United States v. Nevels

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
June 6, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-1240
CLEM M ETH D. NEV ELS,

Defendant-Appellant.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO . 04-CR-417-LTB)

Neil M acFarlane, Westminster, Colorado, for A ppellant.

Joshua Stein, Assistant United States Attorney (Troy A. Eid, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the U nited States A ttorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee.

Before T YM KOV IC H, EBEL, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.

T YM K O VIC H, Circuit Judge.

Clemmeth D. Nevels was convicted of two federal firearm possession

charges in M arch 2006 and was sentenced as an armed career criminal pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). O n appeal, Nevels makes three arguments. First, he

alleges that the disclosure of a government witness’s existence three days prior to

trial denied him a fair trial. Second, he contends that the government’s

introduction of expert testimony describing how he shot and killed an individual

in his home was unfairly prejudicial in a firearms possession trial. Third, he

asserts the district court erred in determining that one of his prior juvenile

delinquency adjudications constituted a predicate offense under the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

W e take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),

and AFFIRM .

I. Background

Before dawn on January 11, 2004, Clemmeth Nevels made a 911 call

requesting assistance at his Denver residence. Police found Nevels leaning

against a car parked across the street from his house. He first identified himself

as “M ichael” and told the police that he discovered an intruder in his house.

After revealing his true identity, he told the police that the intruder had a gun and

said, “I think there’s a body inside.” ROA, vol. XIII, at 172. One officer

testified that Nevels became agitated and angry at some point and that officers

handcuffed him for their safety. Another officer heard Nevels claim, “I’m the

shooter, there will be gun powder on my hands, it’s my house, and I had to do

what I had to do.” Id. at 232.

2
 Inside the house, the police discovered the body of Terrell M cLamb on the

couch. He had been shot seven times at short range and died on the way to the

hospital. On the couch next to M cLamb’s left hand was a Ruger P89 semi-

automatic pistol with an extended magazine. The chamber was fully loaded and

had not been fired.

Another pistol was recovered in the same vicinity. This was a Ruger P95

semi-automatic pistol, with its serial number sanded down. This pistol had a 10-

round magazine with two rounds remaining— one in the chamber and one in the

magazine. Police discovered multiple bullet fragments and spent bullets. They

all matched the P95 pistol. The police arrested Nevels at the scene.

The state subsequently charged Nevels with first degree murder and

weapons possession by a prior offender. The charges w ere later dismissed in

favor of two federal charges: (1) one count of possession of a firearm by a

previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) one

count of possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(k). A fter a four-day trial, a jury convicted Nevels of both counts.

Since Nevels had two prior juvenile delinquency adjudications and one

adult felony conviction, the district court found him to be an armed career

criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court sentenced him to 300 months on

the first count and 60 months on the second, to be served concurrently.

3
 II. Analysis

Nevels alleges three claims challenging his conviction and sentence. W e

find each without merit.

A. Pretrial Disclosure of W itness’s Identity

Nevels first claims the district court erred in permitting the testimony of a

witness who was disclosed to the defense just prior to trial. W e review the

admission of testimony from an unlisted government witness for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 458 (10th Cir. 1992).

The government learned of the existence of Shelly Barnett, Nevels’s ex-

wife, on Friday, M arch 3, 2006— three days before the beginning of trial. Based

on an interview , prosecutors believed she would testify that she had seen Nevels

with an identical semi-automatic pistol two weeks before the shooting and that

Nevels and the victim were close friends. The government notified Nevels’s

defense counsel about B arnett’s existence, her expected testimony and known

impeachment information by email within an hour of her interview. The

government also filed a formal notice with the district court on Sunday, M arch 5,

the day before the trial was to begin. At the beginning of trial on M arch 6,

Nevels’s counsel objected to Barnett’s testimony, claiming that the defense had

no opportunity to investigate Barnett or her story. The district court found no

violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16’s disclosure duty and

permitted the government to introduce Barnett as a witness. Nevertheless, the

4
district court ordered the government to make Barnett available for the defense to

interview that day. Barnett testified two days later on M arch 8— six days after

Nevels’s attorney was first notified she would testify.

“It is settled law in this circuit that, in the absence of a statutory or

constitutional requirement, . . . there [is no] requirement that the government

disclose its witnesses in any manner, except in a case where trial is for treason or

other capital offense.” United States v. Baca, 494 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir. 1974)

(permitting government to conceal the name of an informant until trial); see also

Sturmoski, 971 F.3d at 458 (finding no prejudice from an undisclosed government

witness); M oore’s Federal Practice § 616.02[3][a] (“[A] defendant in a

noncapital case has no absolute right to obtain the names of government witnesses

before trial.”).

The Supreme Court has established that no constitutional right to pretrial

discovery of witnesses exists in non-capital cases. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429

U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (holding that a defendant in a non-capital case has no right

to discover lists of prospective government witnesses); see also United States v.

Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997) (“In noncapital cases, moreover,

there is no constitutional right to the pretrial disclosure of witnesses.”). As

Weatherford states, “the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the

amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded.” 429 U.S. at 559.

Neither does this amount to a Brady violation since Barnett would not exculpate

5
Nevels. See Brady v. M aryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring pretrial

disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of prosecutors).

No statute or rule, moreover, requires pretrial disclosure of non-expert

witnesses. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 provides limited discovery

obligations on behalf of prosecutors. But it does not entitle defendants to

discover the identity of government non-expert witnesses before trial. Russell,

109 F.3d at 1510. Under Rule 16(a)(2), a defendant may only discover statements

made by prospective government witnesses as provided under the Jencks Act, 18

U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Jencks A ct entitles a federal criminal defendant to

obtain any pretrial statement and report made by a government witness, but only

after the witness has testified on direct examination at trial. United States v.

M etropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1984). Furthermore,

the parties do not contend that Barnett was an alibi witness, thereby implicating

the disclosure requirements of Rule 12.1. See United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d

480, 483–84 (10th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, in the absence of a court order, 1 the government was under no

legal obligation to disclose Barnett’s identity prior to trial. In fact, the

1
The parties submitted witness lists to the district court on February 23,
2006. See ROA, vol. I, doc. 99 and 104. Yet, the district court expressly found
that the late disclosure of Barnett’s existence did not violate any discovery order.
[ROA, vol. XIII, at 141–43]. Furthermore, it is in the sound discretion of the
district court to admit or exclude unlisted witnesses. United States v. Combs, 267
F.3d 1167, 1178–80 (10th Cir. 2001).

6
government acted commendably in promptly informing Nevels’s counsel about

Barnett as soon as it learned of her potential testimony.

Nevels also asks us to apply the three factor test for assessing the propriety

of court sanctions for discovery violations found in United States v. Wicker, 848

F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1988) and United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1179

(10th C ir. 2001), to overturn the district court’s decision. He argues that we

should examine: “(1) the reason for the delay in disclosing the witness; (2)

whether the delay prejudiced the other party; and (3) the feasibility of curing any

prejudice with a continuance.” Combs, 267 F.3d at 1179; see also United States

v. M artinez, 455 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. M uessig, 427

F.3d 856, 864 (10th Cir. 2005).

But the government committed no discovery violation here. In any event,

the record does not support the extreme sanction of excluding Barnett from trial.

First, the government did not delay in disclosing Barnett nor does the record

support the allegation that the late discovery of Barnett was the result of a lack of

diligence on the government’s part. Second, Nevels has failed to establish

prejudice from the late disclosure. See Sturmoski, 971 F.2d at 458 (analyzing

whether a “surprise witness” was prejudicial). He was allowed to interview the

witness prior to her testimony and was able to cross-examine her effectively at

trial. Nevels has pointed to nothing specific about Barnett’s testimony or

background that suggests additional time would have been helpful. While

7
perhaps given enough time Nevels may have discovered helpful information for

impeachment purposes, on this record we are left only with speculation and

conjecture that such information exists. Indeed, Nevels w as able to elicit

testimony that Barnett had a warrant for her arrest on the charge of false reporting

or providing false information to the police. 2 Finally, Nevels never asked for a

continuance of the trial.

Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision

to permit Barnett to testify.

B. Admission of Crime Scene Testimony

Nevels also claims that the district court erred in admitting the

government’s crime scene reconstruction expert testimony. The expert testified

that Nevels shot M cLamb seven times at close range, leading to his death. Nevels

contends that such evidence was both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial to the

gun possession charges and should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.

W e review this claim under a plain error standard since Nevels failed to

timely renew his objection at trial after the district court previously denied

without prejudice his pretrial motion to exclude the testimony. See McEwen v.

2
Barnett also admitted to government investigators she had a 1997 felony
conviction for attempted forgery. Nevels was aware of this information but failed
to raise it during trial. Nevels was also able to examine Barnett on the stand
about a 1998 conviction for providing false information to police. The record
does not show whether this allegation was accurate.

8
City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1544 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding where a party

objected to the admissibility of evidence in a motion in limine, but did not

interpose an objection at trial, the issue w as not preserved on appeal). Regardless

of the standard of review, however, we find no error and affirm the district

court’s decision.

Rule 403 requires the trial court to balance the probative value of proffered

evidence against the likelihood of unnecessary prejudice to the defendant. “In

performing the [Rule] 403 balancing, the court should give the evidence its

maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial

value.” Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir.

2000) (internal quote omitted). M oreover, “[e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial if it

makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the

jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant

wholly or apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime

charged.” United States v. Leonard, 439 F.3d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 2006). The

assessment of the evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Here, the district court found that the reconstruction expert’s testimony was

probative considering that Nevels’s theory of the case rested on self-defense or

justification. In opening argument, Nevels’s defense counsel raised the fact that

M cLamb was an armed fugitive and a violent man and repeatedly claimed that

Nevels’s possession of the gun at the time of the shooting was justifiable self

9
defense. In essence, Nevels suggested that the gun was not his and he only

gained possession of the gun (presumably from M cLamb) to defend himself

against M cLamb. 3 The expert’s testimony directly contradicted this scenario

since the evidence showed that Nevels was the only one to fire a weapon and that

the victim was shot at close range and in a defensive position. Accordingly, the

expert testimony went directly to disproving an element of Nevels’s affirmative

defense and was thus relevant.

W hile the testimony about the nature of the killing might elicit some

emotional response from the jury, Rule 403 does not protect a party from all

prejudice, only “unfair prejudice.” Deters, 202 F.3d at 1274. Nevels has not

shown unfair prejudice. First, the district court mitigated the effect of the

testimony by instructing the jury that any evidence about M cLamb’s death was

admitted only for the limited purpose of showing whether and under what

circumstances Nevels possessed the gun. [ROA, Tr. 10, 606]. Second, the

3
In order to gain the benefit of the affirmative defense of justification, he
had to prove by the preponderance of evidence:

(1) The defendant was under an unlawful and present, [sic] threat of
death or serious bodily injury;
(2) The defendant did not recklessly or negligently place himself in a
situation w here he would be forced to engage in the criminal conduct;
(3) The defendant had no reasonable legal alternative; and
(4) There was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action
and the avoidance of the threatened harm.

Jury Instruction No. 33, ROA, vol. I, doc. 116; see also United States v. Butler,
06-5027, __ F.3d __, 2007 W L 1314520 at *2 (10th Cir. M ay 7, 2007).

10
testimony was relevant to rebutting the defense of justification by establishing an

alternative explanation to that offered by Nevels. W here the defendant’s theory

of defense directly provides for the introduction of rebuttal crime scene evidence,

it cannot be said that the evidence was per se “unfairly prejudicial.” W e leave it

to the trial court to assess its prejudicial effect— the defense’s invitation to

introduce this evidence cannot be rescinded once its stratagem does not work,

especially since the district court exercised care in instructing the jury regarding

the scope of the evidence as it applied to the affirmative defense. Finally, we

doubt the expert’s testimony was especially prejudicial given the fact that

Nevels’s own defense counsel conceded the shooting in her opening statement.

Consequently, it cannot be said that the expert testimony’s “probative value

[was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid.

403. The district court did not err in allowing the testimony.

C. Armed Career Criminal Enhancement

Finally, Nevels argues that the district court erred in sentencing him as an

armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

The district court designated Nevels an armed career criminal based on tw o

acts of juvenile delinquency and one adult felony conviction. He contends the

district court erroneously applied the so-called “categorical approach,” which

only looks to the fact of conviction in determining that a juvenile conviction may

serve as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Nevels claims instead that the

11
district court should have examined the underlying facts of his juvenile conviction

and found that it did not constitute an ACCA offense. W e review this legal

question de novo. United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 967 (10th Cir. 2006).

1.

The A CCA enhances a sentence to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years

for a felon convicted of possessing a firearm with “three previous convictions . . .

for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In relevant

part, the ACCA defines a “violent felony” as

[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying
of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by
imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that--

(I) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another[.]

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has provided guidance to

sentencing courts on how to determine whether a defendant has been convicted of

a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA. In the first case, Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Court considered whether sentencing courts may

examine evidence beyond the statutory definitions of a conviction to determine if

it satisfies the ACCA’s predicate crime requirement. Recognizing that states

12
often employ varying definitions for a burglary, the Court held that sentencing

courts must use the “categorical approach” in determining whether a state

conviction for “burglary” constitutes an ACCA predicate offense. Under the

categorical approach, courts should look “only to the statutory definitions of the

prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Id. at

600. Sentencing courts, moreover, should steer clear of the “exact definition or

label” of the conviction and instead should focus on the “basic elements” of the

conviction. Id. at 599. If the statutory elements are consistent with the generic

elements of burglary, then the conviction satisfies a “violent felony.” Id.

In two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed this approach.

In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19–21 (2005), the Court applied the

categorical approach for convictions based on guilty pleas, not only convictions.

And recently, in James v. United States, 550 U.S. ___ (2007), the C ourt

reaffirmed the categorical approach under the ACCA, applying it to convictions

for attempted burglary.

W e thus look primarily at the fact of conviction in assessing the application

of the ACCA. In a “narrow range of cases,” however, the Court authorized

looking beyond the statutory elements of a conviction. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.

First, “where a statute is ambiguous (i.e., reaches different types of conduct) and

a defendant’s conviction followed a jury trial, the court may look to charging

documents and jury instructions to determine if the actual offense the defendant

13
was convicted of qualifies as a crime of violence.” United States v. M oore, 420

F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). Second,

“[w]here the statute is ambiguous and the defendant was convicted by a guilty

plea, the court can review the charging document, written plea agreement,

transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge

to which the defendant assented.” Id. (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16); see also

United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1156–58 (10th Cir. 2005).

2.

The district court utilized the categorical approach in finding Nevels’s tw o

juvenile crimes constitute “violent felon[ies]” under the § 924(e)(1). On M arch

27, 1990, Nevels pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery as a juvenile.

Under Shepard, sentencing courts are permitted to review a charging document

where the defendant pleads guilty to a crime. 544 U.S. at 16. According to the

“Petition in Delinquency” that served as the charging document in his guilty plea,

at the age of eleven, Nevels participated in two aggravated robberies in violation

of Colorado Revised Statute § 18-4-302(1)(c). 4 See ROA, vol. I, doc. 45, attach.

4

A person who commits robbery is guilty of aggravated robbery if during
the act of robbery or immediate flight therefrom:

(c) H e has present a confederate, aiding or abetting the perpetration of
the robbery, armed with a deadly weapon, with the intent, either on the
part of the defendant or confederate, if resistance is offered, to kill,
maim, or wound the person robbed or any other person, or by the use of
(continued...)

14
1–5. In both counts, the Petition stated that “defendant [Nevels], and a

confederate . . . by use of force, threats and intimidation with a deadly weapon,

to-wit: GUN, . . . knowingly put said victim . . . in reasonable fear of death”

during the course of a robbery. Id. Based on this document, the district court

found this an “act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a

firearm” which threatens physical force and thus qualifies as a “violent felony”

under § 924(e). [ROA, vol. XVII, at 8–12].

Nevertheless, Nevels argues that this analysis was flawed and suggests that

the district court should have determined that (1) a gun was actually present at the

crime and (2) he actually carried or used a firearm in the crime. Nevels points to

his presentencing report (PSR ) that indicates he did not actually carry or use a

firearm in at least one of his prior juvenile adjudications. He also claims the PSR

fails to establish that a gun was even present at the incident. According to the

PSR , an older confederate, who had his hands in his pockets, claimed to have a

gun and threatened the use of force with a gun. Based on this document, Nevels

argues the district court should have looked beyond the mere fact of conviction

and examined the underlying facts of conviction to determine if the juvenile

adjudication may serve as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Nevels contends

4
(...continued)
force, threats, or intimidation puts the person robbed or any other person
in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury[.]

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-302(1)(c) (W est 1989).

15
the ACCA’s statutory language— the specific phrase “involving the use or

carrying a firearm” after the phrase “act of juvenile delinquency”— requires the

district court to factually determine that Nevels used or carried a firearm. W e

disagree.

First of all, Nevels cites no authority or case law for his construction of the

ACCA and no basis exists for it. The fact that Congress intended juvenile

adjudications to involve a firearm or some other destructive device does not alter

the well-established process by which sentencing courts conduct the ACCA

analysis. Finding that a juvenile act “involv[ed] the carrying or use of a firearm”

is no different than finding that a conviction satisfied the elements of burglary. If

a sentencing court determines from the statutory definitions of conviction or the

approved Taylor-Shepard supporting documents 5 that there was (1) a qualifying

act of juvenile delinquency, and it (2) involved the use or carrying of a firearm,

then no further inquiry is necessary under the ACCA.

Second, even if the sentencing court accepted the argument that Nevels did

not possess a firearm during the juvenile offense, Colorado law makes it an act of

delinquency to aid or abet someone who did carry a firearm. Furthermore, the

ACCA only requires the juvenile act to “invol[ve] the carrying or use of a

firearm”— it does not require the defendant to personally carry or use the firearm

if the weapon was otherwise “involved” in the act.

5
A presentencing report is not included among these documents.

16
 3.

Nevels finally suggests that Taylor and Shepard are limited to convictions

or guilty pleas for burglary. W hile it is true that Taylor and Shepard involved

only burglary convictions and pleas, we have applied the categorical approach to

a broader array of issues. See, e.g., M oore, 420 F.3d at 1218 (applying

categorical approach to USSG § 4B1.2 “crime of violence” enhancement); United

States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 966–975 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying categorical

approach in holding that a D UI is a “violent felony” under the ACCA); United

States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1304 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying categorical

approach to ACCA “separateness of prior crimes” inquiry). Indeed, several

circuits have already applied the categorical approach to juvenile adjudications.

See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 313 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002); United States

v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640, 646–50 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kirkland, 450

F.3d 804, 806–08 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1187

(11th Cir. 2005).

In any event, the rationale for the categorical approach for burglary

convictions applies with equal force to juvenile adjudications. First, as the

Supreme Court observed, “the language of § 924(e) generally supports the

inference that Congress intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that

the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and

not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.

17
Section 924(e)(1) applies to a person who has three previous “convictions”— not

to a person who has committed three offenses. Id.

Second, the purpose of the categorical approach is to avoid conducting “a

fact finding inquiry, thereby sparing [the sentencing court] from conducting mini-

trials on prior offenses which have already been adjudicated.” United States v.

Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601

(“[T]he practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are

daunting.”). Such a purpose applies even more so to juvenile adjudications,

where their dispositions may be long in the past.

Third, the categorical approach often redounds to the benefit of defendants.

Under the categorical approach, defendants may only receive a sentence

enhancement for facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict. Cf. United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005) (It is “the defendant’s right to have

the jury find the existence of any particular fact that the law makes essential to

his punishment. That right is implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a

sentence that is not solely based on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted

by the defendant.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Permitting

sentencing courts to look beyond the mere fact of conviction potentially increases

the number of ACCA enhancements. W hile the categorical approach here may

have foreclosed the discovery of evidence mitigating Nevels’s involvement in the

juvenile offenses, in the vast number of cases that will not be true.

18
 Finally, Nevels’s argument underscores the dangers in allowing sentencing

courts to wade into the details of prior convictions. He asserts at the time of his

delinquent act that he was only eleven, physically small, immature and under the

influence of an older child. In effect, he argues that his prior conviction was

illegitimate. Under Nevels’s approach, the ACCA effectively becomes an

impermissible tool to collaterally attack the prior conviction.

For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in applying the ACCA

to enhance Nevels sentence. 6

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Nevels’s claims are without merit and we

AFFIR M his conviction and sentence.

6
Nevels also argues that because his juvenile adjudications are defined
under Colorado state law to be “delinquent acts” rather than “crimes,” his
convictions fall outside the definition of the ACCA. W e disagree. Section
924(e)(2)(B) expressly provides that acts of juvenile delinquency are included in
the definition of “violent crimes” if the acts are punishable by a term of one year
if “committed by an adult.” A violation of Colorado Revised Statute § 18-4-302
(W est 1989), if committed by an adult, was punishable by a term of imprisonment
of betw een 4 and 16 years. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-4-302(3) and 18-1-
105(1)(a)(III)(A ) (W est 1989).

19