F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 22, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-2389
v. (D. New M exico)
A BRAH A M A M A Y A , (D.C. No. CR-04-1312-RB)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, A ND ER SO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Following a jury trial, Abraham Amaya was found guilty of possession with
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing
methamphetamine and conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A) and 846. He was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment, followed by
five years of supervised release. He appeals his conviction, which we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
BACKGROUND
Amaya’s arrest and conviction occurred as a result of a multi-year
investigation into a methamphetamine trafficking organization run by Guadalupe
Lopez. In December 2003, federal agents working with a confidential informant
purchased four pounds of methamphetamine from Lopez. Based upon this seizure
and other information gleaned from their investigation, the agents obtained a
wiretap on a cellular telephone used by Lopez. Federal authorities began
intercepting calls in M arch 2004.
On April 5, 2004, federal agents learned from intercepted calls that Lopez
was planning to deliver four pounds of methamphetamine to Amaya’s co-
defendant, Alberto Becerra, the next day. The agents began conducting
surveillance of Becerra. They believed that Lopez would deliver the
methamphetamine using the same black Dodge pickup with Texas license plates
that he had used in the December 2003 sale. Through intercepted calls and
surveillance, the agents found the truck at a Budget Inn in Roswell, New M exico,
on April 6, 2004. At approximately 11:45 a.m., Becerra arrived at the Budget Inn
and met with the driver of the truck, later identified as Amaya.
Shortly thereafter, Amaya, driving the truck, and Becerra, driving a car, left
the Budget Inn and drove to 7018 LaVanne in Hagerman, New M exico. No one
was home at the residence. Amaya and Becerra got out of their vehicles and
looked underneath the back of the truck.
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Approximately an hour later, Amaya drove the truck to Becerra’s house at
400 Kansas in Hagerman, New M exico, while Becerra followed in a car. They
remained at Becerra’s house for several hours. At approximately 6 p.m., Amaya
drove the truck back to 7018 LaV anne and parked in the carport, with Becerra
again following in a car. After Becerra and Amaya arrived at the residence, the
agents observed Becerra and another individual conducting “heat runs” to check
for the presence of law enforcement personnel in the area. W hen the agents
observed several vehicles leaving the residence shortly thereafter, fearing that the
methamphetamine they suspected was in the truck had been unloaded and was
being transported away, they stopped the vehicles and secured the residence.
At this point, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Special Agent
M ike M urphy obtained a federal search warrant for the residence and any vehicles
at 7018 LaVanne. The affidavit prepared by Agent M urphy in support of the
warrant contained the following information about the drug trafficking
organization: a confidential source had informed M urphy that Becerra was
“purchasing and distributing large quantities of methamphetamine in the Rosw ell,
New M exico area”; Becerra’s source was in the El Paso, Texas area; on April 6,
2004, a second confidential source 1 told M urphy that Becerra “would be receiving
a large quantity of methamphetamine from an unknown individual in Rosw ell,
1
This second confidential source was the wiretap on the cellular phone used
by Lopez.
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NM on April 6, 2004”; on April 6, “law enforcement agents observed B[ecerra]
meet with an unknown individual at a hotel in Roswell”; agents then observed
Becerra drive his vehicle while “the unknown man followed in a separate/second
vehicle with Texas license plates”; “[t]he two vehicles then traveled in tandem to
[a] second location . . . [w here] an individual peered under the second vehicle
with the Texas license”; thereafter, “both vehicles departed driving in tandem to
400 Kansas, Hagerman, NM ”; after several hours, the “vehicle with the Texas
license departed the area” and was driven to 7018 LaVanne in Hagerman, where it
was parked in the carport; after other vehicles arrived and departed the residence,
agents stopped the cars and secured the residence. Application and Aff. for
Search W arrant, Attach. C, R. Vol. I, tab 39.
W ith respect to the two confidential sources (“CS”s), the affidavit stated
that “[b]oth CS1 and CS2 have provided reliable information in the past that has
been corroborated through other means.” Id. A United States M agistrate Judge
signed the warrant, and the agents’ subsequent search of the residence and the
Dodge pickup truck driven by Amaya uncovered 507.6 grams of
methamphetamine in a hidden compartment in the truck’s axle. Amaya was
arrested.
On April 8, 2004, Amaya, along with his co-defendants Becerra and
Francicso H uerta-V arela, the ow ner of the residence at 7018 LaVanne, and two
other individuals, was indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to
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distribute methamphetamine. On M ay 6, the district court set a trial date of June
14, 2004. On M ay 28, the government filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
without prejudice, for the stated reason that “the testimony of a confidential
source will be needed at trial and, for investigative reasons, the United States is
not able to disclose the identity of the confidential source at this time.” M ot. to
Dismiss Indictment W ithout Prejudice, R. Vol. I, tab 38. 2 Finding that the motion
“states good cause,” on June 1, the district court dismissed the indictment without
prejudice. Amaya and his co-defendants were then released from custody.
On July 9, 2004, a second indictment was lodged against A maya and his
co-defendants, again charging Amaya with conspiracy and possession with intent
to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. 3 Amaya and his co-
defendants were arrested again. On December 7, 2004, Huerta-Varela filed a
motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his house. Two days
later, Amaya filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and to suppress all evidence
seized during the search of Huerta-Varela’s house, including the
methamphetamine found in the truck Amaya had driven to the residence. After
holding a hearing, the district court denied the motion to dismiss, denied the
2
This confidential source was the wiretap, the revelation of which at that
time would have brought the entire investigation of the Lopez drug trafficking
organization to a halt.
3
A third count charged Becerra only with carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime.
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motion to suppress with respect to the truck, but granted the motion to suppress
with respect to any evidence found inside Huerta-Varela’s house.
Amaya, Becerra and Huerta-Varela proceeded to trial, following which the
jury found Amaya and Becerra guilty, but acquitted H uerta-Varela. The court
then sentenced Amaya to 120 months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Amaya argues on appeal that (1) the district court erred in failing to dismiss
the second indictment because the court had granted the government’s motion to
dismiss the first indictment containing the same charges; and (2) the district court
erred in failing to grant Amaya’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine found
in the truck because the search warrant authorizing the search was inadequate.
D ISC USSIO N
I. M otion to Dismiss Second Indictment
Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) permits the government, with leave of the court, to
dismiss an indictment. If such a dismissal is sought during trial, the defendant’s
consent is required. W hile “[l]eave of court is required pursuant to such a
motion, . . . ‘[a] court is generally required to grant a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a)
motion to dismiss unless dismissal is clearly contrary to manifest public
interest.’” United States v. Romero, 360 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1463 (10th Cir. 1985)).
Furthermore, “to honor the purpose of the rule, the trial court at the very least
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must know the prosecutor’s reasons for seeking to dismiss the indictment and the
facts underlying the prosecutor’s decision.” United States v. Derr, 726 F.2d 617,
619 (10th Cir. 1984). “W e review the denial of a motion to dismiss the
indictment for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d
1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2001). 4
Amaya’s argument appears to focus on the second arrest for the second
indictment, arguing that a second arrest for the same conduct is prosecutorial
harassment and a violation of his due process rights, as well as his right to a
speedy trial. W e disagree.
The sequence of proceedings in this case does not reveal prosecutorial
harassment or any violation of A maya’s constitutional rights. The district court’s
acquiescence in the dismissal of the first indictment was in accordance with Rule
48(a) and our case law . Reasons w ere given for the government’s desire to
dismiss the indictment, and the court evidently concluded that dismissal was not
“‘clearly contrary to manifest public interest.’” Romero, 360 F.3d at 1251
(quoting Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1463). The second indictment was brought
4
Amaya argues that, because he claims the failure to dismiss the second
indictment violated Amaya’s constitutional rights to due process and a speedy
trial, we must review the refusal to dismiss de novo. W e will, of course, address
his arguments and consider whether the failure to dismiss the indictment violated
Amaya’s constitutional rights. In doing so, we review questions of law de novo,
as we routinely do. If we determine that the failure to dismiss the indictment
violated Amaya’s constitutional rights, we surely will conclude that the district
court abused its discretion.
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promptly, thereby minimizing any delay. These facts distinguish this case from
Derr, upon which Amaya places great reliance. 5 Because there was no
impropriety in the dismissal of the first indictment and the second indictment was
brought promptly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision not to dismiss the second indictment. See United States v. Strayer, 846
F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1988).
Furthermore, Amaya suffered no constitutional deprivation as a result of
the proceedings in this case. W hile he endeavors to craft an argument from
several Supreme Court cases, they are all completely different from this case and
afford him no relief. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 214 (1967)
(holding that “unusual” stated procedural device of “nolle prosequi with leave”
which permitted prosecution to “indefinitely postpone prosecution on an
indictment without stated justification over the objection of an accused” violates
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial); United States v. M arion, 404 U.S.
307, 313 (1971) (holding that, because the right to a speedy trial does not attach
until a person is “accused,” pre-indictment delay does not violate Sixth
Amendment); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001) (holding that
increase in prison time from six to twenty-one months constituted prejudice for
5
Derr, in which we approved the district court’s dismissal of the second
indictment as a remedy for the improper dismissal of the first indictment, has
been “clearly limited to its particular facts and circumstances.” United States v.
Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988).
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purposes of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) (holding that prosecution following good-faith
investigative delay does not violate due process).
II. M otion to Suppress
“On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government.” United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173, 1176
(10th Cir. 2005). W e review de novo the “district court’s determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Amaya argues the search warrant in this case did not provide probable
cause to connect methamphetamine to the vehicle driven by him. “[P]robable
cause exists w here attending circumstances ‘w ould lead a prudent person to
believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d
1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001)). In assessing whether there is probable cause for a
warrant, “w e assess the sufficiency of a supporting affidavit based on the totality
of the circumstances.” Id. Further, a m agistrate’s determination that a w arrant is
supported by probable cause is entitled to “great deference.” Id. On review, our
task is to “ensur[e] ‘that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
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probable cause existed.’” U nited States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir.
2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
The affidavit in this case provided sufficient information to permit the
magistrate to conclude probable cause existed. As the description of the contents
of the affidavit, set forth above, indicates, it described activity consistent with the
delivery of narcotics, including by way of a truck. That established a “fair
probability” that drugs would be found in the truck parked at 7018 LaVanne.
Furthermore, while A maya argues the affidavit did not sufficiently
establish the “veracity and basis of know ledge” for the confidential sources,
Appellant’s Br. at 15, we conclude it did. The affidavit included the statement
that both sources had “provided reliable information in the past that has been
corroborated through other means.” Application and Aff. for Search W arrant,
Attach. C, R. Vol. I, tab 39. Furthermore, Becerra’s actions corroborated the
confidential informants’ information. See United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d
1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2000) (“W hen there is sufficient independent corroboration
of an informant’s information, there is no need to establish the veracity of the
informant.”). In short, there was a substantial basis for the magistrate judge to
conclude that probable cause existed.
Even were we to conclude that probable cause was lacking, we could still
affirm the denial of Amaya’s motion to suppress on the basis of the good-faith
exception applicable to search warrants under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
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897, 920-24 (1984). Under that exception, “the evidence seized . . . need not be
suppressed if the executing officer acted with an objective good-faith belief that
the warrant was properly issued by a neutral magistrate.” Danhauer, 229 F.3d at
1006. The Supreme Court has recognized “four situations in which an officer
would not have reasonable grounds for believing a warrant was properly issued.”
Id. at 1007 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23):
First, evidence should be suppressed if the issuing magistrate was
misled by an affidavit containing false information or information
that the affiant would have known w as false if not for his “reckless
disregard of the truth.” Second, the exception does not apply when
“the issuing magistrate wholly abandon[s her] judicial role.” Third,
the good-faith exception does not apply when the affidavit in support
of the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Fourth, the
exception does not apply when a warrant is so facially deficient that
the executing officer could not reasonably believe it was valid.
Id. at 1007 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). None of those situations is present
here. Accordingly, were the warrant not supported by probable cause, the good-
faith exception would bar suppression of the evidence seized from Amaya’s truck.
C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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