F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 4, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4074
EUGENE CHEE, JR., (D.C. No. 06-CV-58-TC)
(D.C. No. 02-CR-66-TC)
Defendant-Appellant. (D. Utah)
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before H ENRY, BRISCO E, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Eugene Chee, Jr., a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks to appeal the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 m otion to vacate, set aside or correct
his sentence. The matter is before this court on Chee’s request for a certificate of
appealability (“COA”). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a),
and, as we determine that Chee has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483-84 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
Chee was convicted by a jury for aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
contact while within Indian country. He was sentenced to two hundred and ten
months of imprisonment, which reflected the trial court’s application of an
obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. Chee filed a direct appeal of his conviction and this court
subsequently affirmed his conviction on January 28, 2004. United States v. Chee,
86 Fed. Appx. 400 (10th C ir. 2004). Chee did not file a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
On January 19, 2006, Chee filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in federal
court arguing that his sentencing enhancement was unconstitutionally imposed
because he was found guilty of having obstructed justice by the sentencing judge
rather than by a jury. The district court denied this petition, finding it was time-
barred. Chee filed a motion with the district court seeking reconsideration or, in the
alternative, to appeal the denial of his petition. The district court denied C hee’s
motion for reconsideration, treating the motion instead as an appeal of its denial of
his § 2255 petition. Because the district court did not issue Chee a COA or state why
a certificate should not issue, w e deem that Chee’s constructive request for a C OA
was denied. See United States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1193 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a C OA is deemed denied if the district court does not address its
issuance within thirty days).
Our granting of a CO A is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Chee’s appeal from
the denial of his § 2255 petition. M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
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W e construe Chee’s appellate brief in support of his notice of appeal as additional
argument in support of his application for a COA. To be entitled to a COA, Chee
must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite showing, Chee must demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented w ere
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” M iller-El, 537 U.S. at 336
(internal quotations omitted); see also Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that when
a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a petitioner is
entitled to a COA only if he shows both that reasonable jurists w ould conclude it
debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether
the district court's procedural ruling was correct).
To determine whether Chee has satisfied his burden, we undertake “a
preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal] framew ork”
applicable to each of his claims. M iller-El, 637 U.S. at 338. Although Chee need
not demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a C O A , he must “prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Having undertaken a review of Chee's application
for a C O A and appellate filings, the district court's order, and the entire record on
appeal pursuant to the framew ork set out by the Supreme Court in M iller-El, w e
conclude Chee is not entitled to a COA. For the following reasons, the district
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court's resolution of Chee’s § 2255 motion is not reasonably subject to debate and
the issues he seeks to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve further
proceedings.
First, Chee’s § 2255 petition was properly denied as time-barred. For the
purposes of a petition under § 2255, if a prisoner does not file a petition for writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court after his direct appeal, the one-year
limitation period begins to run w hen the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.
S.Ct. R. 13(1); United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2000). Here,
the one-year limitation period began to run on April 28, 2004, ninety days after w e
affirmed Chee’s conviction on January 28, 2004. In order for Chee’s § 2255 petition
to be timely, it had to be filed by April 28, 2005. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1). A s
Chee’s petition w as not filed until January 19, 2006, it was time-barred and no
reasonable jurist could conclude otherwise.
Alternatively, even assuming Chee's § 2255 petition was timely, it
unquestionably fails on the merits. Chee essentially argues that Booker is not a new
rule of criminal procedure and ought to be applied retroactively. Despite Chee’s
protestations to the contrary, Booker does indeed “represent[] a new rule,” which
“does not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before . . . January
12, 2005" and it “does not apply retroactively on collateral review.” U nited States
v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1184-88 (10th Cir. 2005). Because Chee's conviction
was final well before that date, he may not benefit from Booker. Likew ise, Chee’s
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next argument, that his appeal is timely because it was filed within one year of
Booker, is equally unavailing. W hile it is true that the one year limitation period of
28 U.S.C. § 2255 runs from the date the Supreme Court recognizes a right and
declares it retroactive, the Supreme Court did not declare that its holding in Booker
would apply retroactively. Id. at 1188. Beyond this, Chee presents no meaningful
argument that the statute of limitations in this case should be equitably tolled. See
M arsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding equitable tolling
available if “an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure
to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control”).
Accordingly, we DENY Chee’s application for a C O A and DISM ISS this
matter.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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