties. Similarly, the
record does not support M r. Pierce’s allegations regarding coercion and failure to
inquire into his mental state. Finally, we agree that there is no constitutional
requirement for the appointment of counsel in postconviction collateral
proceedings. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). As such, M r.
Pierce has failed to raise a constitutional question.
W e have carefully reviewed M r. Pierce’s brief, the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, district court’s disposition, and the record on appeal.
Nothing in the record on appeal or M r. Pierce’s filings raises an issue which
meets our standards for the grant of a CO A. For substantially the same reasons as
set forth by the district court and magistrate judge, we cannot say that M r. Pierce
“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
III. CONCLUSION
W e D EN Y Mr. Pierce’s request for a certificate of appealability, GRAN T
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his motion to proceed IFP, and DISM ISS the matter.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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