F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 13, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LO U IS T. TR UJILLO ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2314
(D.C. No. CIV-04-462 JC/RLP)
CITY O F ALBU QU ERQ UE, (D . N.M .)
a municipal corporation; M ARTIN
CHAVEZ, in his capacity as M ayor of
Albuquerque, New M exico, and
individually; C APTA IN CO N RAD
C AN D ELA RIA and D ETEC TIVE
JOHN W ILLIAM S, Albuquerque
Police Department, in their official
capacities and as individuals; ELLEN
C ON CINI and R OB ER T PIER SON,
Albuquerque Planning and Zoning
Commission, in their official
capacities and as individuals,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before H EN RY, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Louis T. Trujillo appeals from the district court’s decision granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and for qualified immunity.
M r. Trujillo’s complaint included claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,
as w ell as state law claims. M r. Trujillo’s appeal challenges the dismissal of his
claims for defamation, conspiracy and malicious prosecution. 1 W e review
de novo the district court’s summary judgment decision, applying the same
standard as the district court. See Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of M ental Health
& Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). W e affirm.
Background
In 1976, M r. Trujillo began operating an open-air market (“flea market”) on
his property. From 1980-2003, M r. Trujillo was repeatedly cited by the City of
Albuquerque for zoning code violations at his flea market. Finally, in December
2003, the City filed suit in state court seeking injunctive relief on two bases:
(1) violation of the zoning code; and (2) operation of a public nuisance. In M arch
2004, the state court held a hearing and subsequently issued a preliminary
injunction against M r. Trujillo for his zoning code violations. In April 2004,
1
M r. Trujillo does not challenge the district court’s disposition of his claims
for selective enforcement, unconstitutional taking or substantive due process;
accordingly, any issue with respect to those claims is deemed waived. See State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. M hoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
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M r. Trujillo filed a complaint in federal district court against defendants asserting
claims for defamation, conspiracy, selective enforcement, malicious prosecution,
unconstitutional taking and substantive due process violations. In M ay 2004,
after another hearing, the state court issued a permanent injunction against
M r. Trujillo for his zoning code violations. In August 2005, the federal district
court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims.
M r. Trujillo timely appealed.
Defamation Claims
M r. Trujillo brought claims for defamation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
New M exico Tort Claims Act. He alleged that defendants Captain Conrad
Candelaria and Detective John W illiams “defamed Plaintiff by casting his
business operation in a false light, by maligning Plaintiff’s business reputation, by
telling reporters and other third parties Plaintiff was engaged in criminal
activity.” Aplt. App. at 20.
New M exico Defamation Claim
Under New M exico law, “[t]he elements of defamation include a
defamatory communication published by the defendant, to a third person, of an
asserted fact, of and concerning the plaintiff, and proximately causing actual
injury to the plaintiff.” Clough v. Adventist Health Sys., Inc., 780 P.2d 627, 632
(N.M . 1989). The truth of the statement may be asserted as an affirmative
defense. See id.
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Although the complaint alleges that both Capt. Candelaria and
Det. W illiams made defamatory statements, there are no factual allegations in the
complaint or in the response to summary judgment attributing any statements to
M r. W illiams. Summary judgment in favor of M r. W illiams on this claim was
therefore appropriate.
The complaint alleged that the following statement was made by
Capt. Candelaria and was published in a local newspaper: “the criminal activity
at the [flea] market includes fencing, or the selling of stolen items, drug dealing,
pirating of illegally produced compact discs and even prostitution.” Aplt. App.
at 15 (quotation omitted). In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they
asserted that the statements made by M r. Candelaria were true and that therefore
the defamation claim could not survive. Defendants supported this assertion with
testimony from the state court proceeding against M r. Trujillo for zoning and
nuisance violations. In that proceeding, a homeow ner from the neighborhood
adjacent to the flea market testified that there was prostitution, drug dealing and
the selling of stolen items at the flea market. Id. at 125-27.
M r. Trujillo argued in his response to summary judgment that “[t]he truth
of that testimony is for the jury to determine,” id. at 139, but that statement is not
accurate. In order to survive summary judgment and reach a jury, M r. Trujillo
must offer evidence showing that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). M r. Trujillo failed to offer any evidence to dispute
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defendants’ evidence. M oreover, contrary to the allegation in his complaint that
defendants told “reporters and other third parties Plaintiff was engaged in
criminal activity,” id. at 20, there are no statements identified in the complaint
that speak of M r. Trujillo himself engaging in any criminal activity. Because
M r. Trujillo failed to produce evidence to rebut defendants’ evidence or to
provide support for the allegations in his complaint, summary judgment in favor
of M r. Candelaria on this claim was appropriate.
Section 1983 Defamation Claim
The district court, based on its reading of M r. Trujillo’s complaint,
interpreted his defamation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as intending to allege a
violation of a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because of this, the district court applied the following four-part
test for determining whether statements made allegedly infringed upon a protected
liberty interest:
First, to be actionable, the statements must impugn the good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity of the [plaintiff]. Second, the
statements must be false. Third, the statements must . . . foreclose
other employment opportunities . . . . Fourth, the statements must be
published.
Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1153 (10th Cir.
2001) (quotation and italics omitted) (emphasis added). Because M r. Trujillo
must again offer evidence creating a genuine issue on the falsity of the
statements, see id., this claim fails for the same reason that his state claim failed
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as discussed above. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
on this claim.
Conspiracy Claim
M r. Trujillo brought a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
alleging that “Defendant Candelaria conspired with the M ayor, or those under the
M ayor’s direct supervision and control, including the Strike Force to formulate
for dissemination to the press the defamatory allegations complained of, and to
generate false or misleading statistics to include in the City’s C omplaint.” A plt.
App. at 20. This court has held that a § 1985 conspiracy claim requires
“class-based discriminatory animus.” Lessman v. M cCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 608
(10th Cir. 1979). The complaint must therefore “allege facts showing a
conspiracy against plaintiff because of [his] membership in a class, and that the
criteria defining the class were invidious.” Id. (quotation omitted). M r. Trujillo’s
complaint does not meet this standard. There are no allegations that he is a
member of any class that is defined by invidious criteria nor are there any
allegations that any class membership was the motivating factor in the conspiracy.
The district court properly dismissed this claim as a matter of law. 2
M alicious Prosecution Claim
2
M r. Trujillo asserts for the first time on appeal that his complaint also
states a claim for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy. Generally, this court does not
consider an issue not ruled on by the district court. See In re Walker, 959 F.2d
894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument.
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M r. Trujillo brought a claim for malicious prosecution alleging “[t]he
actions of Defendants in prosecuting the City’s C omplaint were made with full
knowledge that no colorable basis existed for prosecuting a claim against Plaintiff
on one or both counts of the City’s Complaint.” Aplt. A pp. at 21 ¶60.
New M exico recognizes a tort of malicious abuse of process. The elements for
the claim are:
(1) the initiation of judicial proceedings against the plaintiff by
defendant; (2) an act by the defendant in the use of process other
than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the claim;
(3) a primary motive by the defendant in misusing the process to
accom plish an illegitimate end; and (4) damages.
DeVaney v. Thriftway M ktg. Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 283 (N.M . 1997). As the court
explained, “[i]n short, there must be both a misuse of the power of the judiciary
by a litigant and a malicious motive.” Id. M r. Trujillo presented no evidence that
defendants misused the power of the judiciary or that they had a malicious
motive.
M r. Trujillo asserts that he has a viable claim for malicious prosecution
because the state court found no merit in the public nuisance claim brought
against him by the City. That is not accurate. The City brought claims against
M r. Trujillo for zoning violations and for public nuisance and sought the issuance
of a permanent injunction against the operation of the flea market. Because the
court found in favor of the City on the zoning violations and entered the
injunction against the flea market, the court deferred ruling on the public nuisance
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claim. Aplt. App. at 103-04. There is no support in the record for M r. Trujillo’s
assertion that the court found no merit to the City’s public nuisance claim. The
district court properly dismissed this claim as a matter of law.
Conclusion
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants. W e find no merit to M r. Trujillo’s argument that the district court
used the wrong standard in analyzing defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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