Burke v. Utah Transit Authority & Local 382

F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
September 1, 2006
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
T E N T H C IR C U IT

LISA BU RK E and M ICH AEL
CARPER, individually and on behalf
of all others sim ilarly situated ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants ,
v. No. 05-4079
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
LOCAL 382 THE A M ALG AM ATED
TR AN SIT U N IO N ,

Defendants-Appellees ,

JOHN INGLISH , individually, and
THE U NITED STATES
DEPARTM ENT OF LABOR,

Defendants.
___________________________

LISA BU RK E and M ICH AEL
CARPER, individually and on behalf
of all others sim ilarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 05-4222
 U TA H TRAN SIT A U TH O RITY,
JOHN INGLISH , individually,
LOCAL 382 THE A M ALG AM ATED
TRANSIT UN ION , and THE U NITED
STA TES D EPA RTM EN T O F LABOR

Defendants-Appellees.

A PPE A L FR O M T H E U N IT ED ST A T ES D IST R IC T C O U R T
FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F U TA H
(D .C . N O . 04-C V -985-PG C )

Daniel G. M oquin, Tuba City, Arizona (M el S. M artin and Edw ard T. W ells,
M urray, Utah, with him on the briefs) for Appellants .

Scott A. Hagen (Jam es S. Jardine and M ichael E. Blue w ith him on the briefs),
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for A ppellees U tah Transit
Authority and John Inglish; Joseph E. Hatch, M urray, Utah, for Appellee Local
382 of The A m algam ated Transit Union; Robert D. Kam enshine, Appellate Staff
Attorney, (W illiam Kanter, Appellate Staff A ttorney, Robert G. M cCam pbell,
United States A ttorney, and Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, with
him on the brief), United States Departm ent of Justice, W ashington, D.C., for
Appellee United States D epartment of Labor.

Before T Y M K O V IC H , Circuit Judge, M cW ILL IA M S , Senior Circuit Judge, and
E A G A N , District Judge. *

T Y M K O V IC H , Circuit Judge.

*
Honorable Claire V. Eagan, Chief District Court Judge, Northern District
of Oklahoma.

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 Recognizing the need for more public transportation options in U tah’s

capital, the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) formulated a plan to add light rail

service in Salt Lake City in the mid-1990s. Salt Lake City has long offered public

transportation, beginning in 1904 with streetcar services and eventually changing

exclusively to bus services. Since its inception, Local 382 of the Amalgamated

Transit Union has continuously represented the employees of Utah’s public transit

system. Therefore, it was no surprise that when UTA established light rail

service, Local 382 became the bargaining representative for those employees.

Despite Local 382’s extensive history serving as the bargaining

representative for Utah’s public transit employees, a handful of light rail

employees sought different representation. The question in this appeal is whether

these employees are entitled under either federal law— the U rban M ass

Transportation Act of 1964 (UM TA), or state law— the Public Transit District

Act, to contest their inclusion in a bargaining unit w ith UTA’s bus employees.

The light rail employees claim that UTA’s failure to afford them a separate

bargaining representative violated the terms of both of these Acts.

The employees brought suit against UTA, Local 382, and the United States

Department of Labor (DOL). The district court denied the employees’ request for

a preliminary injunction, granted summary judgment for UTA, and dismissed the

suit against DOL. This appeal followed.

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 H aving jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and finding no error, w e

AFFIRM .

I. Background

UTA, a political subdivision of the state of Utah, provides public

transportation services to Utah commuters. The bus system, operating throughout

the state and comprising the vast majority of the services, has been in operation

since the 1940s. In 1995, UTA decided to supplement this bus service by adding

a light rail service in Salt Lake City. This service was dubbed TRAX.

At that time, UTA employees were covered by a collective bargaining

agreement negotiated by Local 382, the bargaining representative for U TA and its

predecessors since 1904. To ensure union representation for TRAX employees,

UTA initiated negotiations with Local 382 to modify the collective bargaining

agreement. These negotiations culminated in a new collective bargaining

agreement that a majority of UTA employees ratified in 1999.

The new agreement maintained Local 382 as the bargaining representative

for both bus and TRAX employees. It also established a seniority system for

UTA employees w ho transferred to TRAX positions, thereby allowing a newly

transferred but senior bus employee to bump a current TRAX employee to a less-

desirable shift. A ppellants Lisa Burke and M ichael Carper transferred to TRAX

as a result of this original agreement. In fact, the vast majority of TRAX’s 150

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employees are transferees from the 1000-member bus division.

This combined collective bargaining agreement remained in effect until

2003 when UTA and Local 382 entered into negotiations for a new agreement.

During the course of these negotiations, appellants objected on the grounds that

the proposed agreement maintained Local 382 as its exclusive bargaining agent

and continued the seniority program. UTA denied their petition and a majority of

UTA employees ratified the new agreement, which included a provision

establishing a task force to study the seniority issue.

The task force recommended no changes to the seniority system.

Consequently, appellants complained to DOL that Local 382 could not adequately

represent the interests of TRAX employees and, therefore, UTA was violating

their collective bargaining rights. They asked DOL to investigate alleged

violations of § 13(c) of UM TA, now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b), based on

UTA’s failure to afford TRAX employees a separate bargaining unit from the bus

employees. DOL responded that the existing consolidated bargaining

arrangement fully satisfied the requirements of § 13(c) and rejected their

complaint.

Following DOL’s rejection, appellants filed suit in the District of Utah

against U TA , Local 382, and D OL. The action alleged UTA violated (1) UM TA ,

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(2) Utah Code § 17A-2-1031, and (3) the First Amendment. It further claimed

that Local 382 (4) breached its fiduciary duty to TRAX employees, and DO L

(5) violated U M TA. As part of their law suit, appellants filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction seeking to (1) bar UTA from transferring bus employees to

TRAX, (2) bar UTA from allowing transferred employees to retain their seniority,

and (3) require UTA to post information regarding their efforts to organize a new

bargaining unit at the work site.

The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

Appellants then filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction alleging the

district court applied the wrong legal standards in its original denial. Again, their

motion was denied. The district court subsequently granted DOL’s motion to

dismiss, granted summary judgment in favor of UTA, and dismissed the action

against Local 382. Appellants separately appealed the denial of the preliminary

injunction orders as well as the dismissal of the claim against DOL and the grant

of summary judgment. These appeals are consolidated before us.

II. A nalysis

Appellants assert numerous errors on appeal, broadly arguing that UTA’s

failure to afford TRAX employees a separate bargaining unit with separate

representation is a violation of UM TA and Utah Code § 17A-2-1031. Their

primary argument is that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for

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UTA because it misapplied state and federal law. Additionally, they claim the

court failed to properly assess DOL’s duty under UM TA and failed to consider

the entire administrative record before dismissing their action against DOL.

Finally, appellants claim that the district court should not have denied either their

motion for discovery or their motion to amend the complaint. 1

A . Existence of A ppropriate B argaining U nit

Appellants’ primary argument is that the district court erred in concluding

that TRAX employees were not entitled to a separate bargaining representative

under UM TA and Utah Code § 17A-2-1301. The district court, applying federal

labor law precedents, concluded that the light rail employees failed to show they

should be separated from the existing bargaining unit.

W e review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same legal standards used below. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1131

(10th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). In applying this standard, we “view the evidence and draw reasonable

1
Appellants also appeal the district court’s denial of their preliminary
injunction motions. Because of our ultimate disposition in this case, this appeal
is moot.

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inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Schutz,

415 F.3d at 1131 (quotation omitted). A t the summary judgment stage, a

complainant cannot “rest on . . . ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by

affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary

judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193,

1204–05 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,

889 (1990)).

1. UM TA

W e begin by addressing whether appellants state a claim under U M TA.

The district court noted that UM TA merely requires the preservation of collective

bargaining rights for state transit employees. Finding that plaintiffs raised no

factual issues in this regard, the court rejected the legal basis for their claim.

UM TA sets forth minimal standards that a state transit authority must

satisfy before it may receive federal funding. Section 13(c) of the statute states:

(1) As a condition of financial assistance . . ., the interests of employees
affected by the assistance shall be protected under arrangements the
Secretary of Labor concludes are fair and equitable. . . .
(2) A rrangements . . . shall include provisions that m ay be necessary
for—
(A) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including
continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing
collective bargaining agreements or otherwise;
(B) the continuation of collective bargaining rights;
(C) the protection of individual employees against a worsening
of their positions related to employment . . . .

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49 U.S.C. § 5333(b).

Under its plain terms, the Act governs the financial relationship between

the Department of Labor and state transit authorities. Section 13(c) provides “an

important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit workers, by

ensuring that state law preserve[s] their rights before federal aid [can] be used to

convert private companies into public entities.” Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local

Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 27–28 (1982). The

Supreme Court also has noted that the “legislative history [of UM TA] indicates

that Congress intended [collective bargaining agreements] to be governed by state

law applied in state courts.” Id. at 29; see also Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l

v. Donovan, 767 F.2d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Section 13(c) does not

prescribe mandatory labor standards for the states, but rather dictates the terms of

federal mass transit assistance. States are free to forego such assistance and thus

to adopt any collective bargaining scheme they desire.”).

Accordingly, § 13 does not create a federal cause of action against state

transit recipients. Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 29; City of Beloit v. Local

643, AFSCM E, 248 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2001). Appellants, therefore, do not

state a claim under UM TA. Appellants’ claim must arise, if at all, under state

law .

2. Utah Code § 17A-2-1031

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 Appellants claim UTA violated the Utah Public Transit District Act, in

particular § 17A-2-1031 of the Utah Code. This provision was enacted in 1969 to

comply with the requirements of federal law contained in UM TA and thereby

ensure federal funding. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1030 (requiring that “[t]he

rights, benefits and other employee protective conditions and remedies of [§ 13(c)

of UM TA] . . . apply to the establishment and operation by the district of any

public transit service or system and to any lease, contract, or other arrangement to

operate such system or services.”).

The statute provides that a local transit authority shall recognize a labor

organization that represents the majority of employees:

Employees of any public transit system established and operated by the
district shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing provided, however, that such employees and
labor organizations shall not have the right to join in any strike against
such public transit system. The district shall recognize and bargain
exclusively w ith any labor organization representing a majority of its
employees in an appropriate unit with respect to w ages, salaries, hours,
working conditions, and welfare and pension and retirement provisions,
and, upon reaching agreement with such labor organization, to enter
into and execute a written contract incorporating therein the agreements
so reached.

Id. § 17A-2-1031 (emphasis added).

Appellants argue that under § 17A-2-1031, a bargaining unit composed of

both bus and TRAX employees is not an “appropriate unit,” primarily because

TRAX employees were denied their right to select a bargaining representative.

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This right, they assert, could neither be waived nor resolved by contract. Thus,

they claim the district court erred in concluding that the existing unit could

reasonably serve the interests of the light rail employees.

a. Appropriateness of Bargaining Unit

Section 17A-2-1031 requires U TA to “recognize and bargain exclusively

with any labor organization representing a majority of its employees in an

appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, and

welfare and pension and retirement provisions.” (emphasis added). Based on this

plain language, UTA need only bargain w ith an appropriate unit, not the most

appropriate unit. Because this provision was enacted to ensure federal funding

under UM TA, we read appropriate to mean any unit sufficient to comply with

UM TA.

The bargaining unit here— composed of both TRAX and bus employees— is

appropriate. Preliminarily, UTA has continued to receive federal funding under §

13(c) and, as we later discuss, we find no error on the part of DOL in certifying

the unit and granting aid. But even in the absence of DOL certification, we find

the bargaining unit appropriate, for a number of reasons.

First, the collective bargaining history of UTA evidences the

appropriateness of the consolidated unit. Local 382 has been the bargaining

representative for every mass transit service in Utah since 1904, including all

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services provided by UTA. Local 382 has represented the consolidated unit since

1999.

Second, the current standard practice throughout the nation demonstrates

that consolidation of bus and light rail employees is typically appropriate. The

cities of Los Angeles, St. Louis, Baltimore, San Jose, Houston, Denver, Portland,

and Sacramento have bargaining units composed of both bus and light rail

employees. [Aple. Supp. App. at 7.] See St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 749

(1948) (finding appropriate a system-wide unit of bus and streetcar employees);

cf. Inter-Ocean Steamship Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 330, 332 (1953) (finding that a

bargaining unit must be composed of all ships in an oceanic transport to be

appropriate).

But, more importantly, nothing in the formation of UTA’s current

bargaining unit demonstrates an impairment to collective bargaining rights. The

parties engaged in good faith negotiations on multiple occasions. See Nat’l

Treasury Employees U nion v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 863 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(“Then, as now, collective bargaining [is] universally understood to require, at a

minimum, good faith negotiations . . . .”); Donovan, 767 F.2d at 951 (noting that

the “continuation of collective bargaining rights” as used in § 13(c) requires that

employees, “at a minimum, . . . are entitled to be represented in meaningful,

‘good faith’ negotiations with their employer over wages, hours and other terms

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and conditions of employment.”). The original bargaining agreement was created

after extensive negotiations over the span of four years. Similarly, the most

recent agreement involved extensive discussions, lasting nearly a year, which

recognized the objections made by a subset of TRAX employees. Indeed,

appellants’ concern over seniority was taken into account and a task force to

study the issue was created. Finally, both the original and subsequent bargaining

agreements were ratified by a majority of UTA employees. Cf. 49 U.S.C.

§ 5333(b)(1) (requiring that the protective arrangements be “fair and equitable”).

b. Federal Labor Law Doctrines— Accretion and Severance

The district court reached the same conclusion applying federal labor law

principles. In determining whether a bargaining unit is appropriate under federal

law, courts have looked to two basic fact patterns. The first pattern, known as

accretion, occurs when new employees or present employees in new jobs are

absorbed, without an election, into an existing bargaining unit. The second,

known as severance, occurs when a group of employees splits off from an existing

bargaining unit because material changes in their job structure have made the

existing unit inappropriate.

Appellants urged that accretion is the appropriate framew ork under which

to analyze their situation; the court found the circumstances made the severance

framew ork appropriate. Applying that framew ork, the court found no violation of

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bargaining rights. W e agree with the district court. 2

An accretion “occurs when new employees, or present employees in new

jobs, perceived to share a sufficient community of interest w ith existing unit

employees, are added to an existing bargaining unit without being afforded an

opportunity to vote in a union election.” NLRB v. Superior Prot., Inc., 401 F.3d

282, 287 (5th Cir. 2005); see Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No.

153, 2005 W L 1827781, at *2 (2005) (noting that “accreted employees are

absorbed into an existing bargaining unit without an election or other

demonstrated showing of majority status.”). Typically in these circumstances, a

2
W e doubt federal labor doctrine even applies here. The National Labor
Relations A ct (NLRA) does not govern this dispute because state law and a state
agency are involved, and accretion as well as severance are merely procedural
tools used by the National Labor Relations Board to judge whether a bargaining
unit satisfies the standards set forth in NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2); Utah Code
Ann. § 34-20-2(5); see also Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 27–29 (noting that
§ 13(c) does not supercede state law and leaves intact the exclusion of local
government employers from NLRA); see generally Robert A. Gorman & M atthew
W . Finkin, Labor Law § 5.2 (2d ed. 2004). W hile Congress clearly intended “that
federal labor policy would dictate the substantive meaning of collective
bargaining for purposes of [UM TA],” Donovan, 767 F.2d at 950, it “did not
intend to subject local government employers to the precise strictures of the
NLRA.” Id. at 949. To the contrary, Congress made a reasoned decision to
incorporate only the most fundamental substantive tenets of federal labor policy.

Consequently, we are skeptical of analyzing the plain language of § 17A-2-
1031 through this framew ork. Neither the plain language of the statute requires
it, nor does the legislative intent behind the statute suggest it. Section 17A-2-
1031 was enacted to meet the requirements of UM TA and to ensure the receipt of
federal aid for Utah’s public transportation system. If U M TA does not require
analysis of these doctrines, then neither should § 17A-2-1031.

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smaller group of employees is cast against its will into a larger, preexisting group

of employees. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir.

1994). This occurs most frequently when an employer acquires a new facility,

and attempts to add the new employees at this facility, without an election, to a

preexisting bargaining unit. Superior Prot., 401 F.3d at 287 n.5; see Nott Co.,

Equip. Div., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 2005 W L 2115868, at *6 (2005) (noting that

accretion principles are normally applied in circumstances in which groups of

represented and unrepresented employees are consolidated).

Accretion is allowed only where the accreted employees have no true

identity distinct from the existing unit and share an overwhelming comm unity of

interest w ith that unit. Balt. Sun Co. v. NLRB, 257 F.3d 419, 427 (4th Cir. 2001);

Frontier Tel., 344 N.L.R.B. at *8 n.6. Because of concern that accreted

employees do not have an opportunity to vote on their representation, the burden

rests on the union to make this showing. See NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,

936 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1991).

In contrast, a severance occurs when “changes in job structure are so

significant that the existing bargaining unit, including the affected employees, is

no longer appropriate.” NLRB v. Ill.-Am. Water Co., 933 F.2d 1368, 1375 (7th

Cir. 1991). Severance is viewed as the converse of accretion: a group of

employees either wishes to split off from the larger group in an existing

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bargaining unit or the employer claims that a group of employees should be

excluded from a bargaining unit due to technological or organizational change.

See Robert A. Gorman & M atthew W . Finkin, Labor Law § 5.2(c) (2d ed. 2004).

The burden rests on the party requesting severance to “show sufficient

dissimilarity” to warrant the change to the bargaining unit. Ill.-Am. Water, 933

F.2d at 1375 (quotation omitted). Because severance is typically permitted only

where the bargaining history in the larger unit is not notable or compelling,

severance is rarely granted. N. Peter Lareau, Labor and Em ployment Law

§ 35.03[4] (2006); see NLRB v. Catalytic Indus. M aint. Co., 964 F.2d 513, 519

(5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the NLRB is reluctant “to disrupt an established

stable bargaining relationship.”).

After reviewing the record, we are compelled to agree with the district

court that severance best describes the situation here. First, appellants’ objection

to their inclusion in the bargaining unit arose nearly six years after the alleged

accretion occurred. An accretion occurs, if at all, when the new position is

created and the bargaining unit is extended to it. In contrast, severance occurs

some time after the creation of the position, when it becomes clear that the

bargaining unit is no longer appropriate due to changes in job structure. Cf.

Gibbs & Cox, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 953, 954 (1986) (refusing to assess a bargaining

unit “from the vantage of any period of time but the one presently under

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consideration.”).

Second, this case involves employees previously represented by the same

bargaining unit. Accretion generally involves employees, whether new or

transferred, that are added to an existing bargaining unit, not employees that are

retained within the same bargaining unit.

Third, the circumstances here do not resemble a typical accretion claim.

Accretion involves a group being cast against its w ill into another group. That is

simply not the case with the light rail employees— the original bargaining

agreement was first ratified by the bus employees, who benefitted from the

provision of the agreement allowing for transfer. And, the subsequent bargaining

agreement was ratified by both bus and light rail employees. The instant facts,

therefore, more closely resemble the typical severance case— a smaller group of

employees, who previously approved of their inclusion with the existing

bargaining unit, now requests to form a separate bargaining unit due to changed

circumstances.

It is true that the doctrine of accretion has been applied where an employer

staffs a new facility by transferring employees from an existing facility.

However, even assuming the situation here can be characterized as a transfer to a

new facility, there is a presumption of continued support of the union (and

consequently that the employer is obligated to continue bargaining with the union)

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where the majority of employees in the new facility are transferees from the

original bargaining unit. Gitano Group, 308 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1175 (1992); see

U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 327 (2000) (applying the Gitano presumption).

Therefore, even were we to apply an accretion standard here, the burden rests on

the appellants to overcome this presumption, and they have failed to do so.

The district court’s conclusion is consistent with case law interpreting these

doctrines. In applying severance principles, six non-exclusive factors are used to

assess when severance from an existing bargaining unit should be permitted:

(1) the homogeneity or distinctive character of the proposed unit; (2) the history

of collective bargaining within the group; (3) the extent to which the proposed

unit has maintained a separate identity during its period of inclusion in the larger

group; (4) the history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry; (5) the

degree of integration between the groups; and (6) the qualifications and

experience of the bargaining representative. M allinckrodt Chem. Works, 162

N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966). However, at all times the key consideration is the

history of collective bargaining within the existing unit. Catalytic Indus. M aint.,

964 F.2d at 519.

These factors and the undisputed facts clearly support the district court’s

grant of summary judgment. The majority of TRAX employees, including the

appellants, transferred from the bus unit. An “established stable bargaining

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relationship” has existed between Local 382 and the consolidated unit since 1999.

Local 382 has been the bargaining representative for UTA and its predecessors

and, consequently has represented all mass transit w orkers in Utah, since 1904.

Finally, industry practice is to consolidate mass transit employees into a single

bargaining unit.

Nonetheless, appellants argue that this issue should not be resolved on

summary judgment since a determination of appropriateness is a necessarily fact-

intensive inquiry. W e disagree. Summary judgment is appropriate w here there

are no disputed issues of material fact. As we have explained, the undisputed

facts before us are more than ample to find the bargaining unit appropriate for

purposes of Utah Code § 17A-2-1031 under any standard we apply.

* * * * *

In sum, we hold that appellants’ claim against UTA fails under both UM TA

and the Public Transit District Act. First, because we find that UM TA does not

create a federal cause of action against state transit recipients, appellants do not

state a claim under UM TA. Second, we hold that appellants’ claim under Utah

Code § 17A-2-1031 is legally insupportable under either our primary analysis or

the district court’s alternative analysis. 3

3
Because we find that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was
proper, we agree with both appellants and Local 382 that the district court
exercised its discretion in dismissing the state-based claim against Local 382 for
(continued...)

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B . C ertification C laim against D O L

DOL certified UTA’s bargaining unit in 2001. Appellants argue that the

certification violated DOL’s duty under UM TA. The district court dismissed the

action against D OL for failure to state a claim, noting that appellants “failed to

plead or otherwise allege that the agency had any knowledge or information

regarding the current labor dispute when it made the challenged certification

decision in October 2001.” Aplt. A pp. B. at 282–83.

After review ing de novo the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ claim

against DOL pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we find no

violation. See M oore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006). States

must only preserve “the essence of federally-defined collective bargaining rights,”

Donovan, 767 F.2d at 950–51, by ensuring both that the state’s protective

arrangements are “fair and equitable” and that they provide for the “continuation

of collective bargaining rights.” 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b). In other words, employees,

“at a minimum, . . . are entitled to be represented in meaningful, ‘good faith’

negotiations with their employer over wages, hours and other terms and

conditions of employment.” Donovan, 767 F.2d at 951. As we previously found,

3
(...continued)
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Exum v. U.S.
O lym pic C om m ., 389 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2004) (approving dismissal
of state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after summary judgment
was granted as to all federal claims).

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UTA has met this standard. Accordingly, we find no error in DOL’s certification

of UTA’s protective arrangements in 2001 and 2005.

C . Lack of D iscovery

Before the district court granted summary judgment, appellants had

requested discovery on the following issues: (1) whether Local 382 enjoyed

majority support; (2) whether John Inglish, UTA General M anager, gave special

benefits to the union president for favorable treatment during negotiations; and

(3) whether safety has been compromised as a result of representation by Local

382. [Aplt’s App. at 146–48]. The district court denied discovery, noting that

appellants failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the information they

hoped to discover and UTA’s motion for summary judgment.

W e review a district court’s denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for abuse of

discretion. Bliss v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 2006). Rule 56(f)

provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing [a motion for
summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court m ay
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just.

The central tenet of Rule 56(f) is that “summary judgment [should] be refused

where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information

that is essential to his opposition.” Price ex rel. Price v. W. Res., Inc., 232 F.3d

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779, 783 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 n.5 (1986)). How ever, Rule 56(f) relief is not automatic. The affidavit must

identify “the probable facts not available and what steps have been taken to obtain

these facts.” Id. (quotation omitted). Additionally, it must “state[] with

specificity how the additional material will rebut the summary judgment motion.”

Bliss, 446 F.3d at 1042 (quotation omitted).

W hile the appellants’ affidavit briefly lists the additional discovery they

believe necessary, it fails to do so with any specificity, see id., and with any hint

of what facts such discovery is expected to unearth. See Price, 232 F.3d at 783.

Appellants argue that discovery is necessary as to whether Local 382 enjoys

majority support. But considering the undisputed evidence showing a majority of

UTA employees ratified both the 1999 and 2004 collective bargaining

agreements, additional discovery would be of marginal utility. Based on the

affidavit’s lack of specificity and its questionable relevance to the motion for

summary judgment, we find no abuse of discretion. See Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t v.

Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding no abuse w here

district court denied Rule 56(f) motion on grounds of relevance).

D . M otion to Am end

M inutes before midnight on August 14, 2005, appellants filed a motion to

amend pursuant to Rule 15(a). The district court did not act on the motion. W e

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see no error.

“Filing a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3 transfers the

matter from the district court to the court of appeals. The district court is thus

divested of jurisdiction. Any subsequent action by it is null and void.” Garcia v.

Burlington N. R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (10th Cir. 1987); see Lancaster v. Indep.

Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, appellants filed a

notice of appeal on August 22. This appeal immediately divested the district

court of jurisdiction, except over collateral matters. See Lancaster, 149 F.3d at

1237 (noting that district courts retain jurisdiction over collateral matters).

Because the motion to amend w as not collateral, the district court had no

jurisdiction to act on the motion.

III. C onclusion

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of appellants’

claims against DOL, Local 382, and John Inglish; AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment for UTA; and DENY as moot appellants’ appeal of

the denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction.

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