F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 4, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JERRY W ILLIA M DICKEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-4289
v. (D.C. No. 2:97-CV-782-PGC)
LIEU TEN A N T J. M ER RIC K; (D. Utah)
SER GEAN T M A TTIN G LEY ;
LIEUTEN AN T BEEM US; OFFICER
NELSON ; OFFICER
GA M VR OU LAS; and OFFICER
RENFRO,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cK AY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
resolution of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant is a state prisoner, appearing pro se, who comm enced this action
in 1997, claiming that he was assaulted and injured by other inmates while
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County M etro Jail. Appellant brought this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison employees knew he would face a
substantial risk of serious harm if exposed to other inmates at the jail but
deliberately disregarded that risk, causing him to be attacked and injured.
W hen this action was first filed, the district court dismissed Appellant’s
com plaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, we
determined that the record was insufficient to support a dismissal for failure to
exhaust and thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Dickey v.
Kennard, 156 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1998). Following remand, Appellant was
allowed to file an amended complaint. The district court then directed the named
Appellees to file a M artinez report addressing whether Appellant had exhausted
all administrative remedies. Appellees filed a M artinez report, which was
erroneously docketed as a M otion for Summary Judgment. Appellant did not
respond to the M artinez report, but instead filed a series of unsupported motions,
including motions for injunctive relief. The district court ordered additional
briefing from both parties, to which Appellant did not respond. On February 19,
2003, the district court again dismissed all but one of Appellant’s claims, and
granted summary judgment to the Appellees on the only exhausted claim.
Appellant again appealed to this court and we again reversed, concluding
that the award of summary judgment on the one exhausted claim was improper
because Appellees never filed an actual summary judgment motion and
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consequently Appellant was not given adequate notice or opportunity to respond.
Dickey v. M errick, 90 Fed. Appx. 535 (10th Cir. 2003). Following this second
remand, the district court invited Appellees to file an actual motion for summary
judgment and instructed Appellant that he must respond. Appellant did not
respond directly, but instead renewed his motion for injunctive relief, asserting
that prison officials were denying him access to his legal materials. The district
court then ordered the Utah Attorney General’s office to investigate and file a
report addressing the legal access concerns. After receiving the report and
allowing Appellant an opportunity to respond, the court denied his motion for
injunctive relief. Appellant was also directed to respond to A ppellee’s summary
judgment motion and was given additional reminders and twice the allotted sixty
days in which to do so. Appellant did not respond to the pending motion for
summary judgment, and the district court denied his additional motions for
injunctive relief and granted summary judgment to Appellees. Order, 15 (D. Utah
Sept. 28, 2005).
Appellant claims that he was attacked twice by other inmates while in the
county jail. The district court found nothing in the record where Appellant stated
any injuries from the second attack. W e therefore agree with the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Appellees on the second attack. Id. at 11-12. As
to the first attack, the district court analyzed Appellant’s claim under the Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), test. Although the district court found that
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Appellant satisfied the first prong–showing that the conditions of his
incarceration posed a substantial risk of serious harm–he failed to satisfy the
second prong. Order, at 9-12 (noting that Appellant was involved in the murder
of an influential gang member and was being held in protective custody). The
second prong of the test requires Appellant to establish that the prison official
was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety. The district court carefully
reviewed Appellant’s claim but found that Appellant had made an informed
decision to risk his own safety by choosing to go to the recreation yard when
inmates “on the behavior modification tier” were present. Id. at 13. Appellant
was given the option to go into the yard under those terms and was subsequently
attacked. W e agree that Appellant did not “satisfy his burden on summary
judgment of setting forth specific facts showing that [Appellees] w ere deliberately
indifferent to his safety concerns.” Id. at 14.
W e have carefully reviewed the briefs of Appellant and Appellees, the
district court’s disposition, and the record on appeal, and for substantially the
sam e reasons as the district court stated in its order of September 28, 2005, we
A FFIR M the denial of A ppellant’s additional claims and the grant of summary
judgment for Appellees. W e deny Appellant’s motion to pay the filing fee in
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partial payments and order immediate payment of the unpaid balance due on his
filing fee.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
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