Hackett v. Barnhart

U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S

FO R T H E T E N T H C IR C U IT

ELIZABETH H AC KETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 06-1066

JO A NN E B. BA RN HA RT,
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

OR DER
Filed January 17, 2007

Before B A R R E T T , B R O R B Y , and E B E L, Circuit Judges.

This matter is before the court on the C ommissioner of Social Security’s

petition for panel rehearing. The panel grants the petition for rehearing, and, as

requested by the Commissioner, the panel has modified the opinion previously

filed on November 21, 2006. Specifically, the panel has modified footnote 1, and

a copy of the amended opinion is attached to this order.

Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUM AKER, Clerk

By:
 Deputy Clerk

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 F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
November 21, 2006
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
T E N T H C IR C U IT

ELIZABETH H AC KETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 06-1066

JO A NN E B. BA RN HA RT,
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

A PPE A L FR O M T H E U N IT ED ST A T ES D IST R IC T C O U R T
FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F C O L O R A D O
(D .C . N o. 03-C V -168-L T B )

Submitted on the briefs: *

Ann J. Atkinson, Aurora, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

W illiam J. Leone, United States Attorney, Kurt J. Bohn, Assistant United States
Attorney, M ichele M . Kelley, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Office of
the G eneral Counsel, Social Security Administration, Region VIII, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before B A R R E T T , B R O R B Y , and E B E L, Circuit Judges.

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
E B E L, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Elizabeth Hackett is appealing the order entered by the district

court denying her application for an award of reasonable attorney fees under the

Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Exercising jurisdiction

under 28 U .S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A . Introduction.

In this social security case, plaintiff obtained a district court remand to the

Commissioner of Social Security under the fourth sentence in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

and she is therefore a prevailing party for purposes of EAJA . As such, plaintiff is

entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees from the United States “unless the

court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

In the EA JA application that she submitted to the district court, plaintiff

requested fees for: (1) her merits appeal to the district court; (2) her merits appeal

to this court; and (3) the filing of her EAJA application in the district court.

In her opening brief in this appeal, plaintiff has also requested that she be

awarded fees for the time spent prosecuting this appeal. The total amount of fees

being requested is $13,909.05, and the hourly rates are based on the fixed starting

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hourly rate under EAJA of $125.00, plus a cost of living adjustment calculated

pursuant to the Consumer Price Index. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

In the underlying administrative decision denying plaintiff’s application for

social security disability benefits, the A dministrative Law Judge (ALJ)

mischaracterized the hearing testimony of the vocational expert (VE) when he

attempted to satisfy his step-five duties under Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084,

1087 (10th Cir. 1999). The A LJ’s error under Haddock was the basis for this

court’s prior reversal and remand to the district court for a sentence-four remand

to the Commissioner. See H ackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1174-76 (10th Cir.

2005). Because the A LJ’s analysis at step five was not substantially justified, w e

conclude that plaintiff is entitled to recover all of the EAJA fees that she is

seeking, subject to possible reductions by the district court on remand based on

a reasonableness analysis.

B . W aiver Issue.

In this appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court committed reversible

error by failing to consider whether the ALJ’s unreasonable ruling in the

administrative proceedings could support an award of EA JA fees, standing alone,

regardless of the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s subsequent litigation

position in the proceedings before the district court.

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 Plaintiff’s argument raises a waiver issue, because, while plaintiff referred

to the ALJ’s error in her EAJA application, she did not explicitly argue for an

award of EA JA fees based on the ALJ’s error. Instead, plaintiff focused

exclusively on the “legal theory” advanced by the Commissioner in the district

court proceedings, arguing that the Commissioner’s “position in this litigation

was . . . not substantially justified.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 154. Although plaintiff

subsequently raised the ALJ’s error as a basis for an EAJA award in the reply

brief that she submitted to the district court, the court did not address plaintiff’s

reply brief argument in its order denying her EAJA application.

The EAJA statute simply states that a plaintiff’s application for fees “shall

also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that:

(1) this is merely a “pleading requirement”; and (2) a timely filed EAJA

application may be amended to satisfy this pleading requirement. See

Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414, 423 (2004). In Scarborough, the

Court explained its reasoning as follow s:

Unlike the § 2412(d)(1)(B) prescriptions on w hat the applicant must
show (his “prevailing party” status and “eligib[ility] to receive an
award,” and “the amount sought, including an itemized statement”
reporting “the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and
other expenses w ere computed”), the required “not substantially
justified” allegation imposes no proof burden on the fee applicant.
It is, as its text conveys, nothing more than an allegation or pleading
requirement. The burden of establishing “that the position of the

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 United States was substantially justified,” § 2412(d)(1)(A) indicates
and courts uniformly have recognized, must be shouldered by the
Government.

Id. at 414.

Although the Court in Scarborough used the term “pleading requirement,”

the Court made it clear that the purpose of the requirement is not to provide

notice to the government of any substantive arguments or theories of recovery.

As the Court stated, “the [not substantially justified allegation] does not serve an

essential notice-giving function; the Government is aware, from the moment a fee

application is filed, that to defeat the application on the merits, it will have to

prove its position was substantially justified.” Id. at 416-17. Instead, “EAJA’s

ten-word ‘not substantially justified’ allegation is a ‘think twice’ prescription that

‘stem[s] the urge to litigate irresponsibly.’” Id. at 416 (quoting Edelman v.

Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 116 (2002)). As the Court explained:

By allocating the burden of pleading “that the position of the United
States was not substantially justified”--and that burden only--to the
fee applicant, Congress apparently sought to dispel any assumption
that the Government must pay fees each time it loses.
Complementarily, the no-substantial-justification-allegation
requirement serves to ward off irresponsible litigation, i.e.,
unreasonable or capricious fee-shifting demands. As counsel for the
Government stated at oral argument, allocating the pleading burden
to fee applicants obliges them “to examine the Government’s position
and make a determination . . . whether it is substantially justified or
not.”

Id. at 415 (citation omitted).

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 In sum, according to Scarborough, § 2412(d)(1)(B) requires only that an

EAJA application contain a bare ten-word “allegation” stating that the

government’s position was not substantially justified, and the statute does not

require a plaintiff to set forth any substantive arguments to support the allegation.

In addition, as discussed below, once an EAJA application is filed, the

government is on notice, based on the plain language of the statute, that it must

justify both its position in any underlying administrative proceedings and its

position in any subsequent district court litigation. See § 2412(d)(2)(D)

(providing that phrase “‘position of the United States’ means, in addition to the

position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act

by the agency upon which the civil action is based”). Accordingly, we conclude

that plaintiff’s application satisfied the pleading requirement imposed by

§ 2412(d)(1)(B), and that she did not waive the particular argument she now

raises when she failed to identify it with specificity in her application.

C . U nderlying P roceedings.

In his decision denying plaintiff’s application for disability benefits, the

ALJ made the following step-five findings with regard to the hearing testimony of

the VE:

The Administrative Law Judge called upon the vocational
expert to name jobs a hypothetical person with the claimant’s
residual functional capacity and vocational factors described above
could perform. The vocational expert testified that such a person

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 would be able to perform work as a call-out operator (DOT 237.367-
014; 840 jobs in Colorado and 46,150 nationally) and a surveillance
system monitor (DOT 379.367-010; 175 jobs in Colorado and 10,000
nationally).

The vocational expert acknowledged these opinions do not
directly correspond with information provided in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT) and adjustments to the numbers of jobs
were made on the following basis. At the hearing, the vocational
expert testified that to the extent opinions do not correspond to the
DOT, reliance was being placed on education, experience and
observations of the jobs as actually performed in the economy. . . .
No contrary evidence was presented. The opinions are therefore
accepted as an accurate description of the occupations listed above.

Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 34.

Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s step-five rulings in her subsequent appeal to

the district court, arguing that “[t]he ALJ’s determination that M rs. H ackett could

perform the jobs of surveillance system monitor and call out operator is

unsupported by any substantial evidence, and is contrary to the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles.” Id., Vol. 1 at 35. In addition, plaintiff explained to the

district court that the ALJ had mischaracterized the hearing testimony of the VE:

At page 34 of the Administrative Record, the ALJ states that the
vocational expert testified that his opinion did not correspond
directly with the information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
but that he relied on his education, experience, and observation of the
jobs as actually performed in the national economy. In fact, the
vocational expert was never asked any questions on this point and did
not make these statements in his testimony.

Id.

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 Relying on arguments that the Commissioner set forth in the brief she

submitted to the district court, id. at 87-89, the district court rejected plaintiff’s

challenge, as it concluded, contrary to the finding of the ALJ, that there was no

conflict between the VE’s hearing testimony and the DOT:

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff
could perform the jobs identified by [the V E] was in error because
there are discrepancies between [the V E’s] characterization of these
jobs and the descriptions set forth in the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (“DOT”). Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ had a duty to
inquire as to the reasons for these discrepancies before accepting [the
VE’s] opinions.

An ALJ does have a duty to investigate and obtain a
reasonable explanation for any conflict between the D OT and expert
testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert testimony as
substantial evidence. Haddock v. [Apfel] , 196 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir.
1999). Here, however, no such conflict exists. Although the ALJ
stated in his decision that [the VE] had acknowledged that his
opinion regarding the jobs Plaintiff could perform do not directly
correspond with the DOT, the record is devoid of any such testimony
by [the VE]. . . . The record is equally devoid of testimony from [the
VE] to support the ALJ’s determination that these discrepancies
could be explained by his education, experience, and observation of
the jobs as performed in the national economy. . . . These statements
by the V E may therefore be in error. This error is, however,
harmless upon analysis of the applicable DOT provisions.

Id. at 127-28.

Plaintiff’s next step was to file an appeal in this court. In that appeal,

plaintiff succeeded in convincing another panel of this court to reverse the district

court in part, as the panel agreed with plaintiff that “the ALJ misstated the

testimony of the VE and failed to reconcile the VE’s actual testimony with the

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Dictionary of Occupational Titles (D OT), contrary to this court’s decision in

Haddock . . . and Social Security Ruling 00-4p.” Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1174-75.

The panel explained its holding as follow s:

In his decision the ALJ said that the VE had admitted at the
hearing that his opinions about the jobs Plaintiff could do did not
directly correspond with information in the DOT. The ALJ then
asserted that the V E explained this discrepancy by relying on his own
“education, experience and observations of the jobs as actually
performed in the economy.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 34. As Plaintiff
and the district court have pointed out, however, there is no
indication in the record that the VE expressly acknowledged a
conflict with the DOT or that he offered any explanation for the
conflict. The district court nevertheless ruled that the A LJ’s
assertion about the V E’s explanation was unnecessary because there
was no conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. W e agree
with respect to the “people” function of the designated jobs, but
disagree with respect to the required reasoning level.

....

W e therefore must reverse [that] portion of the ALJ’s decision
and remand to allow the ALJ to address the apparent conflict
between Plaintiff’s inability to perform more than simple and
repetitive tasks and the level-three reasoning required by the jobs
identified as appropriate for her by the VE.

Id. at 1175, 1176.

Following our remand to the district court and the latter’s remand to the

Commissioner, plaintiff filed her EAJA application in the district court. As noted

above, while plaintiff referred to the ALJ’s error in her EAJA application, she did

not explicitly argue for an award of EA JA fees based on the ALJ’s error. Instead,

plaintiff focused exclusively on the “legal theory” advanced by the Commissioner

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in the district court proceedings. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 154. The district court

denied plaintiff’s EAJA application, concluding that “the legal argument

advanced by the Commissioner, and the underlying rationale and reasoning,

although admittedly complex, is not without basis in the law.” Id. at 206.

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 D . C ontrolling Standards U nder E A JA .

Under EAJA, a fee award is required if: (1) plaintiff is a “prevailing party”;

(2) the position of the United States was not “substantially justified”; and

(3) there are no special circumstances that make an award of fees unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The only dispute in this appeal is whether the

Commissioner’s position was substantially justified.

As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 414,

the Commissioner had the burden of proof to show that her position was

substantially justified. See Gilbert v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir.

1995). “The test for substantial justification in this circuit is one of

reasonableness in law and fact.” Id. Thus, the government’s position must be

“justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The government’s “position can be

justified even though it is not correct.” Id. at 566 n.2.

W e review the district court’s determination that the C ommissioner’s

position was substantially justified for an abuse of discretion. See G ilbert,

45 F.3d at 1394. “A n abuse of discretion occurs w hen the district court bases its

ruling on an erroneous conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous fact

findings.” Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir.

1998).

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 E . E A JA ’s D efinition of “Position of the U nited States.”

As defined by EAJA , “‘position of the United States’ m eans, in addition to

the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to

act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2)(D). The statute further provides that “[w]hether or not the position

of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of

the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the

agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for

which fees and other expenses are sought.” Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

This dichotomy between the position of the United States in the underlying

agency action, which means the position of the ALJ in social security

proceedings, see Cunningham v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 862, 863-64 (7th Cir. 2006),

and the position of the government in a subsequent civil action/appeal before a

district court, is difficult to apply in this case. To begin with, as set forth above,

the ALJ in this case made an unreasonable legal/factual ruling at step five, and

the ALJ’s error at step five was the basis for this court’s reversal and remand to

the district court for a sentence-four remand to the Commissioner. See Hackett,

395 F.3d at 1174-76. However, in plaintiff’s m erits appeal to the district court,

the C ommissioner articulated new legal arguments in defense of the A LJ’s

step-five reasoning which, while ultimately unsuccessful, were quite reasonable,

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and the district court subsequently relied on the latter arguments to deny

plaintiff’s EAJA application. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 205-06.

In Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990), the Supreme Court

addressed the question of whether EAJA fees can be awarded to a prevailing

plaintiff for time spent in the fee litigation itself (i.e., the proceedings that arise

after the government opposes an EA JA application), regardless of whether the

government’s positions in the fee litigation were substantially justified. Id.

at 156, 157. After analyzing the controlling statutory language, the Court

concluded that a second “substantial justification” finding is not required before

EAJA fees may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff for time spent in the fee

litigation process. Id. at 162. In reaching this holding, the Supreme Court

emphasized that there can only be a “single finding” on the question of substantial

justification in any given case that involves both underlying agency proceedings

and a district court appeal. As the Court explained:

The fact that the “position” is again denominated in the singular,
although it may encompass both the agency’s prelitigation conduct
and the D epartment of Justice’s subsequent litigation positions,
buttresses the conclusion that only one threshold determination for
the entire civil action is to be made.

Id. at 159.

As argued by the Commissioner in this case, see Aplee. Supp. Br. at 2-3,

5-6, this language suggests that the government may “cure” unreasonable agency

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conduct by taking a reasonable position in any subsequent civil litigation before a

district court. 1 M oreover, there is other language in Jean that arguably supports

this interpretation. See Jean, 496 U.S. at 160, 161 (stating that “[t]he single

finding that the Government’s position lacks substantial justification, like the

determination that a claimant is a ‘prevailing party,’ thus operates as a one-time

threshold for fee eligibility,” and that “[a]ny given civil action can have numerous

phases. W hile the parties’ postures on individual matters may be more or less

justified, the EA JA–like other fee-shifting statutes–favors treating a case as an

inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items.”).

As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, however, the “one threshold

determination” language can also be relied on to support the argument that EA JA

1
The Commissioner is also relying on Jean to argue that her “position” in
the underlying proceedings was substantially justified “under the totality of the
circumstances,” because she prevailed on five of the six issues that plaintiff
raised in the district court. See Aplee. Supp. Br. at 8. W e disagree. Although the
Commissioner is correct that Jean requires this court to treat this case “as an
inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items,” Jean, 496 U.S. at 162, and
that an issue-by-issue approach is therefore not appropriate, the fact that the
Commissioner prevailed on five of the six issues that plaintiff raised in the
district court does not alter our analysis in this case because: (1) plaintiff obtained
a sentence-four remand based solely on the Haddock issue; and (2) the other
issues on which the Commissioner prevailed were completely unrelated to the
Haddock issue, and they did not provide a basis for affirming the ALJ’s denial of
benefits. In other words, the fact that the Commissioner prevailed in the district
court on most issues did not alter the fact that she acted unreasonably in denying
benefits at the administrative level.

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“fees may be awarded in cases where the government’s prelitigation conduct was

not substantially justified even though its litigating position may have been

substantially justified and vice versa.” M arcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1036

(7th Cir. 1994) (citing Jean, 496 U.S. at 159). “In other words, the fact that the

government’s litigating position was substantially justified does not necessarily

offset prelitigation conduct that was without a reasonable basis.” Id.

In fact, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, “Jean quoted legislative

history of EA JA suggesting that a subsequent litigation position cannot ‘cure’

an underlying agency action that is not substantially justified.” Thangaraja v.

Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 875-76 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); see Jean, 496 U.S. at 159 n.7

(“[T]he [1985] amendment [to EAJA defining the phrase ‘position of the United

States’] will make clear that the Congressional intent is to provide for attorney

fees when an unjustifiable agency action forces litigation, and the agency then

tries to avoid such liability by reasonable behavior during the litigation.”)

(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-992, pp. 9, 13 (1984)). Indeed, both the Second and

the Third Circuits reached this conclusion even before Jean. See Smith ex. rel

Smith v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1989); Taylor v. Heckler, 835 F.2d

1037, 1040 (3d Cir. 1988); see also M organ v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir.

1998) (stating that “unless the government’s pre-litigation and litigation positions

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have a reasonable basis in both law and fact, the government’s position is not

substantially justified”).

Having carefully analyzed this important issue, we believe the

Commissioner has misread Jean, and we hold that EAJA “fees generally should

be awarded where the government’s underlying action was unreasonable even if

the government advanced a reasonable litigation position.” United States v.

M arolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). This is only the general rule,

however, and, for purposes of this case, we do not need to state categorically that

a reasonable litigation position by the government can never “cure” unreasonable

agency action. Instead, we limit our holding to the specific circumstances of this

case.

F. C henery.

In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947), the Supreme Court

“emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law.”

That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a
determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by
the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate
or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative
action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or
proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.

Id.

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 This Court has characterized Chenery as establishing a general rule that

“we may not properly affirm an administrative action on grounds different from

those considered by the agency.” Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. United States Forest Serv.,

451 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted); see also M ickeviciute

v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Chenery for proposition that

“we intrude on the agency’s authority . . . by supporting a result reached by the

agency with reasoning not explicitly relied on by the agency”). This court has

also recognized, however, that

it nevertheless may be appropriate to supply a missing dispositive
finding under the rubric of harmless error in the right exceptional
circumstance, i.e., where, based on material the A LJ did at least
consider (just not properly), we could confidently say that no
reasonable administrative factfinder, follow ing the correct analysis,
could have resolved the factual matter in any other way.

Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004).

Here, we are not dealing with a “factual matter” that could not have been

resolved in any other way, and this is not a situation where the Commissioner

simply “suppl[ied] a missing dispositive finding.” Id. Instead, in the merits

proceedings before the district court, the Commissioner came up with entirely

new legal theories in an attempt to reconcile the VE’s hearing testimony with the

pertinent job descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, see Aplt. A pp.,

Vol. 1 at 87-89, and the Commissioner’s theories were based on “reasoning not

explicitly relied on by the [ALJ],” M ickeviciute, 327 F.3d at 1165. Thus, we

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conclude that the Commissioner was acting in violation of Chenery, and that it

would therefore be improper to rely on the Commissioner’s litigation position to

deny plaintiff’s EAJA application.

W e also conclude that the ALJ’s attempt to satisfy his step-five duties

under Haddock was not substantially justified. As set forth above, in his decision,

the ALJ mischaracterized the hearing testimony of the VE. Specifically, as

plaintiff has pointed out:

the ALJ state[d] that the vocational expert testified that his opinion
did not correspond directly with the information in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles but that he relied on his education, experience,
and observation of the jobs as actually performed in the national
economy. In fact, the vocational expert was never asked any
questions on this point and did not make these statements in his
testimony.

Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 35. This error does not meet the reasonableness test for

substantial justification. See G ilbert, 45 F.3d at 1394. It would therefore be an

abuse of discretion for the district court to deny plaintiff’s EAJA application, and

a remand on the substantial justification issue is not necessary.

G . R em and for R easonableness D eterm ination.

The Commissioner has not challenged plaintiff’s computation of her

claimed attorney fees. As a result, we could simply remand this matter to the

district court for an award of all the EAJA fees that plaintiff has requested. See

Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 382 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2004). But given the fact

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that plaintiff’s fee award will come out of the public fisc, we believe the better

course is to remand this matter to the district court with instructions for the court

to consider and determine the reasonableness of the requested fees and the

upward cost of living adjustment.

The order entered by the district court denying plaintiff’s application for an

award of reasonable attorney fees under EAJA is REVERSED, and this matter is

REM ANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Specifically, on remand, the district court shall consider and determine

the reasonableness of the attorney fees and cost of living adjustment that plaintiff

is seeking, and the court shall then enter an appropriate order granting plaintiff’s

EAJA application.

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