F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 25, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 06-6328
v. (D.C. Nos. 98-CR-00183-R and
06-CV-00227-R)
W ILLIA M G EN E EA TO N , (W .D. Oklahoma )
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, M cCO NNELL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Eaton, proceeding pro se, requests a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) to appeal the district court’s September 28, 2006 Order dismissing his
“petition for relief under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(4).” Because Defendant
has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”
see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for COA and dismiss the appeal.
In 2000, Defendant filed his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA ”) challenging his 1999
conviction and sentence. The motion was denied by the district court. On appeal,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
this court denied COA and dismissed. See United States v. Eaton, 20 Fed. Appx.
763 (10th Cir. 2001). In 2005, Defendant filed an unauthorized second § 2255
motion in the district court raising a new claim as to his 1999 sentence. In a June
2, 2006 Order, the district court transferred the unauthorized § 2255 motion to
this court pursuant to Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 399, 341 (10th Cir.
1997) (per curiam).
On September 20, 2006, Defendant filed a “petition for relief under Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(4),” challenging the June 2, 2006 Order of transfer as
“improper” and requesting the order be vacated. In a September 28, 2006 Order,
the district court dismissed Defendant’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion, finding that it was
correct in transferring his unauthorized § 2255 motion to this court. Defendant
appeals.
The Rule 60(b)(4) motion filed by Defendant constituted a “true Rule
60(b)” challenging a perceived defect in the integrity of the district court’s June
2, 2006 Order. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532-33 (2005); United
States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2006). Defendant may appeal
the dismissal of his Rule 60(b)(4) motion only if a COA is issued. See §
2253(c)(1). To make the requisite showing, Defendant must demonstrate that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” See M iller-EL v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
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322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Second or successive § 2255 motions cannot be filed in the district court
until this court has granted the required authorization under the AEDPA. See
United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d at 1148. Because Defendant filed his
unauthorized second § 2255 motion, raising a new sentencing claim, before
obtaining authorization from this court, the district court properly recognized it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the unauthorized § 2255 motion and
acted correctly in transferring the unauthorized § 2255 motion to this court.
Having reviewed Defendant’s application for COA, appellate brief, and the
record on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Defendant’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion. No reasonable jurist w ould
disagree.
Accordingly, the application for COA is DENIED. The motion to proceed
in form a pauperis is DENIED. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
The appeal is DISM ISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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