F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 17, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
In re: H EN RY D EA N V A UG H AN
and JESSIE ELA IN E V A U G HAN,
Debtors, No. 06-6158
(BAP N o. W O-05-028)
------------------------- (BA P)
ROBERT D. GARRETT, Trustee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
B AN K OF C USH IN G ,
Appellee,
v.
HENRY DEAN VAUGHAN and
JESSIE ELA IN E V A U G HA N ,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________________________
In re: H EN RY D EA N V A UG H AN;
JESSIE ELA IN E V A U G HA N ,
Debtors, No. 06-6159
(BAP N o. W O-04-039)
------------------------- (BA P)
B AN K OF C USH IN G ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
H EN RY D EA N V A UG H A N ;
JESSIE ELA IN E V A U G HA N ,
Defendants-Appellants.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Henry and Elaine Vaughan were indebted to the Bank of Cushing (the
Bank) as personal guarantors of a debt ow ed by a company called Americare
U.S.A., Ltd. The Vaughans filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code and their case was later converted to one under Chapter
7. The Bank subsequently filed an adversary complaint alleging that the
Vaughans’ debt to it should be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A)-(B) and (a)(6), and that the Vaughans should be generally denied
discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(c)(1), 727(c)(1). Thereafter, the bankruptcy
trustee (the Trustee) filed his own adversary complaint alleging that the Vaughans
should be generally denied discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A)-(B) and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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(a)(4)(A), (D). In the Bank’s adversary proceeding the Vaughans filed a motion
for partial summary judgment and the Bank responded with its own motion for
summary judgment. The Trustee also moved for summary judgment in his
adversary proceeding.
In the Bank’s adversary proceeding the bankruptcy court granted the
Bank’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)-(B ).
Section 523 reads in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt–
....
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by–
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or
an insider’s financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing–
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial
condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable
for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably
relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with
intent to deceive[.]
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Regarding § 523(a)(2)(A), the bankruptcy court found that a settlement agreement
the Vaughans entered into with the Bank allowing the Vaughans to payback the
amount owed under the guaranty agreements over time qualified as a “refinancing
of credit” and that the V aughans violated this subsection because
both prior to and after entering into the Settlement Agreement . . .
[the Vaughans] made a series of fraudulent oral and written
representations to [the Bank] regarding both the availability and
disposition of assets to repay the indebtedness they owed to [the
Bank]. M oreover, [the Vaughans] made such representations to
induce [the Bank] to enter into the Settlement Agreement, and [the
Bank] both actually and justifiably relied to its detriment on these
representations in agreeing to enter into the Settlement
Agreement . . . .
Supp. Aplee. App. (Bank), Vol. VI, Doc. 136 at 14. Regarding § 523(a)(2)(B),
the bankruptcy court held that the Vaughans provided the Bank with a financial
statement in order to induce the Bank to enter into the settlement agreement, that
the bank justifiably relied on that statement, and that the statement was materially
false and made with the intent to deceive. The bankruptcy court ordered the
Bank’s claim excepted from discharge.
In the Trustee’s adversary proceeding he argued that the Vaughans should
be generally denied discharge under 11 U .S.C. § 727(a)(2) and (a)(4)(A). Those
sections read:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless–
....
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(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of
property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed,
mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred,
removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed–
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of
the petition;
....
(4) the debtor, knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection
with the case–
(A ) made a false oath or account[.]
The bankruptcy court held that its findings in the Bank’s adversary proceeding
were “law of the case” as to the Vaughans’ fraudulent conduct and that those
findings required a grant of summary judgment under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) in the
Trustee’s adversary proceeding.
The V aughans appealed the grants of summary judgment in both adversary
proceedings to the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP). Regarding the appeal from
the summary judgment order in the Trustee’s adversary proceeding, the BAP held
that the evidence showed that the Vaughans had knowingly and fraudulently made
a false oath by not disclosing numerous assets in their bankruptcy schedules and
other pleadings and that affirmance was required under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A).
The BAP held that its order affirming the denial of discharge in the Trustee’s
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adversary proceed rendered moot the appeal in the Bank’s adversary proceeding.
In appeal number 06-6158, the Vaughans appeal the BAP’s affirmance of the
bankruptcy court’s decision in the Trustee’s adversary proceeding. In appeal
number 06-6159, the Vaughans appeal the BAP’s determination that its appeal
from the decision in the Bank’s adversary proceeding was moot.
W e have jurisdiction to review final bankruptcy decisions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). “On appeal from BAP decisions, we independently review the
bankruptcy court’s decision.” Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital v.
Unsecured Creditors’ Liquidating Trust (In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.),
427 F.3d 804, 810 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Further, “[w]e may
affirm for any reason supported by the record.” United States v. M yers
(In re M yers), 362 F.3d 667, 674 n.7 (10th Cir. 2004).
W e review the bankruptcy court’s legal determinations de novo and
its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the
record or if, after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 427 F.3d at 810 (alteration and quotation
omitted).
W e review the grant of summary judgment by the bankruptcy court
de novo, applying the same legal standards as those applied by the
bankruptcy [court and BAP]. Summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Tex., Inc. (In re Barton Indus., Inc.),
104 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation omitted).
In their appellate brief, the V aughans do not address the BAP’s
determination that their failure to disclose assets in their bankruptcy court
statement of financial affairs and bankruptcy schedules was fraudulent. They
argue only that summary judgment was inappropriate because they submitted
evidence showing that a genuine factual dispute existed regarding whether the
Vaughans intended to defraud the Bank by submitting a false financial statement
prior to the settlement agreement and whether the Bank relied on that statement in
entering into the agreement.
Here, follow ing thorough review of the materials submitted by the parties,
we agree with the BAP’s analysis and determination that affirmance of the grant
of summary judgment in the Trustee’s adversary proceeding was required under
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). W hile the bankruptcy court discussed § 727(a)(4)(A),
it based its holding in that proceeding on § 727(a)(2). Nevertheless we find the
BAP’s order and judgment affirming on § 727(a)(4)(A) grounds to be thorough
and persuasive.
Consequently, because we may affirm for any reason supported by the
record and because it would serve no purpose to merely reiterate the BAP’s
conclusions, in appeal number 06-6158 we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s denial
of discharge in the Trustee’s adversary proceeding for the reasons set forth by the
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BAP in its M arch 22, 2006, Order and Judgment. Further, because a general
denial of discharge w as proper, the V aughans’ appeal of the bankruptcy court’s
order granting summary judgment in the Bank’s adversary proceeding in appeal
number 06-6159 is D ISM ISSED as moot.
Entered for the Court
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
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