Moya v. Schollenbarger

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

September 26, 2006
PU BL ISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

G EO RG E M O Y A ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

KAY SCHOLLENBARGER, General
M anager, R OB ER T TA FO Y A , No. 04-2319
D irector of O perations, and R AUL
M ONTOYA, Electrician, “Supervisor
of All Trades,” New M exico State
Fair, in their individual capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New M exico
(D.C. No. CIV-04-172-RB/DJS)

Dennis W . M ontoya, M ontoya Law, Inc., Rio Rancho, NM , for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Daniel Joseph M acke, (Elizabeth L. German with him on the brief), Brown &
German, Albuquerque, NM , for Defendants-Appellees.

Before M U RPH Y, EBEL, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.
 The district court ordered dismissal of George M oya’s civil rights claim

“without prejudice.” W e conclude that the order was nonetheless a final decision

such that our jurisdiction is proper. And although the district court mistakenly

applied a heightened pleading standard in evaluating the propriety of dismissal,

we affirm because we conclude that the dismissal would also be proper under the

correct standard.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Complaint and Am ended Complaint

On February 17, 2004, M r. M oya filed the present civil rights claim

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three officials of the New M exico State Fair

(“Fair”), in their individual capacities. 1 The complaint alleged that in April 2003

M r. M oya was “involuntarily separated” from his job as a plumber for the Fair

due to an on-the-job injury. That injury, in turn, allegedly occurred “as a direct

and proximate result of hostile w ork conditions” to which Defendants

“deliberately and systematically exposed [M r. M oya] . . . in retribution and

retaliation for [M r. M oya’s] having spoken out on issues of public concern.” The

public issues on which M r. M oya allegedly spoke out included: the Fair’s illegal

use of M r. M oya’s plumber’s license to “cover” work done by unlicensed

personnel; the illegal exploitation of Fair employees; violation of the Fair Labor

1
The three D efendants listed in the complaint are: Kay Schollenbarger,
General M anager; Robert Tafoya, Director of Operations; and Raul M ontoya,
Electrician and “Supervisor of All Trades.”

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Standards Act by Fair employees; violation of the Families and M edical Leave

Act by the Fair; and supervision by unqualified personnel at the Fair. M r. M oya’s

complaint sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

In response to the complaint, Defendants filed a motion for a more definite

statement, 2 arguing that it was unclear (1) what M r. M oya claimed as an adverse

employment action, (2) how the timing of M r. M oya’s speech related to the

timing of the alleged adverse action, and (3) what actions were taken by each of

the three Defendants. The district court granted Defendants’ motion on all three

grounds and allowed M r. M oya two weeks to file an amended complaint

correcting the deficiencies.

M r. M oya timely filed an amended complaint attempting to address the

district court’s concerns. First, the amended complaint explained that the adverse

employment action taken against M r. M oya w as the creation of a hostile work

environment. 3 As for the district court’s timing concern, the amended complaint

stated simply that “[t]he hostile work environment created by the Defendants for

the Plaintiff follow ed in close temporal proximity his exercise of First

2
“If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive
pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a
responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
3
The amended complaint also claimed that M r. M oya’s physical injury and
his job loss were each “an extension of and an integral part of” both the hostile
work environment and the adverse employment action.

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Amendment protected activity.” Finally, the amended complaint included three

long paragraphs — one for each Defendant — describing in very general terms

each Defendant’s challenged actions. These alleged actions consisted mainly of

(1) ignoring reports and complaints made by M r. M oya and (2) creating and

facilitating the violations against w hich he allegedly spoke out.

B. Dismissal

In response to the amended complaint, Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The motion asserted that Defendants could not be liable to M r. M oya for the

alleged conduct because they were protected by qualified immunity. After

receiving briefing from both sides, the district court issued a M emorandum

Opinion and Order “GRANT[ING] Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

W ITHOUT PREJUDICE.” D ist. Ct. Op. at 1. An initial portion of the court’s

analysis stated that

where a qualified immunity defense is asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the Court applies a heightened pleading standard,
requiring the complaint to contain “specific, non-conclusory allegations
of fact that . . . if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.”

Id. at 4 (quoting Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation omitted)). Applying that standard, the court noted that “M r.

M oya’s allegations contain conclusory statements, with few specific facts to

support them.” Id. Specifically, the court noted that M r. M oya (1) offered no

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incidents to support his claim of a hostile work environment, (2) provided no

dates or time frames as to when he spoke and when he was retaliated against, and

(3) provided “no specific examples of corruption or details of how Defendants

benefitted from ignoring his complaints.” Id. Because M r. M oya failed to allege

specific facts, the district court concluded that his allegations were conclusory

statements and that Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted. Id. at 5.

The district court then stated that “[d]espite M r. M oya’s failure to allege

any specific facts that would state a claim for violation of his First Amendment

rights, an analysis of the qualified immunity issue follow s.” Id. As to the first

prong of qualified immunity — whether Defendants violated a “clearly

established statutory or constitutional right[],” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982) — the court noted that “a plaintiff must do more than identify a

clearly established right in the abstract and allege that the defendant violated that

right.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. Specifically,

[a]lthough M r. M oya has a clearly established constitutional right to
free speech under the First Amendment, he can not [sic] simply allege
that Defendants violated that right. He must also allege sufficient facts
that, if true, would show that Defendants violated his First Amendment
rights. M r. M oya has failed to do so.

Id. at 6–7. The court recognized that “M r. M oya’s interest in speaking out about

what occurs at the State Fair . . . may outweigh Defendants’ interests in

promoting an efficient work environment” but concluded that “he has not alleged

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sufficient facts to show that the speech w as a substantial factor in the adverse

employment action, if any.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). Specifically,

[n]either of M r. M oya’s complaints . . . indicate to the Court what the
hostile work environment was, nor what M r. M oya’s injuries were, nor
how, if at all, they were related to each other and to M r. M oya’s
separation from his State Fair job. In other words, M r. M oya has not
alleged sufficient facts that show any adverse employment action taken
against him by D efendants. He has also failed to show that his
complaining to his supervisors was a substantial factor in any adverse
employment action.

Dist. Ct. Op. at 11.

The final paragraph of the district court’s decision concluded: “IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED: Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss M r. M oya’s

suit for failure to state a claim is Granted. The case will be dismissed W ithout

Prejudice, each side to bear their own costs and fees.” Id. at 12.

C. Appeal and M otion to Dismiss the Appeal

M r. M oya filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s M emorandum

Opinion and Order. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss the appeal

for lack of appellate jurisdiction, claiming that “since Plaintiff’s Complaint was

dismissed without prejudice, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction” and that

“Plaintiff may still pursue a second amended complaint, raising the same claim,

provided sufficient facts are alleged.” In his reply to D efendants’ motion, M r.

M oya asserted that this court’s jurisdiction is proper because his injury and some

of the conduct of which he complained occurred so long ago that he would be

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barred by the statute of limitations if he were forced to “‘start over’ w ith his

complaint.” W e deferred decision on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal

until after argument on the merits.

II. D ISC USSIO N

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

The courts of appeals are granted jurisdiction by statute over “appeals from

. . . final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The initial question we face in this case is whether the dismissal of M r. M oya’s

claims without prejudice was a “final decision”; if not, then we lack jurisdiction

to hear the appeal. See Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 1259, 1261

(10th Cir. 2001) (“Aside from a few well-settled exceptions, federal appellate

courts have jurisdiction solely over appeals from ‘final decisions . . . .’”)

(emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). W e conclude that the district

court in this case intended to dismiss M r. M oya’s entire cause of action; thus, that

decision was final and our appellate jurisdiction is proper.

1. Legal framew ork

a. Practical approach to § 1291 finality

Although Defendants assert that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal

because the district court’s dismissal was without prejudice, that a dismissal was

without prejudice does not necessarily make it non-final under section 1291. See

United States v. W allace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 (1949) (“That the

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dismissal was without prejudice to filing another suit does not make the cause

unappealable . . . .”); Coffey v. W hirlpool Corp., 591 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir.

1979) (“A case dismissed without prejudice may or may not be a final appealable

order, depending upon the circumstances.”). Rather, in this circuit, “whether an

order of dismissal is appealable” generally depends on “w hether the district court

dismissed the complaint or the action. A dismissal of the complaint is ordinarily

a non-final, nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be available),

while a dismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final.” M obley v. M cCormick,

40 F.3d 337, 339 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted, emphasis added); see also

Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971, 978 (10th Cir. 1974) (“It is w ell

settled that an order dismissing the action, as distinguished from dismissal of the

complaint, is a final judgment.”).

Despite our use of this complaint/action terminology, we have long

recognized that “the requirement of finality imposed by section 1291 is to be

given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’” Sherman v. Am. Fed’n

of M usicians, 588 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). In evaluating finality, therefore, we look

to the substance and objective intent of the district court’s order, not just its

terminology. See M obley, 40 F.3d at 339 (stating that in evaluating whether a

dismissal is a final decision, “the focus must necessarily be on the district court’s

intent in issuing its order”) (quotation omitted); M frs. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Arapahoe

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Drilling Co., 267 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1959) (“[A] final decision within the

significance of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 depends not on its name, its propriety or its

normal function but rather upon the determination or refusal to determine a

justiciable issue . . . .”).

Thus, an order is not necessarily devoid of finality simply because it speaks

in terms of dismissal of a complaint. Rather, we “endeavor to scrutinize

[complaint dismissals] . . . closely in order to pinpoint those situations w herein, in

a practical sense, the district court by its order has dismissed a plaintiff’s action

as well.” Petty v. M anpower, Inc., 591 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1979) (per

curiam)); see also Thompson v. Dereta, 709 F.2d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir. 1983) (“It

is well settled that dismissal of a complaint is not an appealable order unless, in a

practical sense, the district court dismisses the action as w ell.”) (citation omitted);

Bragg v. Reed, 592 F.2d 1136, 1137 (10th Cir. 1979) (“This Court . . . reviews a

dismissal to see if it effectively extinguished the plaintiff’s cause of action.”).

Thus, for example, in a prior appeal from a district court order dismissing a

complaint for lack of prosecution, “a matter going to the merits of appellant’s

complaint itself rather than a procedural problem w hich amendment of a

complaint might rectify,” 4 we considered the order to be final and appealable.

Petty, 591 F.2d at 617. Similarly, in a case where a district court dismissed a

4
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (a dismissal for lack of prosecution “operates as
an adjudication upon the merits” unless the court specifies otherw ise).

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complaint because the plaintiff’s claims w ere barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

we concluded that the dismissal was final and appealable because “a

determination that the Eleventh Amendment was applicable sounded the ‘death

knell’ of the litigation in federal court.” Korgich v. Regents of N.M . Sch. of

M ines, 582 F.2d 549, 550 (10th Cir. 1978). W e have also found finality in cases

where complaints were dismissed based on: federal preemption, Airparts Co., Inc.

v. Custom Benefit Servs. of A ustin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1994);

Burford 5 abstention, Robert-Gay Energy Enters., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n of

Kan., 753 F.2d 857, 859 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1985); Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287,

289 (10th Cir. 1980); lack of personal jurisdiction, Sherman, 588 F.2d at

1314–15; lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United

States, 601 F.2d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 1979); lack of a cognizable property

interest for purposes of the D ue Process clause, Chavez v. City of Santa Fe H ous.

Auth., 606 F.2d 282, 283 (10th Cir. 1979); failure to timely exhaust

administrative remedies, Bragg, 592 F.2d at 1138; and unripeness, Landmark

Land Co. of O kla., Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 719–20 (10th Cir. 1989),

abrogated on other grounds by Fed. Lands Legal Consortium ex rel. Robart Estate

v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). In each case, the district court

effectively “determined that the action could not be saved by an amendment of

the complaint which the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to make.”

5
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).

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Sherman, 588 F.2d at 1315. Thus, the dismissals — though nominally just of

complaints — practically disposed of entire actions and thus were final decisions.

Our “practical” approach to finality also allows us to deal with the

unfortunate reality that sometimes courts are less than clear as to whether they

intend to dismiss just the complaint or the entire action. 6 See 15A Charles Alan

W right et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.1 (“[T]his distinction [between

dismissal of a complaint and dismissal of an entire action] is not always observed

by the trial bench and bar . . . .”); see also id. § 3914.6 (“Inevitably some

dismissal orders are ambiguous in ways that undermine any clear determination of

finality.”). In cases w here the district court order is ambiguous, our approach is

to determine as best we can whether the district court’s order evidences an

“inten[t] to extinguish the plaintiff’s cause of action,” Landmark Land Co., 874

F.2d at 720 (alteration, quotation omitted), and “whether [the] plaintiff has been

effectively excluded from federal court under the present circumstances,” Facteau

v. Sullivan, 843 F.2d 1318, 1319 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). If so, then our

appellate jurisdiction is proper.

6
As we have observed, it is “possible that by inadvertence a district court
order could refer to dismissal of the action, when in reality the court meant to
dismiss the complaint.” Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 851 F.2d 316, 320
(10th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The reverse is also true.

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 b. Sum mary of § 1291 finality principles

Based on our precedent, and although “it is impossible to devise a formula

to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the

‘twilight zone’ of finality,” Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152

(1964), we can lay out the following principles to be used in reviewing dismissal

orders for finality. First, if a district court order expressly and unambiguously

dismisses a plaintiff’s entire action, that order is final and appealable. 7 See

Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The

district court dismissed the entire action, effectively excluding Amazon’s suit

from federal court. Therefore, the dismissal . . . w as final and appealable . . . .”).

Second, where a district court dismissal expressly denies the plaintiff leave to

amend, or the district court’s grounds for dismissal are such that the defect cannot

be cured through an amendment to the complaint, that dismissal (even if it is

ambiguous or nominally of the complaint) is for practical purposes of the entire

action and therefore final. See Landmark Land Co., 874 F.2d at 720 (“[A]

dismissal of a complaint based upon a defect that cannot be cured by amendment

is an appealable order.”); Sherman, 588 F.2d at 1315 (finding the dismissal final

because it was “clear that the trial court determined that the action could not be

7
W e reemphasize that bare terminology in a district court order is not
determinative. See Huff, 851 F.2d at 320 (“It is . . . possible that by inadvertence
a district court order could refer to dismissal of the action, when in reality the
court meant to dismiss the complaint.”).

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saved by an amendment of the complaint which the plaintiff could reasonably be

expected to make”); Facteau, 843 F.2d at 1319 (“The critical determination is

whether plaintiff has been effectively excluded from federal court under the

present circumstances.”). 8 Third, when the dismissal order expressly grants the

plaintiff leave to amend, that conclusively shows that the district court intended

only to dismiss the complaint; the dismissal is thus not a final decision. See

Trotter v. Regents of Univ. of N.M ., 219 F.3d 1179, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2000)

(“The order granted Trotter express leave to file a motion to amend her complaint

within ten days from entry of the order. This order clearly shows that the district

court did not consider its . . . order to be a final order disposing of the entire

action.”); Hunt v. Hopkins, 266 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a district

court grants a plaintiff leave to amend his pleading, the court signals that the

action has not been fully and finally adjudicated on the merits . . . .”); Thompson,

709 F.2d at 1344; see also Landmark Land Co., 874 F.2d at 720 (“[D]ismissal of a

8
Similarly, a dismissal “w ith prejudice” is final and appealable because it
means either that the entire action is dismissed or that the complaint is dismissed
without leave to amend. See Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 661, 666 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (“The dismissal with prejudice of either a complaint or an action is final
and appealable.”); Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) produces a final order appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . .”). In contrast, a dismissal “without prejudice” may
or may not be final, depending on “[i]f it is intended to dispose of the cause of
action.” Coffey, 591 F.2d at 620.

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complaint with leave to amend is not an appealable order . . . .”). 9 Finally, in all

other cases, we look to the language of the district court’s order, the legal basis of

the district court’s decision, and the circumstances attending dismissal to

determine “the district court’s intent in issuing its order — dismissal of the

complaint alone or actual dismissal of plaintiff’s entire action.” Petty, 591 F.2d

at 617. If the effect of the district court order is that the plaintiff is “effectively

excluded from federal court,” Facteau, 843 F.2d at 1319, then the district court

must have intended to dismiss the entire action and our appellate jurisdiction is

proper.

2. Analysis

a. M r. M oya’s argument

Before applying the above finality principles to determine w hether this case

involves a final decision, we first dispose of the finality argument advanced by

9
Over sixty years ago, we explained the process a plaintiff should follow
when he or she would rather appeal a non-final dismissal than amend the
complaint:

W here a demurrer or motion to dism iss the complaint is sustained and
the complaint dismissed in whole or in part, and plaintiff does not
desire to amend, he should announce his election to stand on his
pleading, let a final order or judgment be entered dismissing the action,
and then appeal from that order or judgment.

Crutcher v. Joyce, 134 F.2d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1943). Thus, where a district
court dismisses but grants leave to amend, the plaintiff may notify the district
court of his or her decision to stand on the original complaint and, once a final
order or judgment is entered, appeal the grounds for dismissal.

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M r. M oya. He argues that the district court’s dismissal order should be

considered final because if he were forced to “start over” with a new complaint

the applicable statute of limitations would now bar recovery for some of the

conduct by Defendants of which he complains. In support of his position, M r.

M oya cites our statement in Bragg v. Reed that “[i]f it is clear that the plaintiff

may not start over again with a properly drawn complaint, because of limitations

problems or otherwise, the action is treated as final and the order is appealable.”

592 F.2d at 1138 (emphasis added).

M r. M oya’s position misunderstands the Bragg holding and is without

merit. Our reference in Bragg to “limitations problems” was not a reference to

statutes of limitations that eventually may bar recovery in federal court

subsequent to the initial dismissal of the complaint by the district court, but to the

administrative limitations periods at issue in that case that had already run. The

district court in Bragg had dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged

racial discrimination, because she had failed to file a discrimination claim with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within the 30-day period

specified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.214(a)(1)(i). 10 See 592 F.2d at 1138. Even though the

dism issal w as nominally of the plaintiff’s complaint and not her entire action, w e

concluded that it was a final decision because the reason for dismissal meant

10
That regulation has since been replaced with a regulation providing a 45-
day limitation period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105.

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amendment was futile; that is, it was “clear that the plaintiff [could] not start over

again with a properly drawn complaint, because of [the administrative] limitations

[period given in 5 C.F.R. § 713.214].” Id.; see also id. (“The [district court’s]

ruling was that the period of limitations with respect to filing an administrative

complaint barred the lawsuit. Plaintiff cannot cure that defect except to persuade

this court that the agency and trial court’s interpretation of the law was

erroneous.”). Therefore, Bragg did not, as M r. M oya claims, hold that the

subsequent expiration of a limitations period makes an otherwise non-final district

court order final. Rather, Bragg merely reiterated the rule that the dismissal of a

complaint is a final decision where it in effect dismisses the entire action.

M oreover, the finality rule argued for by M r. M oya is generally

unnecessary because a plaintiff in M r. M oya’s situation is in little danger of being

barred by the statute of limitation when he or she erroneously attempts to appeal

the non-final dismissal of his or her complaint. If the dismissal is not a “final

decision,” that necessarily implies that the plaintiff may seek to amend the

complaint — otherwise the dismissal would have been final. 11 See also M obley,

40 F.3d at 399 (stating that when only a complaint is dismissed, “amendment [is]

generally . . . available”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“[L]eave [to amend] shall be

11
Or, as we contemplated in Crutcher, the plaintiff may instead choose to
“announce his election to stand on his pleading, let a final order or judgment be
entered dismissing the action, and then appeal from that order or judgment.” 134
F.2d at 814.

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freely given when justice so requires.”). That amendment (assuming it was

limited to the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” at issue in the original

complaint) would then relate back to the date that the original complaint was

filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (“An amendment of a pleading relates back to the

date of the original pleading when . . . the claim or defense asserted in the

amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading . . . .”). Thus, no claim that was

timely when made in the original complaint would be barred when made in a

properly authorized amended complaint. W e therefore reject M r. M oya’s

proposed basis for finding the district court’s dismissal to be a final decision.

b. Analysis of the district court order

Turning now to our own finality analysis, we conclude that the district

court’s decision is ambiguous as to whether dismissal was just of M r. M oya’s

complaint or of his entire action. First, the terms used by the district court are

ambiguous. The first paragraph of the district court’s opinion describes

Defendants’ motion as a motion “to dismiss the complaint against them,” 12 then

states that the court “GRANTS Defendants’ . . . motion.” D ist. Ct. Op. at 1

(emphasis added). That would seem to indicate that dismissal was of the

complaint only. However, the final paragraph of the opinion concludes that “[t]he

12
Although Defendants’ motion to dismiss does not state whether it seeks
dismissal of the entire action or just the complaint, the district court apparently
construed it as seeking dismissal of the complaint.

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case will be dismissed W ithout Prejudice” and states that “Defendants’ . . .

motion to dismiss M r. M oya’s suit for failure to state a claim is Granted.” Id. at

12 (emphases added). Use of the terms “case” and “suit” w ould seem to indicate

that the district court intended to dismiss M r. M oya’s entire action, not merely the

complaint. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining “case” as “[a]

civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or in equity”

(emphases added)); see also Amazon, Inc., 273 F.3d at 1275 (“[W]here the

dismissal finally disposes of the case . . . , the dismissal is final and appealable.”)

(emphasis added); Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 601 F.2d at 1124 (“[T]he practical

effect of the District Court’s dismissal order is the termination of the entire case

in Federal District Court.”) (emphasis added).

The substance of the district court’s opinion is similarly ambiguous. It

initially appears only to find Plaintiff’s complaint deficient, as a matter of

pleading: “M r. M oya failed to allege specific facts that show a violation of his

free speech rights in either the complaint or the first amended complaint. The

Court, therefore, views M r. M oya’s allegations as conclusory statements and

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.” D ist. Ct. Op. at 5 (emphasis added). 13

That would seem to indicate that the district court thought that an amendment

13
See also Dist. Ct. Op. at 4 (“M r. M oya’s allegations contain conclusory
statements, with few specific facts to support them.”); id. (“M r. M oya offers no
incidents to support this claim.”); id. (“The Court . . . is not provided with any
dates or time frame . . . .”).

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alleging additional facts could cure the defects 14 and that dismissal was therefore

just of the complaint. However, the district court also proceeded to analyze

Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. In conducting that analysis, the district

court concluded that “no [adverse employment] actions occurred,” that

“Defendants’ failure to respond to M r. M oya’s complaints did not violate any

established free speech rights,” and that “M r. M oya did not allege any facts that

would constitute a First Amendment claim.” Id. at 7. These more substantive

conclusions tend to show that the district court considered Defendants to be

entitled to qualified immunity and therefore intended to dismiss M r. M oya’s

entire action, not just his complaint.

Although there is no easy resolution to the question of finality in the face

of this ambiguity, we ultimately conclude that the district court’s order evinces an

intent to dismiss M r. M oya’s entire action, not just his complaint. “Ambiguities

at times are resolved in favor of finality, but at some point there is a sufficiently

clear invitation to resurrect the action that finality is denied.” W right et al.,

supra, § 3914.6. W e conclude that in this case, there is not a “sufficiently clear

invitation” for M r. M oya to amend the complaint or otherwise continue the

proceedings in the district court. First, we consider the dispositive language in

the final paragraph of the district court’s opinion most clearly to express the

14
However, the district court neither granted nor denied leave to amend, and
M r. M oya never sought to amend a second time.

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district court’s intent; there, the court states that the “case” is dismissed. Second,

that paragraph states that each side is “to bear their own costs and fees,” which

indicates that in the district court’s view the case was finished. Third, when the

district court granted Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, it

specifically ordered that “Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint that corrects

the deficiencies identified by this M emorandum Opinion and Order by June 11,

2004.” That the dismissal order contains no analogous statement or any other

reference to amendment, which at this stage w ould have required “leave of court

or . . . written consent of the adverse party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), is at least some

indication that the court did not intend to allow for amendment. Finally, the

“overall tenor of the district court’s order,” Airparts Co., Inc., 28 F.3d at 1064,

given the court’s analysis of Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity, evidences

an intent to dismiss the entire action. Therefore, although it is a close question,

we construe the district court’s order as a dismissal of the “entire action” and

exercise appellate jurisdiction accordingly.

B. M erits of the appeal

W e now address the merits of M r. M oya’s appeal. W e conclude that

although the district court mistakenly applied a heightened pleading standard, the

decision to dismiss the action without prejudice should be affirmed.

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 1. Standard of review

Because whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted is a question of law , we review de novo the district court’s grant of a

motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6). Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind,

173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).

The district court asserted that

where a qualified immunity defense is asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the Court applies “a heightened pleading standard,
requiring the complaint to contain specific, non-conclusory allegations
of fact that . . . if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.”

Dist. Ct. Op. at 4 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1204) (additional quotations omitted).

Although for a time we did apply such a heightened standard in qualified

immunity cases, in 2001 we concluded that intervening Supreme Court precedent

required us to abandon that approach. See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916-

17 (10th Cir. 2001) (“W e conclude that this court’s heightened pleading

requirement cannot survive Crawford-El [v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)]. . . .

Therefore, this court will review Defendants’ motions under the customary

motion to dismiss standard . . . .”). As Defendants concede, the district court

therefore erred in holding M r. M oya’s complaint to a heightened standard.

Instead, the proper standard for evaluating dismissal in a qualified

immunity case is the normal standard we apply to dismissals generally. That is,

in reviewing the dismissal, “[w]e accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as

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distinguished from conclusory allegations, and view those facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” M aher v. Durango M etals, Inc., 144 F.3d

1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998). W e affirm a district court’s dismissal if “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.” Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236 (internal quotations

omitted).

2. Analysis

W e turn now to an evaluation of M r. M oya’s allegations under this proper

review standard. As discussed in more detail below, we conclude that his

amended complaint did not sufficiently allege violation of a constitutional right

and that dismissal was therefore appropriate.

a. The tw o prongs of qualified immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields government officials

performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Trotter, 219 F.3d at 1184

(quotations omitted). A proper qualified immunity analysis involves two steps:

“A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity ‘must first determine whether

the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all,

and, if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the

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time of the alleged violation.’” Id. (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290

(1999)).

b. Deprivation of constitutional right

1. First Amendment rights

As to the first prong of a qualified immunity analysis, M r. M oya’s

allegations clearly implicate First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has

held that the First Amendment prohibits a state government from “condition[ing]

public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally

protected interest in freedom of expression.” Connick v. M yers, 461 U.S. 138,

142 (1983). Therefore, as we have noted, “a public employer cannot retaliate

against an employee for exercising his constitutionally protected right of free

speech.” Dill, 155 F.3d at 1201. M r. M oya’s amended complaint asserts that

Defendants exposed him to a hostile work environment that led to his injury and

termination “in retribution and retaliation for Plaintiff’s having spoken out on

issues of public concern.” He has thus broadly invoked valid First Amendment

rights; we must therefore evaluate whether he has properly pled a violation of

those rights.

In Dill, we noted that our review of this type of First A mendment claim

involves “the four-step analysis derived from Pickering v. Board of Education,

391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick[, 461 U.S. at 138].” Id.

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 First, we must determine w hether the employee’s speech involves a
matter of public concern. If so, we then balance the employee’s interest
in commenting upon matters of public concern against the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. Speech is protected if the
employee’s interest outweighs the interest of the em ployer. If this
balance tips in favor of the employee, the employee then must show that
the speech was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the
detrimental employm ent decision. Finally, if Plaintiff makes such a
showing, the employer may demonstrate that it would have taken the
same action against the employee even in the absence of the protected
speech.

Id. at 1201–02 (quotations, citations omitted). W hereas “[t]he first two steps are

legal questions w hich the court resolves to determine whether the speech is

constitutionally protected,” “[t]he second two steps concern causation and involve

questions of fact.” Id. at 1202. W e have also noted that “[i]mplicit in the

Pickering test is a requirement that the public employer have taken some adverse

employment action against the employee.” Belcher v. City of M cAlester, O kla.,

324 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210,

1220 (10th Cir. 2005) (“An employee alleging retaliation must show that his

employer took some adverse employment action against him.”). If M r. M oya has

failed to properly allege one or more of these prongs, then his action was properly

dismissed.

2. Application of the Pickering analysis

Defendants admit for purposes of their appeal that M r. M oya has

sufficiently alleged that he engaged in protected speech — thus, they concede that

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the first two prongs of the Pickering analysis are met. Defendants contend,

however, that M r. M oya failed to sufficiently allege facts to meet the implicit

requirement that there be an adverse employment action taken against M r. M oya.

W e agree.

M r. M oya’s allegations as to his termination are as follow s:

1. “[T]he New M exico State Fair ‘involuntarily separated’ Plaintiff
from his employment as a Plumber”;

2. “Plaintiff’s involuntary separation from his job was directly the
result of his having sustained an on-the-job injury”;

3. “Plaintiff was injured on the job as a direct and proximate result
of hostile work conditions imposed upon him by the Defendants”;
and

4. “The Defendants deliberately and systematically exposed
Plaintiff to a hostile work environment in retribution and
retaliation for Plaintiff’s having spoken out on issues of public
concern . . . .”

M r. M oya further alleges that each Defendant (1) created or facilitated the

purported violations against which he spoke out and (2) ignored M r. M oya’s

complaints and reports about the alleged violations and illegal activity. W e

conclude that these allegations are insufficient to establish, even at this

preliminary stage of the litigation, that Defendants took an adverse employment

action against M r. M oya.

First, M r. M oya’s allegations that Defendants were involved with the

violations against which he spoke out and that they ignored M r. M oya’s

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complaints about those violations does not establish that Defendants took an

adverse employment action against M r. M oya. 15 Rather, the allegations show

only that M r. M oya was unable to get the response to his complaints that he

desired from his employer. Although “employer action short of discharge may

violate an employee’s First A mendment rights,” Dill, 155 F.3d at 1204, we

conclude that failing to respond to an employee’s complaints to that employee’s

satisfaction does not. Cf. Lybrook v. M embers of Farmington M un. Schs. Bd. of

Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1340 (10th Cir. 2000) (neither the employer’s issuance of a

“Corrective Action Plan” requiring the plaintiff to “[s]trive to create an

atmosphere that will nurture collaboration with all colleagues” and to “conduct

affairs with a conscious concern for the highest standards of professional

comm itment,” nor requiring the plaintiff to attend weekly meetings with her

supervisor constituted an adverse employment action).

Second, M r. M oya’s general assertions that he was “exposed” to a “hostile

work environment” and that Defendants “imposed” “hostile work conditions” on

him are merely conclusory allegations, see M aher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and are

therefore insufficient by themselves to state a First A mendment retaliation claim.

See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs must allege

15
M r. M oya does not allege that he was somehow injured by the alleged
violations of which he complained, e.g., that he was denied leave under the
Family and M edical Leave Act or that he complained of safety violations and was
injured because they were not remedied.

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sufficient facts to support their § 1983 claims. Bare conclusions, even read in the

light most favorable to plaintiff, may prove insufficient.”) (emphasis added);

Phelps v. W ichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 1989)

(“[C]onclusory allegations . . . are insufficient to state a claim under the First

Amendment.”); Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); see also

Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The

words ‘hostile work environment’ are not talismanic, for they are but a legal

conclusion; it is the alleged facts supporting those words, construed liberally,

which are the proper focus at the motion to dismiss stage.”); cf. Carter v. Three

Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998)

(concluding that statements that a place of employment “‘was a racially hostile

environment’ . . . were properly struck [from affidavits] as conclusory”);

Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that

affidavits “replete with conclusory allegations of . . . [a] hostile working

environment” were properly rejected). The broad claim of a “hostile work

environment” therefore does not by itself constitute an allegation that Defendants

took an adverse employment action against M r. M oya.

Furthermore, M r. M oya’s amended complaint is completely devoid of any

supporting factual allegations as to what made his work environment or work

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conditions hostile. 16 W e are left entirely in the dark as to what about M r. M oya’s

work environment was objectionable. M ore importantly, M r. M oya’s conclusory

and unsupported allegations fail to “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Because M r. M oya has failed to allege facts showing that

Defendants took an adverse employment action against him, he has failed to

satisfy the Pickering test. Therefore, his allegations are insufficient to survive

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Since he has thus failed to satisfy the first prong of a qualified immunity

analysis, we need not address the second prong. See Butler v. City of Prairie

Village, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 747 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999).

III. C ON CLU SIO N

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Defendants’ motion to dismiss for

lack of appellate jurisdiction and AFFIRM the dismissal of M r. M oya’s action

without prejudice.

16
Although in his brief on appeal M r. M oya also refers to being “placed in
dangerous situations,” we need not consider that as an allegation because it is
absent from the amended complaint. See Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 494
(10th Cir. 1995) (“It is well-established . . . that in determining whether to grant a
motion to dismiss, the district court, and consequently this court, are limited to
assessing the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained within the four corners
of the complaint.”). And, although the amended complaint refers to M r. M oya’s
physical injury and his job loss, the complaint clearly states that those injuries are
derivative of the alleged hostile work environment and not based on Defendants’
actions; those injuries therefore cannot independently constitute the requisite
adverse employment action.

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