F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 9, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TIM O TH Y S. TH ER RIEN ,
an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 06-5110
v. (D.C. No. 06-CV-217-JHP-FHM )
(N.D. Okla.)
TA RG ET C OR PO RA TIO N ,
a M innesota corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HO LM ES, M cKA Y, and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
Timothy S. Therrien was shopping at a Target store when a Target
loss-prevention employee confronted a suspected shoplifter. The Target
employee and the suspect became involved in a physical confrontation. W hen the
suspect began to overw helm the employee, the employee called out to bystanders
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
for help, and M r. Therrien responded. During the ensuing struggle, the suspect
stabbed and injured M r. Therrien.
Alleging various theories of negligence, M r. Therrien filed suit against
Target Corporation in Oklahoma state court. Target removed the case to federal
district court and moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for dismissal of the
complaint. The district court granted Target’s motion, and M r. Therrien appeals.
W e have jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 1291, and we REVERSE and REM AND
for further proceedings.
I. Standard of Review
W e review de novo a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim for relief. Ruiz v. M cDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181
(10th Cir. 2002). W e take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. “[A] complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “The issue in reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but
whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support [his] claims.” Ruiz,
299 F.3d at 1181. Because this is a diversity case, we apply federal law to
procedural questions, but state law to the analysis of the underlying claims.
Haberman v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006).
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II. Analysis
M r. Therrien argues that he set forth at least five distinct claims:
(1) negligent provision of store security; (2) negligent training and supervision;
(3) negligent handling of the situation with the suspect leading to the physical
altercation; (4) negligently requesting assistance and directing such assistance
from bystanders; and (5) liability under the rescue doctrine. To proceed with
a claim of negligence under Oklahoma law, M r. Therrien must establish that
(1) Target owed him a duty to protect him from injury; (2) Target failed properly
to perform its duty; and (3) he suffered injuries that were proximately caused by
Target’s breach of its duty. See Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067, 1071-72
(O kla. 1995).
A. O klahoma Landow ner Liability for Criminal Attacks
The primary issue is whether Target owed M r. Therrien a duty to protect
him from injury from a criminal attack by a third party. M r. Therrien contends
that, under Oklahoma law , Target has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a
criminal attack when it knows that the attack is occurring or is about to occur.
See Taylor v. Hynson, 856 P.2d 278, 281 (O kla. 1993).
Oklahoma premises liability law classifies M r. Therrien as an invitee.
See id. (“It is well established that a person w ho goes on land to conduct business
is a business invitee for the purposes of establishing liability.”). A business
generally does not have a duty to protect an invitee from criminal attacks by third
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persons. Id. Oklahoma, however, has recognized such a duty in “unique
circumstances.” Id. An invitor’s knowledge “that the acts of the third person
are occurring, or are about to occur” may constitute such circumstances. Id. at
281-82 (quotation omitted). Thus, Oklahoma law recognizes that, “[w]hen an
invitor has knowledge that an invitee is in imminent danger, the invitor must act
reasonably to prevent injury.” Id. at 281.
In M organ v. Southland Associates, 883 P.2d 205, 206 (Okla. Civ. App.
1994), a case involving a criminal attack on plaintiff at a mall food court, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s
petitions. After describing Taylor’s teachings, the court stated that because
plaintiff had pleaded defendant’s knowledge of the attack, which would give rise
to a duty on defendant’s part, as well as breach of the duty and damages, the trial
court had erred in dismissing the petitions for failure to state a claim. Id. at 207.
“To hold otherwise would be to find that the rule a business invitor has no duty to
protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties is absolute.” Id. at 206-07.
Similarly, M r. Therrien pleaded that Target was aware that a criminal act
was imminent or occurring, so that Target had a duty to use reasonable care to
prevent the suspect from harming M r. Therrien; that Target breached its duty; and
that M r. Therrien suffered harm as a “direct and proximate result” of Target’s
breach. Aplt. App. at 7-9. As in M organ, these allegations are sufficient to state
a claim under Taylor.
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Target urges us to decide that the fight between the Target employee and
the suspect was an open and obvious condition and that M r. Therrien had
knowledge equal to Target of the unsafe condition, so that Target owed
M r. Therrien no duty of care. See, e.g., Dover v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 111 P.3d 243,
245 (Okla. 2005) (“There is no duty to warn the invitee of any defect or danger
which is as w ell-known to the invitee as to the owner or occupant or which is
obvious or which should be observed by the invitee in the exercise of ordinary
care.”); Pickens v. Tulsa M etro. M inistry, 951 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Okla. 1997)
(“Even vis-a-vis an invitee, to whom a landowner owes the highest duty . . ., the
law does not require that the landowner protect the invitee against dangers which
are so apparent and readily observable that one would reasonably expect them to
be discovered.”). But since Taylor, Oklahoma’s premises liability cases involving
criminal attacks focus on the invitor’s knowledge of criminal activity; they do
not appear to incorporate the “open and obvious danger” analysis found in
physical-defects cases. See, e.g., Taylor, 856 P.2d at 281-82; Rogers v. Burger
King Corp., 82 P.3d 116, 122-23 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); Young v. Bob Howard
Auto., Inc., 52 P.3d 1045, 1048-49 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); M cClure v. Group K
Enters., Inc., 977 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999); Folmar v. M arriott,
Inc., 918 P.2d 86, 87-89 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996); Edington v. A & P Enters., Inc.,
900 P.2d 453, 455 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994); M organ, 883 P.2d at 206-07; see also
Wells v. Boston Ave. Realty, 125 F.3d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiff has
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cited no cases that support treating a criminal assault as a ‘defect’ creating
premises liability.”). In any event, whether or not a particular condition is open
and obvious generally requires an examination of all of the circumstances. Zagal
v. Truckstops C orp. of Am ., 948 P.2d 273, 275 (Okla. 1997). Thus, we decline to
hold, at this initial stage of the proceedings, that the “open and obvious danger”
rule necessarily bars M r. Therrien’s claim as a matter of law.
Target also argues that M r. Therrien’s “attempt to create five distinct
claims is contrary to law.” A plee. Br. at 9. W e agree that four of M r. Therrien’s
five claims (the exception being the negligent training and supervision claim)
appear to stem from Taylor, rather than stating separate bases for recovery.
But in light of the limited record before this court, we w ill let the district court
evaluate each of M r. Therrien’s claims in the first instance to determine whether
each should proceed separately.
B. Negligent Training and Supervision
M r. Therrien also alleges that Target was negligent in its training and
supervision of the loss prevention employee. This claim invokes a recognized
basis for recovery in Oklahoma: “[e]mployers may be held liable for negligence
in hiring, supervising or retaining an employee.” N.H. v. Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999); see also M organ, 883 P.2d at 206-07
(reversing dismissal of petition that included claims of negligent training).
Negligent hiring and supervision is a separate theory of recovery based on the
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employer’s direct negligence, rather than liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. N .H ., 998 P.2d at 600. In Oklahoma, this claim is only
available if an employer’s vicarious liability is not established. Id.
Consequently, while M r. Therrien has stated a claim sufficient to withstand a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on this issue, how far this claim can
proceed will depend on the evidence before the district court during further
proceedings.
III.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is
REM ANDED for further proceedings in the district court.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
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