F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 6, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-3026
(D.C. No. 04-CR-20115-JW L)
C ARLO S R OB ER TO O RTEG A, (D . Kan.)
also known as BoBe,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before O’BRIEN, EBEL, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Carlos Roberto Ortega pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to three
counts of distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C) and one count of using a communication facility to facilitate a
drug-trafficking felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The district court
sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment, a sentence at the low end of the
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
guideline range determined applicable by that court. Although his plea agreement
included a waiver of his right to appeal any sentence that did not depart upwards
from the sentencing guideline range determined by the district court, see Plea
Agreement at 6, M r. Ortega filed a pro se notice of appeal. The government has
moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). W e grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
In Hahn, this court held that a w aiver of appellate rights w ill be enforced if
(1) “the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights”;
(2) “the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights”; and
(3) “enforcing the waiver would [not] result in a miscarriage of justice.”
359 F.3d at 1325. A miscarriage of justice will result if (a) “the district court
relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (b) “ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid”; (c) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (d) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted). For an “otherwise
unlaw ful” w aiver, the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732 (1993); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
The government’s motion to enforce addresses each of the three Hahn
factors, but M r. Ortega argues only that enforcing the appellate waiver would
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result in a miscarriage of justice. W e therefore only address this third factor. See
United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing each
Hahn factor need not be addressed if defendant does not make argument with
respect to that factor).
M r. Ortega argues in his response to the government’s motion to enforce
the appeal waiver that the sentence he received is a miscarriage of justice because
it is greater than the sentence he expected to receive, based on his discussions
with his trial attorney. 1 In his pro se notice of appeal, he challenged the
reasonableness of the sentence, asserting that he pled guilty to and agreed to a
sentence of forty-six to fifty-seven months of imprisonment. M r. Ortega’s
arguments appear to fall within the second and fourth miscarriage-of-justice
categories. W e discuss each in turn.
Assuming that M r. Ortega has asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in connection with the negotiation of the appeal waiver, the claim is not a
basis for an appeal, but rather only for a possible motion for collateral relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Delacruz-Soto, 414 F.3d 1158, 1168
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be
brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal). But see also Plea
Agreement at 6 (w aiving right to bring § 2255 action).
1
M r. Ortega’s trial counsel has withdrawn and new counsel has been
appointed by this court.
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M r. Ortega has failed to meet his burden to persuade us that his appeal
waiver is unlawful. See United States v. M aldonado, 410 F.3d 1231, 1233
(10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 577 (2005). His argument that
his sentence is too long is not an argument that “the w aiver is otherwise
unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (quotation omitted). “The relevant question .
. . is not whether [his] sentence is unlawful . . . , but whether . . . his appeal
waiver itself [is] unenforceable.” Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144; see also Hahn,
359 F.3d at 1326 & n.12 (addressing knowing and voluntary factor and noting
improperness of focusing on result of proceeding instead of on right
relinquished). Allowing an alleged sentence computation error to render the
waiver unlawful would nullify the waiver based on the very type of claim the
waiver was intended to waive.
M r. Ortega has failed to assert any claim that his appeal waiver itself was
unlaw ful, and therefore has not shown that the enforcement of the waiver would
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings. In this regard, we note that the plea agreement and plea colloquy
made clear that he understood that (1) he faced a possible maximum sentence of
sixty-four years’ imprisonment; (2) he waived his right to appeal any sentence
within the guideline range as determined by the district court; (3) the district
court would determine his sentence; (4) the district court did not know at the time
of the plea hearing what his sentence would be; (5) his counsel could not make
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any promises or guarantees about what the sentence w ould be; and (6) counsel’s
estimate of what his sentence might be would not control. In addition, M r. Ortega
agreed not to request a sentence below the low end of the guideline range
determined by the district court. Thus, the sentence he received complied with
the terms of the plea agreement and with his understanding of the plea. See
M aldonado, 410 F.3d at 1234. His objections to the reasonableness of his
sentence do not establish that enforcement of his appeal waiver is unlawful. See
United States v. M ontano, 472 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to
adopt rule that appeal waiver is unenforceable where defendant did not know at
time of plea agreement what sentence range would be and that resulting sentence
was greater than anticipated).
The government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver is GRANTED, and
the appeal is DISM ISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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