F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
December 26, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RODNEY JEROM E BURTON,
Petitioner–Appellant, No. 06-6237
v. (D.C. No. 06-CV-267-LRW )
JUSTIN JONES, Director, (W . D. Okla.)
Respondent–Appellee.
OR DER *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining Petitioner’s brief and the record on appeal, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner, a state inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
petition. In his petition, Petitioner sought to challenge his O klahoma state
conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs. The petition was denied as untimely,
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
and the district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability in the matter.
Petitioner argues that the magistrate judge and the district court incorrectly
calculated the limitations period. First, he argues that, for tolling purposes, the
ninety-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari should be calculated
from the date on which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”)
issued its mandate, rather than the date on which the OCCA affirmed his
conviction. The Supreme Court’s rules clearly provide, however, that “[t]he time
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the
judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the
mandate (or its equivalent under local practice).” Rule 13.3, Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Next, Petitioner argues that, because the OCCA allowed him to appeal out
of time, the limitations period should be tolled for the entire period between his
initial filing for post-conviction relief and the state appellate court’s final denial,
including the period between the expiration of his time to appeal and his request
for leave to appeal out of time. W e rejected this tolling argument in Gibson v.
Klinger, 232 F.3d 799 (10th Cir. 2000).
Finally, Petitioner argues that the limitations period should be equitably
tolled because of counsel’s failure to forward him a letter advising him of the
OCCA’s decision to deny his post-conviction appeal. However, we note that
“attorney error is generally not a basis for equitable tolling.” Pink v. M cKune,
-2-
146 Fed. App’x 264, 267 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
To obtain a certificate of appealability, Petitioner must make a “substantial
show ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Because
his petition was rejected on procedural grounds, Petitioner must demonstrate “that
jurists of reason would find it debatable w hether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
After carefully reviewing Petitioner’s filings, the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendation, the district court’s ruling, and the record on appeal, we are
not persuaded that jurists of reason would find debatable or incorrect the district
court’s dismissal of the petition as untimely. W e therefore DENY Petitioner’s
request for a certificate of appealability and DISM ISS the appeal. W e do,
however, GR A N T Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
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