F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
December 8, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-1217
v. (D. Colorado)
M ELQ U IA D ES O CA N A -R ASCON (D.C. No. 05-CR-481-REB)
aka M elquides Ocana-Rascon,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before T AC HA , Chief Circuit Judge, A ND ER SO N, Circuit Judge, and
BRO RBY, Senior Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-appellant M elquiades Ocana-Rascon pled guilty to one count of
illegal reentry by a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He was sentenced to forty-six
months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. He has
filed a timely appeal.
Ocana-Rascon’s appointed counsel, Assistant Federal Public Defender
Robert Pepin, has filed an Anders brief and moved to withdraw as counsel. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Ocana-Rascon has filed a very short
response, and the government has declined to file a brief. W e therefore base our
conclusion on counsel’s brief, O cana-Rascon’s short response, and our own
careful review of the record. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with
M r. Pepin that the record in this case provides no nonfrivolous basis for an
appeal, and we therefore grant his motion to withdraw and dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
As indicated, Ocana-Rascon was indicted on one count of unlawful reentry
by a previously-deported felon. On February 24, 2006, he entered into a written
plea agreement whereby he pled guilty, in exchange for the government’s
agreement to recommend a three-level reduction in his offense level for
acceptance of responsibility and to recommend a sentence at the bottom of the
advisory sentencing range calculated pursuant to the United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines M anual (“USSG”) (2005).
-2-
As a factual basis for his plea, Ocana-Rascon admitted that he was a citizen
of M exico and that he had been previously deported (in 1995) following a
conviction for second degree assault. He further admitted that after he was
deported, he illegally reentered the United States in 2000. At his change of plea
hearing, the district court carefully ascertained that Ocana-Rascon was knowingly
and voluntarily entering into the plea agreement and engaged in a full colloquy
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Following his guilty plea, the United States Probation Officer prepared a
presentence report (“PSI”). Pursuant to USSG §2L1.2, the PSI calculated Ocana-
Rascon’s base offense level at eight. With a sixteen-level increase based on his
prior conviction for second degree assault, USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), and a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Ocana-Rascon’s total
offense level was twenty-one. W ith a criminal history category of III, based upon
the prior assault conviction as well as three driving-while-impaired convictions,
Ocana-Rascon’s advisory Guideline sentencing range was forty-six to fifty-seven
months.
Ocana-Rascon filed a written response to the PSI, in which he did not
challenge the accuracy of the advisory Guideline calculations, but he did raise
tw o factors he argued warranted a sentence below the advisory Guideline range.
First, he argued that although he had pled guilty to second degree assault in 1994,
he was not in fact guilty of that crime. He asserted that he had only pled guilty
-3-
because he had been in jail for six months and had been told by his attorney that
he would receive a sentence of probation if he pled guilty. As it turned out, he
was sentenced to two years. Ocana-Rascon argued that those circumstances
warranted a low er sentence. Additionally, he argued that his youngest daughter,
who has a speech and language disability, was profoundly affected by his
incarceration and a long incarceration would have a severely negative impact on
her. On the basis of those two factors, O cana-Rascon requested a thirty-month
sentence.
A t O cana-R ascon’s sentencing hearing, his counsel reiterated those two
arguments in favor of a thirty-month sentence. The district court issued findings
and conclusions as follows: regarding Ocana-Rascon’s argument that he was
wrongly convicted of second degree assault, the court stated it was “troubled,”
Tr. of Hr’g on Sentencing at 16, R. Vol. III, because for the situation to have
occurred as described by Ocana-Rascon, Ocana-Rascon’s attorney, as well as the
prosecutor and the state court judge, would have all had to have failed to fulfill
their constitutional duty to correctly inform Ocana-Rascon of the permissible
sentence for assault. The court further noted that Ocana-Rascon had three
driving-while-impaired convictions and had only received ninety days in jail for
each conviction. Finally, while Ocana-Rascon’s daughter’s situation “tug[ged] at
[the court’s] heart strings,” the court ultimately determined that Ocana-Rascon’s
criminal record outweighed those concerns. Id. at 18. After considering the
-4-
advisory Guideline range in light of the statutory sentencing factors contained in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court determined that a sentence at the bottom of the
Guideline range was actually “very lenient.” Tr. of Hr’g on Sentencing at 19, R.
Vol. III. The court accordingly sentenced Ocana-Rascon to forty-six months,
followed by three years of supervised release. This appeal followed.
D ISC USSIO N
Under Anders, “counsel [may] request permission to withdraw [from an
appeal] where counsel conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930
(10th Cir. 2005) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). This process requires counsel
to:
submit a brief to the client and the appellate court indicating any
potential appealable issue based on the record. The client may then
choose to submit arguments to the court. The [c]ourt must then
conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether
defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous. If the court concludes after
such an examination that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and may dismiss the appeal.
Id. (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). As indicated, Ocana-Rascon’s counsel has
filed his Anders brief, to w hich O cana-Rascon has submitted a very short
response. The government has declined to file a brief.
W e agree with counsel that there is no nonfrivolous issue related to the
district court’s sentence or to Ocana-Rascon’s guilty plea. Ocana-Rascon himself
-5-
concedes he can articulate no specific challenge to his conviction or sentence. 1
Our careful review of the record convinces us that Ocana-Rascon knowingly and
voluntarily pled guilty and that the district court considered all appropriate
sentencing factors in reaching the sentence it did. W e discern no basis for
ignoring the presumption of reasonableness arising from the sentence imposed
within the advisory Guideline range. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050,
1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
1
He asserts that “the Supreme Court is currently reviewing Almendarez-
Torres” v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), in w hich the Supreme Court
concluded that the fact of a prior conviction need not be charged in an indictment.
Appellant’s Response. Further, although the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), held that any fact which increases a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum must be charged in an indictment and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, it made an exception for the fact of a prior conviction. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005), reaffirmed that exception for prior
convictions. W hile the Court has itself questioned the continuing validity of
Almendarez-Torres, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “Almendarez-Torres . . . has
been eroded . . . and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-
Torres, was incorrectly decided”); Apprendi, (noting “it is arguable that
Almendarez-Torres w as incorrectly decided”), it has not overruled it. Thus, until
the Supreme Court does so, this court is “bound by existing precedent to hold that
the Almendarez-Torres exception fo the rule announced in Apprendi and extended
to the Guidelines in Booker remains good law.” United States v. M oore, 401 F.3d
1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005).
-6-
C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and
this appeal is D ISM ISSED .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-7-