F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 3, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-2348
v.
(D.C. No. CR-03-2112 M V)
(D . N.M .)
JOSE FRAN CISCO D IAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, M cCO NNELL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
A rather remarkable drug trafficking operation employed a series of
comm ercial tractor trailers to move multi-ton quantities of marijuana from
M exico and the southwestern United States to the Chicago area from June 2002
through November 2003. Though authorities seized one truck after another,
conspiracy members did not cotton on to the fact that the government had an
informer in their midst. Jose Francisco Diaz, owner of “Stallion Transportation,”
a shady truck leasing company, was associated with a number of the tractor
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec.
1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
trailers employed in (and seized full of drugs during) the course of the
conspiracy. At trial, a jury convicted M r. Diaz for his participation, and he
received a sentence of 168 months imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A), 846, 849(a), and 860(a). On appeal, M r. Diaz professes that he ran
a legitimate truck leasing business and had no idea his trucks were transporting
narcotics. He also contends that the district court erred in calculating his
sentence. W e disagree and so affirm.
t t t
This case began when law enforcement detained Yolanda Alarcon, a
comm ercial truck driver, on her way from El Paso, Texas, to Las Cruces, New
M exico, suspecting that her truck recently had been involved in transporting a
load of marijuana. Trial Tr. 706-11. In the course of that encounter, M s. Alarcon
admitted that she was involved in a significant drug trafficking operation and she
eventually offered to serve as a paid government informant. An eight-month
investigation leading to the arrest of 14 individuals followed.
The M ay Seizure
On M ay 18, 2003, M s. Alarcon informed Agent Andrew Armijo of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) that a member of her drug trafficking
operation, Edgar Lopez-Hernandez, had asked her to move a purple tractor trailer
(the “purple trailer”) for him and Jorge Torres-Laranega to stash houses w ithin
Las Cruces, New M exico, in order to fill the truck with drugs for its eventual
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journey to Chicago. Trial Tr. 156, 723-28. After M s. Alarcon completed her
assigned task, another member of the conspiracy, M r. M artin M endivil, proceeded
to drive the purple trailer north. At a permanent United States Border Patrol
checkpoint on Interstate 25, approximately 20 miles outside of Las Cruces, New
M exico, the truck was searched and 1,417 kilograms of marijuana were seized.
Id. at 167, 239.
Agent Jacinto Flores, a special agent with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”), subsequently inspected the tractor trailer and discovered
a black binder containing insurance cards, the vehicle registration, and a New
M exico Public Regulation Commission (the “Commission”) registration receipt.
Id. at 246-48, 252. The insurer of the purple trailer was also listed as Stallion
Transportation with a business address identified as a post office box in Sunland
Park, New M exico. Id. at 248-49. The Commission had on file two business
addresses for Stallion Transportation, both of which principally listed Jose F.
Diaz in the address. Id. at 253. In late M ay 2003, Agent Flores attempted to
contact M r. Diaz but discovered that the addresses provided to the Commission
were phony. Id. at 254.
Remarkably, M r. Diaz’s attorney contacted Agent Flores in an effort to
retrieve the purple trailer. Id. at 255. On or about June 6, 2003, M r. Diaz’s
attorney faxed to Agent Flores the vehicle registration and title indicating that the
truck was registered to Jose F. Diaz and owned by Stallion Transportation. Id. at
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256-58, 308. A couple weeks later, M r. Diaz and his attorney met with DEA
agents in a further effort to retrieve the vehicle. Id. at 258. M r. Diaz provided a
written lease to Agent Flores representing that M r. Diaz leased the purple trailer
in the first week of M ay 2003 to a Jorge Reyes. Id. at 259. The lease agreement,
however, contained several irregularities, viz., it did not meaningfully identify the
trailer to be leased (no vehicle identification number, license plate number, make,
or model was listed), and the lease term stated it was for three months even
though the contract start and end dates spanned four months. Ex. 152. The lease
was purportedly notarized by Lorena Garcia, a notary licensed in the State of
Texas. Id. However, M s. Garcia testified at trial that the signature on the
document was not hers, she had never seen the document previously, and she did
not know how her stamp became imprinted on the document. Trial Tr. 609-10.
M r. Diaz also provided the DEA with yet another business address for Stallion
Transportation which the DEA subsequently discovered was also a sham. Id. at
284-85.
The July Seizure
In early July, M s. Alarcon informed A gent Armijo that M r. Torres-
Laranega had asked her to drive another tractor trailer from Chicago to Laredo,
Texas, so that it could be packed with marijuana for a return trip to Chicago. Id.
at 753. The tractor trailer – this time white and blue (the “white trailer”) – was
also leased by M r. D iaz’s Stallion Trucking company. Id. at 801-03. W hen the
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truck stopped for gas in Indiana, a police officer with the Chicago Police
Department approached Jose Barraza, the driver, and requested, and received,
permission to search the white trailer. Id. at 1399-1400, 1403. During the search,
the officer uncovered about 681 kilograms of marijuana. Id. at 1407-08. Officers
also uncovered a black file folder in the cab of the white trailer which contained a
lease agreement, dated M ay 21, 2003, between Steven Broussard and Jose F. Diaz
d/b/a Stallion Transportation. Id. at 1461, 1464; Ex. 785. The lease agreement
stated that Jose F. Diaz was to provide the “commodities” being transported. Ex.
785.
Several days after the truck was impounded, M r. Barraza retrieved the truck
from the Gary Police Department in Gary, Indiana. Id. at 1550-54. He presented
an insurance identification card issued to Stallion Transportation, and a letter
from Broussard Carriers purportedly notarized by Scott Kinney which requested
release of the white trailer to M r. Barazza and gave M r. Barraza permission to
drive the white trailer. Id.; Ex. 806. M r. Kinney testified at trial that neither the
notary stamp nor the signature on the B roussard letter was his – both w ere
forgeries. Trial Tr. at 1716-18.
Undeterred by the government’s repeated seizures, M r. Torres-Laranega
instructed M s. Alarcon to register yet another tractor trailer under M s. Alarcon’s
name. Trial Tr. 812-13. If asked for a reference, M r. Torres-Laranega told M s.
Alarcon to use Joe Diaz at Stallion Transportation and, in fact, M r. Diaz
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subsequently had a conversation with the truck registration company regarding
M s. Alarcon. Id. at 829-30.
The August and September Seizures
In August 2003, M s. Alarcon met M r. Diaz, M r. Torres-Laranega, and
others in order to repair still another tractor-trailer (this time, a grey Freightliner)
purchased for still another drug run. Id. at 864-68. On August 6, 2003, a New
M exico Police Officer photographed M r. Diaz and M r. Torres-Laranega
attempting to jump start the engine of the grey Freightliner. Id. at 1989-92, 1995-
97. On that same day, two phone calls were intercepted between various
members of the cell discussing delivery and unloading operations at a stash house
in El Paso, Texas. Ex. 381; 388. In one of these conversations M r. Torres-
Laranega remarked, “Joe already went to pick up the big truck.” Ex. 381. On the
following day, August 7, 2003, 523 kilograms of marijuana were found in the
stash house after the police received an anonymous tip. Id. at 1912-13, 1926. One
of the individuals detained while fleeing the residence, Raul Espinoza,
participated in the phone call intercepted the day prior in which “Joe” was
mentioned. Id. at 1769-70; Ex. 381.
On September 9, 2003, M r. Torres-Laranega instructed M s. Alarcon to
drive the grey Freightliner from Las Cruces to El Paso to pick up drugs for yet
another journey to Chicago. Id. at 878-81. The following day, M s. Alarcon did
just that. Id. at 883; see also id. at 2011. Upon arriving at a Love’s Truck Stop
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in El Paso, Texas, M s. Alarcon was met by two of her colleagues in the
trafficking ring. Id. at 883-84. Following M r. Torres-Laranega’s direction that
M r. Diaz would coordinate travel arrangements for M s. Alarcon and her
companions in and around El Paso, the three of them left the truck stop together
in M r. Diaz’s personal truck. Ex. 510. Subsequently, FBI agents observed
another member of the conspiracy drive the grey Freightliner to a warehouse in El
Paso and back it into a loading dock. Id. at 1970-71. The warehouse was located
near railroad tracks, a refinery, and Interstate 10. Id. at 1980-81.
The FBI recorded two calls that day involving M r. Diaz. The first was
between two members of the conspiracy who referred to M r. Diaz and described
Cesar M iramontes, another member of the conspiracy, as “the one who hangs
around with Joe.” Ex. 505 at 3. Another conversation between M r. Diaz and M r.
M iramontes shows M r. Diaz speaking in code and asking M r. M iramontes about
the grey Freightliner, its location and security, and whether the drugs had been
loaded – to which M r. M iramontes responded, “U PS has stopped . . . by there to
deliver and all that.” Ex. 507 at 3.
Two days later, the grey Freightliner was searched in El Paso and found
carrying a total of 2,340 kilograms of marijuana. See Id. at 2017, 2078-79.
Incredibly, even after this fourth seizure, M r. Torres-Laranega was apparently not
aware of the government’s investigation and instructed M s. Alarcon to register
and insure another tractor trailer in her name to transport narcotics. Id. at 920-21.
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M r. Torres-Laranega then arranged a meeting between M r. Diaz and M s. Alarcon
where M r. D iaz supplied M s. Alarcon with keys to a new truck. Id. at 921-22.
The Arrest
Authorities arrested M r. Diaz and M r. M iramontes in El Paso, Texas, in
November 2003. Trial Tr. 2211, 2213-14. During a search of M r. M iramontes’s
vehicle, the FBI uncovered a binder containing several documents bearing the
name “Jose F. Diaz” including an agreement specifying an interest rate for a 2000
Cadillac Escalade; a tractor trailer rental agreement, dated October 13, 2003,
between Joe Diaz and Jorge L. Reyes, purportedly notarized by Lorena Garcia; a
lease of motor vehicle equipment between Jose F. Diaz d/b/a Stallion
Transportation and Steven Broussard d/b/a Broussard Carriers for the period
beginning M ay 21, 2003, and ending November 21, 2003; a purchaser’s statement
and a retail installment contract for a Columbus Trucking tractor trailer under M r.
Diaz’s name; and a security agreement describing Jose F. Diaz as the purchaser of
a used Freightliner for $89,527.35. Id. at 2135-43.
At a search of M r. Torres-Laranega’s home the same day, the FBI found
still more documents relating to M r. Diaz and Stallion Transportation, including
an insurance certification card issued to Stallion Transportation; a lease
agreement, commencing M ay 21, 2003, between Jose Diaz d/b/a Stallion
Transportation and Steven Broussard d/b/a Broussard Carriers; New M exico
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taxation documents for Broussard Carriers; and a letter from the U.S. Department
of Transportation, dated July 19, 2002, addressed to Jose Diaz. Id. at 2237-43.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Internal Revenue Service has no record of any
tax filings for Jose F. Diaz, his social security number, or Stallion Transportation
for the years 2001, 2002, or 2003. Id. at 1656-57.
t t t
Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenge
W e review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, asking
whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. United States v. Rockey, 449
F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006). Out of respect for the jury’s verdict, we are
obliged to review the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences that might
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government. United States
v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006). The evidence “need not
conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all
possibilities except guilt. Instead, the evidence only has to reasonably support the
jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wilson, 182
F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
To prove its charge, the government had to establish that M r. Diaz (1)
agreed with two or more persons to import and possess with intent to distribute
1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, (2) knew at least the essential objectives of
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the conspiracy, (3) knowingly and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy, and
(4) w as interdependent on other co-conspirators. See United States v. Arras, 373
F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004); 21 U.S.C. § 846. In a conspiracy case,
moreover, “the government must prove guilty knowledge: an implicit or explicit
agreement to enter into a known conspiracy with a known objective.” United
States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir. 1995). That said, a jury is free to
infer an agreement to pursue an unlawful objective from the acts of the parties
and other circumstantial evidence; it may presume that a defendant is a knowing
participant in the conspiracy when he or she acts in furtherance of the objective of
the conspiracy. United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1998).
M r. Diaz concedes that his business practices – including the accuracy and
legality of his business documents – were less than commendable. But, he
argues, there is no evidence indicating that he knew, much less agreed, that the
object of the conspiracy was to transport marijuana (M r. Diaz’s counsel suggested
at oral argument that M r. Diaz could have believed, for example, that the illicit
activity was trafficking illegal aliens). W e find this suggestion unpersuasive.
From the facts recited above, a reasonable jury easily could have concluded that
M r. Diaz’s Stallion Transportation was not only a sham business involved in
illegal activity but also that M r. D iaz knew marijuana distribution was the plan.
After all, M r. Diaz picked up the purple trailer from the DEA in early June
2003 with full notice it had been used by M r. Torres-Laranega’s operation for
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transporting drugs, yet he continued to do business with M r. Torres-Laranega.
Indeed, none of the three subsequent seizures deterred him from continuing to
pursue this line of business. M r. Diaz was also the person designated to provide
the “commodities” to be transported in the white trailer. H e helped to coordinate
the travel of each of the truckloads seized in one fashion or another. And, a jury
could easily have concluded that M r. Diaz’s coded conversation on September 10,
2003, suggested that he knew precisely the object of the conspiracy. Even
counsel for M r. Diaz conceded at oral argument that it would be reasonable for a
jury to conclude that the participants on the September 10 call using coded terms
knew the object of the conspiracy, suggesting only that the “Joe” on the call was
more likely Jose Barraza than Jose Diaz. However, M ario Garcia, a language
specialist with the FBI, testified that based on his training, experience and
methodology, he is able to identify speakers based on speech patterns particular to
individuals, and a host of other factors. Trial Tr. 434-36. M r. Garcia separately
identified M r. D iaz and M r. Barraza based on their different “vocal fingerprints,”
id. at 437, 439, and identified M r. Diaz as the “Joe” participating in the
September 10 call. Id. at 428, 461-62. Taken in the light most favorable to the
government, this evidence is sufficient to establish that M r. Diaz was the speaker
and knew the object of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Earls, 42 F.3d
1321, 1324 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that recorded conversations in which
defendant spoke in code in conjunction with expert testimony explaining the code
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terms sufficient to find the defendant a co-conspirator in a methamphetamine
distribution conspiracy); compare Jones, 44 F.3d at 865-66 (finding evidence
insufficient to support defendant conspired to distribute cocaine where defendant
was merely a passenger in a vehicle transporting cocaine, no cocaine was found in
her personal effects, and all other conspirators w ere linked through pen registers
demonstrating frequent communication with a known drug dealer); United States
v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 988-89 (10th Cir. 1986) (the defendant’s sale of his ranch
to strangers who subsequently used the ranch to transport marijuana, and the
defendant’s later suspicions that the ranch may have been used for illegal activity,
were insufficient for a rational fact finder to infer that defendant knew the object
of the conspiracy was the distribution of marijuana). 1
Sentencing Challenges
M r. Diaz cites two supposed errors in his sentencing, but raises each for the
first time on appeal. Given the absence of a contemporaneous objection bringing
these issues to the trial court’s attention, we are constrained to review M r. Diaz’s
sentence only for plain error. United States v. Johnson, 414 F.3d 1260, 1263
1
M r. Diaz’s additional sufficiency of the evidence argument, that he was
not interdependent on other co-conspirators, is also unavailing. A reasonable jury
could well have found that M r. Torres-Laranega relied upon M r. Diaz to
coordinate many of the transportation arrangements for the marijuana deliveries
and that M r. D iaz, inter alia, supplied two trailers to the organization, gave M s.
Alarcon keys to another trailer, coordinated transportation with members of the
conspiracy, repaired a refrigerated trailer, and served as a job reference for M s.
Alarcon.
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(10th Cir. 2005) (defendant “must show that the district court (1) committed
error, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the plain error affected his
substantial rights”). Neither of his claimed errors comes close to satisfying this
standard.
First, M r. Diaz contends that the district court erred in calculating his
sentence because “there was insufficient evidence to establish that Diaz could
foresee that any amount of marijuana would be transported by others in his trucks.
Accordingly, no amount of marijuana may be attributed to Diaz.” Appellant’s Br.
at 12. This, however, is less a challenge to his sentence than a retread of his
sufficiency of the evidence argument, suggesting again that M r. Diaz had no
knowledge that any drugs were involved, and it is no more persuasive.
Alternatively, M r. Diaz argues that only the amounts seized in the M ay
2003 and July 2003 seizures in which his trucks were used to transport marijuana
are reasonably attributable to him. Appellant’s Br. at 13. There was, however,
ample evidence connecting M r. Diaz to each and every one of the four seizures,
see supra at 2-9, and we are thus constrained to conclude that the entire amount
seized by the government was w ithin the scope of the agreement and reasonably
foreseeable to M r. D iaz. See Johnston, 146 F.3d at 795 (a defendant
“participating in a drug conspiracy is accountable for that drug quantity which
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was w ithin the scope of the agreement and reasonably foreseeable to [him]”
(internal quotation omitted)). 2
t t t
M r. D iaz’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
2
Although not raised by M r. Diaz on appeal, nor addressed by the
government, we note an apparent discrepancy regarding the total amount of
marijuana seized. The government’s brief suggests that the amount was 4,961
kilograms. See Appellee’s Br. at 39 (stating “5,316 kilograms” but providing
quantities that add up to 4,961 kilograms). M eanwhile, the presentence report
(“PSR”) listed the sum as 5,316.6 kilograms. PSR at 12. Even if there were some
computational error, however, any such error would not have affected M r. Diaz’s
substantial rights and, thus, does not rise to the level of plain error. So long as
the amount seized is between 3,000 and 10,000 kilograms, the base offense level
under the statutory guidelines is the same. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2) (Nov.
2004).
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