F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 23, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-6101
(D.C. No. CR-05-94-2-R)
GILBERT COOPER BATEM AN, III, (W .D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Gilbert Cooper Bateman, III appeals his conviction
for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, asserting that the
evidence was insufficient. He does not challenge his conviction for conspiracy to
possess and distribute methamphetamine. He also appeals his sentence on the
ground that the district court violated his constitutional rights when it considered
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
evidence of drug quantity not found by the jury. W e exercise jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, vacate the conviction for possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, and affirm the sentence.
Background
In the summer of 2003, Oklahoma state and federal drug task force agents
investigated a methamphetamine distribution ring in the Oklahoma City area.
They discovered that Jennifer Lujan was distributing methamphetamine to various
individuals, including M r. Bateman, his then-girlfriend Brandi Hodges, and his
friend Charles Council. M r. Bateman was charged with four criminal counts
based on his participation in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Following a jury trial, he was convicted on two counts: conspiracy to possess and
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He
was acquitted of the remaining two counts.
On a special verdict form, the jury found that the quantity of drugs
involved was “less than 500 grams but 50 grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.” R. Vol. I,
Doc. 93 at 1. W hen sentencing M r. Bateman, however, the district court found by
a preponderance of the evidence that the drug quantity attributable to
M r. Bateman w as not less than 500 grams. Accordingly, the court imposed a
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sentence of 165 months based on the greater drug amount. 1 M r. Bateman
contends that his maximum sentence was 121 months based on the jury’s finding
of drug quantity.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
M r. Bateman first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction on Count 2 for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine
under § 841(a)(1). He contends that the evidence showed only that he and his
friend Charles Council were joint users who shared the methamphetamine they
received from M s. Lujan.
W e review de novo the issue of whether there is sufficient
evidence to sustain a jury verdict. W e must examine the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation and
quotation omitted).
To establish that a defendant violated § 841(a)(1), the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “(1) possessed the controlled substance;
(2) knew he possessed the controlled substance; and (3) intended to distribute or
dispense the controlled substance.” United States v. M cKissick, 204 F.3d 1282,
1291 (10th Cir. 2000). M r. Bateman concedes that the evidence was sufficient on
1
The court imposed concurrent sentences of 165 months on each count, plus
supervised release and a monetary assessment.
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the first two criteria, but he asserts that no evidence demonstrated that he
intended to distribute or dispense methamphetamine. “[I]n the context of a drug
trafficking case, [the term ‘distribute’] means to intentionally deliver narcotics to
another person.” United States v. Cherry, 433 F.3d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1930 (2006).
M r. Bateman contends that the evidence did not show that he distributed
methamphetamine at the place alleged in Count 2, which was the residence of his
friend Charles Council, during the time alleged, the winter of 2002. See R.
Vol. 1, Doc. 14 at 3. The evidence pertaining to M r. Bateman’s drug activities at
the time and place charged came from M r. Council. He testified that he and
M r. Bateman used methamphetamine together and it was “like [Council] and
[Bateman] buying it together.” R . Vol. 4 at 233-34. Although M r. Council
distributed drugs to others, he did not consider M r. Bateman a customer; rather,
they took “care of each other, you know, as a drug addict.” Id.
There was no evidence that M r. Bateman’s drug use at the Council home
was associated with any of the customary accouterments of drug distribution, such
as scales, packaging materials, firearms, or large amounts of cash, from which the
jury could infer that he was a distributor. Cf. United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d
291, 294 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding presence of materials used to distribute drugs
supported jury’s finding that defendant was involved in the distribution of drugs).
Similarly, there was no evidence that M r. Bateman possessed more
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methamphetamine than was consistent for personal use. Cf. United States v.
Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 1994) (“An intent to distribute may be
inferred from the possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance.”).
Finally, the government points to events occurring well after the time
period charged in Count 2 at places other than M r. Council’s home to support its
argument that there was evidence that M r. Bateman w as distributing
methamphetamine. The record indicates that M r. Bateman distributed
methamphetamine he received from M s. Lujan, but it also shows that the two did
not meet until 2003, R. Vol. 4 at 119, 267, after the time period charged in
Count 2, the winter of 2002. The government points to no sales transaction
occurring at M r. Council’s residence and our review of the record reveals none.
The government’s case on Count 2 required the jury to infer that because
M r. Bateman was distributing drugs in 2003, he must also having been doing so in
the winter of 2002. “[T]he jury should not have been allowed to substitute its
belief about what probably occurred for what the government actually proved.”
United States v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we
conclude that the jury’s guilty verdict on Count 2 was based on speculation and
conjecture, rather than evidence, and we cannot allow the guilty verdict to stand.
See id. at 632-33. The conviction for possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine is therefore vacated.
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Sentence
M r. Bateman also challenges his sentence, claiming that the district court
violated his Sixth Amendment rights by basing his sentence on a drug quantity
higher than that found by the jury. The district court found by a preponderance
that M r. Bateman’s Guidelines range should be based on a drug quantity that
included two pounds of methamphetamine M s. Lujan left in his apartment during
the night of October 22-23, 2003. M r. Bateman maintains that the court
impermissibly rejected the jury’s finding of drug quantity.
“W hen reviewing a district court’s application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, we review legal questions de novo and we review any factual findings
for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s application of the
guidelines to the facts.” United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 781 (10th Cir.
2006). Specifically, because M r. Bateman made his Sixth Amendment argument
at sentencing, we review that issue de novo. United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d
1185, 1191 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 775 (2005). A sentencing court is
required to consider the Guidelines in determining a sentence, but it is not
required to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2000).
M r. Bateman does not challenge his conviction for conspiracy to possess
and distribute methamphetamine. In addition, he acknowledges that the district
court properly applied the Guidelines and treated them as advisory, rather than
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mandatory. Rather, he objects to being sentenced based on judge-found facts as
to drug quantity, rather than on the jury’s special verdict of drug quantity. He
asserts that the court constitutionally was required to base his sentence on the
lower drug quantity found by the jury, rather than on the greater quantity the
judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence.
M r. Bateman’s argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent holding “that
when a district court makes a determination of sentencing facts by a
preponderance test under the now-advisory Guidelines, it is not bound by jury
determinations reached through application of the more onerous reasonable doubt
standard.” United States v. M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 468 (2005); accord United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295,
1312 (10th Cir. 2007) (“‘After Booker, a constitutional violation lies only where a
district court uses judge-found facts to enhance a defendant's sentence
mandatorily under the [Guidelines], and not where a court merely applies such
facts in a discretionary manner.’”) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Felix,
450 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 420 (2006)); Patterson,
472 F.3d at 781 (“[T]here is clear precedent in this circuit that, under Booker’s
advisory regime, a district court may make Sentencing Guidelines calculations
using facts found by the judge.”); United States v. Bustamante, 454 F.3d 1200,
1202 (10th Cir. 2006) (same). As explained in M agallanez,
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[D ]istrict courts are still required to consider Guideline ranges,
which are determined through application of the preponderance
standard, just as they were before. The only difference is that the
court has latitude, subject to reasonableness review, to depart from
the resulting Guideline ranges. . . . [W ]hen a district court makes a
determination of sentencing facts by a preponderance test under the
now-advisory Guidelines, it is not bound by jury determinations
reached through application of the more onerous reasonable doubt
standard. In this respect, the prior Guidelines scheme is unchanged
by the seeming revolution of Booker.
M agallanez, 408 F.3d at 685 (citation omitted).
M r. Bateman attempts to distinguish his case from M agallanez by pointing
out that he preserved his Sixth Amendment claim, while the M agallanez
defendant did not. Consequently, the M agallanez defendant received only plain
error review on appeal. “[B]ut this distinction makes no difference: the[] cases
unequivocally establish that, so long as the district court applies the Guidelines in
an advisory, rather than a mandatory, fashion, it may rely on facts found by a
judge to be true based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Bustamante,
454 F.3d at 1202. M r. Bateman does not challenge on appeal the district court’s
finding that the greater drug quantity was established by a preponderance of the
evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s sentencing decision
did not violate M r. Bateman’s Sixth Amendment rights.
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For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the conviction for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, and AFFIRM the sentence.
Entered for the Court
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
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