F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 14, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
__________________________ Clerk of Court
CA LV IN SHANE M YERS,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
v. No. 06-4034
(D. Utah)
LO W E LL H . C LA RK , (D.Ct. No. 2:05-CV-367-TC)
Respondents - Appellees.
____________________________
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
A ND DISM ISSIN G A PPLIC ATIO N
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Calvin M yers, a state prisoner proceeding pro se 1 and in form a pauperis,
filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court
dismissed the petition as untimely. M yers then requested a certificate of
1
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318
F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). Myers’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal
was granted by the district court.
appealability (COA). Because the district court did not rule on the request w ithin
thirty days, we deem it denied. See 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). M yers renews his
application for a COA with this Court. For the same reasons set forth by the
district court, we DENY a COA and dismiss his application.
Background
The State of U tah charged M yers w ith two counts of aggravated murder,
both capital offenses, alleging M yers had killed his girlfriend and her unborn
child. M yers entered an unconditional guilty plea to one count of aggravated
murder and the trial court dismissed the second count in accordance with a plea
agreement. On February 6, 1996, the trial court sentenced M yers to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole. M yers did not file a direct appeal.
In July 2000, M yers filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Utah state
court. The petition was dismissed on the basis of state procedural bars and the
court’s finding M yers’ trial counsel was not ineffective. M yers appealed this
decision and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. M yers v. State of
Utah, 94 P.3d 211 (Utah 2004). M yers then filed a § 2254 petition on M ay 23,
2005, asserting, inter alia, his claims were not procedurally barred. The district
court dismissed the petition, concluding M yers’ claims were untimely under the
Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
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Certificate of Appealability
A COA is a jurisdictional pre-requisite to our review. M iller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U .S. 322, 336 (2003). W e will issue a COA only if M yers makes a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this showing, he must establish that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved [by the district
court] in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(quotations omitted). Insofar as the district court dismissed his habeas petition on
procedural grounds, M yers must demonstrate both that “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. “W here a plain procedural
bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in
dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further.” Id. W e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. English v. Cody, 241 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir.
2001).
Because M yers’ conviction became final before the effective date of
AEDPA , April 1996, M yers was required to file his §2254 petition by April 1997,
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unless the limitation period was tolled. Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803
(10th Cir. 2000) (one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until
AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996, for convictions becoming final before
that date). The district court found M yers filed his § 2254 petition more than one
year after the effective date of AEDPA and there was no justification for
equitable tolling. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001).
M yers argues he filed within one year of the Utah court’s resolution of his
state post-conviction claims and, therefore, his petition was timely filed. W hile a
claim for state post-conviction relief will generally toll the limitations period, it
will not toll a limitation period which has already expired. Fisher, 262 F.3d at
1142-43. M yers filed his post-conviction claims in July 2000, after the 1997
AEDPA statute of limitations had already expired.
M yers also fails to present sufficient grounds for the application of
equitable tolling, a remedy applied only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.”
Gibson, 232 F.3d at 808 (quotations omitted). Consequently, the district court’s
dismissal order is not reasonably debatable. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. M yers has
failed to make a sufficient show ing he is entitled to a COA. W e DENY a COA
and dismiss the application.
Entered by the C ourt:
Terrence L. O ’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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