F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 28, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-1002
v. D. Colorado
FELICIAN O M ERINO -SAN CH EZ, (D.C. No. 05-CR-252-W M )
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TACH A, Chief Judge, A ND ER SO N and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant/appellant Feliciano M erino-Sanchez pled guilty to one count of
unlawful reentry by an alien previously deported following a conviction for an
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He was
sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment. He has timely appealed.
M erino-Sanchez’s appointed counsel, W arren R. W illiamson, has filed an
Anders brief and moved to withdraw as counsel. See Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967). M erino-Sanchez has not filed a response, and the government
has declined to file a brief. W e therefore base our conclusion on counsel’s brief
and our own review of the record. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with
M r. M oore that the record in this case provides no nonfrivolous basis for an
appeal, and we therefore grant his motion to withdraw and dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
As stated in his plea agreement, M erino-Sanchez, a citizen of M exico, was
convicted in 1993 of a felony drug trafficking offense, in violation of California
law. He was deported to M exico in February 2001. He reentered the United
States illegally in June 2002. On M ay 13, 2005, he w as arrested in D enver,
Colorado, on charges related to the consumption of alcohol in a public park and
was found to be present illegally in the United States.
M erino-Sanchez then entered into a written plea agreement, in which he
agreed to plead guilty to the single-count indictment, in exchange for a stipulated
sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). The stipulated sentence w as a
sentence at the lowest end of the United States Sentencing Commission,
-2-
Guidelines M anual (“USSG ”) (2004), sentencing range applicable for a total
offense level of 17. Plea Agreement at 5, R. Vol. I, tab 19. The plea agreement
calculated M erino-Sanchez’s criminal history category as III, which yielded an
estimated sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months. The United States
Probation office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), which also calculated
M erino-Sanchez’s guideline sentencing range at thirty to thirty-seven months.
The district court subsequently held a sentencing hearing and imposed the
thirty month sentence to which the parties had stipulated. M erino-Sanchez,
proceeding pro se, filed this appeal. W e appointed counsel to represent M erino-
Sanchez.
D ISC USSIO N
Under Anders, “counsel [may] request permission to withdraw [from an
appeal] where counsel conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930
(10th Cir. 2005) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). This process requires counsel
to
submit a brief to the client and the appellate court indicating any
potential appealable issues based on the record. The client may then
choose to submit arguments to the court. The [c]ourt must then
conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether
defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous. If the court concludes after
such an examination that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and may dismiss that appeal.
-3-
Id. (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).
W e agree with M erino-Sanchez’s counsel that there are no nonfrivolous
issues related to M erino-Sanchez’s guilty plea or sentence.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) states that, in
structuring a guilty plea, the parties may “agree that a specific
sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the
case, . . . (such a recommendation or request binds the court once the
court accepts the plea agreement).” W here a defendant agrees to and
receives a specific sentence, that defendant may only appeal the
sentence if it was (1) imposed in violation of law, (2) imposed as a
result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, or (3) is greater
than the sentence set forth in the plea agreement.
United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005). Our review of the
record in this case reveals no argument that the sentence was imposed in violation
of law, nor is there any argument that it resulted from an incorrect application of
the guidelines. Furthermore, it is precisely the sentence set forth in the plea
agreement. W e can perceive nothing in this record which would rebut the
presumption of reasonableness accorded the sentence imposed in this case. See
United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2006). It is both
reasoned and reasonable.
-4-
C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and
this appeal is D ISM ISSED .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-5-