F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 9, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ALFRED L. BR IGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 06-5141
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-237-FHM )
(N.D. Okla.)
M ICH AEL J. ASTRU E, *
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT **
Before L UC ER O, M cKA Y, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Alfred L. Briggs appeals from the order entered by the district court
denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits under the Social Security Act. Exercising jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), M ichael J. Astrue is substituted for
Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the appellee in this action.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
In his applications for benefits, plaintiff alleged that he became disabled in
April 2003 as a result of an abdominal wall hernia and back problems. After
conducting a hearing and receiving oral testimony from plaintiff and a vocational
expert, the administrative law judge (ALJ) went through the five-part sequential
evaluation process for determining disability and denied plaintiff’s applications
for benefits. Specifically, in his written decision dated October 21, 2004, the ALJ
found that: (1) plaintiff’s ventral hernia is a severe impairment at step two; (2) for
purposes of step three, plaintiff’s hernia impairment does not meet or equal the
criteria of any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1;
(3) plaintiff’s “allegations regarding his limitations are not totally credible,” Aplt.
App., Vol. 2 at 21; (4) for purposes of step four, plaintiff retains the residual
functional capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements of his past
relevant work as a mail room clerk and fast food worker; and (5) in the
alternative, for purposes of step five, plaintiff retains the residual functional
capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements of other light and
sedentary jobs that exist in significant numbers in the regional and national
economies.
In M arch 2005, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of
the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the district court. In July
2006, the magistrate judge, sitting by consent of the parties and by designation of
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the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), entered an order and a related
judgment affirming the denial of plaintiff’s applications for social security
benefits. This appeal followed.
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision is the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. See Doyal v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision,
“we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the
agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & H um an Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.
1991). Instead, we review the ALJ’s decision only “to determine whether the
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether
the correct legal standards were applied.” Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760.
II.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed reversible error by: (1) failing to make
a proper determination at steps two and three of the sequential evaluation process;
(2) failing to fully and fairly develop the administrative record; and (3) failing to
make a proper credibility determination. W e conclude that plaintiff’s arguments
are without merit.
A. Steps Tw o and T hree.
In January 2000, plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from “[m]arked
restriction of motion throughout the vertebral system secondary to morbid obesity
and osteoarthritis.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 136. Plaintiff was also diagnosed as
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suffering from morbid obesity in April and M ay 2003. Id. at 171, 188. In
addition, in September 2003, an x-ray of plaintiff’s abdomen showed possible
“sclerosis of the left sacroiliac joint with increased density of the left femoral
head,” id. at 246, and plaintiff claims that this “x-ray evidence [is] compatible
with arthritic changes,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at
step two because he failed to address whether plaintiff’s osteoarthritis and obesity
qualify as severe impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a) and 416.921(a)
(providing that an impairment is severe for purposes of step two if it significantly
limits the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities”).
W e are constrained to disagree.
First, as the magistrate judge noted in his thorough and well-reasoned
order, plaintiff “relies upon a notation by W alter L. W ilson, D.O., as support for
his allegation that he has a severe impairment of osteoarthritis.” Aplt. A pp.,
Vol. 1 at 22. However, “this is the only mention of such a condition in the
medical records,” id., and “there is no suggestion [anywhere in plaintiff’s medical
records] that any functional limitations were found or restrictions on activities
were imposed due to osteoarthritis by Plaintiff’s health care providers,” id.
at 22-23.
Second, the magistrate judge correctly noted that “[t]he record does not
contain a diagnosis of degenerative joint disease or even any treatment for such a
condition.” Id. at 22. As explained by the magistrate judge:
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A radiologist’s report of “Increased density in the left sacroiliac joint
and left femoral head which may be due to technique secondary to
the patient’s large body habitus versus degenerative change versus
other” does not support Plaintiff’s allegation that this is a severe
impairment. [R. 246]. Standing alone, this observation by the
radiologist, who was review ing Plaintiff’s x-rays in relation to his
complaints of abdominal pain, does not constitute substantial
evidence of degenerative joint disease as a severe impairment at step
two.
Id.
Third, we agree with the magistrate judge that the ALJ did not err at step
tw o by failing to consider w hether plaintiff’s obesity is a severe impairment. A s
the magistrate judge noted:
Plaintiff did not address his obesity either in his application
for benefits or at the hearing before the ALJ, but he now contends
that the ALJ failed to consider the limitations of Plaintiff’s obesity as
required by S.S.R. [02-1P] (requiring ALJ to consider obesity at
various points of the five-step analysis). Plaintiff’s physicians noted
the condition in several medical reports. [R. 135, 136, 169]. In
particular, Dr. W hitworth, refused to perform elective surgery on
Plaintiff’s hernia on April 30, 2003, because of “a very high chance
of significant complications and even death” due to the “extreme
weight in this region.” 1 [R. 170]. The ALJ acknowledged this
evidence. [R. 18]. However, none of Plaintiff’s physicians indicated
that obesity was a factor in regard to exertional, postural and social
functions. Nor did Plaintiff testify that his w eight contributed to his
inability to engage in activities in any way. Because there is no
evidence regarding obesity in the record that the ALJ failed to
consider or that the A LJ improperly considered, Plaintiff’s
contention of error on the part of the ALJ for failing to specifically
identify obesity as a severe impairment at step two is w ithout merit.
1
W e note that the medical records that plaintiff submitted to the Appeals
Council show that he had surgery to repair his ventral hernia in December 2004.
See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 337-53.
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Id. at 23 (footnote added and footnote omitted); see also Soc. Sec. Ruling 02-1P,
2000 W L 628049, at *4 (“Neither do descriptive terms for levels of obesity (e.g.,
‘severe,’ ‘extreme,’ or ‘morbid’ obesity) establish whether obesity is or is not a
‘severe’ impairment for disability program purposes. Rather, we will do an
individualized assessment of the impact of obesity on an individual’s functioning
when deciding whether the impairment is severe.”).
Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider at step
three whether the combined effects of his osteoarthritis and obesity meet or equal
a listed impairment under the listings for musculoskeletal and respiratory systems.
As the magistrate judge pointed out, however, “[b]ecause the Court [found] no
error on the part of the ALJ in his step two findings, Plaintiff’s incidental
argument with regard to the ALJ’s step three findings [is] likewise without
merit.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 24.
B. Development of the Record.
Plaintiff’s counsel requested that the ALJ “aid in the development of the
record by obtaining an examination by a consultative examiner (CE).” A plt.
Opening Br. at 29 (citing Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 395). Specifically, the record
shows that plaintiff’s counsel “requested a CE to evaluate Claimant’s knee pain,
including x-rays of the knees, and evaluate his hand symptoms for carpal tunnel
syndrome, including electrodiagnostic testing of the upper extremities.” Id. at 30
(citing Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 395). Plaintiff argues that a consultative examination
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was necessary to “resolve the conflict or ambiguity regarding Claimant’s hand
limitations due to alleged carpal tunnel syndrome, and the presence or absence of
osteoarthritic changes in the knees,” id., and he claims that the ALJ committed
reversible error by failing to order the requested consultative examination.
The magistrate judge accurately summarized the ALJ’s duty to develop the
administrative record as follow s:
An ALJ has the responsibility “in every case ‘to ensure that an
adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent
with the issues raised.’” [Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164
(10th Cir. 1997)] (quoting Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Hum an Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1993)) . . . . This
responsibility to develop the record may require the ALJ to order a
consultative examination. See Hawkins, 113 F.3d at 1166. The
Commissioner is given broad latitude, however, in making a decision
to order such an examination. Diaz v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1990). M oreover, the A LJ’s
duty is triggered only after the claimant has satisfied his or her
burden to provide objective evidence “sufficient to suggest a
reasonable possibility that a severe impairment exists.” Hawkins,
113 F.3d at 1167.
Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 24-25.
W e agree with the magistrate judge that plaintiff failed to make a sufficient
showing to require the ALJ to order a consultative examination. There is simply
no medical evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff suffers from hand or
knee impairments, and plaintiff has not argued that any of his other impairments
required a consultative examination. Accordingly, we cannot accept plaintiff’s
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assertion that “[t]here was a clear need for a consultative examination and
testing.” Aplt. O pening Br. at 31.
C. Credibility.
The ALJ found that plaintiff’s “allegations regarding his limitations are not
totally credible.” A plt. App., Vol. 2 at 21. Plaintiff argues that the A LJ’s
adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. He specifically challenges the ALJ’s findings and/or lack of findings
regarding his abdominal and shoulder pain, his daily activities, his obesity, his
alleged failure to make an effort to improve his health by losing weight and
quitting smoking, and his ability to sit and stand. “Credibility determinations are
peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such
determinations when supported by substantial evidence.” Diaz, 898 F.2d at 777;
see also White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 910 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that
“ALJ’s credibility findings warrant particular deference”).
W e conclude that the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported
by substantial evidence in the record, and we see no merit in the arguments
advanced by plaintiff in this appeal. In particular, while plaintiff has correctly
noted that he was never prescribed a diet or other treatment for his obesity, the
ALJ did not err in relying on the medical records of Dr. W hitworth as part of his
credibility evaluation. As pointed out by the magistrate judge, those records
indicate that “Dr. W hitworth reported that when he recommended Plaintiff ‘see
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the clinic on South Harvard’ to initiate treatment for his weight and smoking,
Plaintiff became belligerent and was not motivated to do so.” Aplt. A pp., Vol. 1
at 26 (quoting Dr. W hitworth’s medical record dated April 30, 2003). M oreover,
plaintiff’s failure to follow Dr. W hitworth’s advice was not the only factor the
ALJ relied on to support his adverse credibility determination. As noted by the
magistrate judge, the A LJ also “cited evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s
treating doctors released him to return to work with the limitation of no lifting,
pushing or pulling of more than 20 pounds. He also cited Plaintiff’s testimony
that he can continue sitting and standing if he is allowed to change position.” Id.
W e also reject plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly consider the
medical evidence pertaining to his hernia. As explained by the magistrate judge,
“[t]he ALJ found Plaintiff’s hernia to be a severe impairment and assessed his
[residual functional capacity] accordingly.” Id.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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