F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
December 4, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TIM O TH Y JO H N K EN N ED Y ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-1160
(D.C. No. 04-CV-1706-EWN-BNB)
OFFICER LA KE, (D . Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before T YM KOV IC H, A ND ER SO N, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Timothy John Kennedy, an inmate in the custody of the Colorado
Department of Corrections (C DOC), appears pro se to appeal the dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against CDOC Officer Danny Lake. Although Kennedy
asserts a host of violations, the thrust of his complaint alleges that Officer Lake
violated his constitutional right of access to the courts by denying him a contact
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
visit with a privately retained investigator. The district court dismissed the case
because Kennedy failed to plead an actual injury and therefore lacked standing.
W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I. Background
K ennedy is serving a sentence for a 1997 double homicide conviction. O n
August 9, 2002, Kennedy was incarcerated at CDOC’s Centennial Correctional
Facility and was scheduled to meet with a privately retained investigator, M ichael
M artinez. W hen M artinez arrived at the prison, he was informed by Officer Lake
that he and Kennedy would be given a non-contact interview room that required
them to communicate through a glass partition via a monitored telephone
connection. At some point, Kennedy requested a contact interview room.
Initially, Officer Lake agreed, but first requested to inspect certain legal papers
Kennedy intended to give to M artinez. Kennedy claims he handed the papers to
Officer Lake believing that he would merely “shake any papers for contraband,
and then return them.” R. Doc. 3, Sec. C at 2. Instead, Kennedy alleges “Officer
Lake leaned up against a table and started to compleatly [sic] read [his three]
typed pages of legal documents.” Id. at 4-5. After approximately fifteen to
twenty seconds, Kennedy asked Officer Lake to return the papers. Officer Lake
complied, but then refused to allow the contact visit and instead required
Kennedy and M artinez to continue using the monitored, non-contact interview
room. This incident precipitated Kennedy’s suit.
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Before a magistrate judge, Kennedy argued that Officer Lake’s denial of a
contact visit violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. Officer Lake
countered with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied,
but the district court rejected that recommendation. Reasoning that Kennedy
failed to assert any actual injury given that he was permitted to meet with
M artinez, albeit through a glass partition, the court ruled that Kennedy lacked
standing. R. Doc. 104 at 7. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss.
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
W e review de novo a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Stidham v. Peace
Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001). Under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). In making this determination, a court
must presume that “plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construe[] them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. At the same time, the court should
construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, holding them “to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 1110.
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“It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional
right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). This
right extends to civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, White v.
Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998), and may require that prison
officials provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law, Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. Notwithstanding this right,
however, an inmate alleging a constitutional violation must demonstrate that he
suffered actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). As the
Supreme Court explained in Lewis, the actual injury requirement derives from the
doctrine of standing, which seeks to constrain courts to their proper role of
providing relief to claimants who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual
harm, without usurping the political branches’ authority to administer government
institutions. Id. at 349-50. W ere the actual or imminent injury requirement
absolved, courts of law would find themselves enmeshed in this administrative
function of the other branches. See id. at 350.
Here, Kennedy lacks standing because he has suffered no actual harm.
Indeed, Kennedy concedes that Officer Lake permitted him to meet with
M artinez; his only allegation of harm is that they were required to meet in a
non-contact interview room. Although Kennedy insists his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel entitled him to a confidential, contact meeting with M artinez, the
Sixth Amendment does not create such a per se rule of entitlement. See M ann v.
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Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1060 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not
require in all instances full and unfettered contact between an inmate and
counsel.”). Kennedy has failed to plead an actual injury and therefore does not
have standing to bring this suit. The district court was correct to dismiss the
claim.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM ED. All outstanding motions
are DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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