F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
April 26, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 06-2215
TH O MA S S. C AC HU CH A ,
Defendant - Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D.C. NO . CR-05-2156 W J)
Susan Bronstein Dunleavy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New
M exico, for Defendant - Appellant.
David N. W illiams, Assistant United States Attorney, (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, and Norman Cairns, Assistant United States Attorney, on the
brief), Albuquerque, New M exico, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before H E N RY, B AL DOC K , and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
HA RTZ, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Cachucha was indicted in the United States District Court for the
District of New M exico on a charge of involuntary manslaughter in Indian
Country. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a), 1153. He pleaded guilty to the charge under
a plea agreement that anticipated a sentence of not more than 16 months’
imprisonment. At sentencing, however, the prosecutor expressed distress at such
a short sentence and the district court sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal M r. Cachucha contends (1) that the 30-month sentence violates the
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because at the time of the offense, which
predated United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), such a long sentence
could not have reasonably been foreseen; (2) that the sentence was unreasonable
because of the district court’s reliance on amendments to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) enacted after his offense, reliance on state-court
sentences, and failure to consider his post-offense rehabilitation; and (3) that the
government breached the plea agreement. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C
§ 1291. W e reverse the sentence on the third ground and remand for resentencing
before a different judge.
I. B AC KGR OU N D
On October 5, 2000, M r. Cachucha was driving while intoxicated on the
Laguna Indian Reservation w hen his vehicle struck and killed Earl M ontoya. O n
September 27, 2005, almost five years later, he w as indicted for involuntary
manslaughter. On December 12, 2005, he reached a plea agreement with the
government. The agreement contained the following “Stipulations”:
7. The U nited States and the defendant stipulate as follow s:
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a. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, the defendant has clearly
demonstrated a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal
responsibility for his criminal conduct. Consequently, the defendant
is entitled to a reduction of two (2) levels from the base offense level
as calculated under the sentencing guidelines. This reduction is
contingent upon the defendant providing an appropriate oral or
written statement to the United States Probation officer who prepares
the presentence report in this case in which the defendant clearly
establishes his entitlement to this reduction.
b. The parties stipulate and agree that the 2000 Edition of
the Sentencing Guidelines M anual applies. Pursuant to the
guidelines, the base offense level should be 14. The adjusted offense
level should be 12 after the two point reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.
8. The United States and the defendant understand that the above
stipulations are not binding on the C ourt and that whether the Court
accepts these stipulations is a matter solely within the discretion of
the Court after it has review ed the presentence report.
R. Vol. I Doc. 17 at 3–4.
At the initial sentencing hearing on April 5, 2006, the prosecutor made
several statements implying that the offense level of 12 was too low. Asking the
district court if he could “address a couple issues,” R. Supp. Vol. I at 24, he
stated:
Your honor, one of the difficulties, the hardest thing I have to
do as a prosecutor is in cases like this w hen you meet with family
members where there’s vehicular homicide— and I know M r. Olson
[the victim’s father] and the family believe this was an intentional
murder. Your honor, if I— if there was any evidence of that, I can
assure the Court that we w ould have done that. W e just never w ere
able to, after the fact, come up w ith that evidence.
But one of the problems is, when you look at involuntary
manslaughter, the guidelines that were in effect at the time were the
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2000 guidelines, and they set the offense level with acceptance to 10
to 16 months. The problem with the guidelines in effect at that time
also, Your Honor, were that, had there been a separate person in the
vehicle that had been injured and survived, the defendant would get
more time under the guidelines for the victim that was injured than
they do or did under the guidelines for the victims that were killed.
It’s very difficult to explain that to the family. I’m not sure I
understand it either as a lawyer, but that’s the way the guidelines
were set up.
Effective 2004, November 1st, the guidelines were increased
for situations like this, and they are now in the range of, I believe, 37
to 47 months. But we look at these cases, the facts of this case, as
M r. Olson indicated, the defendant and victim were friends. They
knew each other. They had gone to high school together.
They were drinking during the day. They both left in separate
vehicles. M r. M ontoya was in the first vehicle. The vehicle pulled
over. M r. M ontoya got out of the vehicle and ended up in the road,
and he was struck by M r. Cachucha.
W as that an intentional act, Your Honor? W e don’t have the
evidence to prove it was. It’s just not there. If it was, I indicated
and I told the family we would have charged that. It just isn’t there.
Id. at 25-26.
These guidelines are way too low, but they are in effect
unfortunately . . . . If there were any grounds for departure in the
facts of this case, I would have. I just don’t think we could have
sustained them on appeal.
Id. at 31.
These things are tragic. They’re very tragic. One of the things
that I told M r. Olson and his family, as I do in all of these cases w ith
all of the victim’s family, is the sentences that are imposed don’t
make any sense to me as a professional prosecutor. But one of the
things that I do ask and I will reask, if you feel inclined in your
heart, please write Congress. W rite them a letter and say you think
these sentences are too low.
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Because they’re the ones that are going to have to deal with
this, Your Honor. They’ve done it a little bit but certainly not to the
level that I think anyone finds acceptable.
W ith that, Your Honor, I know the defendant’s guideline range
comes out, I think, incredibly low, but those were the guidelines in
effect at the time. W e saw no factors. I w ish I could
have— M r. Olson, I wish there was more there. I wish we could have
gotten involved sooner. I don’t know if that would have made a
difference on the factors, but I apologize to you for any delay in the
government, as a representative of the government, things that were
not handled as expeditiously as they would have or should have been.
But we’re still faced, Your Honor, now with sentencing, and
we would ask the Court to impose a sentence within the guideline
level.
Id. at 32-33.
In explaining its sentence, the district court noted that (1) if M r. Cachucha
had been convicted under the New M exico homicide-by-vehicle statute he would
have faced a sentence of six (and probably ten) years, and (2) under the 2006
Guidelines M r. Cachucha’s offense level would be substantially higher. The
court concluded, “I do not consider offense level 12 with a range of 10 to 16
months to be a reasonable sentence,” and sentenced M r. Cachucha to 30 months’
imprisonment. Id. at 56.
A week later, however, the government moved to vacate the sentence
because M r. Cachucha had not received notice that the district court was
considering an upward variance. The motion stated that “[w]hile the United
States believes that the sentence imposed by the court is properly supported by
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the grounds stated by the court at sentencing, there is an issue as to whether the
defendant received adequate notice of the departure on the grounds relied upon
[by] the court.” R. Vol. I Doc. 25 at 1. The motion was granted. M r. Cachucha
filed a sentencing memorandum contending that an above-guidelines sentence
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
At resentencing, the district court rejected M r. Cachucha’s ex-post-facto
argument, repeated its concerns about “unwarranted sentencing disparities,” and
additionally noted that it was taking into account that M r. Cachucha’s previous
tribal convictions went uncounted in his presentence report. R. Vol. IV at 17. It
again imposed a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment.
II. D ISC USSIO N
M r. Cachucha raises several substantial issues on appeal. His ex-post-facto
argument might appear to be foreclosed by our decisions holding that Booker can
be applied to sentences imposed for pre-Booker offenses, see United States v.
Portillo-Quezada, 469 F.3d 1345, 1354–56 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United
States v. Herula, 464 F.3d 1132, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2005); but we have not yet decided
(nor, apparently, has any other circuit) a case in which the post-Booker sentence
imposed was “higher than any that might realistically have been imagined at the
time of the crime.” United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2005)
(distinguishing sentence under review from a sentence of the quoted type); see
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United States Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 657 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lata); cf. M iller
v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432–33 (1987) (application of Florida’s revised
sentencing guidelines to defendant whose crimes occurred before their effective
date violated Ex Post Facto Clause). And the district court’s reliance on New
M exico sentencing practice would appear to contravene our recent statement that
“[a]djusting federal sentences to conform to those imposed by the states where the
offenses occurred would not serve the purposes of § 3553(a)(6), but, rather,
would create disparities within the federal system, which is w hat § 3553(a)(6) is
designed to discourage.” United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th
Cir. 2006).
The ground on which we reverse, however, is the government’s breach of
the plea agreement. 1 W e apply general principles of contract law when
interpreting a plea agreement. See United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1210
(10th Cir. 1998). W e construe ambiguities against the government as the drafter
of the document. See id. “It is well settled that we must interpret the agreement
according to the defendant’s reasonable understanding of its terms.” United
States v. Scott, 469 F.3d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 2006).
1
At oral argument the government contended that M r. Cachucha had waived
this claim at the second sentencing hearing. But the government did not advance
this argument in its brief on appeal, so we need not address it. See United States
v. Brakeman, 475 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007).
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The government owes the defendant a duty to pay “more than lip service”
to a plea agreement. United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000). A
plea agreement may be breached when “[t]he government’s attorney . . . [i]s not
only an unpersuasive advocate for the plea agreement, but, in effect, argue[s]
against it.” United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1977).
The government agrees that it “promised to recommend that Cachucha
receive a sentence within the advisory guideline range and stipulated to an
adjusted-offense level of [12].” Aplee. Br. at 8. In other words, it promised not
to seek a higher offense level or an upward variance from the resulting Guidelines
range. Yet that is what the prosecutor did by complaining about the applicable
Guidelines. He stated that there were “problem[s]” with a Guidelines-based
sentence, R. Supp. Vol. I at 25–26, that such a sentence was “way too low” and
“incredibly low,” id. at 31, 32, and that the Guidelines did not “make sense to
[him] as a professional prosecutor,” id. at 32. W e are further troubled by the
prosecutor’s unprompted assertion in his motion for resentencing that
M r. Cachucha’s “sentence . . . is properly supported by the grounds stated by the
court at sentencing.” R. Vol. I Doc. 25 at 1. These statements undermine the
prosecutor’s promises to M r. Cachucha. See United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d
263, 269 (1st Cir. 1992) (“W hile it can be argued that the government stopped
short of explicitly repudiating the agreement, [Supreme Court precedent]
prohibits not only explicit repudiation of the government’s assurances, but must
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in the interests of fairness be read to forbid end-runs around them.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “W hile a prosecutor normally need not present
promised recommendations to the court with any particular degree of enthusiasm,
it is improper for the prosecutor to inject material reservations about the
agreement to which the government has comm itted itself.” Id. at 270 (citations
omitted); see United States v. M itchell, 136 F.3d 1192, 1193–94 (8th Cir. 1998).
W e recognize that the prosecutor did not repeat his improper remarks at the
second sentencing hearing, but a breach of the plea agreement had already
occurred.
There remains only the question of remedy. Ordinarily, “[w]hen the
government has breached a plea agreement, it is generally preferable to remand
the case to the district court for its determination as to whether defendant should
be resentenced by a different judge or should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea.” United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 1998). But in this
case M r. Cachucha has not sought to withdraw his plea. In conformity with
Supreme Court precedent, we therefore remand for resentencing by a different
judge. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (W hen the remedy
is “that there be specific performance of the agreement[,] . . . petitioner should be
resentenced by a different judge.”); Brye, 146 F.3d at 1213. As the Ninth Circuit
said in the same circumstance, “W e intend no criticism of the district judge by
this action, and none should be inferred.” United States v. M ondragon, 228 F.3d
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978, 981 (9th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 368 (6th
Cir. 2002).
IV . C ON CLU SIO N
W e REVERSE the sentence below and REM AND for resentencing before a
different judge.
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