F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
December 19, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
R AY M ON D G . C HA PM A N ,
individually, and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-5064
STA TE OF O K LA H O MA ; W.A.
DREW EDM ONDSO N, Attorney
General; BRAD HENRY, Governor;
JOSEPH M . W ATT, Chief Justice,
Oklahoma Supreme Court,
Defendants-Appellees.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO R TH E NO RTH ERN DISTRICT O F O K LAH O M A
(D .C . N o. 04-CV-722-CVE-PJC)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Raymond G. Chapman, Pro Se.
Gregory Thomas M etcalfe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma A ttorney
General’s Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Before TYM KOV IC H, A ND ER SO N, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
T YM K O VIC H, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Raymond G. Chapman appeals from the dismissal of his amended
complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1
W e conclude that even though federal jurisdiction is not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, jurisdiction is barred by the Younger abstention
doctrine. 2 W e therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal but remand for the
limited purpose of having that dismissal corrected to be without prejudice.
M r. Chapman filed suit in federal court attempting to challenge, on behalf
of himself and others adjudicated by an Oklahoma state court to be a noncustodial
parent, alleged constitutional violations in the family court system of the State of
Oklahoma. He sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the
State of Oklahoma and the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Chief Justice
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, all in their official capacities only. The district
court dismissed the amended complaint, holding that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred federal jurisdiction over M r. Chapman’s claims. On
1
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
2
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
-2-
M r. Chapman’s “M otion to Correct Errors,” the district court reconsidered
M r. Chapman’s claims in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon M obil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), and again reached the
same conclusion–that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal jurisdiction.
On appeal, M r. Chapman argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
defunct in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lance v. Dennis,
126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam), and that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over his amended complaint. In their response, defendants concede
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been limited and that its application to this
case is questionable, but argue that federal jurisdiction is otherwise barred by
(1) the Younger abstention doctrine; (2) the domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction; and (3) the State of Oklahoma’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
W e review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006).
W e conclude that the district court erred by dismissing under Rooker-Feldman.
In Exxon M obil, the Supreme Court made clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
has a narrow scope, and that federal jurisdiction is not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine if suit “was filed before the end of the state courts’
appeal process.” Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1029, 1031-32 (discussing Exxon M obil,
544 U.S. at 290-91). In Lance, the Supreme Court reemphasized the narrow
-3-
contours of the R ooker-Feldman doctrine (but, contrary to M r. Chapman’s
contention, did not hold that the doctrine is defunct). See Lance, 126 S. Ct.
at 1200-01. M r. Chapman’s state court proceedings have not reached the end of
the state courts’ appeal process, and the district court therefore erred by
dismissing his complaint under Rooker-Feldman.
Defendants argue that the Younger abstention doctrine nevertheless obliges
the district court to abstain from hearing M r. Chapman’s claims. Although
defendants did not make this argument to the district court, we can consider
Younger abstention for the first time on appeal. M orrow v. W inslow, 94 F.3d
1386, 1390-92 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Supreme Court has established three factors to be relevant to our
decision as to whether abstention is required under Y ounger. Seneca-Cayuga
Tribe of Okla. v. Okla. ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989)
(citing M iddlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982)). These factors ask us to determine whether:
(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative
proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the
claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings
involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to
state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state
policies.
Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215
(10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). “O nce these three conditions are met,
-4-
Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances,
a district court is required to abstain.” Id.
The three Younger conditions are met in this case. First, M r. Chapman is
involved in a state civil proceeding that is ongoing. Second, he has not shown
that the state court is not an adequate forum to hear his constitutional challenges
to the state family court system. Cf. Crown Point I, LLC, 319 F.3d at 1215
(holding that state court was inadequate forum where state court held that plaintiff
was collaterally estopped from raising constitutional challenges); Joseph A.
ex. rel W olfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Younger abstention cannot be avoided by purported class action as long as
individual relief can be provided by state court). Finally, the Supreme Court has
long held that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). W e
conclude that the district court must abstain under Younger from hearing
M r. C hapman’s claims.
It is unnecessary to discuss defendants’ other arguments.
W e AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal and REM AND only for the
district court to amend its Opinion and Order to reflect that the dismissal is
without prejudice and to enter a Rule 58 judgment dismissing the suit without
prejudice.
-5-