F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 6, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
R OBER T B UN D Y ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-2154
(D.C. No. CIV-05-122 M CA -RLP)
C HA V ES C OU N TY BO A RD OF (D . N.M .)
CO M M ISSIONERS,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HO LM ES, M cKA Y, and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Bundy appeals from the summary judgment in
his disability-discrimination case. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
B ACKGROUND
M r. Bundy worked as a guard at the Chaves County Detention Center in
Roswell, New M exico. On October 9, 2003, he was injured in a car accident and
had to have his left arm amputated above the elbow. The next day, the C ounty’s
human-resource specialist, Sheila Nunez, mailed a letter to M r. Bundy’s home,
stating that he was being placed on leave under the Family and M edical Leave
Act (FM LA), and that he needed to have his physician fill out the enclosed FM LA
certification form. M r. Bundy’s physician, Dr. Fred Hensal, completed the form
on October 28 and returned it, indicating that M r. Bundy was unable to perform
any kind of work and that it was necessary for M r. Bundy to be absent from
work. 1 The final paragraph of Nunez’s letter directed M r. Bundy to “present a
‘release to return to w ork’ certificate from [his] health care provider . . . before
[he could] resume work.” Aplt. App. at 51.
In late October 2003, after being released from the hospital, M r. Bundy met
with Nunez and discussed “the paperwork and how the disability worked and [he]
brought to her attention that [he] was interested in a dispatch job” with the
Sheriff. Id. at 58. But “[he] never said anything about not wanting to go back to
the jail.” Id. Instead, he asked Nunez to “send [him] advertisements . . . for any
1
Dr. Hensal later indicated during his deposition that the probable duration
of M r. Bundy’s “incapacity” was three to six months, Aplt. App. at 153, but that
“he could [have] return[ed] to some form of lighter, limited duty if it were
available,” at the end of November 2003, id. at 81.
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job openings within the county that [he] was qualified for.” Id. Afterward,
M r. Bundy visited the D etention Center, where he told several of his co-workers
that “[he] had no idea” “when [he] was coming back to work,” and “that [it] was
up to [Dr. Hensal].” Id. at 59.
M r. Bundy met with Dr. Hensal for treatment on October 28, 2003,
November 13, 2003, and January 21, 2004. Dr. Hensal told M r. Bundy that he
“had some concerns about a one-armed prison guard” and “about his ability to
return to that kind of work.” Id. at 76. But Dr. Hensal also told M r. Bundy that
“if the prison would allow him to go to work under those circumstances, [he]
wouldn’t stand in his way.” Id. at 77. Dr. Hensal testified during his deposition
that he could not recall M r. Bundy ever requesting a release to return to w ork or a
statement of physical limitations that could be provided to the County.
Additionally, Dr. Hensal could not recall M r. Bundy ever indicating an interest in
working as a dispatcher.
On January 12, 2004, Nunez notified M r. Bundy that he was about to
exhaust his FM LA leave and that he needed to submit “a prognosis for return to
work from [his] physician . . . so that we may evaluate this situation further.”
Id. at 83. M r. Bundy responded, telling Nunez about an upcoming doctor
appointment on January 21 and that “when [he] got back from [his]
doctor . . . [he] would let her know what [he] needed.” Id. at 61. But M r. Bundy
did not provide Nunez with the information. Indeed, he later testified that he did
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not ask Dr. Hensal for a return-to-work release because he believed that
Dr. H ensal would not release him to work in the Detention Center. Id. at 136.
On January 23, the County M anager, Stanton Riggs, notified M r. Bundy
that a pre-termination hearing had been scheduled for January 28 because
he had exhausted his FM LA leave and had provided neither “a medical
release . . . allowing [him] to return to work” at the Detention Center nor “a time
table as to when [he would] be able to return to regular duty.” Id. at 84. Riggs
also informed M r. Bundy that at the hearing, he would “be allowed to present any
documentation from [his] doctor regarding [his] return to work.” Id.
At the pre-termination hearing, M r. Bundy offered nothing from his doctor,
and instead reiterated his interest in a dispatcher position. Riggs responded that
only the Sheriff could hire a dispatcher, and that “no matter w hat, you have got to
have a return-to-work release from your doctor.” Id. at 86 (quotation omitted).
Riggs terminated Bundy on February 2, 2004, citing his exhaustion of leave and
his lack of a release to return to work.
In February 2005, after receiving from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission a determination that he was denied a reasonable accommodation,
M r. Bundy sued the County Board of Commissioners in federal court. The
complaint sought relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213, the New M exico Human Rights A ct, N.M . Stat.
§ 28-1-7, and New M exico tort and contract law. The district court granted the
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Board summary judgment. Regarding the ADA claim, the district court ruled that
accommodating M r. Bundy’s disability by making him a dispatcher amounted to
an unreasonable accommodation:
Combined with [M r. Bundy’s] failure to provide medical
documentation or a timetable for returning to work, his request to be
reassigned to a [dispatcher] position under the hiring authority of the
County Sheriff placed [the Board] in an untenable dilemma rather
than offering an avenue for reasonable accommodation. On the one
hand, [the Board] could not send [M r. Bundy] back to his job as an
Adult Detention Officer because [he] . . . never provided the medical
documentation necessary to determine whether he could perform that
job (or whether it was possible to restructure that job so as to
accommodate [M r. Bundy’s] disability). On the other hand, [the
Board] could not reassign [M r. Bundy] to the position of dispatcher
because, even assuming [he] would be qualified to perform that job
(with or without reasonable accommodation), [the Board] could not
override the statutory hiring authority of the County Sheriff . . . . [2]
Aplt. App. at 235. As for M r. Bundy’s state-law claims, the district court simply
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction given the loss of the ADA claim to
summary judgment.
On appeal, M r. Bundy argues that (1) the requirement that he provide a
return-to-w ork release was unrealistic, unnecessary, and in bad faith; (2) his
requests for accommodation were ignored; (3) there was no evidence that his
absence from work was indefinite; (4) he “was undisputably qualified for the
2
W hile a board of county commissioners may set the salaries of the
employees and deputies necessary to discharge the functions of the county, only
elected county officials, including sheriffs, have the authority to hire persons
necessary to carry out the officials’ duties. See N.M . Stat. § 4-38-19(A ); N.M .
Const. art. X, §§ 2(A) & (B).
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dispatcher position, and . . . positions were available,” Aplt. Br. at 28; and (5) he
could have been transferred into a dispatcher position because it would not have
infringed on the Sheriff’s crime-fighting duties.
D ISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standards
W e review the district court’s summary judgment de novo. Stover v.
M artinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is
appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In applying this standard,
we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Stover, 382 F.3d at 1070.
II. Disability Discrimination
The ADA requires an employer “to provide reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified” employee
with a disability. Bristol v. Bd. of County Com m’rs, 312 F.3d 1213, 1217
(10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). To survive summary judgment in a
failure-to-accommodate case involving a request for reassignment, the employee
must first establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) he “is a disabled person
within the meaning of the ADA and has made any resulting limitations from
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his . . . disability known to the employer”; (2) “[t]he preferred option of
accommodation within the employee’s existing job cannot reasonably be
accomplished”; (3) he “requested the employer reasonably to accommodate his
. . . disability by reassignment to a vacant position”; (4) he was qualified, with or
without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the
desired job; and (5) the employer did not offer reassignment. Smith v. M idland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). If the employee meets this
burden, the employer must then “present evidence either (1) conclusively
rebutting one or more elements of [the] prima facie case or (2) establishing an
affirmative defense.” Id. Finally, “if the employer does either of the above,
summary judgment will be appropriate for the employer unless the employee then
presents evidence establishing a genuine dispute regarding the affirmative
defenses and/or rehabilitating any challenged elements of [the] prima facie case.”
Id.
W e conclude that M r. Bundy, by failing to respond to the repeated requests
for documentation concerning his ability to return to work, never triggered the
Board’s duty to consider reassignment. Reassignment is an option to be
considered only after other efforts at accommodation within the employee’s
existing job have failed. Id. at 1170-71; see also Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116,
1132 n.8 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In general, an employee requiring a reasonable
accommodation will need to initiate the interactive process by notifying the
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employer of his disability and resulting limitations, and requesting reassignment
if no reasonable accommodation is possible in the employee’s exiting job.”).
M oreover, M r. Bundy’s requested accommodation of reassignment to a dispatcher
position was not reasonable, given that it was not within the Board’s authority.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons given by the
district court in granting the Board summary judgment. 3
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
3
To the extent that the district court found that Nunez’s and Riggs’ requests
for work releases concerned M r. Bundy’s ability to resume work in any capacity,
rather than just his ability to return to the Detention Center, we conclude that the
district court misconstrued the evidence. The totality of the evidence is not
definitive one way or the other. Nevertheless, there is no dispute that M r. Bundy
failed to provide any information about when he could resume any sort of work or
what the limitations from his disability were. W ithout such information, the
Board could not determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made at
the D etention Center.
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