F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
December 11, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
W E N DELL R . H A MILTO N ,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 06-6200
v. (W .D. of Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES, W arden, (D.C. No. CV-05-836-M )
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
W endell Hamilton, a Nebraska state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
For substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge, whose
thorough report and recommendation was adopted by the district court, we deny
the COA and dismiss this appeal. We also deny Hamilton’s request to proceed in
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
forma pauperis (IFP) because he has failed to make the requisite showing that this
appeal w as made in good faith.
I. Background
In January 2001, eleven Oklahoma City area stores (mainly convenience
stores and fast-food restaurants) were robbed. In seven of the robberies, a man
approached the store clerk and handed him a note that said “this is a robbery” and
instructed the clerk to turn over the money and he would not be shot. In the other
four cases, the perpetrator would either ask for change or make a small purchase
and then flash what appeared to be a pistol handle in his waistband, announce the
robbery, and demand cash. After the robbery of a Dunkin Donuts shop on
January 22, 2001, Hamilton and his son were stopped by a police officer
responding to the scene. From Hamilton’s car, the officer recovered a Dunkin
Donuts bag, a coat matching the description given by the store clerk, $150 in
cash, a toy pistol, and a crack pipe.
The evidence amassed against H amilton was considerable: the victims of all
eleven robberies identified Hamilton as the assailant; Hamilton’s son admitted to
driving the getaw ay car in several of the robberies; a handwriting expert
concluded Hamilton wrote six of the robbery notes, and his son admitted to
writing the seventh; during police interrogation, Hamilton admitted to comm itting
three of the robberies, explaining that his ongoing drug habit was the impetus.
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Hamilton was convicted by a jury on ten counts of first degree robbery, one
count of robbery with an imitation firearm, and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia. Receiving enhancements for prior felony convictions, Hamilton
was sentenced to eleven consecutive life terms of imprisonment. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on November 7, 2003 but
modified the sentence so that the consecutive life terms would run concurrently.
Hamilton’s subsequent application for post-conviction relief was denied by the
state district court on M arch 15, 2005. That decision was affirmed by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on June 16, 2005.
Hamilton next filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court
denied. Hamilton v. M iller, CIV-05-836-M (W .D. Okla. M ay 23, 2006). In doing
so, the district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge concluding each of
Hamilton’s claims lacked merit under the standard established by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), i.e., that a w rit of habeas corpus under § 2254 can be granted only if
the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, or if the state court applied the correct legal
rule that nevertheless resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Hamilton’s subsequent appeal was construed by the district court as a petition for
a COA. In an order dated June 16, 2005, the district court denied that petition.
Hamilton now appeals to this Court.
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II. Analysis
Hamilton is entitled to a COA if he can make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Such a showing can be
made by demonstrating the issues raised are susceptible to debate among jurists of
reason. Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U .S. 473, 484 (2000) (“The petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”). This Court gives deferential
treatment to state court decisions in considering a habeas petitioner’s request for
COA. Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004).
Hamilton raises six claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in permitting
the joinder for trial of all eleven robbery counts and the drug paraphernalia count;
(2) his sentences were excessive under the Eight Amendment and the Oklahoma
Constitution; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt with respect to
two of the robbery counts without first consulting with Hamilton and for
stipulating to his prior convictions at trial; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise certain defenses on appeal due to a conflict of interest w ith
trial counsel stemming from their working together at the Oklahoma public
defender’s office; (5) the trial court erred in instructing the jury under the
enhancement provisions applicable to habitual offenders generally, rather than
those applicable to robbery offenses specifically; and (6) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the enhancement issue on appeal.
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Because Hamilton has failed to show that reasonable jurists would conclude
the trail court’s resolution of any one of these issues is “debatable or wrong,” w e
deny his request for a COA. In so doing, we adopt the conclusions of the
magistrate judge, whose 25-page report and recommendation reflects a careful
analysis of the record and is amply supported by applicable law. W e briefly
address each claim in turn.
Joinder of Counts
To the extent H amilton argues that joinder was improper under state law,
he fails to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Webber v. Scott, 390
F.3d 1169. 1177 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004). He argues joinder violated his federal right
to due process, but this claim is procedurally barred for failure to raise it at the
state court level. Hamilton may bypass the procedural bar only if he can show
cause and actual prejudice resulting from his default, or that failure to consider
his claim will result in a miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thom pson, 501 U.S.
722, 749–50 (1991). W e agree with the magistrate judge that Hamilton is unable
to make either showing.
Excessive Sentence
Hamilton’s claim that his sentences w ere excessive because the trial court
ordered the eleven life sentences to be served consecutively was dismissed by the
magistrate judge because the issue was resolved on direct appeal. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals modified the sentence such that the life terms w ould
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be served concurrently rather than consecutively. Since Hamilton concedes in his
reply that relief has been granted on this point, his argument on appeal fails.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Hamilton also asserts three grounds for relief based on ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Based on the recommendation
of the magistrate judge, the district court found none of those grounds met the
applicable standards. To implicate the Sixth A mendment, counsel’s
representation must fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
resulting in “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Hamilton cannot demonstrate
prejudice to his case under any of the arguments articulated.
Error Predicated on Enhancement Instructions
Hamilton’s final claim is that the trial court erred by instructing the jury
under the general enhancement provisions of Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 51.1(B) rather
than under the specific enhancement provisions applicable to robberies comm itted
with a dangerous weapon. Pursuant to the general statute, the jury was instructed
that the minimum enhancement was twenty years as opposed to ten years under
the specific statute.
But as the magistrate judge’s report makes clear, errors relating to jury
instructions are not reviewable in a federal habeas action “unless they are so
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fundamentally unfair as to deprive petitioner of a fair trial and to due process of
law.” Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1357 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Long v.
Smith, 663 F.2d 18, 23 (6th Cir. 1981)). W e agree this standard has not been
satisfied here.
Significantly, the choice to use the general enhancement instructions in
Hamilton’s case has been explicitly sanctioned by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, which has held that “when one of the predicate offenses is not
a robbery offense and the new offense is a robbery offense, it is proper to enhance
under either [section].” Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Okla. Crim. App.
1990) (internal citations omitted). As the magistrate judge’s report indicates, one
of the offenses used to enhance H amilton’s sentence w as not a robbery offense
but a felony conviction for check fraud. Thus, Hamilton’s case falls squarely
within the language of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the trial court did not
err in issuing the general instructions.
M otion to Proceed IFP
W ith respect to Hamilton’s motion to proceed IFP, such requests are only
granted if the petitioner can show his appeal is taken in good faith and that he
lacks the financial ability to pay required fees. M cIntosh v. United States Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997). Since we accept the district court’s
conclusion that Hamilton has “not presented a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument
on appeal,” District Court Order at 2, the motion is denied.
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III. Conclusion
Hamilton has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. Therefore, we DEN Y his request for a CO A and DISM ISS
this appeal. His motion to proceed IFP is likewise DENIED because he has not
made the requisite showing that his appeal is in good faith.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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