F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 27, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Respondent-Appellee, No. 05-5179
v. Northern District of Oklahoma
DON ALD RAY CARTER, (D.C. Nos. 04-CV-794-HDC and 01-
CR-116-HDC)
Petitioner-A ppellant.
OR DER *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Donald Ray Carter, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district court’s
order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that M r. Carter has failed to make “a
substantial show ing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request
for a COA, and we dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
I. Background
On January 10, 2002, M r. Carter pleaded guilty to one count of possession
of a firearm after prior conviction of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
The district court calculated M r. Carter’s sentence pursuant to the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years, and sentenced him to 192 months
imprisonment.
M r. Carter entered his plea on the condition that he be allowed to appeal
the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress. On appeal, this Court affirmed
the denial of the motion, United States v. Carter, 64 Fed. App’x 109 (10th Cir.
2003), and the U nited States Supreme Court subsequently denied M r. Carter’s
writ of certiorari. Carter v. United States, 540 U.S. 846 (2003).
M r. Carter then filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. M r. Carter
argued that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
challenge the fact-finding procedure used by the district court to determine M r.
Carter was an armed career criminal. He further argued that counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the district court’s conclusion that two prior
Oklahoma convictions for second-degree burglary constituted “violent felonies”
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The district court denied the motion on the
merits, holding that because Circuit precedent allows district judges to make
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factual findings about prior convictions, M r. Carter’s counsel was not ineffective
for failing to challenge the court’s fact-finding procedure. The court also held
that M r. Carter’s second-degree burglary convictions satisfy the requirements of
the Armed Career Criminal Act and that counsel’s performance was not defective
for failing to object to that conclusion. The district court did not act on the issue
of whether to grant a COA, and we deem the district court’s failure to act a denial
of a COA. 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). M r. Carter now petitions this Court to grant his
request for a C OA .
II. Claims on A ppeal
The denial of a motion for relief under § 2255 may be appealed only if the
district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A
COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make such a
showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In order to establish an ineffective assistance claim sufficient to warrant
reversal of a conviction or a sentence, a convicted defendant must show both that
counsel’s performance was so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective
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standard of reasonableness, and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The ultimate
question, according to the Supreme Court, is “whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
[proceedings] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686.
A. Judicial Fact-Finding
M r. Carter argues that counsel had a duty to object to the district court’s
consideration of the nature of his prior convictions, as opposed to the mere
existence of the convictions, in sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. M r. Carter relies on United States v. Greer, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379-80
(M .D. Ga. 2005), to show that at least one federal district judge has ruled that the
Sixth Amendment requires juries, not judges, to make such determinations. The
Eleventh Circuit recently reversed the decision in Greer, finding that the district
court’s analysis contradicted both Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, both of
which establish that judges have authority to engage in factual inquiries about
prior convictions. See United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1273-74 (11th Cir.
2006) (concluding that the district court’s decision cannot be reconciled with
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), or United States v.
Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)).
As the district court below correctly observed, this Court has recognized
that “[b]ecause determining whether a given felony constitutes a ‘violent felony’
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is a question of law and not fact, the Sixth Amendment does not require that
determination to be made by a jury.” United States v. M oore, 401 F.3d 1220,
1225 (10th Cir. 2005). Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to
challenge the court’s fact-finding authority.
B. Full Faith and Credit Clause
M r. Carter also argues that his second-degree burglary convictions, which
the State of Oklahoma classified as non-violent felonies, have been
unconstitutionally re-classified as violent felonies by the district court. M r.
Carter contends that Oklahoma’s final judgment in each of his burglary
convictions must be respected by the federal government as well as other states
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV , §
1.
M r. Carter relies on a concurring opinion from the Eighth Circuit to support
his position that federal courts are bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
adopt state judicial characterizations of violent or non-violent felonies as their
own. See United States v. Davis, 417 F.3d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J.,
concurring) (arguing that our federal system requires federal courts to “respect
the character of state judicial proceedings, as determined by the states
themselves.”) We are not persuaded. Even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause
were binding on federal courts – which it is not, University of Tennessee v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) – the characterization of state court judgments
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to determine their consequences under the United States Sentencing Guidelines is
a federal question. It does not accord a state judgment less than full faith and
credit for a federal court to determine its effect on a subsequent federal sentence
under federal law. One of the overriding purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines
(even in their post-Booker advisory form) is to reduce unwarranted disparities in
sentencing. This is best achieved by applying a uniform national standard to the
characterization of prior convictions. M r. Carter’s counsel was not
constitutionally deficient for refraining from arguing otherwise.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we D EN Y Donald Ray Carter’s request for a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal. W e also DENY his request to proceed in form a pauperis.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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